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Introduction
Transition in Serbia has entered its fifth year and it is time to review the 
progress made so far, to evaluate the ground covered and identify obstacles 
to be expected on the road to a liberal-democratic system, a market economy 
and the rule of law. In addition, this book aims to explain the decision-
making mechanisms that have formed this transition and the factors that have 
influenced the decisions made. Politicians act rationally and react to incentives 
from their surroundings. This is why it is important not only to determine how 
far transition has progressed, but also to explain why the transition has taken 
the form it has.  
In some respects this book is a logical sequel to the overall activity of the 
CLDS on the monitoring and the analysis of the transition. The first step in 
that direction was the collection of papers entitled The Strategy of Reforms 
(2003) comprising works written at the beginning and in the first phases of 
this wave of transition including texts by Vojislav Koštunica, Zoran Djindjić, 
Miroljub Labus and others. While those texts mostly dealt with the ideas and 
plans of reformists and high state officials, the texts in this collection offer an 
overview and analysis of the situation over the last four years. In this respect 
these two books are complementary.
1st September 2005. Boris Begović
Boško Mijatović

Boško Mijatović
General Overview of Transition in Serbia
INTRODUCTION
In the developed part of the world, institutions evolved gradually during 
tens and hundreds of years, in order to get to the present rational and efficient 
forms. In 2000 Serbia attempted to compensate for at least part of the historic 
delay and, by using good political and economic concepts and accumulated 
experiences, conduct the reforms swiftly and build new, democratic and 
capitalist institutions. Today, four years since the beginning of transition, 
Serbia is in the middle of deep changes of the government, political, economic 
and social system. Changes are probably happening more slowly than they 
should, but also faster than is sometimes thought.
Transition is usually defined as a change of the institutional system of 
a country, i.e. the group of domestic institutions and related mechanisms 
providing a framework for the behavior of individuals and their interaction, 
such as the market or elections. The institutional system covers, inter alia, the 
political and economic system, so it is possible to differentiate between the 
political and economic transition. Political transition essentially encompasses: 
democratization, i.e. multiparty system and fair elections; change in the 
character of the state, i.e. parliamentary liberal democracy instead of the 
party state; and the new role of the state, i.e. the state with the role limited to 
the protection of the rules of the game and moderate intervention, instead 
of the all-powerful paternalistic state. Economic transition encompasses the 
abandonment of the socialist model of economic activity, either centrally-
planned, or self-management-market model, and the construction of the 
standard market model with the domination of private ownership.2
  V. Gligorov (Serbia and Montenegro: Situation and Proposed Reforms, 2004) claims that transition in 
Serbia so far has been quite unsuccessful and is consequently still at the beginning.
2  More details, L.Balcerowicz – Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation, Central European University 
Press, Budapest, 995
0 Boško Mijatović
For most East European countries in transition, the classification into 
political and economic transition meets the cognitive needs. It is different with 
the countries created by the breakup of the USSR and SFR Yugoslavia, which, 
apart from the narrow political and economic changes common to all countries 
in transition, also entered two additional transition processes: building of a 
(new) state and search for (new or innovated) national identity, which makes 
their transition much more complicated. This is particularly true for Serbia, 
which came out of the 990s as a defeated side in the war for Yugoslav heritage 
and, thus, faced the problems of the determination of the new state (the 
issues of Montenegro and Kosovo and Metohia) and the formulation of a new 
national strategy.
Most of the literature on transition is dominated by its economic aspect. 
This is probably caused by the fact that economic transition is perceived as 
a more complex and less certain process than political transition, while the 
social aspect is, generally speaking, quite disregarded. This book is not an 
exception from the rule either: economic transition has been given most room, 
whereas much less space has been dedicated to political transition (only the 
most important issues will be dealt with) and even less to social transition. 
Nevertheless, when analyzing transition in a country, it should always be 
borne in mind that transition is a multidimensional phenomenon and that the 
economic component is only one of many. 
PRIOR TO OCTOBER CHANGES
Political developments during the 1990s
The first wave of political and economic transition in Serbia was initiated 
already towards the end of the existence of the former SFR Yugoslavia, at 
the same time as in other republics, present independent states. During the 
federal government of Ante Marković, at the very beginning of the 990s, deep 
economic reforms of the old self-management economic system were initiated, 
  It is interesting that perhaps the first state reform paper in Eastern Europe with a developed concept 
of promarket reforms was prepared by a Milošević’s committee and published in 988. It called for 
shareholding as a way to solve the negative effects of Yugoslav social ownership. Still, in view of the 
subsequent developments, it is more likely that this was just a tactical move in bargaining with other 
republic authorities rather than honest pleading for procapitalist reforms.
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whereas the party reform was initiated with the breakup of the Communist 
Union of Yugoslavia (SKJ) along republic lines. 
Around 990 an impetus to the reforms in Yugoslavia was certainly given 
by the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, as well as the inefficiency of 
the system of socialist self-management, so clearly demonstrated during the 
980s and before. Simply put, the then party and political elite realized that 
the old path, including cosmetic changes, was no longer viable. The only issue 
was how far to go with reforms. It was clear to some that that the goal had to 
be capitalism, while the others, together with Gorbachov,4 naively believed that 
the third path was possible – the path that would combine the best of socialism 
and capitalism. The former would give wide state interventionism and state 
ownership over large and important companies, while the latter would give the 
market, to the necessary extent. In the political sphere, democracy would be 
limited, i.e. there were dreams of the so-called non-party pluralism (Mihajlo 
Marković). 
The beginning of reforms, stable exchange rate and opening of the country 
to the world brought the feeling of prosperity and confidence in progress 
in the years to come. However, the cruel reality was stronger, and 990 was 
remembered in Serbia for a long time as the last normal, even beautiful year. 
The process of reforms and  democratization of Yugoslavia was, however, 
powerless in the race against fervent national programs. What was for decades 
swept under the carpet as a problem best avoided – conflicting national goals 
and their history – arose in full force as soon as the iron fist of the communist 
party disappeared. Ante Marković did not stand a chance. 
A brief and unsuccessful attempt to reach an agreement on preserving 
the state or on breaking it up consensually in the first half of 99 did not give 
results and was followed by the proclamation of independence, and then by 
war(s). The finding of the Badinter Committee from 99 that Yugoslavia had 
broken up signified a judgment on the guilt for war – it belonged to Serbia, 
which acted as a protector of a non-existing state – which led very quickly 
(already in the first half of 992) to economic and political sanctions against 
it. 
This was followed by an economic nosedive, as well as the reinforcement 
of the political position of the authorities. The then regime very skillfully rode 
the nationalist wave and did well in the elections, probably with significant 
abuse during elections. When it did not have majority by itself, SPS entered 
4  The meeting between Gorbachov and Milošević in Belgrade in 988 was interesting. While the 
former spoke about the necessity of reforms, the latter praised the virtues of socialism.
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coalitions with other parties (New Democracy, Radicals, and SPO). SPS, 
later together with JUL, held firmly the levers of power and used them to the 
maximum extent: state media, police, finance, economy, judiciary... This was 
accomplished through personnel policy, i.e. convenient positioning of well 
motivated own people (‘staff are the key to everything’ – Stalin). 
Military defeats of the Serbian forces in Croatia and B&H from the 
summer of 995 and the Dayton Agreement ended the wars. The lifting of the 
trade, although not of financial sanctions from the end of the same year gave a 
certain breathing space to the country, but the political situation remained the 
same. The regime even seemed to have American support.5 
In 998 terrorist actions of KLA began at Kosovo, followed by a severe 
military-police response of Serbia, unsuccessful diplomatic mediation of the 
West and bombardment of Serbia in the period March-June 999. Milošević 
capitulated, but, very comically, attempted to pass the defeat off in the media 
as a victory. The regime was definitely worn out, although its leader failed to 
realize it. He even unnecessarily announced the elections for the president of 
the FR Yugoslavia for September 2000 – and was defeated. He was obviously 
beyond any hope: he had lost all the wars, and Serbia’s socio-economic situation 
was disastrous. He was apparently abandoned by the previously reliable pillars 
of the regime from the military, police and finance. It was time for new people 
and new strategies. 
Transition and economic developments during the 1990s
Economic crisis is practically immanent in the Serbian economy. Only the 
older citizens remember the last upswing from the late 970s. Already in the 
980s economic stagnation was registered - GDP grew by around %, which 
was equal to the population growth, so GDP per capita remained the same. 
The cause of difficulties lay in the problems of servicing accumulated foreign 
debt, combined with the negative effects of developed self-management. 
The government of Ante Marković, followed partially by the Serbian 
authorities as well, initiated in 990 more comprehensive reforms. First 
macroeconomic stabilization was achieved, which was necessary after the 
inflationary wave from 989, and presented part of the reform package 
according to the then fashion (liberalization + stabilization + privatization). 
5  The American negotiator Holbruck, together with Milošević, condemned the boycott of 997 
elections by the democratic opposition.
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The liberalization of prices and foreign trade were conducted practically at the 
same time, followed by privatization (according to the capital increase model) 
and tax reform (conducted in Serbia at the beginning of 99). A rehabilitation 
of the banking system was also planned, but things never got that far. Problems 
arose immediately: already in 990 wages and fiscal expenses grew at a pace 
leading to destabilization; at the end of 990 banks were no longer able to pay 
out FX commitments to the citizens; devaluation from April 99 marked the 
end of the stabilization program. Soon the former republics of the SFRY, now 
independent states, went their separate ways.
During the 990s economic trends in Serbia were extremely unfavorable 
- from the collapse of GDP, real value of wages and all other personal income, 
reduction of employment, increase in unemployment and technological 
lagging, to thriving gray economy, criminalization of economic life and society 
as a whole, etc.
The breakup of the Yugoslav market in 99, beginning of wars and UN 
sanctions against the FR Yugoslavia during 992 and misguided economic 
policy resulted in a drastic decrease in GDP and hyperinflation in 99: GDP 
was halved relative to 990, and inflation, despite the constant price freezes, in 
December 99 and January 994 broke the world record for the period after 
World War II. Wages and pensions were reduced to 5-0-20 German marks a 
month, and production practically ceased in the autumn and winter of 99/94, 
because any sale of goods was unprofitable. In January 994 hyperinflation was 
interrupted and economic activity restored.. 
In those few war years reforms regressed in all respects. First, the 
trademark of the new policy was the elimination of the relatively liberal foreign 
trade regime upon the introduction of the foreign trade sanctions from May 
992 in a highly restrictive manner: licenses and quotas were reintroduced. 
This move was even extremely stupid, because it was precisely the freedom of 
trade, and in particular of imports that could have been the best defense from 
international sanctions. Then, most of the economy was transferred to the 
semi-war system: it practically became a single company, whose management 
board was the Government of Serbia, while company managers were obedient 
executors.7 The main goal of economic policy was the provision of sufficient 
 Imports control was probably part of the strategy for wealth accumulation by the political elite. 
7 This was ensured by personnel policy. If that was insufficient, there were other instruments: financial 
sanctions against the company  via the control over banks; criminal prosecution of the manager for 
violating an unrealistic law (on the ban on foreign currency trading, for example); sending various 
inspections to the company; mistreatment by utilities, unfounded transfer of funds from the company 
accounts, etc.
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quantities of basic foodstuffs for the population (bread, oil, milk, sugar), 
regardless of whether it was a profitable business or not.8 The financial sector 
fared just like the real sector: banks, including the central bank, were placed 
under control and their task was to supply the enterprises and state trading 
companies with the necessary amounts of dinars and foreign currency, so it 
is no wonder that in the period 994-2000 dinar lost 97% of its value, while 
banks were completely destroyed.
Privatization was interrupted, both due to the more restrictive law than 
the Marković’s and the overestimated official dinar exchange rate and the fact 
that the Party did not give a signal that privatization should be initiated, i.e. did 
not conduct a campaign supporting it. Admittedly, informal privatization was 
very advanced, consisting of taking money out of socially- and state-owned 
companies and its transfer into private hands. Similar to privatization, there 
was a legal, although expensive possibility for the companies to eliminate 
surplus labor, but no managers were willing to do so, because the Party was 
obviously against it. The foreign exchange market was forbidden, and the state 
distributed foreign currency. 
According to the Dayton Peace Accord, the foreign trade sanctions 
against Serbia were suspended at the end of 995, but the financial sanctions 
were retained (the membership of the FRY in the IMF and the World Bank 
was not renewed, the ban on investment was introduced, etc.). After 994 
a mild increase in GDP was recorded, but the whole period 994-998 can 
be assessed as stagnant. Year 997 presented somewhat of an improvement, 
because the Telekom sales proceeds increase incomes and demand, and partly 
the production as well. Already in 998 industrial production exhibited a 
downward trend, with the Serbian economy returning to the old, low levels. 
The worst thing is that after Dayton the single company Serbia, managed by 
the Government of Serbia, was not dismantled, but preserved, and transition 
was nowhere to be seen.  
In 999 the NATO Pact committed aggression against Serbia, with the 
destruction or damage of numerous infrastructural, industrial and civilian 
facilities. As a consequence of the destruction and interruption of economic 
activity in many companies, GDP was reduced by a fifth relative to the previous 
year. In the second half of 999 there was a certain, but insufficient recovery 
of production.
As a consequence of all these developments, the production structure in 
Serbia was changed: the share of industry (in particular metal, electric and 
8 The price controls for basic products were not eliminated.
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chemical) and construction was significantly reduced, with an increase in the 
share of agriculture, traditional services and energy. The decline of the formal 
sector was partly compensated by the gray economy. The Serbian economy 
practically returned to the pre-industrial phase, where it was half a century 
ago. 
Situation before October 2000
Policy. On the eve of 5 October, Serbia lived in a multiparty system, 
but with a great advantage of the ruling party based on the full control over 
government media, repression levers, judiciary, financial system, etc. There 
was also a group of parties ready to sacrifice themselves for Serbia, as Vuk 
Drašković said, and enter a coalition with SPS (and JUL) in order to participate 
in power. On the other hand, the democratic opposition was divided into a 
large number of smaller parties, often reluctant to cooperate mutually and 
full of leaders with delusions of grandeur. For the ruling party foreign policy 
failures (Kosovo was the last) and bad socio-economic situation in the country 
presented a bigger threat than the activities of the opposition itself.
The position of the Serbian authorities was burdened by two problems 
related to the stability and character of the state, which would continue to do 
so in the future as well: Montenegro and Kosovo. The Montenegrin authorities 
began already in 997, under the guise of democratization, to sever the ties with 
Serbia, gradually taking over the federal areas of competence. Since June 999 
Kosovo and Metohia has only nominally been part of Serbia and Yugoslavia, 
while in reality it is a protectorate of the international community.  
Formal institutional foundation of the system was the 992 Constitution 
of Serbia. The opposition attacked it as the actual foundation of the Milošević’s 
reign, which was an exaggeration. His power certainly did not stem from the 
authority the federal constitution gave the president of the FRY or the Republic 
constitution to the president of Serbia, but from the concrete control over the 
party which beyond the constitutional provisions, even unconstitutionally, 
controlled everything else (together with his wife’s party). This constitution 
has its weaknesses – in the parts related to the economic system and vertical 
division of competence (excessive centralization) – but it is difficult to blame it 
for all political and institutional weaknesses in Serbia. Moreover, the experience 
after the October changes showed that this constitution does not present a 
serious obstacle to political and economic reforms.
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Economy. On the eve of October changes, Serbia nominally had many 
institutions of standard market economy: there were laws on companies, 
property protection, privatization, bankruptcy, stock exchanges, securities, 
foreign investment, taxes, antimonopoly legislation, accounting, etc. The only 
significant exceptions were the non-existence of the formal foreign exchange 
and labor market. There were also institutions that were formally equal to 
those in market economies - independent companies, central bank and other 
banks, stock exchanges, free-trade zones, courts, arbitration, chambers, trade 
unions, etc. Entry into business was to a great extent free, although there 
were certain barriers; there was a freedom of possession and sale of property; 
competition of economic subjects was recognized. Despite all that, the Serbian 
economic system was certainly not a market system in the standard sense. The 
laws were usually bad and were often not implemented, while the state and 
policy informally and illegally took over the role of all-powerful arbitrator with 
decisive influence on all economic flows.
The suspension and then the annulment of transition during the 990s made 
Serbia inherit almost all negative mechanisms of the operation of the economy from 
the previous period, with the addition of the new ones: domination of inefficient 
social and social ownership; discrimination of the private sector; domination of 
politics over the economy; transformation of companies into social care centers, 
which brings lack of financial discipline; abuse of the police and judicial system, 
leading to widespread criminalization of the society and corruption; reducing 
the market to the goods market, while the markets of money, foreign currency, 
capital and labor were semi-legal, with mostly administrative prices; bankruptcy 
legislation was not implemented for large companies; non-payment of taxes was 
common practice; administrative distribution of foreign currency and loans 
from primary issue to the favorites under preferential conditions was a rule; the 
closed economy concept continued to dominate (import substitution); debtors 
dominated the financial relations, not the creditors, etc. It is obvious that those 
nominal market institutions did not function.
The situation was almost desperate with regard to economic legislation. 
There were several types of laws: most were bad in the legal-technical sense, 
which enabled excessively liberal and wrong interpretations by the government 
bodies, at the expense of companies; furthermore, most laws were restrictive on 
purpose, so that the government bodies could prosecute the offenders at will; 
numerous laws enabled individuals to amass wealth through monopolistic 
benefits of different types; the few existing decent laws were not implemented, 
such as, for example, the bankruptcy law; laws were often replaced by government 
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decrees, which was unconstitutional; the government of Serbia often regulated 
by its decrees the issues from the federal area of competence; on occasion, it even 
behaved as if there had existed a regulation granting it a right to intervention, 
although this was not so.
It is not an exaggeration to say that in Serbia there was a legal anomy, or 
lawlessness, so the chaos in economic life was an inevitable consequence. 
Practically no one respected the laws, partially because they could not be 
enforced and because the insistence on their enforcement would stall the 
economic life, and partially because that favored certain individuals from 
the ruling regime at the expense of other subjects. This created a situation in 
which nothing was safe, in which managing in an unclear situation was the 
only motto. Taxes were not paid, contracts were not honored (debts were not 
paid), the state was used as an instrument for amassing wealth, many did not 
live by their work or entrepreneurship, but like parasites, at someone else’s 
expense. Modest resources were redirected away from the productive towards 
the unproductive, purportedly in order to preserve social peace. Social and 
state ownership became the place of unprecedented plunder. Such waste and 
abuse of money were directed towards not only the current income, but also 
at the expense of the existing capital and new external borrowing. Inevitable 
consequences of institutional weaknesses and legal anomies were the insecurity 
of business operation, general lack of confidence and waste of scant financial 
resources, whose result was a deep economic crisis. Economic sanctions and 
wars only gave a significant contribution to it.
AFTER OCTOBER CHANGES
Political dynamics
Wear of the regime was demonstrated on 5 and  October 2000, when 
the pressure of the large masses of citizens in Belgrade removed it without 
difficulty. 
Power takeover by DOS was performed in two steps: at the federal level 
immediately, with President Koštunica, with certain difficulties regarding the 
formation of the government, since it was necessary to win over the Montenegrin 
SNS, until yesterday the faithful ally of SPS; at the Republic level, first the 
technical government of relevant parties was established (SPS+DOS+SPO), 
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and, after the decisive victory of DOS in the parliamentary elections at the end 
of 2000, the new government of Serbia was formed in January 200. 
The DOS coalition was composed of 8 parties. It is probable that such 
a wide composition was necessary for a victory over the old regime, but it 
proved to be difficult in terms of government operation. As the time passed, 
the idea of Serbia’s progress was a decreasingly cohesive factor.
The foreign policy position of the new authorities seemed excellent to 
begin with, as the world diplomacy was satisfied with the disappearance of 
Milošević. This was confirmed by pats on the back. However, the truth was 
much less favorable: Serbia was heading for various foreign policy, as well as 
domestic policy trials. The first of them was the so-called cooperation with the 
Hague Tribunal, or extradition of Milošević and many other civilians, military 
and police personnel. The other two, which are certainly not in the interest of 
Serbs and Serbia, are the gradual extinguishment of Republika Srpska, through 
the strengthening of B&H institutions contrary to the Dayton Agreement, and 
independence of Kosovo, which should resolve a difficult problem of Western 
diplomacy. At the end, there are complicated relations within the federal state, 
with Montenegro. 
At the internal plane it seemed that the new authorities could not have 
bigger difficulties, because it possessed a large parliamentary majority and 
general popular support. However, tensions were soon evident within DOS. 
The two leading parties almost immediately got into conflict, starting from the 
old animosities and rivalries, adding new lover of power, while smaller parties 
persistently insisted on their cut. 
It is probably wrong to seek causes of the DOS breakup in the characters 
and personal relations of the main players, but we shall do this here anyway. One 
was pragmatic, all about solving problems, capable and brash, but uninterested 
in moral and ideological issues. The other is a politician of academic type, all 
about ideas of old writers and doctrinarian, personally honest and analytical, 
with somewhat slow reactions. Both very intelligent, even shrewd. The former 
considered the latter incompetent, while the latter considered the former 
dishonest. If they had been old, seasoned politicians, they would have found 
a modus vivendi and ruled together for at least a few years, and Serbia would 
have peacefully gone through the most difficult transition difficulties. However, 
they were too much involved intellectuals, and too little classic politicians and 
the conflict was inevitable to the detriment of Serbia, since too much political 
energy was spent on unproductive activities, such as fierce fight for power. 
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The first round of the conflict between DS and DSS was won by Đinđić, 
using disallowed methods as well (taking away the mandate of DSS MPs). For 
a while DS ruled Serbia unhindered, with Đinđić cheaply and skillfully buying 
the support of small parties. After his assassination, Zoran Živković, not 
particularly wisely, entered a conflict with G7, which made them definitely 
lean towards DSS, and the satellite SDP toppled his government. After the 
parliamentary elections from the end of 200 a new coalition was formed 
led by DSS and G7, which, with the support of SPS, formed a minority 
government. 
The new government, led by Vojislav Koštunica, was fortunate to enjoy 
a calmer domestic policy position, which enabled it to focus on important 
activities of a government in transition. This was certainly contributed to by 
both the ruling coalition and leading opposition parties. Heated passions on the 
Serbian political scene are gradually calming down and Serbia is increasingly 
looking like standard democratic states. High time. On the other hand, the 
foreign policy difficulties of Serbia significantly contributed to the growth 
of popularity of SRS, which, with around / of votes, has become the single 
strongest political party. 
The progress in the political aspect of transition, i.e. in the position 
of citizens before the authorities, will be illustrated by the evolution of the 
freedom index, published every year by Freedom House. Naturally, it is only 
an indication, since both this methodology and the methodologies of similar 
indices are always disputed.
Figure . Freedom index
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FR Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro drastically improved their 
position at the beginning of this decade and in the last few years have had the 
status of free societies. Admittedly, the average of 2.5 for these two indices is 
significantly weaker than index  of all post-transition countries which became 
the EU members in 2004.
A particularly significant change occurred in the elections procedure, 
namely vote counting. After the October change counting is conducted fairly, 
unlike the 990s when election manipulations were a standard procedure of 
the ruling party/coalition. Since 2000 there have been no objections to the 
procedure of result determination, except marginal ones in municipal elections 
at the end of 200. Thus, it is to be hoped that Serbia has definitively joined the 
ranks of civilized states. 
Economic reforms
A country in ruins – that is the right area for reformers and a reform-
oriented government. Serbia was indeed in ruins in 2000, not only in economic 
ones, but also in social and political ruins. And the Government of Serbia and 
the Serbian part of the Federal Government certainly were reform-oriented. 
The beginning of transition. The changes have been already initiated by 
the departing old government when it liberalized all prices of basic articles 
with a single move (decree) of its vice-president from the Radical Party in 
October 2000 in the hope that by that it would cause political damage to the 
new regime. Similarly, the transitional government’s minister for privatization, 
from the Socialist Party of Serbia, called upon the company managers to 
start privatization under the 997 Law, which many of  them did. His aim 
was probably to undermine the privatization potential of the new, upcoming 
government, which did occur: many of the best companies obeyed the 
minister and began the privatization process, meaning that they avoided the 
privatization under the future government’s model, which was already in sight. 
An interesting fact is that, out of malice towards the new government, the 
departing regime’s ministers were now doing what should have been done not 
only then, but also during the previous decade, when they ruled alone. 
The first change at the federal level was the establishment of a real dinar 
exchange rate, i.e. the abolishment of the ridiculous, but permanent system 
with two essentially different exchange rates: the first being the official rate, 
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serving only to make the ruling elite rich, and the second one used in everyday 
transactions. At the end of 2000 and the beginning of 200 foreign trade was 
liberalized and customs duties reduced significantly.
What kind of general reform strategy was adopted by the governments of 
Serbia and the federal state? Was the orientation liberal or social democratic? 
Were they seeking maximum speed or sequential consideration? Were the new 
authorities ready and did they have a reform concept or were they making it 
up along the way? 
The answer to the last question is the easiest. The new government 
had at its disposal a prepared set of reform proposals of Pavle Petrović and 
his associates. However, that set did not satisfy the needs of new economic 
authorities either in its macroeconomic part, which was the better one, or in its 
institutional part, which contained considerably more weaknesses. That set was 
used by the G 7 in summer 2000 to make an economic platform for elections, 
in which promises were given and orientation announced, but without getting 
into operational policies.
Liberal or social democratic orientation? Nowadays, this dichotomy is 
not of essential importance for the analysis of European policies, since the 
difference between these two orientations in terms of economic organization 
is smaller than ever: modern social democracy has adopted, in its Third Path 
version, an essentially market concept of economic activity coordination and 
conducts reforms which, until recently, characterized liberals and conservatives 
exclusively.9 The only more serious difference regards social policy: should 
the existing Western European welfare state be disassembled to a lesser extent 
(social democrats) or to a greater extent (liberals). Admittedly, in Serbia, the 
old-school social democrats still fight against economic reforms, attacking the 
local transition as a neoliberal one, and as being brutal to the working class. 
The orientation of the first (Đinđić-Živković) government was essentially 
social democratic, in the sense as we previously defined modern social 
democracy. Namely, its reform strategy was based on two pillars:
•		the first, creation of a real market economy, rather than a vague amalgam, 
i.e. giving priority to the economic logic over the political one when 
building the institutions of market economy, and 
•		the second, a strong social policy, which was supposed to facilitate 
transition by compensating the losers for at least part of their loss and 
raising them, as far as possible, above the poverty line; part of that policy is 
9  See the Lisbon Agenda, i.e. the program of reforms which should turn the European Union’s economy 
into the most competitive economy in the world by 200.
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not only the permanent priority in payments from the budget enjoyed by 
social transfers (including pensions), but also the toleration of increase in 
average wage in real terms above the productivity increase in the socially- 
and state-owned sectors, with the help of revenues from privatization, 
foreign assistance and loans.
A relatively liberal orientation of Đinđić's government was not part of a 
plan devised in advance, because there was no plan, but rather an outcome of 
the Prime Minister's instinctive understanding of the business needs, and of a 
technocratic approach of some of the line ministers. 
The second (Koštunica's) government additionally intensified the social 
democratic component by the new Labor Law, which certainly aims at a wider 
protection of jobs and an expansion of the rights of employees, including 
numerous financial benefits. 
Observed in a somewhat more classic coordinate system, the Serbian 
transition has so far been mostly a combination of primarily liberal0 
economic reforms and social democratic social policy, which is by no means 
the worst combination imaginable. Of course, in the given moment it is of 
least importance whether the governments were going this way sincerely, i.e. 
because they thought it was the best way, or under the pressure of the IMF 
and the World Bank (economic reforms) and for demagogic reasons (social 
policy). But, for the long-term sustainability of transition, the question of 
reform initiator is extremely important. 
Big bang or gradualism? Ever since the beginning of transition in 
Eastern Europe there have been discussions about the best strategy – whether 
it is better to carry out reforms as soon as possible on the widest front or to 
establish a reasonable sequence of reforms and carry them out gradually. The 
basic argument of the proponents of the first strategy is that it is necessary to 
use a good opportunity for reforms, which, for political reasons, may not exist 
for long, and try to carry out basic reforms very quickly in order to prevent 
reversible tendencies and return to the former or practically former state. 
The main arguments of the second strategy proponents were, firstly, that it is 
necessary to bring order into the sequence of the reform performance in order 
to obtain efficiency and, secondly, that it is necessary, for political reasons, to 
use the results of one group of measures to build other measures, along with 
the increase in the reputation of the government and reforms. 
0 Liberal in a broader sense, rather than the radical libertarian one.
 See, for example, G. Roland – Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firms,  MIT Press, 2000
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There were no beforehand discussions or decisions in Serbia as to how to 
answer this question. The basic orientation was towards a rapid implementation 
of reforms, especially those that were clear and unambiguous or, at least, 
considered as such (for example, privatization and labor relations), while 
the reforms were carried out more slowly in the areas where basic solutions 
were not manifest (for example, financial markets or insurance). The present 
government also conducts intense reform-oriented legislative activity, with 
somewhat more favorable internal political conditions. However, when the 
previous four-year or five-year period is analyzed, it can be seen that transition 
develops more slowly than necessary, but also more slowly than planned by the 
main subjects themselves. 
One factor of reform deceleration was beyond the control of the republic 
authorities – the influence of Montenegrin parties at the federal level. Namely, 
a system from the period of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was 
retained in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, according to which numerous 
important areas of the economic system were regulated entirely or basically at 
the federal level, such as the regulation of securities, companies, bankruptcy, 
pension system etc. The situation was alleviated to a certain degree by the 
fact that Montenegro was represented at the federal level by a coalition which 
wanted the federal state to function, but it also had its local interests (its rating 
in Montenegro) and it did not always agree with reform-oriented ideas coming 
from Serbia. Therefore, there was a lot of delay in the changes in certain parts 
of the economic and social legislation that concerned Serbia. The solution to 
this problem was brought by the Constitutional Charter at the beginning of 
200, when both Serbia and Montenegro now even formally assumed the right 
to regulate their own economic systems.
An important factor of deceleration was also the normalization of politics 
in Serbia, meaning the shift of the political life from a revolutionary phase to 
an ordinary, calculating phase, in which the political rating of the ruling party 
or coalition is taken very much into account. 
Particular factors of transition deceleration are, firstly, insufficient 
administrative capacity of the government administration which failed to 
provide sufficient and necessary contribution to the formulation of reforms, as 
well as to their implementation and, secondly, the influence of business circles, 
increasingly manifest as the time passed (see further in the text).
On the other hand, there were also factors that encouraged reforms 
and were their drivers. The most important of those certainly is a sincere 
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commitment of the new government’s leading people in favor of reforms, which 
was weakened only periodically by the needs of the political moment (or party 
rating) and an imperfect knowledge of technical matters demonstrated by line 
ministers. A very important role in the encouragement of reforms was also the 
role of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund which, because 
of earlier failures in some countries, perceived Serbia as an opportunity to 
present themselves in the best light. Therefore they provided Serbia with 
technical knowledge and financial resources, which Serbia lacked, as well as 
with strong incentives (blackmails, practically) to continue with reforms even 
when the government’s reform enthusiasm seemed dissipated.
The transition was made easier to a certain degree by using experiences 
collected in other countries in transition, due to Serbia’s considerable 
delay. Therefore, for example, a better privatization model was chosen and 
unnecessary spending of money on the banking system rehabilitation was 
avoided. Nevertheless, there are local specificities in each country, on one 
hand, while on the other hand, the transition has not produced definitive 
manuals for changes, so a lot of space has remained for an innovative approach 
of Serbian reformers.
Let us conclude: the Government’s orientation was essentially a big bang 
approach, but, due to various limitations, it was conducted as a gradualist 
program. The window of opportunity for reforms at the beginning of the 
second wave of transition was not used in the best way. In term of ideology, a 
combination of liberal and social democratic policies was carried out, just as 
in many other countries in transition.
Insufficient administrative capacity of government administration. 
After the October 2000 and January 200 changes, the entire top echelon of the 
government machinery was changed, but it was also followed by the departure 
of a considerable number of skilled government employees. On the other 
hand, the ruling parties of DOS possessed a quite poor and inexperienced 
personnel structure, which was also reflected in their inability to fill numerous 
governmental positions with skilled and experienced people. The highest 
positions (ministerial and similar) were usually taken by individuals with 
the work experience from institutes or universities, which imply a lack of 
experience in administration. On the average, more experienced were our 
citizens that came to help from abroad. The West also sent its experts as part 
of technical assistance, but frequently they were of no particular quality. 
Particular difficulty was the deficit of capable experts in the positions of deputy 
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ministers and department heads, who should essentially carry the work and 
guarantee the quality of its performance. In simpler terms, Serbian government 
administration is still considerably more a Balkan one than a European one.
In the first years of this decade, the wages of employees in the government 
administration were kept low for demagogic reasons. Therefore, few capable 
people agreed to be employed in the republic administration in the presence of 
better paid jobs not only in the private sector but also in the local administration 
and public companies. Some, but insufficient, support was provided by some 
international organizations (UNDP, for example) by financing the wages of 
some leading experts (usually Serbs from abroad), while a small relief came 
from extraordinary, reward payments to domestic employees. It was only 
recently that the wages in republic administration were increased significantly, 
so that a positive motive for employment of skilled individuals appeared. 
Insufficient capacity of the government administration is certainly a 
limiting factor for the transition progress. It is an obstacle both in the preparation 
of laws, since incorrect concepts appear or the good ones get spoiled, and, even 
more, in the implementation of reforms, or during the implementation of the 
law, when the weal government administration initiates and allows violation of 
the rule of law or the legal state principle.
Transition phases. The first phase of this transition wave represented 
a moment of enthusiasm about new opportunities and a honeymoon for 
democratic political forces both with each other and with the people.2 
Legislative reforms were being easily adopted at that time, and there were 
practically no opponents to the changes. There was some bargaining within the 
coalition (judicial laws in exchange for the labor law, traded between DSS and 
the remaining part of DOS), but it was considered to have little importance. 
Year 200 represented a real starry moment of transition in Serbia.
Soon, however, the enthusiasm about the political change dwindled, 
naturally, and the political life took the normal course in which political 
costs of particular moves for the government were carefully considered and 
attempts were made to maximize its position. No one tried any more to make 
brave moves, without considering political effects. This cooling of transitional 
energy was certainly contributed to by increasingly intense conflicts between 
the two leading parties of DOS. Therefore, there was naturally a deceleration in 
transitional changes during 2002 and at the beginning of 200. 
2  At the beginning of 200, DOS enjoyed support of even up to 5% of citizens, while at least /4 of 
the citizens were undecided. See Public Opinion of Serbia and Montenegro, February 2002, IDN, 
March 2002
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The lamentable assassination of Prime Minister Đinđić oriented Zoran 
Živković’s government towards the state of emergency and the operation 
“Sablja” (Saber), whereby yet another good opportunity for reforms was 
missed: at that time the government enjoyed exceptionally high popularity 
and was able, also due to the confusion of the opposition, to push through any 
reform law. It was only before the end of the year that the government turned 
to transition-related activities and sent several draft laws to the Assembly, but 
it no longer had majority: SDP found new coalition partners. 
That deceleration of transition almost to a halt worried the World Bank 
and the IMF. They were probably particularly irritated by the demagogic 
behavior of the G 7 representatives during the election campaign and at the 
beginning of the existence of Vojislav Koštunica’s Government. There was talk 
about patriotic protectionism, enormous budget deficits, unusually great social 
care for citizens and farmers, and the “developmental” budget and similar. That 
did not promise anything good. The first one to react, quite gruffly, was the 
World Bank’s representative, otherwise a person very much inclined to Serbia, 
who in February 2004 insisted that the new majority adopt, within a month, 
a couple of dozens of laws prepared earlier. The IMF also showed its teeth: it 
immediately forced the Serbian Government to revise the just adopted budget 
and to reduce the deficit significantly. So the Government capitulated and the 
IMF continued its hard pressure towards reforms during 2005, making use 
of the fact that the IMF’s positive assessment of extended arrangement with 
the SRY/S&M is necessary for the definitive write-off of 700 million dollars 
owed to the Paris Club Creditors. Conclusion: the reform activity of Vojislav 
Koštunica’s Government is essentially determined by the permanent pressure 
of the IMF and the World Bank.
The passage of time should bring a change in the course of transition: 
while the first phase was unavoidably directed towards legislative changes, 
at the same time the second phase should be based on the intensified law 
enforcement, since the legislative reforms were mostly carried out. Although 
other countries in transition were also rather late with the reform of the rights 
protection system, especially private property, in Serbia there is a clear 
weakness in the application of laws, not only in the private sector but also 
on the part of government authorities themselves. So, some laws are applied 
only partly, while there is usually a delay in the building of new institutions or 
agencies compared to the legal time limits. The weaknesses of the judiciary will 
be discussed further in a separate section of this book.
  J. Svejnar – Transition Economies: Performance and Challenges, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
No. /2002
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The influence of interest groups. At the beginning of this wave of 
transition the influence of interest groups was weak, and a good opportunity 
for reforms was at arm’s length. Businessmen of the former regime lay low, 
waiting for the revolutionary uproar to subside and trying to preserve their 
dubiously acquired wealth. Those that were on good terms with everyone and 
gave contributions at one time even to the parties which now came to power 
had not asked to collect for the investment yet, while the revolutionary morals 
provided control over businessmen of the ruling democratic parties for a while. 
Unfortunately, that important opportunity for reforms without resistance and 
influence of businessmen was utilized only partly, and with the passage of 
time businessmen consolidated their positions, establishing firm ties with the 
politics and politicians in power. 
The making of peace between the new government and the businessmen 
from the period of the former government took place, maybe paradoxically, 
by means of the extra profit tax. Namely, the DOS government (including also 
DSS) presented this tax as a moral move which would ensure social justice, 
because it would have to be paid by those who abused their connections with 
the previous government and became rich in an unfair manner during the 
990s. Two things occurred during its application. First, there were difficulties 
in its realization, which is unavoidable with such a tax, so many people 
practically managed to avoid payment, reducing the whole effect of the law 
essentially to one man (Karić). Second, when the tax is paid on one part of 
(dubious) profit, then the remaining part must be considered legalized, so it 
is neither suspicious any more, nor may any action be taken against its owner 
again. Indeed, the new government has not initiated any investigation for 
establishing the (un)lawfulness of wealth acquisitions from the 990s.
In time, several lobbies or groups of businessmen who obviously have 
influence over the policy of the government, including legislative activities, 
emerged. Four groups, or lobbies, are distinguished by their power and 
influence:
•		the financial lobby, which, for a long time already, has been successfully 
blocking the laws on takeover and investment funds that were prepared a 
long time ago, as well as the necessary changes in the law on securities,
•		the energy lobby, which obviously influences the decision making and 
almost regularly wins in state tenders relating to fuel supply, annulling the 
tenders in which it did not win,
•		the "production" lobby, which actively advocates extension of customs 
protection with the help of worn-out arguments rejected long ago in the 
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economic science, of mercantilist type; it has also been successful recently, 
so the customs protection has been increased referring to the failure of 
harmonization with Montenegro as the reason,
•		the media lobby, which has been blocking for years the application of the 
broadcasting law in the area of frequencies. 
The influence of interest groups (or lobbies) on the politics, for their own 
benefit, is a lamentable, although unavoidable, fact of democratic life. In order 
to make it as benign as possible, it must be regulated and made transparent, 
which is certainly not the case in Serbia. Here, the corruption is somehow 
more likely.
Specificities of transition in Serbia. Transitions of various countries 
differ in many elements, but also have certain similarities. Two of them are 
a significant reduction of production in the first years of transition and a 
sharp increase in poverty.4 The decline in production is mostly caused by the 
collapse of the old coordination mechanism before the new one was built and 
the elimination of companies which do not stand a chance in the market, while 
the increase in poverty is a consequence of a decrease in income, increase in 
inequality and slow building of efficient social security mechanisms. 
In Serbia, the evolution of production and poverty during this phase 
of reforms went differently: production was increasing, while poverty was 
decreasing,5 which can be interpreted as specificities of local transition. Let us 
look at the possible reasons.
There are several reasons for the absence of decline in production, or 
for its increase. First, Serbia did not have a radical break in the coordination 
mechanism unlike the vast majority of countries in transition, i.e. in 2000 
it did not shift from a central planning system to a market system, since it 
was already in the market system, which, although deformed by the socialist 
government and party, was still a market system. According to economic 
institutions and the accustomedness of the people to the market, in 2000 Serbia 
was much better prepared for transition than the other countries of Eastern 
Europe had been ten years earlier. The liberalization of prices, foreign trade 
and business on the whole at the end of 2000 and at the beginning of 200 
merely abolished much unnecessary regulation, as well as the wide formal and 
informal administration by the government and the ruling party, which even 
had a positive effect on production: when unnecessary regulation, or state 
4 See Transition: The First Ten Years, The World Bank, 2002
5 See Chapters 2 and 2 of this book for the data.
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intervention, is abolished, it is natural that there will be an increase in economic 
activity. Second, macroeconomic stabilization also brought improvement of 
the business environment and enabled growth. Third, the considerable inflow 
of external financial support (.2 billion euros in the period October 2000 
– end 2004) did foster domestic production, although considerable part of it 
was transferred to imports. Fourth, after the victory of the democratic forces 
the last sanctions against Serbia, the financial ones, were also lifted – that also 
generated a positive effect on economic activity. In other words, the beginning 
of actual transition did not bring any reasons for production decline, but, on 
the contrary, for its increase. And that is what happened.
Similar to that, there were no strong reasons for the increase in poverty. 
Quite the contrary. First, as a consequence of GDP growth, the population’s 
income was increasing. Second, the increase in inequality was not large, and 
so it could not cause a transfer of large number of people to the poor category. 
Third, in nominal terms there was also quite a developed social security system 
in Serbia in the past, which was only poorly financed, so the amounts owed 
to the beneficiaries were over two years in arrears (social benefits, children’s 
allowances, etc.).7 After the normalization of situation at the beginning of 200, 
and with the aid from donors, the arrears were settled and a regular payment 
of current transfers was provided, which improved the situation of the poorest 
people. The provision of the regular payment of pensions had a similar positive 
effect on the position of the oldest citizens. And fourth, the considerable and 
already mentioned financial support from the world increased the purchasing 
power of the population over the level of domestic resources and enabled a 
noticeable increase in spending. 
New private sector. The new private sector in Serbia is growing well, but 
does not represent such a driving force it represented in some other countries 
in transition (in Poland, for example), where it very soon became the main 
driver of economic progress. The causes of this are, firstly, the fact that the 
private sector had existed and been relatively developed even before the 
October changes, while in the majority of countries in transition it started 
from scratch and, therefore, exhibited very rapid growth in the first phases. 
Secondly, the essential limiting factor for the private sector development in 
Serbia is the weak banking sector, which did not, even remotely, manage to 
keep pace with financing needs. Namely, the old, state-owned banking system 
did not even have that role, so there was practically no financing of private 
 B. Milanović - Incidence of social transfers; Inequality, in Poverty and reform of financial support to 
the poor, Ministry of Social Affaires and CLDS, 200
7 Social policy was conducted mostly by controlling the prices of basic articles (food and utilities). 
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companies. After its liquidation, the new banking system was created, which, 
being still small, did not have the necessary financial potential. Several credit 
lines from abroad, as well as a specialized bank founded by foreign banks, have 
been very useful in the creation and growth of small private companies, but it 
is not sufficient. The main source of money for investment is still the company’s 
profit and the owner’s assets, which prevents more rapid development. And 
thirdly, there are all other problems that burden the economic life in Serbia 
and create barriers to the entry: complicated administrative procedures, poor 
law enforcement and protection of contracts, and generally low legal security, 
frequently uncooperative local authorities, problems with construction and 
building land and similar. 
Accession to the European Union. The strongest impetus to reforms 
not only in Serbia, but in the whole Eastern Europe as well, has been the EU 
accession process. In order to become a member state, a country must meet 
the so-called Copenhagen Criteria of functional market economy, efficient 
protection of civil rights and the rule of law in general and political stability, 
which all implies the harmonization of the candidate country’s legislation 
and practice with the European Union. In this way, a country aspiring to the 
EU membership is forced to gradually change its legislation towards reforms 
and improve the functioning of its institutions, and it is much easier for a 
government to push through often unpopular measures if it can refer to 
European standards and the accession process. Therefore the accession process 
may be considered as the best chance for encouraging reforms, or also as an 
instrument with which the reform enthusiasm can be maintained in the best 
way and for the longest time. Simply put, the EU membership was a carrot 
used to award reform efforts and the people’s patience. 
Unfortunately, Serbia’s chances to join the EU soon are practically 
nonexistent, partly owing to the situation in Serbia, but partly also because 
of the current crisis of the European Union and the spreading of an opinion 
among the citizens and politicians of the EU countries that the rapid expansion 
should not continue and that many countries now applying are not European 
enough. It is therefore likely that Serbia may not expect to obtain the EU 
membership for at least another ten years, which means that the accession 
motive can hardly be a serious political reform driver. 
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Where do we stand now?
The initial praises of our transition by the representatives of the IMF, the 
World Bank and similar institutions, as well as the overemphasizing of their 
importance by the domestic ministers and governors, created an impression 
that the transition in Serbia is exceptional and that the countries involved in 
transition for ten years were surpassed in a year or two. Nothing could be 
further from the truth: according to transition success Serbia is trailing not only 
within Eastern Europe, but also the Balkans.8 Therefore it is not surprising that, 
according to basic economic and social indicators, after four years of transition 
Serbia is at the level of the group of countries in its immediate neighborhood: 
Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro. It is 
probably a sad fact that during the last fifteen years Serbia relatively regressed 
compared to its environment and became equal with it, while earlier it had 
been considerably more developed than all the countries mentioned. 
Serbia entered transition at a quick pace, but in time it decelerated, so 
now the country is only halfway there.9 Although numerous reform laws have 
been adopted (though many of them might already need improvements), the 
law enforcement, the so-called legal state, is still the weakest link in the chain. 
The expectations of many people regarding a much faster economic 
and social progress may have been based on the DOS’s exaggerated promises 
in the period before the September and December 2000 elections, but they 
certainly were not realistic. For there are not two or three exceptional moves 
that the government could make and solve the country’s economic problems 
in that way. Serbia is simply a poor country which will need several decades 
of hard work and effort to reach the present European development level. It is 
unrealistic to expect any faster development than 4-5% per year.
Priority in further transitional efforts must be given to non-economic 
issues, because that is where the obstructions to transition are mostly located. 
The first is the question of state, the second is the stabilization and maturing of 
democracy, and the third is the building of institutions. Parallel to these, there 
are more specific economic measures: privatization continuation, monetary 
and exchange rate policy issues, reduction of taxes and public spending, 
restructuring of public companies and similar. 
The basic obstacle to the transition in Serbia probably lies in the self-
management and socialistic mentality of many citizens. The expression of that 
8 Transition Report 2004, EBRD
9  See Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of Serbia, Economic Growth and Employment Program, the 
World Bank,  December 2004.
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mentality is, for example, the belief that companies exist so that the employees 
may receive wages and meal allowances, that the state is responsible if the 
payment of wages is irregular or if someone loses their job and that this has 
to be compensated for at the expense of taxpayers, that the one who earns 
something should share it with the ones who did not, that an individual should 
not bear any risk, and that he should be completely insured against all risks by 
the state, that each citizen of Serbia has inalienable rights to various services 
free of charge, and similar.
Most interestingly, this misguided leftist mentality has a stronger support 
in the so-called social intelligentsia and among politicians than in the people. 
The majority of the people, except part of employees in the former socially-
owned sector who would still like to live at another’s expense, know that they 
have personal responsibility for the results they achieve and for their position 
in the society. A convincing indicator of such majority opinion is the frequent 
electoral failure of the parties that appear with leftist programs and slogans.
Danica Popović
Economic developments and 
macroeconomic policies in transition
Economic Activity AnD mAcroEconomic 
PoliciEs: GEnErAl AssEssmEnt
A ten-years long pre-transitonal fall in the living standards and the 
absence of a political consensus on the core measures of the reform package 
are main characteristics of the first four years of transition in Serbia. Thus 
the average GDP growth rate of 4.5 percent on an annual basis during transiton 
is considerably undermined by the fact that the economy kept falling over the 
previous ten-year period at an average rate of around 8 percent a year. That 
is why an impressive cumulative real growth in wages, which in four years 
doubled in real terms (consequently, real wages grew at an average rate of 20 
percent), still seems too low to the once-well-to-do, and now impoverished, 
population of serbia, which in the meantime grew by almost 400,000 refugees. 
moreover, both the first transition government and the second one promised 
a very quick recovery, which objectively was out of the question. still, despite 
these promises, neither of the governments has really got to grips with 
issues that are at the core of transition – the issues of imposing hard budget 
constraints and carrying out institutional reforms, which are the steps that 
had been initiated by the most successful transition governments immediately 
after their coming into power. For that reason, an attractive environment for 
an inflow of new (foreign and domestic) investment has not been created, 
consequently, it was not possible to avoid the key adverse results – a rising 
balance of payments deficit of more than 13 percent of GDP, and a continuously 
increasing unemployment rate, which now stands at 34 percent. After four years 
  The author of this text is of the opinion that the period 99-2000 was totally lost from the standpoint 
of transition. in this period no significant reform step was made, hence this period will not be the 
subject of the analysis, either from the positive or normative aspect. 
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of transition, GDP is estimated at around US$ 3,000 in per capita terms (around 
US$ 5,200 in PPP terms), while slightly less than 11 percent of people in Serbia 
still live below the poverty line.2
In four years of transition, Serbian economic policy passed through 
four cycles: () reform cycle; (2) abandoning reform in mid-2003 and shifting 
the focus on issues (to be subsequently given up) of harmonization with the 
montenegrin economy, with partial reversal of its own initial foreign trade 
liberalization; (3) coming into power of a new government (in early 2004), 
followed by almost nine months of systematic populist steps; and (4) a positive 
breakthrough and announcements of good reform steps (2005), which resulted 
from interventions by the imF, WB and the EU announcement of the initiation 
of the sAA process as of october 2005. in this manner, in these first four years 
of transition less than half of the time was spent on serious transition issues, 
while the remainder was characterized by typical macroeconomic populism, 
with announcements of reexamining the privatization method, revisiting past 
privatization deals, reversing the already introduced liberalization measures, 
etc. therefore, the general public did not get the impression that the very 
process of transition is inevitable and irreversible, coming to believe that the 
most difficult reforms – elimination of subsidies, bankruptcies and large-scale 
cuts of non-productive jobs can, in fact, be indefinitely postponed.
2  For GDP: imF WEo Database, April 2005, for poverty: PrsP (2004), WB (2004). An alternative 
source on the unemployment rate – labor Force statistics, indicates a rate of 8.5 percent.
table . Aggregate assessment*) of macroeconomic measures and results
Results Measures
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
Economic growth + + + + +− Subsidies − − − − −
Inflation + + + − − Appreciation − − + + +
Fiscal deficit + + + −+ + Privatization + + + − −
BOP deficit − − − − + FDIs + + + − −
Unemployment − − − − − Wage policy − − − − −
*) (+) позитивни помаци; (-) неповољне промене
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Without no radical changes in macroeconomic policy, favourable 
initial results will become unsustainable and that further boosting domestic 
demand seriously undermines macroeconomic stability. Hence, the burden of 
stabilization had to be shifted to the lowering of the share of fiscal expenditure 
in the GDP, which would make room for export-driven growth.3 The policy 
pursued so far (based on the growth in domestic demand) has indeed 
enabled faster and easer initial results of reform, including the lower rate 
of unemployment (at the cost of a widening balance of payments deficit). 
nevertheless, a turnaround is necessary primarily because (i) the balance of 
payments deficit has become unsustainable; (ii) public spending is too high, 
crowding out private investment; (iii) the institutional framework practically 
hinders further privatization of the state and socially owned sector; and (iv) 
the absence of a more serious increase in export earnings calls into question 
the capacity to repay external debt and threatens to spark a debt crisis. it means 
that subsidies must be reduced, wages must be limited by productivity growth, 
and privatization of state and socially owned companies must be completed 
(in the meantime, downsizing in the civil service and public enterprises is 
called for). instead of the “development budget” concept and policy of further 
encouragement of domestic demand (a policy suitable only for the economy 
of Japan!), tight fiscal policy must not stop at the achievement of a balanced 
budget. namely, the problem is not so much in the deficit, but rather in the size 
of the budget, which is such that it crowds out both domestic investment and 
exports, thus making the accomplished development results unsustainable. 
The political context for carrying out reform is considerably more 
challenging than in other transition economies. First, in serbia it was not 
possible to garner political support by simply abolishing central planning, state 
monopoly on foreign trade, etc., which assisted authorities in other transition 
economies to create a powerful transition momentum.4 second, the serbian 
reformers are still facing three very controversial political tasks – issues related 
to the handover of suspects to the Hague tribunal, the status of montenegro 
vis-à-vis the Union and the resolution of the final status of Kosovo, which were 
as often as not included in the conditionality set by the developed world for 
both financial assistance and support to economic reform. in the meantime, 
Prime minister Đinđić’s assassination in early 2003 and the election of the 
3  This view, with an explicit recommendation to shift the burden of stabilization from monetary to 
fiscal policy, is advocated by both the World Bank (cf. WB [sEm, 2004], and the imF [2004].
4  vaclav Klaus [994]: “A very unique and an unrepeatable psychological euphoria prevails. There is 
a widespread readiness to actively participate in reversing the past, in getting rid of old, unpopular 
institutions and even in “belt tightening.” This moment is suitable for fast implementation of various 
painful measures.”
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second reform government of Prime minister Koštunica practically postponed 
reform by a whole year. Prime minister Koštunica’s government itself has then 
traveled the road from a feverish advocate of macroeconomic populism, 
“development budget”, a high budget deficit and subsidies to public and 
socially owned enterprises, to the adoption of a revised budget with a fiscal 
surplus, announcing phasing out of subsidies and privatization of public and 
socially owned enterprises. A change in policy came after the imF made the 
approval of a 5 percent write-off of the debt to the Paris club of creditors 
(amounting to some 750 million dollars) to serbia conditional upon accepting 
more radical reform. to a great extent, such policy of setting conditionality 
has compelled the (basically populist) ruling parliamentary majority to pass 
this quite restrictive package of economic policy measures.
Delays in the fields of microeconomic and institutional reforms 
can easily result in an overall reform failure.5 no flexible and strong 
microeconomic grounds have been established, and thus macroeconomic 
policy sufferes from the absence of clear, rapid and flexible response to its 
measures, and that is a basic prerequisite for sustainable growth in employment, 
exports, investment and domestic savings. Due to this incompleteness of the 
economic environment, some extremely good macroeconomic results (in the 
field of fiscal stability, declining currency appreciation, a moderate inflation 
rate, etc.) have not produced high growth, particularly not export-oriented 
growth. This text will look at the accomplishments and quality of underlying 
macroeconomic policies, as well as at alternative policy mixes which would 
enable the country to embark upon the road of sustainable, export-driven 
growth.
Economic DEvEloPmEnts in trAnsition
Avoiding a transition recession
Transition in Serbia began as late as 2000, while ten years which 
preceded it are completely lost from the standpoint of transition. A sharp 
decline in incomes over that previous decade cannot be attributed to a classic 
5 on the role of macroeconomic policies in transition cf. Blanchard [2000]. 
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transition recession, because it happened as a result of the break-up of the 
country, hyperinflation, Un trade embargo (992-995) and the bombing of 
serbia (999). Despite the fact that over the said period the so-called insider 
privatization began, its main result resurfaced in asset stripping. A very non-
transparent economic environment was created, where clientelism, insiders’ 
privileges and corruption were flourishing. it should be pointed out that, owing 
to delays in creating a market-oriented institutional framework, even after 
four full years of transition in serbia there is no sound market-based business 
environment or institutions which efficiently protect property and contracts. 
similarly, the subsidizing of loss-making companies has been going on until 
the end of the fourth year of transition, now advancing well into its fifth year.
Ten years of declining economic activity have brought about a change 
in the economic structure, in favor of branches with simpler technologies 
and a lower import content (agriculture, food industry, electricity, etc.), with 
a dramatic drop in output in the chemical industry, mechanical engineering, 
electronics, etc. The rate of capacity utilization went down from around 75 
percent in 989 to below 40 percent at the beginning of transition in the 
autumn of 2000. The structure of final demand also changed, in favor of private 
Figure . real GDP Percentage change index (989 = Base), 989-2004
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and public spending, with a simultaneous dramatic drop in investment, which 
practically turned into disinvestment.
There are two reasons why Serbia avoided the transition recession, which 
certain countries experienced twice (Bulgaria, romania, the czech republic, 
etc.).6 Firstly, it seems that a paradoxical outcome of 994 is happening again, 
when excessive postponement of a stabilization program eventually led to 
an antiinflation program accompanied with economic growth. A similar 
comparison comes to mind now: a heavy pre-transitional fall in economic 
activity has by itself led to the closing down or contraction of production of 
many non-viable firms, and that is why in all four years of transition, despite 
macroeconomic stabilization measures, GDP growth rates were positive. The 
same applies to industrial output, where no drastic fall was recorded: after 
a slight fall in the period 200-2003, it subsequently also registered positive 
growth rates. 
The second, crucial reason for avoiding a transition recession is an active 
subsidizing policy of state and socially owned companies. The private sector 
still produces only slightly more than half (55 percent) of the GDP, and a large 
portion of the economy is subsidized, which implies that not even this low 
level of economic activity is sustainable without permanent active government 
support. in a large number 
of these companies, even 
when they work (supported 
by subsidies) and increase 
phyisical output – value-
added is falling in real 
terms. in mid-2005 serbia 
is, explicitly or implicitly, 
still subsidizing 75 large 
socially owned loss-making 
companies, which employ 
around 50,000 workers. 
in addition, the government is adamantly keeping control over public 
enterprises and public utilities (600,000 employees), which gives a total 
6  The second fall in economic activity happens due to belated implementation of tougher reforms: 
in Bulgaria after a hyperinflation, in the czech republic in three successive years (997-999) 
negative growth rates were registered, triggering the launch of a policy of export-based growth and 
“greenfield” FDi inflows; in romania, over the same period, a sharp decline in economic activity 
was registered because of the opening of the already closed down factories and plants, which then 
collapsed anew, etc. 
table 2.  relevance of the private sector in 
the serbian economy, 2004 (%)
2004.
private sector share in GDP 55
share of private sector employment 35
private sector share in capital 29
source: serbian statistical office (sso), trends, 
December 2004
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of around 40 percent of registered labor. since most of them (according to 
the minister of labor – two thirds of them are redundant) are in principle 
– potential losers in transition, it seems that serbian economic policy has 
tailored a whole set of measures precisely to their maximum protection: (i) the 
overvalued exchange rate, which enabled higher imports of consumer goods 
and higher living standards, particularly in the first two years of transition: 
(ii) high public spending, which kept wage increases high above productivity 
growth, (iii) delays in the implementation of bankruptcy legislation and an 
overly protective labor law, which kept the loss-making firms on the market, 
are just the key characteristics of that policy. 
A growing danger of the worst-case scenario – a simultaneous rise in 
inflation and unemployment – comes as a consequence of the delays in 
reforms, which generated deep macroeconomic imbalances. such an 
outcome would to a large extent shrink the space for potential winners – a new 
private sector, new exporters, retrained workers and the like, to faster attain a 
dominant position in the structure of serbia’s economy. such economic policy 
has become unsustainable, both because it has exhausted the room for “buying“ 
social peace and because further financial support of the imF is conditional 
precisely on radical changes in the mentioned economic policies.
Change in economic structure – yes or no?
Besides changing ownership structure, transition also stands for 
turbulent sectoral reallocation of capital, labor and economic activity from 
the overdeveloped primary and manufacturing sectors to the uderdeveloped 
service sector, which thus increases its share in the GDP.
table 3. Economic growth, 2000-2004 (%)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Gross domestic 4.2 4.8 3.7 2.6 7
Agriculture -7 8.4 -3.4 -8.2 9.8
manufacturing 2 0 .7 -2.7 7.
services 5 8 8 7 2
source: sso, communiqué no. 274, December 2004
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in serbia, agriculture is reducing its share from 22.6 to 4.4 percent, an 
even more dramatic fall has been registered in manufacturing industry – from 
27.3 to 8.6 percent of the gross domestic product,7 while other sectors have 
seen significant growth (cf. Figure 2). 
There are three reasons to hesitate about the fact that effective changes 
in economic structure took place in Serbia. Firstly, due to price liberalization 
from the very beginning of transition (2000), changes can partly be attributed 
to nominal adjustments. The tripling of the energy sector in the economic 
structure corresponds almost completely to the past price adjustments in this 
sector. A rise in the share of health, education, transport and utility services 
and social insurance can in part be attributed to the same cause.
Secondly, data for 2004 show that the increase in sevices sector was to 
a certain extent overestimated, and that restructuring is actually carried out 
more slowly then evidenced by the available data. namely, the data for 2004 
indicate that part of the previously registered drop in industry and agriculture 
(in 2003) was not of a structural nature, but a consequence of a bad harvest and 
7  As of January 2004, the aggregation methods for industrial output has changed: coverage has been 
increased, a new system of weights has been introduced and a new nomenclature of industrial 
products adopted, which points to the fact that one of the underlying reasons for the 2003 fall lies in 
the shortcomings of the statistical coverage of the emerging private sector. 
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a lag in effects of the privatizations carried out in the course of 2003. similarly, 
the introduction of fiscal cash registers in 2005 has enormously increased the 
growth rate of trade (and thus the share of services in the economic structure), 
although this, too, is not indicating an increase in turnover, but rather the 
curbing of the gray economy and increasing regular trade flows.8 
Thirdly, statistical tests indicate that the structure of employment by 
sector has not changed significantly, and thus labor is neither “moving” to 
propulsive sectors, nor leaving those declining ones. The lillien measure9 
(calculated as a standard deviation of annual sectoral employment growth 
rates) for the first four years of transition in serbia amounts to 3.9 percent. 
Although the classification of sectors is not the same (hence this comparison 
should be understood only as an illustration) in the first four years of transition 
lillien coefficient for the czech republic amounted to 20.9 percent, for Poland 
to 20.3 percent, for slovakia to 4 percent, for Hungary to 9 percent, etc. 
8  industrial output grew by 7.4 percent in 2004, while a rise in agriculture was 9.8 percent. in the first 
quarter of 2005, the GDP growth rate was 5.2 percent, with the socially owned trade sector alone (for 
which statistics are regularly available) was growing by more than 33 percent.
9  The calculation is made for each year, and than the average for the reporting period is calculated. if 
the dynamics of sectoral rates of employment slightly deviate from the average, the lillien coefficient 
will be close to zero, which will point to the fact that all sectors are moving along more or less similar 
paths, indicating that there is no structural reform. High values of the lillien coefficient will point to 
turbulent changes in the economic structure. 
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obviously, the intensity of structural reform in serbia is still very weak. Both of 
the already mentioned causes – macroeconomic populism and the absence of 
financial discipline, coupled with the absence of reforms which would enable 
its implementation, largely explain such a slow pace in the restructuring of the 
real sector of the serbian economy. 
Imbalances in the structure of final demand
The two major imbalances – an overly low share of investments and high 
trade deficit – were ”inherited” from the Milosevic era, but also maintained 
by reformist authorities. yet, one imbalance has started to “give in”, the share 
of investment is growing (though not fast enough), but the trade deficit is 
permanently deteriorating. 
A notable “expansion” of domestic demand (from 117 to 130 percent 
of GDP)10 is a combined effect of the populist macroeconomic policies and 
unbuilt institutional framework. namely, lax financial discipline in socially 
owned and public enterprises (employing around 750,000 workers), and the 
substantially overvalued exchange rate in the initial period, are the main reasons 
for the growth in wages and private consumption (see figure 4). This helped 
to maintain “fictitious” employment and social peace, but reduced productivity 
and considerably undermined export competitiveness. increased wages also 
significantly contributed to a rise in imports. The existing ownership structure, 
where GDP is formed predominantly in the social and state sector, has so far 
been maintained with the assistance of loose fiscal policy, which generated a 
steadily rising trade deficit of more than 30 % of GDP.
The inherited difficult pre-transition situation can (to a certain extent) 
explain macroeconomic populism at the very beginning of reform. A 
dramatic drop in real wages which lasted for almost ten years, and nearly 
doubled absolute poverty relative to 990, have in a way determined the first 
basically populist steps of the reformist authorities.
0  Domestic demand includes private and government spending, as well as private and government 
(public) investment. A sum of all components of the gross domestic product is not always 00 
because of the rounding off. one should keep in mind that the presented government spending 
of 8 percent of GDP includes only wages and purchases of goods and services of the public 
administration. consolidated public spending amounts to 45.3 percent of GDP in 2005, and in 
addition to government spending and public investment (which is presented together with private 
investment in the graph), it includes pensions, social protection, subsidies, costs of public debt 
service (interest payment and repayment of principal) and other (cf. section on fiscal policy). 
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But macroeconomic populism gain further ground with the second 
reformist government of Prime minister Koštunica in early 2004 – privatization 
was brought to a standstill, while the parliament adopted a “developmental” 
budget, increased social transfers and subsidies, etc., trying very hard to miss 
the agreed deficit target by almost full 50 percent. Although six months later 
the plan was corrected and privatization resumed, distortions further deepened 
in the course of 2004, primarily because the key generator of the growing trade 
deficit and inflation was not eliminated: budget subsidies and the number of 
employees in the public sector remained unchanged. The imF set this task to 
this same government as an imperative for economic policy in 2005, making it 
part of the conditionality for the write-off of the remaining 5 percent of the 
debt to the Paris club of creditors (amounting to 750 million dollars). However, 
data indicate that the fulfillment of the undertaken obligations has been 
mixed: while the number of employees in public enterprises has decreased by 
about four percent, and there practically was no increase in the average wage, 
local public utilities kept on increasing both the number of employees and the 
wages, which went up by around eight percent.2 Therefore, it is completely 
legitimate to say that there is no political will to fully honor the undertaken 
commitments. 
The most difficult and unavoidable task before Serbia definitely is to 
change the composition of final demand. The basic objective is to increase 
investments, and the share of private spending in GDP has to go down. The 
investment rate in the medium term should increase from the present 7.5 
percent to 25 percent of GDP, thus reaching the level in comparable transition 
countries. it requires a relative drop in private consumption to around 70 
percent of GDP and a fall in material costs for public spending to about 5 
percent of GDP. of course, room would be still left for all the variables to grow, 
but not at the same speed: consumption would grow at a rate of around 2.7 
percent in real terms, while the entire transformation would practically be 
based on an accelerated increase in investment of more than 2 percent a year, 
and on average annual export growth of 25 to 30 percent.3 
The policy of accelerating investments is the only exit from the vicious 
circle: wage growth above productivity – a rise in consumption and imports 
  it was a direct breach of the already achieved understanding with the imF to cut the budget deficit 
from 3.9 to 2.5 percent of the gross domestic product. Under the pressure from the imF, the deficit 
was later on reduced from 45 to 30 billion dinars (below  percent of the gross domestic product).
2  The statement of the Deputy Director of the Federal statistical office, 7 July 2005, a mAt news 
conference
3 see Appendix 2. 
44 Danica Popović
– a fall in export competitiveness – a standstill and a fall in economic growth. 
since, on the other hand, national savings4 will remain for a long time to come 
far below investment needs, this is where foreign direct investment comes into 
play as a variable of strategic importance.
The mechanism is as follows. Growth in foreign direct investment 
ensures own self-sustainable growth of purchased or new companies, and also 
brings wage payments in line with labor productivity, etc. This creates demand 
for domestic inputs (intermediates, energy, services, etc.), which acts as an 
impetus for growth in production and investment in other economic sectors, 
which are developing as suppliers to strategic investors. on average, one job 
4  Domestic savings include savings of all institutional sectors: households, the corporate sector and 
the government. national savings constitute a sum of domestic savings and net factor payments. in 
the case of serbia, the difference usually boils down to private remittances.
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Тable 4. rate of investment in transition countries
Serbia 
(2003) Bulgaria Romania Croatia Hungary Poland
Czech 
Rep.
Rate of investment 17.5 20.4 21.9 23.8 30.0 24.0 28.0
source: imF WEo
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in the FDi sector generates the creation of 3-5 new jobs in the domestic sub-
contractor sector (Klein, 2004). This scenario was applied not only in the most 
advanced transition economies, but also in the countries whose institutional 
frameworks bear more resemblance to serbia’s, such as slovakia, Armenia 
and the like, where it also proved effective. For all these reasons, all successful 
transition countries concentrate their efforts on attracting foreign investors, 
even granting them more favorable terms in comparison with the domestic 
ones. 
In 2003, thanks to large privatization proceeds, FDIs in Serbia reached 
almost US$ 1.4 billion, but in 2004 they amounted to only US$ 966 
million (Although serbia had a significant inflow of FDis in the period after 
democratic change in 2000 (in 2000 the inflow of FDis was Us$ 25 million, 
in 200, this inflow went up to Us$ 65 million, in 2002 to Us$ 475 million 
and in 2003 to Us$ ,360 million), the main concern is related to the fact that 
serbia has attracted just a few ‘greenfield’ investments, as well as the fact that 
investors identified significant shortcomings in the business environment in 
serbia (Fic, 2003). in addition, serbia is losing pace (i.e. according to the World 
Economic Forum ranking of global competitiveness indices, serbia has fallen 
from the 77th place in 2003 to the 89th place in 2004 (mc Kinsie, 2004)). Data 
of the Privatization Agency confirm a fall in foreign direct investment in 2004. 
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out of a total of ,270 privatization deals which were closed in the period 2002-
2004 only 84 (6 percent) were FDis. out of this number, 20 privatization deals 
were realized in the course of 2002, 45 in 2003, and only 9 in 2004. The results 
themselves indicate that neither the climate, nor the policies, for attracting 
FDi in serbia meets the expectations. in comparison with the countries of the 
Western Balkans, serbia takes the lead in terms of volume, but not in terms 
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Figure 7.  FDIs per capita and share in GDP
Figure 8. Key determinants for attracting FDis
39%
42%
48%
49%
53%
57%
58%
61%
65%
68%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Price/quality of labor
Presence of competition
Business climate
Market size
Macroeconomic stability
Profit repatriation
Institutional framework
GDP growth
 Political stability
Market size
Izvor: FDI Confidence Index, AT Kerney 2002
Key determinants for attracting FDIs
source: FDi confidence index, At Kerney 2002
47Economic Activity And Macroeconomic Policies In Transition
Box . Foreign Direct investment - macroeconomic Effects 
Foreign direct investments are the main source of foreign exchange 
inflows and play a significant role in (non-credit) financing of the deficit 
on the current account of the balance of payments. in countries like serbia, 
where it is very difficult to mobilize domestic savings, FDis constitute a very 
important source of financing growing consumption and investment. since 
these are, as a rule, long-term investments, the host-country is enabled in this 
manner to increase productivity and generate revenue for debt service, thus 
attaining a sustainable level of external debt. since transition economies, 
like serbia, by rule have poor access to the international financial market, 
their high balance of payments deficits, if they are not financed by FDis or 
international financial institutions, result in lower consumption, investment 
and lower growth rates. 
table 5.  net inflow of FDis (mil. UsD)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1993-2003
value 
(mil USD)
per 
capita
Albania 90 48 45 41 143 204 135 178 1.083 338.4
BIH 0 0 100 90 150 130 230 320 1,020 248.8
Bulgaria 137 507 537 802 998 803 876 1,398 6,302 808
Croatia 486 347 835 1,420 1,085 1,404 591 1,875 8,389 1,906.7
Macedonia 11 30 128 32 175 441 78 94 1,023 503.7
Romania 263 1,224 2,040 1,025 1,048 11,740 1,128 1,485 10,232 469.4
Serbia 0 740 113 112 25 165 562 1,395 3,112 374.9
Czech R 1,280 1,261 3,574 6,223 4,944 5,475 8,276 2,351 37,227 3,649.7
Hungary 3,264 3,617 3,202 2,899 2,172 3,524 2,864 977 30,622 3,031.9
Source: WB – ECA Regional Tables
The connection between FDis and an increase in domestic investment 
is very obvious: irrespective of whether these are reinvestments on existing 
companies or greenfield investments, local firms in this manner secure 
sorely needed financial and physical capital, technology, management and 
export markets. 
The influence on the labor market is ambiguous. The labor market 
generates demand for productive jobs, where offered salaries are often
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of per capita FDi, or in terms of share of FDi in the gross domestic product. 
The attractiveness of the serbian environment for foreign direct investment 
is obviously still very alarmingly low, and on removing key obstacles to the 
inflow of FDis the work is still done without enough money, human resources 
and, what is the most important, an unambiguous political conviction about 
the necessity of FDi inflow.
Box  (continued)
higher than in the rest of the economy. However, in the case of privatizations 
of existing firms, a direct effect will very often be labor shedding, but the indirect 
effect will be significant: in addition to the resulting increase in the number 
of firms which become their suppliers, room is created for vertical FDis 
(e.g. in serbia, after coca-cola and sartid, Ball Packaging expressed interest 
in a greenfield investment), etc. As mentioned before, one job in the FDi 
sector spurs the creation of 3-5 new jobs in the domestic sub-contractor 
sector.
The influence on the balance of payments is not unambiguous, either. 
Foreign direct investments may cause deterioration in the balance of 
payments of the host-country, predominantly because they will, for instance, 
import equipment at the initial stage, and then continue with importing 
intermediates. yet, the ultimate effect on the balance of payments will 
depend on whether a strategic investor will export its products or sell them 
solely on the domestic market. in the case of exporters, positive effects may 
spill over to domestic firms, which will supply them with necessary inputs, 
thus increasing the domestic content in exported goods. on the whole, 
empirical research (World Bank (2003a); d. Djankov and murrell (2002); e. 
UnctAD (999)) has shown that FDis have a positive effect on the balance 
of payments, and that through attracting them, a sustainable mechanism is 
created for financing the BoP deficit.
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PricEs AnD ExcHAnGE rAtE
Prices 
The initial stage of macroeconomic stabilization was carried out very 
successfully, by eliminating the key causes of inflation: the monetization of 
the fiscal deficit was terminated and its non-inflationary financing has started, 
while huge quasi-fiscal deficits were substantially reduced, primarily due to 
comprehensive price liberalization. ironically, the liberalization itself has 
not been initiated by the reformist, authorities, but was instead initiated as a 
“revenge of the outgoing” who probably reckoned that without price controls 
a chaos would be created on the market, which would seriously undermine, or, 
with a bit of luck, even topple the new reformist authorities. yet, as dilettantism 
in the conduct of economic policy was their main feature, the outcome was 
totally opposite to their expectations: inflation did initially almost double, but 
after a one-off rise in prices (which in part covered the quasi-fiscal deficits and 
eliminated pent-up inflation) stability was achieved, while all political odium, 
which price increases normally cause among the electorate, was rightfully 
attributed to milošević’s outgoing government. in addition, superiority of that, 
so-called first generation of reform, was immediately visible: there were no 
shortages of edible oil, flour, milk, sugar, bread, gasoline, and the like. Prime 
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minister Đinđić’s government, owing to the credibility it earned (first and 
foremost through non-inflationary payments of all current budget expenditures 
and clearance of part of expenditure arrears), was very successful in lowering 
inflationary expectations. However, lagging behind in more serious elements 
of reform, which was caused mostly by the failure to impose hard budget 
constraints, resulted in new growth of aggregate demand, again much faster 
than production growth. That is why media discussions about which inflation 
rate could constitute a “psychological threshold” and whether inflation this 
year would be kept below the last year’s 3.7 percent, or the government would 
miss the inflation target, are ever more frequent. 
The policy of encouraging domestic demand had helped to mitigate 
the consequences of price liberalization for the poorest segments of the 
population, but in time it turned into a “reform trap”, which practically blocked 
further reform. to begin with, in the first two years of transition the dinar 
was appreciating fast, which resulted in a large increase in wages expressed in 
euro terms, hence in increased purchasing power of the population for buying 
imported goods, which still account for a considerable share of total supply of 
goods in serbia. secondly, social safety was regularly financed by subsidizing 
state and socially owned companies, which further strengthened employees’ 
purchasing power that kept growing far beyond labor productivity.
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Thirdly, the danger of losing the job due to bankruptcy is practically 
eliminated owing to the fact that bankruptcy legislation has not been 
implemented to this day, because transition has fallen into the classic “reform 
trap” of equilibrium at a low level of reform, and only after imF’s conditionality 
the government has accepted and announced that it will start to cut the number 
of employees in the civil services, privatize remaining, state and socially owned 
companies, impose financial discipline and stop subsidizing and fueling 
domestic aggregate demand, thus lowering labor productivity and worsening 
the current account deficit of the BoP.
After three years of deceleration of inflation, the escalation of macro-
economic populism in 2004 was paid by another surge in inflation – from 
7.8 to 13.7 percent. moreover, core inflation doubled, which is an indication of 
the fact that the contribution from aggregate demand pressures to the inflation 
rate was higher than the contribution from elimination of price disparities or 
from price fluctuations on the world market (increases in the prices of oil and 
other primary products, whose prices are in part under government control). 
Price liberalization policy has addressed one of the main sources of 
the inherited quasi-fiscal deficit. still, further elimination of price disparities 
Figure . Electrical energy prices, cents/kWhElectrical energy prices, cents/kWh
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constitutes an important basis for sustainable medium-term macroeconomic 
stability, because it considerably reduces public expenditures for direct or 
hidden subsidies. This is the most difficult part of the reform and it has not 
been completed even in the most advanced transition countries. The electricity 
price has been increased about 5 times, reaching the level of some 4 cents per 
KWh, which covers operating costs. The target level, which will enable EPs 
to operate normally, is 4.5-5 cents per KWh. substantial adjustments have 
also been made in the prices of utility services, which is of great importance 
to the efficient use of resources, and thus to the achievement of sustainable 
medium-term growth. namely, the objective is for the prices in the sectors 
under control to reach such level at which these companies will be able to 
independently cover not only operating costs, but also total costs. Until that 
level is reached, elimination of disparities will be an integral part of the total 
annual inflation rate.
A steep rise in the prices of crude oil reverted the authorities to the 
familiar populist practice of price freezes, which produced the well-known 
result – fuel shortages. As usual, this proved to be bad practice, which 
encourages wasteful consumption, stalls restructuring and increases future 
costs. According to the nBs data, the share of oil price increases in last year’s 
total inflation was around 4 percentage points, which certainly increases costs, 
decreases productivity and widens the trade deficit, as experienced by other oil 
importing countries. However the estimate for oEcD countries is that a rise 
in the oil price of Us$ 0 per barrel would increase inflation by 0.5 percentage 
points, with economic activity falling by 0.4 percent. of course, countries with 
lower energy efficiency, like india (which consumes 2.5 times more oil per 
unit of GDP), inflation would rise by 2.6 percentage points, in Argentina by a 
mere 0.2 percent, etc. (Birol, 2004). Therefore, the publicized information that 
the contribution from oil price increases to the rise in inflation in serbia was 
as much as 4 percent deserves detailed analysis, which, of course, is beyond the 
scope of this paper.
table 6.  changes in basic macroeconomic indicators in case of oil price 
increase of Us$ 0 per barrel, 2002
Real GDP Inflation Trade balance (%GDP)
Аsia -0,8 ,4 -,0
chinа -0,8 0,8 -0,6
india -,0 2,6 -,2
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The evidence in transition economies proved that is that rising economic 
growth cannot be “bought” by higher inflation. It was also confirmed that 
disinflation does not cause a recession, just the opposite in fact. Extensive 
econometric surveys of transition economies (Balcerowicz, 2003, svejnar, 
2003) confirm that the main determinants of growth were – a low inflation rate, 
public spending cuts and resolute implementation of institutional reform. What 
may be surprising here is the fact that countries whose economic performance 
was better in terms of growth and inflation have also achieved more equality 
in distribution.5 it turns out that sustainable growth in economic activity is 
based primarily on macroeconomic stability, inflow of foreign investment and 
growth in domestic investment, improved competitiveness and export growth, 
and ex-post (instead of ex-ante) growth in incomes and living standards. 
in such a mechanism of economic growth, major disturbances are created 
by overheating domestic demand, which infallibly points to macroeconomic 
populism at work, and entails a danger of inflationary expectations discouraging 
strategic investors, while the other two causes of inflation (elimination of price 
disparities and increases in energy prices) exert much less influence not only 
on inflation, but also on inflationary expectations and investment decisions 
of economic agents, with this latter being crucial. A rise in the price of fuel 
in serbia has never resulted in lower consumption. instead, it was interpreted 
primarily as a call on the decision-makers to “adjust wages to the cost of living.” 
Therefore, it is necessary to put an end to such practice.
5  cf. Balcerowicz, WB (2003). in Poland, the Gini coefficient went up from 28 to 3, but in russia Gini 
rose from 26 to 5, in Azerbaijan it jumped from 29 to 50; in Ukraine from 24 to 46. consequently, 
fast reformers experienced much less rise in inequality than slow reformers. 
Real GDP Inflation Trade balance (%GDP)
malaysia -0,4 2,0 0,0
The Philippines -,6 ,6 -2,0
Thailand -,8 0,8 -3,0
latin America -0,2 ,2 0,0
Argentina -0,4 0,2 0,2
Brazil -0,4 2,0 -0,4
chile -0,4 2,0 -,4
HiPc (heavily indebted 
poor countries (incl. 
mexico))
-,6 ... ...
source: iEA on the basis of imF analyses
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Exchange rate 
Although it was declared immediately after the beginning of transition 
that a dirty-float exchange rate policy would be pursued, in the recorded 
interval, two explicit sub-periods can be instantaneously noticed: a period 
of the fixed exchange rate (30 din/DM, later 60din/€), attended by strong 
real appreciation (2000-2002), and a period of managed floating of the 
exchange rate, which started after a “small speculative shock” that happened 
in late November 2002. The initial strong appreciation was primarily resulted 
from boosting domestic demand, aimed at protecting the living standards of 
both the poor and those who live on fixed incomes, as dinars that were worth 
less and less could nevertheless buy increasing quantities of foreign exchange 
or imported goods. Furthermore, the fixing of the exchange rate and the 
overvalued dinar very well suited importers, a group which is a traditionally 
strong player in serbian politics. Finally, this regime was advantageous to non-
exporting, loss-making companies, as imported production materials were 
becoming cheaper and cheaper. For all other economic agents, such policy was 
harmful: the state was spending too much of its official reserves to defend the 
exchange rate, while exporters were losing potentially rising earnings. in that 
period, domestic prices increased 2.5 times, while the nominal exchange rate 
rose by a mere 2 percent roughly. strong appreciation created expectations that 
Figure 2. real and nominal exchange rate, 2000-2005.
Real and nominal exchange rate, 2000-2005.
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the national Bank would not be able to defend the existing parity for too long. 
in that context, after only one announcement by the then Prime minister about 
a possible exchange rate adjustment, the demand for foreign exchange tripled, 
and interventions of the nBs rose from the average six million to around eight 
million euros a day6. Following that episode, banks in serbia were refusing to 
sell foreign exchange, though they had to re-start selling eventually in order 
not to lose their licenses for exchange operations. After that, the dinar started 
to depreciate slightly, but, for all practical purposes, ever since november 2002, 
a policy of a constant real, instead of constant nominal, exchange rate has been 
conducted. 
The pass-through from the exchange rate depreciation to inflation is one 
of the fundamental undesirable effects of the implementation of the so-called 
“truly-floating” exchange rate regime. in serbia, however, in the first year of 
implementation (2003), no signifiacnt pass-through was registered, while in 
the following year (2004) the government of Prime minister Koštunica to a 
large extent gave up on imposing fiscal discipline which would support such 
exchange rate regime.7 in the course of 2003, namely, the dinar depreciated 
by about 2 percent, while inflation, even with elimination of price disparities, 
was almost halved (from 4 percent it dropped to 7.8 percent). As discussed 
in section  of this chapter, the trends have changed in the course of 2004, 
primarily due to the halting of transition and continuation of the policy of 
boosting domestic demand, which is strictly counter-indicated in the case of a 
floating exchange rate. 
Therefore, the issue of the choice of the exchange rate regime is primarily 
the issue of choosing the losers in this process: whether those would be 
workers, pensioners and the importers’ lobby (to whom the fixed exchange 
rate suits better), or the export sector and workers who would find 
employment there, to whom depreciation is more advantageous. yet, for 
depreciation to be able to encourage exports, the rate of depreciation must 
be higher than the rate of increases in domestic prices. Bearing in mind that 
part of the costs is relatively fixed in the short run and foreign currency-
indexed, real depreciation means that an increase in non-indexed costs must 
be considerably lower than the total inflation rate or, in other words, that they 
have to be nominally frozen. it implies a real fall in these costs, among which 
the largest items are net wages and salaries and pensions. Experiences of the 
countries which have successfully conducted floating exchange rate policy 
6 Ekonomist Magazin, no. 33
7  nBs estimates are that a rise in the euro rate by  percent would result in a gradual price increase of 
0.32 percent (nBs, 2004).
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actually testify to the above: real wage growth over the entire period of faster 
exchange rate depreciation was minimal, or non-existent.8 
The issue the distance of the Dinar from its equilibrium exchange rate 
level (the issue of “misalignment”) in the pre-transition period, due to the 
self-containment of the economy, large distortions and non-market-based 
pricing, cannot be successfully resolved through standard macro-econometric 
methods.9 Therefore, in this analysis one has proceeded from an unambiguous 
theoretical result – that a country which systematically (meaning every 
year, in a long interval) runs a trade deficit, definitely has a currency which 
is overvalued in relation to its equilibrium level. By using this criterion, we 
arrive at a conclusion that the dinar in serbia has always been overvalued, 
that exporters have been discouraged, and importers privileged, which is 
clearly evidenced by experience: macroeconomic populism, whose trade mark 
8  Depreciation policy for the purpose of attracting strategic investors was used by all successful 
transition economies. Hungary, for example, was permanently depreciating the forint in almost five 
consecutive years, in certain years even more than 2 percent a month, consequently, more than 25 
percent a year, which was one of those key measures on the basis of which they managed to attract 
(and keep) strategic investors, whose exports nowadays account for 70 percent of Hungary’s total 
exports. 
9  ”let’s take a man who first climbs two meters up the dam, and then goes down three meters. 
Whether he’ll drown or not depends on where he had been before he started to climb. The same 
problem arises when assessing whether a currency is undervalued or overvalued.” – The Economist, 
26 August 995.
Figure 3. structure of imports of commodites, 200-2005Structure of imports of commodites, 2001-2005
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is an overvalued currency, practically has not yet been abandoned in serbia. 
The trade deficit in the first four years of transition was systematically rising 
from Us$ 2.8 billion in 200 up to as much as Us$ 7.4 billion in 2004, which 
points to the fact that the overvaluation of the dinar is () undeniable and (2) 
obviously very high, and (3) again has a slight upward tendency, against the 
backdrop of an announcement by the imF that the government has decided to 
use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor in the coming period as well.
In Serbia, an above-average increase has been registered in imports of 
capital goods and intermediates, where depreciation of the currency, in the 
nature of things, cannot vitally influence investment decisions. yet, data indicate 
that overheated aggregate demand did manage to affect the composition of 
imports, in that the share of consumer goods in imports, despite the floating 
of the currency, almost constantly and steadily grows, which brings us back to 
the issue of the overvaluation of the domestic currency and the necessity of its 
long-term adjustment to its fundamental determinants (first and foremost to 
the level of the surplus which has to be run for a number of consecutive years 
in order to meet the debt service obligations falling due).
Like all other transition economies, Serbia has to expect its currency to 
appreciate, even if core inflation is stagnant, because of both (i) elimination 
of price disparities, and (ii) leveling of wages in the export sector with the 
wages in the industries supplying solely the domestic market. since this latter 
wage growth is going to be higher than sectoral productivity growth, domestic 
prices will go up and the currency will appreciate. it is important to mention 
here that there is nothing that economic policy could do to avoid this (Balassa-
samuelson) effect, hence policymakers have to tailor their measures to such 
anticipated disturbances [EcE, 2000 59ff.]. According to some calculations, 
the real exchange rate in transition countries is appreciating considerably. 
Kovács/simon (998), rother (2000) and Halpern/Wyplosz (200) show that 
real appreciation caused by productivity growth amounts to around 3 percent 
a year, while De Broeck – slok (200), corricelli – Jazbec (200) and Égert 
(2002a,b), contrary to that, present more cautious estimates of 0. – .5 
percent on an annual basis. All the analyses, however, have confirmed that the 
intensity of the Bs effect is higher in the later years of transition. Therefore, 
one should expect such exogenous shocks in serbia in the future and adjust 
macroeconomic policy to them.
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WAGEs AnD EmPloymEnt
Wages 
An impressive four-year real wage growth of almost 20 percent a year 
(which has nearly doubled them in real terms) still seems too low to the 
once-well-to-do and now impoverished population of Serbia. Expressed in 
euros, wages in late 2004, due to high appreciation of the dinar, were as many 
as four times higher than in late 2000: from €80 (october 2000), gross wages 
reached the level of €320 in December 2004 and thus exceeded the level of 
average gross wages in Bulgaria (€230) and romania (€20). yet, relative to 
the average wage in serbia of Dm752 (€380) in December 990, when the 
number of employees was also much larger, thus total household incomes 
as well, the perception of poverty in serbia is much higher than one can 
possibly realize on the basis of available statistics.20
Very soon after 2000. the population was again able to finance the 
minimum consumers basket out of one average wage. Generous initial foreign 
grants, policy of dinar appreciation and subsidizing domestic aggregate demand 
20  the average wage in December 990 amounted to Dm752, to reach its absolute minimum of 
Dm2 in December 993. in the period 994 -998, the average wage amounted to around Dm 
70, in the course of 999 it fell to Dm80, which was its level also just before the beginning of 
transition.
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were key instruments to acieve that. The living standards of the population 
were additionally improved through a substantial inflow of private remittances, 
which to a large extent contributed to the high growth of consumer goods 
imports and had a substantial impact on the widening of the country’s trade 
deficit. The estimates are that a difference between wages and total incomes of 
about twenty-odd percent has created room for an accelerated rise in demand 
for imported goods.2
Real wage growth of more than 20 percent a year, which happened in 
Serbia, has not been seen in any transition economy (Galgoci, 2002). in 
transition economies, a very clear mechanism was established, in which 
productivity growth was “pulling” growth in the gross domestic product, while 
real wages were growing at a much slower pace. Thus, almost no real wage 
growth (a mere 0.84 percent a year) accompanied high productivity growth 
in Hungary of almost 5 percent a year all the while to 2000, in romania and 
Bulgaria productivity growth was accompanied by a drop in real wages (by 
3 and 7 percent, respectively), while the countries which are considered the 
most “generous”, the czech republic, slovakia, the Baltic states and slovenia, 
2  Practically every year imports of household appliances were doubled, but for tv sets they were 
tripled every year, and for washing machines increased five times every year. imports of tv 
sets rose from .8 to 32 million dollars, imports of air-conditioners from around 5 to 29.5 million 
dollars, of washing machines from around 2.2 to 5 million dollars, and deep freezes from around 
.4 to nearly  million dollars, and of stoves from 488,000 dollars to around 8.8 million dollars.
table 7.  Growth in gross domestic product, productivity and  real wages 
in transition countries, 2003, in %
productivity GDP wages unemployment rate 
Bulgaria 5,5 0,7 -6,6 2,7
czech rep. 6,7 2,0 5, 0,6
Estonia ... 2,5 4,8 
Hungary 4,6 3,4 0,8 6
latvia ... 0,9 4,8 
lithuania ... -,7 3, 3,2
Poland ,3 6,0 6,8 7,9
romania 7,9 0,6 -2,2 6,3
slovakia 5,8 4,2 ,6 5,6
slovenia 8,0 4,8 4,9 8
Serbia 5,5 4,7 19,8 33
Productivity and GDP from Galgoczi (2003), unemployment from Bishop, K. (2004)
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registered wage increases of less than 5 percent a year. As demonstrated in 
table 7, in almost all countries faster wage growth was “paid” by a higher 
unemployment rate. 
Since purchasing power of the euro in all transition economies is 
much higher than in the European Union, it is of relevance to establish 
purchasing power of the average wage in transition economies relative to the 
EU countries. By comparing the price levels of goods and services for private 
and household consumption, it has been established that the average wage in 
serbia can buy 2.5 times more goods and services than in the EU, implying that 
with the average wage of €320, whose purchasing power is equivalent to the 
amount of around €800,22 the level of wages in serbia is higher than in most 
of the new EU member states. 
It seems that high wages have not undermined the competitiveness of 
the Serbian economy, measured by unit labor costs. By comparing nominal 
labor costs with productivity (we obtain the so-called unit labor cost), we 
can see that serbia is not lagging behind the countries in the region (imF 
2005a), that the unit labor costs are considerably lower than in croatia, but 
that serbia is still much behind the EU candidate countries, behind romania, 
and in particular behind Bulgaria. However, it is indicative that this factor has 
22  For the sake of comparability, the calculation of PPP taken over from the archives of WiiW, 
Economic indicators for serbia, corresponds to the empirical one.
Figure 6. Gross wages, in Euros and PPP
source: Galgoczi, 2003
Gross w ges, in Euros and PPP
350 400
470 505 570
680 680 690
925
1140
1930
12
0
15
0 21
0
23
0
22
0 4
20 42
0
39
0
32
0 39
0
92
0
800
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
B
ul
ga
ria
R
om
an
ia
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Le
th
on
ia
Es
to
ni
a
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Po
la
nd
H
un
ga
ry
Se
rb
ia
C
ze
ch
 R
.
Sl
ov
en
ia
EU
 1
5
PPP Nominal wage
Serbia
6Economic Activity And Macroeconomic Policies In Transition
not substantially contributed to the inflow of export-oriented foreign direct 
investments. instead, investments were directed mainly toward “buying” 
markets, accordingly financial intermediation, trade, construction industry, 
beverage industry, i.e. non-export-oriented branches, but primarily focused on 
domestic consumption. it is obvious that for the creation of an export climate 
it is not enough to have relatively cheap labor force, which is, nevertheless, 
constantly and systematically becoming expensive, while strikes constitute a 
very frequently used method for solving various social problems of workers.
In parallel to high real wage growth and significant widening of wage 
scales, in Serbia every one in six employees in the socially owned sector is 
not receiving any wage at all. Bearing in mind that in serbia the state is a 
dominant owner of capital and a dominant employer (see table 8) maintaining 
the status quo with respect to overstaffing is one of the ways to “buy” social 
peace, and there is great reluctance to lay off redundant workers. one of the 
ways to align expenditures with the level of activity was to accumulate wage 
arrears. 
Data for 2005 show that more than 90,000 employees, or every one in 
six employees in the socially owned sector, are either not paid wages or their 
wages are paid with enormous delays, in some case as long as several years. 
Figure 7.  An estimate of unit labor costs, 2003 (annual net wages/per 
capita GDP)
An estimate of unit labor costs, 2003
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At least two conclusions can be drawn from the above: (i) a large number of 
workers is obviously employed in the gray economy, (ii) actual employment in 
private sector is greater than registered, and (iii) the total wage bill in serbia is 
higher than statistics can register.
Employment
Along with fictitious employment, unemployment is a pressing 
problem of the Serbian economy. official data indicate that there are 
,987,000 employees, and around 995,000 unemployed persons, and that the 
unemployment rate has reached the unbelievable 33.4 percent. Alternative 
research (lFs, 2003) indicates that the number of employed persons is higher 
by almost a million people, while unemployment is lower by one third, 
consequently the unemployment rate stands at about 8.5 percent. Here a 
deficiency of the monthly surveys has been redressed, since these surveys 
have not covered a large number of unregistered employed persons.
High unemployment in Serbia is predominantly a consequence of slow 
job creation, which can be attributed mostly to a poor business environment, 
and in particular to strict regulations on protection of employment, which 
were adopted despite warnings from strategic investors that such legislation 
would only undermine chances for employment growth23. in addition, job 
creation was also slowed down by relatively high unit labor costs which are 
for the most part a result of the pressure on wages exerted by insiders, i.e. 
workers in state owned enterprises or privatized companies. other possible 
23 Fic, ibid.
Тable 8. Employees to whom wages have not been paid
March 2005
Republic of Serbia Central Serbia Vojvodina City of Belgrade
1. Total ,287,529 950,467 337,062 36,489
2.  Those who have 
not received 
wages
90,656 40,55 50,05 25,526
2:1 (in %) 4.8 4.8 4.9 7.
source: sso, communiqué no. 29, June 2005
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causes for slow job creation and high unemployment, such as the structure 
of unemployment benefits, structure of wages, enterprise restructuring and 
related qualification and territorial mismatch, at best play secondary role. on 
the whole, more attention is paid to the preservation of the existing jobs, than 
to creation of new opportunities for employment. 
Labor legislation in Serbia is extremely rigid and will disable employment 
growth. On the whole, that results in maintaining the status quo, since 
political factors in Serbia prone to the prolongation of life of non-viable 
firms, rather than to creating a sound business environment. regarding 
management rights in public enterprises. a deal has been reached for the ruling 
political parties on the basis of their electoral results. For unsuccessful (or 
successful) operation of these firms they are accountable to no one, which is 
to a large extent hindering any change in the existing business environment. 
restructuring and privatization, therefore, are carried out at a pace imposed 
by international financial institutions, in particular the imF, which has made 
the remaining write-off of the debt to the Paris club creditors of around Us$ 
750 million conditional particularly on the speeding up of structural reform 
and reduction of the share of public spending in the gross domestic products. 
The key danger which the failure to meet the obligations to the imF entails, 
however, is related to the fact that this international financial organization 
practically produces an assessment whether serbia’s economic reforms are 
Figure 8. Employment
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successful or not, which has a direct impact on the country’s credit worthiness, 
as well as on the investment rating of the country. 
DEFicits
Fiscal deficit
Once a country where wheat harvest was paid to farmers exclusively by 
money creation, in the four years of transition, Serbia has become an orderly 
fiscal jurisdiction. numerous quasi-fiscal activities of the central bank were 
stopped, special budget funds and special accounts eliminated and a treasury 
was set up, and in this manner a foundation was laid for conducting sound 
fiscal policy. Pension and child benefit arrear accumulation has become 
history, while old arrears are being gradually cleared. Finally, in the beginning 
of the fifth year of transition, the value added tax was introduced at last, which 
resulted in a significant budget revenue increase. With a view to reining in 
overheated aggregate demand, the fifth year of transition will be ended with a 
low budget surplus on a cash basis, in the amount of .2 percent of GDP. in that 
respect, serbia has become a country with very strict fiscal discipline, which 
will, provided that such policy is pursued in the future as well, significantly 
increase serbia’s investment and credit rating.
In Serbia, the budget balance as such does is not a problem, the problem 
is in the size of the budget. such a high share of public spending is typical of 
all former socialist economies, and in some of them it was over 60 percent at 
the beginning of transition, only to be dramatically reduced in all the countries 
during transition (cf. WB, 998). it was empirically confirmed that public 
spending has negative effects on economic growth (Barro 2002), primarily 
because an overly high tax burden crowds out investment and thus “condemn” 
public spending to permanently remain at low absolute amounts. Therefore 
a cut in budget spending is an imperative, whose delay is going to be very 
expensive.
Such a high share of public spending is unavoidably pro-inflationary 
and inherently unsustainable, because internal equilibrium in the medium 
term crucially depends on fiscal sustainability. The past expansive fiscal 
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policy has led to rapid real wage growth and a high trade deficit, which finally 
passed through to a double-digit inflation rate and threatens to seriously 
undermine macroeconomic stability. As shown in table 9, the deficit was first 
financed out of grants, then out of foreign loans and privatization receipts. 
Thus, maintaining a too large budget proves to be harmful in two ways: not 
only that it crowds out private investment and slows down economic growth, 
but it also directs too much of the privatization proceeds, for the purpose of 
budget balancing, into consumption, which constitutes a classic example of 
disinvestment, i.e. irretrievable capital outflow into consumption.
Public spending has to be reduced first in the fields of subsidies, public 
sector wages, health and pensions, while increasing the shares of public debt 
service and government investment spending. if its share remains high, the 
growth rate will recede significantly. After restructuring, budget spending 
would be gradually reduced from the present 46 percent of GDP by one 
percentage point each year, to come down to around 40-42 percent of GDP 
by 200.24 in the case of serbia, it is of utmost importance to put an end to 
the practice of financing losses of socially owned companies, which are given 
subsidies either from the budget, or through accumulation of contribution 
and tax arrears, or through subsidized energy prices, which the energy sector 
then shifts to the budget through their own payment arrears, etc. This problem 
24  This scenario is envisaged by the World Bank and imF documents, as well as in the Poverty 
reduction strategy Paper. 
table 9. consolidated public spending in serbia, 200-2005
2001 2002 2003 2004 estimate
2005 
projection
revenue 38.9 42.8 42.7 45.2 44.8
Expenditure 40.3 47.3 46 45.5 43.7
cash balance -.4 -4.5 -3.3 -0.3 .2
Foreign grants 0.7 . 0.2 0. 0.2
Foreign loans (net) 0 .8 .2  0.9
Privatization receipts 0 2.2 4.3 0.6 3.
Domestic financing 0.7 -0.5 -2.4 -.4 -5.4
Gross public debt (% GDP) 23.2 85.4 79.2 60.2 53.
of which foreign currency 
denominated (of total debt) 92 9.9 9.9 87.9 95.
source: imF, July 2005
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in serbia is, for all practical purposes, concentrated primarily in 75 large 
socially owned companies (with more than 40,000 employees),25 where the 
restructuring process was initiated several years ago, but has not progressed 
much since then. An even more important problem is the fact that transfers 
are under a veil of secrecy, hence both their effectiveness and their final effect 
remain quite unclear. 
Public spending has been proven to reverse economic growth (Barro 
2002), and also it was empirically confirmed that the restructuring of budget 
spending (creation of a healthy business environment and the building of a 
social safety net) has a very important effect on economic growth (chadha 
and coricelli (997), roland (999)). the importance of restructuring of 
25 There are still 850 socially owned companies employing around 372,000 people.
table 0. Fiscal revenue and expenditure. 200-2004
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total expenditure 40.7 48 47.3 47 Total revenue 39.1 44.3 43.1 45.5
1.  Expenditures 
for employees 8.9 10.3 10.6 10.5 1. TAX REVENUE 37.3 43.1 40 41.7
2.  Purchases of 
goods and 
services
7.1 7.6 6.6 6.1 1.1.  Personal income tax 4.6 7 7 5.9
3.  Pension 
benefits 11.1 13.9 13.9 13.6
1.2.  Corporate 
income tax 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
4.  Social 
protection 3.3 4.2 4 3.6 1.3.  Sales tax 10.2 12 11.5 12.3
5. Subsidies 5.6 7.6 5.3 5.9 1.4. Excise 3.7 5.1 5.3 5.3
6.  Capital 
investment 1.1 2.2 2.8 2.5
1.5.  Customs duties 
and other taxes 
on imports
2 2.7 2.7 2.6
7.  Public debt 
service 1.6 1.5 3.1 3.7
1.6.  Other tax 
revenue 5.5 5 2.3 2.7
8.  Other 
expenditures 2.1 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.7. Contributions 10.8 10.8 10.6 12.3
CAPITAL 
REVENUE 0 0 0.4 0.5
source:  ministry of Finance, memorandum on the Budget and Economic and Fiscal 
Policies for 2006 with Projections for 2007 and 2008
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public expenditures, primarily with respect to the creation of the social safety 
net, is best reflected in the light of political economy of transition. namely, 
restructuring and reallocation of resources toward more efficient sectors cause 
transitory unemployment, rising poverty and inequality in income distribution. 
These costs can create a lot of resistance to reform and significantly slow 
down the restructuring process. Hence, in principle, the point is to change the 
composition of budget expenditure – by cutting current financing of (unearned) 
wages and starting with payments of severance pays. This can, to a reasonable 
extent, facilitate the restructuring process.
Reforms of the pension system, health care system and public 
administration strongly encroach on the acquired rights, and for that 
reason a strong political will and a consensus (reached at least in principle) 
between the government, employers and trade unions, are necessary for 
their implementation. However, since in Serbia the key reformer, that is, the 
government itself, is not demonstrating any willingness to relinquish its own 
management rights in public enterprises, reform has been almost completely 
halted, which naturally creates discontent and confusion among voters. That 
is why a surprisingly large portion of serbia’s electorate (5 percent) opted in 
the 2004 presidential election for a scenario of reopening previously closed 
factories and a series of similar populist proposals which would largely mean 
backtracking on reform. And that such a scenario is not impossible, one can see 
from romania’s experience, where in the course of the fifth year of transition 
happened exactly that: previously closed down factories and plants were 
reopened, privileged credit lines were reactivated, as were implicit or explicit 
fiscal incentives, which has (of course) provoked a macroeconomic crisis in 
996.26 The romanian electorate, who accepted this adventure fearing a decline 
in wages and layoffs, very soon had to face even more large-scale retrenchments 
and a huge real decline in wages, which was certainly the only outcome they 
wanted to avoid at any cost.
The failure to implement hard budget constraints to a large extent can 
make pointless all the efforts in the field of restructuring and public 
spending cuts. in a situation where privatization of large, bankrupt, socially 
owned companies has not been carried out, the climate of interventionism 
will be restored, in which it is more important for an entrepreneur to have 
good contacts in some ministry than to wisely respond to a change in 
market sentiment. Therefore, accelerated privatization and implementation 
of bankruptcy and anti-monopoly legislation, with the protection of private 
26 World Bank, transition: The First 0 years, p.55. 
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property and contractual rights, are imperative. in fact, precisely that is the 
key role of the state – to produce public goods which most directly affect the 
quality of the business environment, which ensure protection of property 
rights and safeguard competition. Uncompleted and inconsistently carried out 
reforms have already produced such an effect that the majority of employees 
still believe that assets belong to workers, and responsibility to the government, 
which was a source of numerous protests and industrial actions that in the 
fourth year of transition became almost a daily event, while reform was very 
nearly suspended.
Privatization of public enterprises and introduction of fiscal discipline 
in those companies as well, offers itself as an imperative here. Privatization of 
public enterprises is indispensable, because there is a whole range of privileged 
large state owned companies in serbia which call themselves “strategic” and to 
which, as long as they are owned by the state, the strict climate of bankruptcy 
and liquidation will not apply, and the culture of non-payment and clientelism 
will not be eradicated. Experiences of successful transition economies show 
that soft budget constraints were completely eliminated only after the 
privatization of the power industry, water supply company, telecom, and the 
like, in sum, companies which do not produce public goods and for which 
there is no rationale for remaining state owned.27 However, in such a case, the 
political parties which are running these companies will become losers, hence 
every announcement of such a possibility provokes an immediate response 
from party officials, offering an explanation that such solutions are “bad for the 
country”, whatever that may mean. Experiences show that after privatization, 
the services of these companies, as a rule, become much better, costs lower and 
the political influence of new owners, in a good regulatory framework, is much 
weaker than the influence of political parties which acquire the management 
rights without investing a single dinar in it and, by rule, without adequate 
management capacities.28 
27  Public goods are, namely, those goods which the private sector will not produce in sufficient 
quantities because it cannot adequately price them (law and order, the judiciary, defense, the business 
environment, etc.). Electricity, oil, air traffic, railroads, postal services, in brief, the production 
program of our public enterprises, certainly cannot be classified as public goods. The absence of 
privatization here can mean only one thing: that the socialist practice of buying social peace is 
continued through subsidized prices of these services, while in return the management boards of 
these companies gain a huge financial and political influence.
28  “The social Democrats will not support the privatization of JAt, EPs, nis, the railroad company. 
not because we are against privatization, but because we want partnership relations first with 
respect to these large systems,… secondly, these large systems are of both state and strategic 
interest. They cannot belong to everybody and nobody. Thirdly, through a partnership approach, 
these large systems may increase their value and then they can be privatized, in, say, five years. And 
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Deficit on the current account of the balance of payments 
The current account deficit rose in the four years of transition from 10 
to the unbelievable 15.5 percent of GDP. Thus, the experience-based rule 
– that any deficit in the balance of payments higher than 5 percent of GDP 
should be considered “dangerous” – has been exceeded as many as three 
times.29 the deficit in the last observed year (2004), however, cannot be 
considered representative, because for the most part it is a consequence of 
“anticipated” imports, resulting from the introduction of the value added tax 
on products on which no dues were levied in the past. nevertheless, the trade 
deficit was by just a couple of percentage points lower even before that, and the 
medium-term risk of such a high deficit causes great concern, because it arises 
from deep structural imbalances of the serbian economy. still, the short-term 
balance of payments risk is lower than the medium-term one, primarily due 
to the continued inflow of foreign direct investment, rising foreign exchange 
reserves, as well as to the low share of the short-term debt in the country’s 
total debt. 
fourthly, when you privatize EPS and NIS then you neither need government, nor the authorities in the 
country, because the capital is running certain things then,” 9 July 2005, a press release by the sDs, 
a party which has a key role in the minority government and “whose” line ministry has drafted the 
controversial labor law which provides for two working days off as a reward for blood donors (i.e. 
the healthiest and strongest people, for a completely harmless humane deed), etc.
29  The critical limit of a current account deficit which is sustainable in the medium term is, however, 
double that value – 0 percent (EBrD). in addition to the level of the deficit, the risk is posed also 
by the length of the period in which it uninterruptedly lasts. 
table .  current account balance of serbia’s balance of payments. 
200-2005
2001. 2002. 2003. 2004. 2005.(proj.)
current account balance. before grants. in 
mil. of U.s. dollars -. -2.0 -2.5 -3.7 -2.9
(% of GDP) -9.7 -2.9 -2.9 -5.5 -.0
trade deficit, in mil. of U.s. dollars -2.8 -3.9 -4.9 -7.4 -7.
(% of GDP) -24.5 -25.2 -23.6 -3.0 -26.6
current account balance, after grants, in mil. 
of U.s. dollars -0.5 -.4 -.5 -3. -2.5
(% of GDP) -4.6 -8.9 -7.3 -3. -9.5
source: imF. 2005a
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The key source of the huge trade deficit is in too low exports, which in 
the fourth year of transition have come to only 7 percent of the gross domestic 
product, while imports, even with the explained sudden leap in 2004, have not 
yet reached even half of GDP. in comparison with other countries of a similar 
size, serbia obviously belongs to relatively closed economies: total volume of 
serbia’s trade barely reaches 64 percent of GDP, while in other countries it 
ranges between 26 and 70 percent of GDP. (cf. table 9) 
table 2. share of foreign trade in gross domestic product
Trade in 1989
Trade volume 
in small open 
economies
Trade volume
Total Inter-national
Inter-
republic 1998 2004**
import contents 48 9 29 50-80 26.2 48
Share of exports 42 7 25 50-80 5.5 7
total trade 90 36 54 00-20 4.7 64
source:  WB, trade institutions and Policies *) includes goods and non-factor services; **)  includes 
trade with former sFry republics; comparable with the first column in the table.
source: office for national statistics; Eurostat
Figure 19.  Exports and imports in 
GDP, 2003
Figure 20.  Major export products in 
2004 (mil. USD)
Major export products in 2004, mil. USD.
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Therefore the Serbian economy has to finally open up to the world, and 
current account must not be balanced by reducing imports. On the contrary, 
it should be carried out only at a significantly higher level of trade. to that 
effect, all prepared scenarios of serbia’s sustainable economic growth envisage 
that the fastest rise has to be in exports (on average about 20 percent a year, 
while a fast rise in imports (too) is not ruled out (9 percent), not only because 
of import dependence of future export supply, but also because it was proved 
beyond doubt that closed economies have very poor economic performance 
and that their recovery usually coincides with economic opening (srinivasan 
and Bhagwati, 999).
A weak export orientation is a traditional feature of Serbian companies 
dating back to the times of former SFRY, where inter-republic (60 percent) 
trade was much more intensive than international trade. The reason is very 
simple and utterly rational: domestic firms managed to sell a good portion 
of their products in other republics on the basis of inter-republic political 
dealings, and thus the same revenue could be generated with much less work 
on the quality and promotion of products, export channels, etc. With the break-
up of sFry, exports were falling much faster than any other variable, which 
certainly constitutes the key synthetic indicator of the concerted effects of 
sanctions (992-2000) and bad economic policy conducted for ten full years 
prior to the beginning of transition in serbia. 
Figure 2.  serbia and montenegro: exports, imports and foreign trade 
deficit, 965-2005.
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Parallel to the fall in the volume of exports, their structure underwent 
significant disindustrialization. the composition of the first ten products 
exported to the EU has also radically changed: exports of machines and 
spare parts for automobiles fell from more than 5 to less than 5 percent, and 
agricultural products increased their share from 4.8 to more than 20 percent. 
The leading export products, and at the same time the strong suits of serbia’s 
foreign trade, both last and this year (2005), are iron, steel, sugar, raspberries, 
tyres, polyethilen and drugs. the estimates of the serbian chamber of 
commerce are that as many as 3,000 importers and ,300 exporters operate in 
serbia in 2005, which (ironically) more or less corresponds to the proportion 
between exports and imports in foreign trade performance. 
With annual exports of goods and services of barely 4.2 and the trade 
deficit of US$ 7.4 billion, Serbia can solve none of its pressing problems: the 
domestic product will grow slowly, unemployment will remain high, and 
the country will not be able to avoid a debt crisis. External debt sustainability 
analyses show that exports should grow at an average annual rate of around 25 
percent in the period 2005-2008, and then continue growing at a rate of around 
5 percent a year in order to eliminate this critical structural imbalance in the 
medium term (imF, 2005). The situation is rapidly improving in the course 
of 2005, in the first semester exports recorded growth of 5 percent, hence it 
appears that the imF’s requirement will be met, that this year’s export growth 
should be 25 percent relative to last year. one of the identified reasons for 
export growth is the introduced mechanism for vAt refunds after an export 
transaction has been closed. At the same time, it is an indicator that exporters 
were not reporting full amounts of their revenues in the past, in order to reduce 
part of their tax liability in that manner. if that was the main reason for such 
a sudden leap in exports, then there is a big problem, because thus created 
export growth does not leave room for further requested accelerated export 
growth. 
Both future composition of exports and directions of trade will depend 
primarily on FDIs which Serbia will manage to attract, whatever may 
be enshrined in any national export strategies. namely, it has been evidenced 
beyond doubt that the domestic economy does not have sufficient 
technological, staffing, financial or export capacities to ensure sustainable 
annual export growth of more than 20 percent, which is the primary task 
and strategic economic goal. The indirect confirmation of this view is the fact 
that the largest serbian exporter, for two years in a row, has, in fact, been the 
only multinational company that came – Us steel. Experiences of successful 
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transition economies point to fact that the mechanism of fast, export-oriented 
growth was precisely that: newly arrived multinationals were employing a 
range of domestic sub-contractors and thus influenced the growth of new 
small and medium-sized companies, which never exported on their own, but 
were building in the “domestic component” into finished goods exported by 
multinational companies. The data for 2003 indicate that in the czech republic 
60.5 percent of exports “belonged” to multinational companies, in Hungary 89 
percent, in Poland 60 percent, in slovenia 30 percent, etc. These multinationals 
directly employed between 27 (the czech republic) and 47 percent (Hungary) 
of total labor force, and thus a faster rise in employment was enabled than 
what data on factor productivity in those countries could suggest (UnctAD, 
2004). Therefore, a good export strategy inevitably turns into a good strategy 
for attracting foreign direct investment.
Remittances
Serbia’s revenue from migrants’ remittances in 2004 reached almost 15 
percent of GDP and practically became level with the earnings from exports 
of goods. According to the official data, more than 400,000 people from serbia 
work abroad, while the number of emigrants is certainly much larger (around 
3.5 million). it should be noted, however, that the statistical coverage of 
Figure 22. receipts, 2000-2004.Receipts, 20 -2004.
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remittances is still insufficiently precise, and therefore it cannot be established 
with certainty to which extent this surge in remittances can be explained by the 
increase in foreign exchange inflows through the banking system,30 and which 
portion is explained by their real growth relative to the previous years. 
Although the propensity of emigrants to send remittances is falling 
over time, the total sum of remittances, as a rule, first grows for a very long 
period owing to new emigrations. Analyses show that remittances in less 
developed regions are rising as long as the number of newly created well-paid 
jobs in the country is lower than demand for them. consequently, the highest 
percentage of the money sent to the country will be spent on basic necessities, 
while only a small portion could be directed in long-term savings or directly 
into investment (Quesada, 2005). These conclusions are certainly relevant for 
serbia as well, particularly because domestic savings have almost no tradition at 
all, predominantly because the main reasons for saving in developed countries 
– education, health and pension insurance – were non-existent in serbia in 
the past, while confidence in banks (albeit not in the domestic currency) was 
restored only recently. the inflow of remittances will in all likelihood be 
maintained for quite some time to come, while the low standard of living of 
the population will, however, significantly limit the possibility for productive 
engagement of this, on an aggregate basis, huge inflow (muco, 2003). 
Imports
Liberalization of imports and a sudden rise in aggregate demand resulted 
in an above-average rise in imports, whose composition, however, did remain 
dominated by investment goods and intermediates. Bearing in mind the need 
for accelerated economic growth, this trend should not be interrupted. The 
envisaged and expected inflow of foreign direct investment will only increase 
such imports, which is fully in line with inter-temporal budget restrictions of 
the companies as such and of the government, where the only constraint is the 
capacity to repay debts. since the procurement of equipment is financed by 
private borrowing, the sustainability of such a scenario is not threatened. 
A rise in imports of consumer goods is a consequence of the rise in 
aggregate demand and the lack of high-quality (and in some cases of any) 
domestic supply. Thus the imports of household appliances were doubled every 
30  in principle, variations in the level of remittances are attributed to the degree of appreciation, so with 
the stronger dinar the inflow of remittances is higher and vice versa. namely, particularly when they 
come to the country, migrants compensate for the fall in the purchasing power of the currency they 
have brought through intensified conversion of foreign exchange.
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year, imports of tv sets tripled every year, and of washing machines increased 
five times, etc.3 The bulk of the money, accordingly, went for replacing long 
depreciated household appliances, while part was spent on the procurement 
of less outdated models of used cars. Unfortunately, citizens are still far below 
the living standards they had in the past, and one already has to put an end to 
this policy. namely, this part of aggregate demand is to a large extent financed 
directly out of subsidized wages, consequently, out of the central and local 
budgets, whose expenditures have to be radically cut. The economy has to 
be relieved of the high tax burden, foreign grants will keep falling, while the 
time for debt repayment is nearing. Therefore, one has to apply a completely 
different strategy of economic growth, which will be driven by exports, instead 
by domestic demand, and the only precondition for such a turnaround is to 
bring wages in line with labor productivity. 
The opponents of such policy will be public enterprises, political 
parties, socially owned companies living on subsidies, importers, as well as 
pensioners, of whom only part will manage to progress to the category of 
winners. Under this development scenario, profits are “moving” to exporters 
3  imports of tv sets rose from .8 to 32 million dollars, imports of air-conditioners from around 5 
to 29.5 million dollars, of washing machines from around 2.2 to 5 million dollars, and deep freezes 
from around .4 to nearly  million dollars, and of stoves from 488,000 dollars to around 9 million 
dollars.
Figure 23. commodity imports, quarterly data, 200-2005
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and their domestic suppliers and sub-contractors, on whose success, as the 
experience of transition has shown, the success of transition actually 
depends. 
Public debt
After four years of transition, and despite debt relief granted by the Paris 
Club, to be followed by the London Club, providing for a 2/3 debt write-off, 
Serbia’s public debt is almost as high as its annual GDP (92.5 percent), while 
foreign-currency-denominated debt accounts for its largest portion: frozen 
foreign currency deposits and external debt. serbia’s external debt at the end 
of 2004 dropped in euro terms and rose in dollar terms and amounted to €0.3 
billion, i.e. Us$ 4. billion. total liabilities of the government for all kinds of 
frozen foreign currency deposits are estimated at around €4.2 billion, and the 
estimates are that 90 percent of holders of these deposits will be paid out in 
just two years.32
By applying World Bank criteria for assessing the level of indebtedness, 
it turns out that Serbia’s debt is not high, but that Serbia has extremely low 
capacity to repay the debt out of current foreign exchange earnings. namely, 
according to the present value of debt service to GDP ratio, serbia is not 
belong to severely indebted countries, while according to the other criterion 
(the present value of debt service to exports ratio) it does belong (table 3). 
since each criterion is eliminatory, serbia is still treated as a severely indebted 
32 see a detailed breakdown of external debt in Appendix 7.
Figure 24. External debt, share in GDP
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country. serbia’s total indebtedness stands at 65.7 percent of GDP, while its 
capacity to repay is very weak: the debt is more than three times its annual 
exports (37 percent), while in less indebted countries debt can be repaid, in 
principle, with one year’s export revenues. it practically means that through 
accelerated growth of exports (25-30 percent a year) serbia could easily meet 
both criteria for moderately indebted countries and thus also obtain a better 
credit rating on the international financial market. in addition, there is still 
room for debt reduction by another Us$ .5 to 2 billion, through the write-
off of Us$ 750 million of the Paris club creditors’ claims33, regularization of 
Kosovo and metohija’s debt (Us$ .2 billion), as well as through the settlement 
of the issue of surpluses with russia, china, Kuwait and libya, where the debt 
issue has not yet been regulated. 
The high tranches of debt service falling due in the near future will 
require an increase in foreign exchange earnings, but also enough room on 
the expenditure side of the budget, from which part of the debt will be serviced. 
From another angle, they also point to the necessity of changing the structure 
of final demand, restructuring the budget and cutting fiscal expenditure. namely, 
it is of utmost importance to ensure a stable rise in export revenue and thus 
accelerate economic growth, while putting an end to the subsidizing of non-
viable firms as soon as possible, and reducing the present too high burden of 
fiscal levies on other economic agents capable of creating export supply. That 
would ensure an alternative, productive use of these resources and creation of 
preconditions for export-oriented growth. The notorious “Argentine scenario” 
(see Box 2) happened precisely because economic agents were protected (by 
33  The completion of this debt relief requires a positive assessment of the Executive Board of 
the international monetary Fund of the carried out privatization of public enterprises, strict 
implementation of bankruptcy legislation and imposition of tough fiscal discipline. The decision 
has been postponed for the end of 2005.
table 3.  criteria for the level of indebtedness and serbia’s indebtedness 
in 2003
Severely 
indebted
Moderately 
indebted
Less 
indebted
Serbia, 2003
2001 2002 2003 2004
Debt/GDP x>80% 48%<x<80% x≤48% 03.9 78.2 7.0 65.7
Debt/Exports y>220% 32%<y<220% y≤32% 429.5 383.2 387.0 37.0
source: nBs, serbia’s external debt sustainability, April 2004
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subsidies) against external shocks and were not prepared and did not have any 
incentives to respond flexibly to the changes in the environment, which finally 
caused a financial collapse and a debt crisis.
Numerous external debt sustainability analyses (IMF, 2005, World 
Bank, 2004, NBS, 2005) indicate that there is no danger that the “Argentine 
scenario” could be repeated. The threshold for maintaining external liquidity 
is the average annual economic growth rate of 5 percent, a rise in the value of 
exports by 25-30 percent in dollar terms and annual inflow of foreign direct 
investment in the amount of Us$ .3-.6 billion. A considerably lower growth 
rate would be very risky, because external debt service and public spending are 
almost independent from the output volume, hence they would grow in relative 
terms. The projected substantial export growth from 9 percent to 35 percent 
in 200 implies that already in 2006 the value of exports should stand at around 
Us$ 6 billion, which based on comparisons with the neighboring countries 
seems to be feasible. together with foreign direct investment, it constitutes 
the main strategic direction of serbia’s economic development (PrsP, 2004). 
Sustainability risks, however, are not negligible. They are related to slower 
inflow of foreign direct investment, a fall in privatization proceeds and 
deceleration of reform, which would reduce the economic growth rate and 
once again increase the rate of indebtedness.
Figure 25. Public debt repayments, 200-200.
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mAcroEconomic PoliciEs
In four years of transition, Serbia changed two governments34, and 
went through four cycles in the conduct of economic policy: () reformist, 
(2) abandoning reform in mid-2003 and shifting the focus to the issues of 
economic harmonization with montenegro (to be discarded later on), with 
partial renunciation of its own initial foreign trade liberalization, (3) coming 
into power of the new government (early 2004), disorientation, the backtracking 
on reforms and almost nine months of systematic populist steps, and finally 
(4) a positive breakthrough and announcements of good reform moves (2005), 
which ensued after interventions of the imF, WB and an announcement by 
the EU about the initiation of the stabilization and association process as of 
october 2005. Thus, in these first four years of transition less than half of 
the time was spent on serious transition issues, while the remaining part was 
characterized by typical macroeconomic populism, with announcements 
about reexamining liberalization which was carried out (the end of Prime 
minister Živković’s term in office), announcements about changing the 
method of privatization and revisiting past privatization deals, reversing the 
already introduced liberalization measures, etc. (Prime minister Koštunica’s 
government). For that reason, the general public did not get the impression 
that the process of transition was inevitable and irreversible, believing that the 
most difficult reforms – elimination of subsidies, bankruptcies and large-scale 
cuts of non-productive jobs, can, in fact, be indefinitely postponed.
Unlike the first government, which made its first transition steps 
rather resolutely, but circumvented the key issue of financial discipline, the 
current government gained the reputation of the builder of non-functioning 
institutions, as well as of a silent guardian of clientelism, which now 
unwillingly has to give in to IMF’s requests. namely, a gap between populist 
announcements and attempts, on the one hand, and a final, rather restrictive, 
set of measures implemented after the government’s “successful” conclusion 
of negotiations with imF missions, on the other hand, is quite obvious. Thus, 
for instance, the same government which in 2004 had passed a “development 
budget” with a deficit in the amount of csD45 billion, reduced the deficit later 
in the same year by /3, while in 2005 it adopted a program envisaging a budget 
surplus and announced accelerated privatization of public and socially owned 
34  to be more precise, serbia has changed three governments, because after the assassination of Prime 
minister Đinđić the government obtained a new Prime minister – Zoran Živković. However, the 
composition of the government was not changed, and government policies did not undergo any 
major changes, and that is why this distinction was not highlighted in the text. 
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companies! still, since the majority of reform steps are adopted after imF’s 
interventions, the reforms as such are basically not ascribed to the will of the 
government, and policy changes are accepted with less odium than it would 
normally be the case. in the macroeconomic domain, political agreement on 
the budget surplus was achieved relatively painlessly (the parliament adopted 
the revision of the budget), but, as previously mentioned, the success will 
crucially depend on microeconomic reforms which deeply infringe upon 
party, financial and other interests, where the losses of oligarchs, insiders 
and party structures are much more explicit and much more important to 
the government than the imF’s conditionality. nevertheless, the failure to 
implement the announced measures agreed with the imF mission would mean 
that serbia has not fulfilled conditions for a write-off of 5 percent of the debt 
to the Paris club creditors (amounting to Us$ 750 million). This condition is 
practically the only incentive to coalition partners to relinquish the acquired 
privileges and accept to continue transition.
Such “stop-go” policies are in complete contradiction to two key 
principles for successful macroeconomic policy, namely that (i) all the 
measures should be implemented in small dosages, thus reducing turbulence 
to a minimum, and (ii) every successive measure must be a recognizable and 
logical sequel of the previously implemented measures (Wyplosz, Burda, 
2004). only then economic agents cease to rely more on their cronies among 
ministers than on their own forecasts of future market developments. such 
turnarounds happened not only after the second transition government 
decided (absolutely emotionally, in an unserious manner) to totally distance 
itself from all the actions of the first reformist government, but also in the 
first government, in which foreign trade liberalization from the beginning 
of transition was declared excessive and harmful 8 months later. The next 
government, on the other hand, breached its promise that it would undo 
everything what the previous government had done, and its Prime minister 
even made a statement that he was beginning to better understand former 
and late Prime minister Đinđić and a series of his pragmatic moves, whose 
most vocal and dangerous opponent was nobody else but him. regardless of 
how ironically this may sound at first, such a statement is assessed in literature 
(Belka, 2004) as a sign of the strengthening of political stability of the country, 
which is reflected precisely in the fact that the former opposition has gained 
a realistic insight into the gravity of the reform task and attained maturity 
which will help in achieving political consensus on directions and methods of 
carrying out transition. 
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In the four years of transition an array of missed opportunities can 
be identified. The most important undertaking for which the chance was 
missed is implementation of modern bankruptcy legislation. contrary to 
successful transition economies, in serbia there was not enough awareness 
of the importance of, or political will for, establishing, declaring and 
implementing hard budget constraints soon after coming into power, which 
have not been implemented to date. in the first phase of reform, at the point 
when four banks were closed, further imposition of financial discipline on the 
rest of the economy was not even mentioned, so after a while the public gained 
the impression that the “storm” was over and that everybody could go on with 
business as usual, with subsidies, party privileges and “bypass mechanisms”.
The most important missed opportunity of Prime Minister Koštunica’s 
cabinet is a failure to build a modern judicial system and the non-
implementation of key enacted laws. Therefore, not a single future step in 
serbia can be predicted on the basis of previous steps, which to a large extent 
creates uncertainty and stirs great political discontent, practically driving a 
large number of voters away from the idea to build their own better future by 
themselves, for a simple reason that they themselves do not know what kind 
of future they want to create for their voters. Therefore, it is really necessary to 
follow the two mentioned criteria for a good macroeconomic policy – defined 
objectives should be implemented in small dosages and every subsequent 
measure should be created in such a manner that it constitutes a logical follow-
up and consolidates the belief among the electorate that the government has 
both a vision and instruments with which to materialize it. This is something 
that fairly unbuilt democracies such as Hungary, Poland, slovakia, and even 
Armenia managed to do, hence there is no relevant reason whatsoever to doubt 
that such a positive experience can be implemented in serbia as well. 
Monetary and exchange rate policies
The initial stage of macroeconomic stabilization was carried out by 
using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for curbing inflation. Parallel to 
the initial price liberalization, the exchange rate was fixed at the market level, 
the regime of the so-called managed floating was introduced, and then also 
the current account convertibility under Article viii of the imF’s Articles of 
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Box 2. “Argentine scenario” and threats to serbia 
The fact that Serbia is a heavily indebted country (which implies 
an implicit threat of an outbreak of a debt crises) very often arouses 
fears in Serbia of the so-called “Argentine scenario”, which is customarily 
ascribed to IMF’s wrong policies and pressures. Therefore, the table below 
presents a short comparative overview of implemented policies in order to 
see whether there is a danger that such scenario of a debt crisis might be 
repeated in serbia.
table 4. Argentina and serbia – similarities
Crisis indicators Argentina1999-2002
Serbia
before 2002 2002-2004
Exchange rate* currency board fixed exchange rate dirty float
fiscal deficit* rising (-7%) moderate (3-4%) turnaround (surplus) 
fiscal expenditure extremely high sub-sidies high subsidies 
announced turn-
around  
fiscal revenue huge evasion, only 21% of GDP 46% of GDP 45% of GDP
privatization 
proceeds 
spent, without 
regulating monopolies in progress in progress
business 
environment
unbuilt, corruption, 
clientelism unbuilt unbuilt
pension reform poorly implemented, deficit on the rise not carried out not carried out
export 
competitiveness 
high appreciation, as 
well as subsidies
strong appreciation 
subsidies
subsidies + constant 
real effective 
exchange rate 
vulnerability to 
shocks pronounced pronounced pronounced
economic growth steady fall in GDP  moderate growth moderate growth
trade barriers explicit protection  two liberalizations FTA, WTO, SAA,
IMF’s “forbearance” marked  moderate  none
*)  one school of thought advocates the position that the crisis was caused by the 
exchange rate regime (currency board), because economic agents were not able to ad-
just to external shocks (in particular to Brazilian devaluation), while the other school 
points to the fact that fiscal spending was too high.
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Box 2 – continued
As presented in the above table, with the introduction of the “truly 
floating” exchange rate and with the beginning of policy of public spending 
cuts, the risk of such an outcome in serbia has been largely eliminated. A 
huge risk in Serbia remains in the domain of delays in pension system 
reform, where it is useful to highlight Argentina’s experience, which 
stopped halfway, when the inflow of contributions into the budget had 
ceased, and the obligation to pay pensions remained, which caused a rise 
in the fiscal deficit by another 3 percent of GDP (The Economist, 2002). 
However, surprisingly little apprehension is stirred by the privatization of 
public enterprises in which state monopolies were replaced by private 
monopolies, where new owners fired previously hidden redundant labor, 
and local officials “cushioned” a fall in the living standards by paying wages 
out of local budgets. since local budgets were automatically receiving their 
respective percentages of revenue from the central government coffers, it 
was not possible to put an end to reckless spending, and the fiscal deficit 
kept rising. in addition, the situation with local budgets got out of hand, and 
their deficit rose to 60 percent of the country’s total deficit. On the whole, 
the huge fiscal deficit is the reason for the outbreak of the debt crisis in 
Argentina. Serbia has another problem – fiscal discipline is good here, but 
the budget is oversized, crowding out investment and hindering exports 
and economic growth.
In Argentina, the policy of trade barriers and subsidies completely 
“put to sleep” economic agents and caused a huge rise in corruption and 
clientelism. And the height of irony is that although all the blame was put 
on the imF, its missions had tolerated it all – there was no conditionality 
related to either a reduction in the deficit or disinflation, and so in four 
consecutive years Argentina was running a rising fiscal deficit, had inflation, 
appreciation, negative economic growth rates, rising unemployment, but in 
its negotiations with the imF it persisted in requesting to keep the same 
exchange rate regime (currency board). Unlike Argentina, liberalization of 
foreign trade is proceeding in Serbia, albeit under pressure (harmonization 
with Montenegro, regional FTAs, WTO), but still proceeding, while the 
IMF is not tolerating a rise in inflation and the deficit.
Clientelism and corruption from the Peronist regime can be recognized 
in Serbia as well (Begović, 2004). in serbia, too, employees of socially owned
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Agreement. In this manner, inflation fell from 111.9 percent in 2000 to 41 
percent in 2001, and then to 15 percent in 2002. inflationary expectations 
were cut short, which created a sudden rise in money demand and initiated 
strong remonetization. consequently, the dinar appreciated strongly, domestic 
prices increased 2.5 times, while the nominal exchange rate went up by around 
2 percent only. in late 2002, a period of stabilization of the real exchange rate 
and faster “floating” of the domestic currency began, with further disinflation, 
which in 2003 fell to 7.8 percent. However, a surge in inflation in 2004 (13.4 
percent), coupled with increasingly strong growth in inflationary expectations 
in 2005, prompted the monetary authorities to revert to the old model of 
accelerated appreciation, with a view to anchoring inflationary expectations 
(imF, 2005).
The end of the four-year period of transition is characterized by “more 
subtle” mechanisms of inflation generation. Thus, it was noticed that local 
governments practice to deposit money in commercial banks, and then 
banks use these funds to purchase government securities That practically 
means that government money is used to buy government securities, and then 
the nBs has to sterilize that same amount of money in an effort to contain 
overheated aggregate demand and inflationary pressures – either by increasing 
the reserve requirement or by selling its own securities. likewise, by imposing 
other levies – road tolls, tv subscription fee and the like, additional fiscal 
revenues are generated, the spending of which is not under direct control of 
the republican budget and which will also require further sterilization with a 
view to curbing inflation. These were key reasons for the imF mission to agree 
to the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor in the coming period as 
well, in order to prevent a further surge in inflation.
Box 2 – continued
companies which are not working keep receiving wages out of subsidies, 
and the government has no incentive to stop this practice and thus make 
political foes out of its “clients”. Therefore, IMF’s requests for rapid 
privatization of public enterprises are practically turning into a serious 
threat to the survival of the clientelistic order in Serbia. Elimination of 
this similarity to Argentina would eliminate every danger of “Argentine 
scenario” in Serbia.
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Strong growth in foreign exchange reserves in the previous years is 
slowing down and stabilizing at the level of around US$ 5 billion. Foreign 
loans and grants continue to be the most significant items of inflow, while 
outflow is related to the sales of foreign exchange on the foreign exchange 
market, repayment of frozen foreign currency deposits and the loan for 
economic recovery, as well as to interest payments which have fallen due. 
Foreign exchange reserves are almost 2.5 times higher than money supply (see 
nBs 2005) and have exceeded the amount of four months of imports, which 
is very satisfactory. on the other hand, the fact that there is no capital account 
convertibility “protects” the reserves against speculative shocks, despite the 
existing, as well as announced, new appreciation of the currency. 
This time, in the fifth year of transition there is no excuse for returning 
to the policy of using the dinar as a nominal anchor: if it was necessary to 
begin transition by at least slightly stuffing the wallets of the very impoverished 
population that needed a break, and then proceed by publicly telling them what 
was going to happen in transition and how to choose for themselves a winning 
strategy, now this policy constitutes a hurdle to continuing transition: instead 
of reducing aggregate demand, that is, instead of using fiscal instruments, 
inflation is curbed in the most expensive way there is, by making the domestic 
currency more expensive, which entails a rise in interest rates, intensified 
spending of international reserves and an increase in the degree of monetary 
restrictiveness. in an environment where exporters should kick-start growth 
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and enable a rise in new domestic production and employment, this is not a 
smart move. The absence of political will to initiate more serious reforms is 
once again paid by halting transition, and how aware interest groups are of the 
medium-term harm they are doing not only to others, but also to themselves, 
remains an open issue. 
Despite strong remonetization, carried out primarily owing to the 
inflow of foreign grants, privatization proceeds and the euro conversion, 
which lasted as long as the middle of 2003, as well as to a very solid degree of 
monetary stability, the role of the dinar is still very limited, and our monetary 
system has a full dual-currency character, where foreign currency is a store 
of liquidity stocks and reserves. Foreign exchange reserves reached the level 
of around Us$ 5 billion in 2005 (cf. Appendix 2). Foreign exchange savings 
deposits in 2005 reached the amount of EUr.8 billion, which is almost by one 
third higher than in 2004. The dinar is used only in low-value transactions, 
and almost 80 percent of payments are made in foreign currency. Therefore, 
Figure 27. nominal and real m, 996-2005
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the domestic currency actually does not have the role of the integrator of the 
entire economy, which is an irony of its own kid, because the dinar is covered 
with 250 percent of foreign exchange reserves.
The announced return to the use of the dinar rate as a nominal anchor 
will increase the index of monetary restrictiveness35 and thus discourage 
economic activity, which will specially worsen the environment for opening 
new small and medium-sized enterprises, on which future economic 
development should be based. Therefore, it is of importance to take a look at 
the movements in this index in the past four years of transition (nBs, 2005), 
where one can clearly see that the previously mentioned two sub-periods 
(2000-2002 and 2003-2004) differ considerably in the degree of monetary 
restrictiveness, which is systematically falling and already in 2005 the two 
curves are fully separated. 
In the first four years of transition, the liqidation of four large insolvent 
banks constituted the bravest and the most accurately performed reformist 
step of the Serbian authorities, which unfortunately was not followed by 
further institution-building and approprate measures either in monetary 
35  index of monetary restrictiveness imr is a weighted sum of changes in interest rates and percentage 
changes of the exchange rate relative to the base period mcit=wi(it-i0)+ we(et-e0)+ 00, wi +we =. in 
the case the imr>00 monetary policy was more restrictive relative to the base month, while values 
below 00 point to expansive monetary policy, maravić, Palić (2004).
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or overall macroeconomic policy. in monetary policy, the entire period 
after that event is characterized by a growing degree of monetaray policy 
expansiveness, which is a result primarily of a poor set of instruments at the 
disposal of the national Bank, for which reason the national Bank was not 
able to efficiently sterilize excess liquidity. The peak was reached in the last 
quarter of 2004, when bank lending rapidly increased, with commercial banks 
borrowing abroad, selling the thus obtained foreign exchange on the foreing 
exchange market and in this manner creating credit potential for approving 
corporate and retail loans. As a consequence, monetary and credit aggregates 
rose considerably, the inflation rate started to grow significantly, and the index 
of monetary restrictiveness began to fall. changes in the reserve requirement 
did not always produce intended results, nor did the sales of nBs bills, hence 
inflation started to rise faster.
A limiting factor for the efficiency of monetary policy measures is a 
high and rising degree of euroization, predominantly due to a considerable 
share of the foreign-currency-denominated or foreign-currency-indexed 
component of banks’ balance sheets. An analysis of the consolidated banking 
sector balance sheet (nBs 2005c) has established that in late 2004 the degree 
of euroization in the country was still growing and that at end-2004 it reached 
around 55 percent. A high contribution to the increase in the degree of 
euroization in 2003 and 2004 came from considerable amounts of foreign 
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exchange which the household sector had received through severance payments, 
as well as through the sale of shares in privatized companies, in addition to the 
contribution from the increased amounts of payments to households arising 
from frozen foreign currency deposits. Furthermore, the rise in the degree of 
euroization in the course of 2004 was also fueled by acceleration in inflation 
and inflationary expectations. Besides, the fact that foreign currency deposits 
are far better protected than dinar ones, both by the exchange rate depreciation 
and by the accruing real positive interest, is just further increasing the degree 
of euroization.
Despite the dual-currency character of the monetary system, the switch 
to the euro is not a good solution for Serbia, first and foremost because 
such a step is not envisaged by the Euro area even for the new EU member 
countries, at least not for a period of two years. Unilateral adoption of the euro 
(dollarization) is appropriate for very small countries, i.e. for the countries 
whose track record is such that they are evidently unable to pursue a credible 
monetary policy. since this is not the case with serbia, this option should be 
ruled out. leaving aside the issue of seigniorage36, serbia should not deprive 
36  countries which consider dollarization have to come to terms right from the start with the loss 
of seigniorage, whose level, nevertheless, should not be overestimated. seigniorage is a difference 
between costs of putting a bill into circulation and its nominal value. For example, the cost of the 
printing of a one-dollar bill is around 3 cents, but the state can buy with that bill goods worth  
dollar. seigniorage in this case amounts to 97 cents. in the UsA seigniorage amounts to around Us$ 
25 billion a year, which is huge money, but still accounts for less than .5 percent of fiscal revenue 
and a mere 0.3 percent of the U.s. GDP. in serbia, even in the periods of accelerated money creation, 
Figure 30. Hard currency and dinar savings, 2003-2005 (mil. Din)
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itself of a very important economic policy instrument, which can play a key role, 
particularly in the following stages of transition, in finding the optimal policy 
mix for reconciling macroeconomic stability and creation of a competitive 
environment for future exporters. 
For a successful economic policy, but also for a country, it is very 
important to have a national currency which not stronger than the national 
economy. otherwise, adopting a foreign currency may be counterproductive, 
and making this shift too early entails a big risk (Popovic 200). Furthermore, 
not even the fulfillment of four maastricht criteria is enough to successfully 
switch to the euro.37 namely, it is quite possible for the country to make a 
certain effort in a year or two and to adjust its economic performance to these 
key criteria, although, realistically, its economy cannot take that pressure in 
the long run. surveys have shown that even for the most successful new EU 
members the switch to the euro could result in a recession, primarily because 
the real exchange rates of these countries are still misaligned, hence the 
introduction of the euro could cause erosion of their external competitiveness 
and increasing debt accumulation (Bulir, smidkova, 2005). Therefore, the 
appropriate policy for them (and for serbia as well) would be further slight 
depreciation, in order to bring the real exchange rate closer to its equilibrium 
level and thus improve the current account of the balance of payments. 
Abandoning sovereign monetary policy, which the adoption of the euro would 
actually mean, would in the coming period rather inflict damage on serbia 
than bring benefits to it. 
The domestic credit to GDP ratio stands at around 17 percent and is still 
low by regional standards (20 to 30 percent). The share of loans to households 
and enterprises in GDP is much lower than the average for the European 
Union, and also considerably lower than in the EU candidate countries. The 
new legislation, as well as new institutional arrangements (see the section 
on financial policy), which are to be adopted in the near future, can ensure 
credit growth and encourage development of new financial instruments, while 
strengthening financial discipline and efficiency of banks’ risk assessment 
practices. 
(994-2000) seigniorage amounted to around 2 percent of GDP, while restrictive policy pursued as 
of late reduces seigniorage to a minimum. 
37  inflation has to be low and should not be higher than .5 percentage points above the average of three 
best European countries, members of the Euro area. The state must not have a fiscal deficit higher 
than 3 percent of GDP. long-term bonds of the “candidate” country must not have significantly 
higher yields relative to government bonds of the countries in the Euro zone, while the exchange of 
euros and the currency of the candidate country must be carried out in two years within “normal 
margins of fluctuation” within Erm.
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Financial intermediation has significantly increased its share in GDP, 
reflecting the rise in confidence into the banking system, while another 
general characteristic is rapid credit growth (private sector credit rose in 2004 
by as much as 56.9 percent, while lending to households went up by all of 
25.6 percent). Furthermore, in the course of 2004, credit expansion exceeded 
deposit expansion for the first time (36.5 percent). As a result, the amount of 
loans is higher than the amount of deposits which prompted banks to turn 
to the practice of using foreign exchange deposits to finance dinar loans. 
Against the background of the increasing risks related to depreciation, the risk 
doing business in the banking sector is going up again, while the previously 
mentioned index of monetary restrictiveness is beginning to fall sharply, 
resulting in a doubling of core inflation relative to 2003 and in a considerable 
rise in inflationary expectations in the course of 2005. 
After two years of permanent slight depreciation, the real effective 
exchange rate of the dinar embarked upon a path very similar to those 
registered in the most successful transition economies (cf. the graph on the 
next page). However, there were no effects on exports and economic growth, 
primarily due to the unresolved conflict between exchange rate policy and 
incomes policy, i.e. because the political elite has not taken a decision who 
(apart from them) should be the winners and who are going to be the losers 
of the transition. Except for paying lip service by declaring “export patriotism”, 
Figure 3. Domestic credits in GDP
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the combination that was chosen in serbia was in fact a loser’s combination, 
according to which real incomes are not only growing faster than productivity, 
but their growth also completely compensates for the depreciation of the 
domestic currency. in such a scenario, individual gains of employees are 
minimal and their discontent ever greater, and all the while the chance to 
create an attractive environment for strategic export-oriented investors in 
serbia is being missed. 
Therefore, monetary policy for the coming period would have to abide 
by the golden rule according to which productivity growth has to be at least 
equal to the sum of real appreciation and real wage growth. since it has 
been announced that the exchange rate should once again play the role of a 
nominal anchor, appreciation is, accordingly, inevitable. Hence, the golden rule 
should imply two steps – a wage freeze and accelerated creation of a business 
environment which would guarantee financial discipline and attracting 
of strategic export-oriented investors who would crucially increase labor 
productivity in serbia. in this process, microeconomic reform and institutional 
reform will be vitally important, and their constant delays should be as often 
as possible emphasized to the public, thus finally pointing to interest groups, 
which usually advocate protection of employees while creating a clientelistic 
environment where only they have clear rising benefits. 
Therefore, the recommendations (or unquestionable conditions) of 
the IMF and the World Bank that it is necessary to change the policy mix 
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are really an essential prerequisite for successful continuation of transition. 
Expansive fiscal policy and further increase in employment, wages, support to 
non-viable companies and redistribution of almost half of GDP is incompatible 
with the proclaimed objective of switching to the efficient capitalist method of 
production. Further appreciation and tightening of the degree of monetary 
restrictiveness deprives the government of the possibility to pursue the policy 
of a competitive exchange rate and to attract exporters, while at the same 
time keeping non-indexed expenditures under control. The success in further 
transition will depend predominantly on the political will to reduce public 
expenditure, and thus the power of party bigwigs, voluntarily, consciously or 
under imF’s pressure, to create room for private initiative. in the meantime, 
if the building of contemporary institutions for the protection of property 
rights does not take place, transition will be render senseless, because private 
monopolies are almost more detrimental than the state ones, which serbia 
had a very good chance to see at first hand during the years in which serbian 
telecommunications were run by the italo-Greek consortium stEt/otE.
Therefore, the repetition of the “Romanian scenario” in Serbia, with the 
reopening of the closed down companies (and all that for the purpose of 
reactivating gyro accounts for financing political parties in power), is more 
likely than the so-called “Argentine scenario”, i.e. a debt crisis caused by too 
high and always public borrowing by the government. Therefore, at the end 
of the fourth year of transition, risks to fail are still higher than numerous 
individual successes, while the overall outcome remains uncertain. 
Fiscal Policy
At the onset of transition fiscal policy was to a large extent overlapping 
with fiscal reform. A single sales tax rate (20 percent) was introduced, as well 
as so-called gross wages, which include all payments to employees (vacation 
vouchers, hot meal allowances) into the base for taxation. on the expenditure 
side, the bulk of the quasi-fiscal deficit was registered, resources were secured 
for the regular payment of pension benefits, a transition fund was set up with 
a view to helping those most affected by reform, etc. However, more serious 
reforms were, for the most part, considerably delayed. Thus the value added 
tax of 8 percent was introduced as late as the fourth year of transition. The 
tax was introduced successfully and did not cause an inflationary shock, 
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particularly in light of the fact that the rate was reduced from 20 to 8 percent, 
and for some goods the vAt rate has been set at 8 percent. 
The central problem of fiscal policy remains the level of public spending, 
and key necessary changes remain in the domain of its systematic and explicit 
reduction. to this effect, the Government of serbia has publicized a plan for 
reducing the tax revenue to GDP ratio from 4.8 percent in 2005 to 38.8 percent 
in 2008, with a view to reducing the share of direct taxes, contributions and 
“non-tax” revenue. A reduction in the share, and a change in the structure, 
of public spending are priority objectives of public expenditure policy in the 
observed period. The plan is to reduce the expenditure to GDP ratio from 45.7 
percent in 2005 to 42.5 percent in 2008, while if public debt service is excluded, 
the cut in expenditures is even larger, from 4.9 percent of GDP in 2005 to 38.3 
percent of GDP in 2008.
Three problems surround the implementation of the adopted plan 
for public spending reduction: (i) a large quasi-fiscal deficit in still non-
privatized public and socially owned companies (ii) very non-transparent 
policy of subsidizing and (iii) poor control of public spending in local 
budgets. Firstly, huge inter-enterprise arrears, that deeply rooted culture 
of defaulting, can be eradicated only by means of total privatization and 
implementation of bankruptcy legislation, while building a robust and 
recognizable regulatory framework. in addition to privatization of banks and 
companies, it is also necessary to privatize public enterprises, because these 
privileged, large public companies, which call themselves ‘strategic’, impede the 
introduction of financial discipline at all levels. The government has accepted 
this task in principle, but for the time being it is not showing any signs of 
willingness to carry it out. instead of privatization, it has given itself a very 
long time limit for the selection of strategic consultants, which (judging by the 
well-known decade-long practice) can take any amount of time, after which 
another administrative obstacle can easily “pop up”.
Secondly, a very non-transparent subsidizing policy will be maintained 
to 2007, and probably long after that as well. namely, on the occasion of 
the adoption of the revised budget for 2005, it was announced that bank 
privatization will be completed by 2006, of socially owned companies by end-
2007, and of public enterprises and public services by 2008. in this manner, by 
end-2007 subsidies to loss-making companies would be completely eliminated, 
but their share in the budget for the subsequent year, 2008, would account 
for almost 0 percent of the gross domestic product. Thirdly, it is common 
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knowledge already that “tightening of the belt” at the level of the Republic 
so far has often been accompanied by increases in all types of spending at 
local levels, hence it is necessary to set up local treasuries as soon as possible 
and establish full control over the accounts of local self-government units. 
This proposal deeply encroaches upon interests of the local authorities and 
deprives political parties of significant sources of financing, therefore it stands 
no chance of being adopted for now. similarly, the voices talking about rises 
in extrabudgetary charges (road tolls, tv subscription fee) are ever louder, 
although their spending would also fuel inflation and make the task of 
containing its level in the current year below 5 percent by no means easier. 
likewise, they do not provide assurances that the government will focus on 
environment creation and production of public goods, instead on solving its 
current financial and party problems. 
table 5.  consolidated public revenue and expenditure (in percent of 
GDP),  2005-2008
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue 46.2 44.9 43.7 42.5 Total expenditure 45.7 44.6 43.5 42.5
1.  TAX REVENUE 41.8 40.7 39.8 38.8 1.  Expenditures for employees 10.5 10.2 9.8 9.2
1.1.  Personal 
income tax 6.1 6.1 5.9 5.7
2.  Purchases of 
goods and 
services
5.6 5.3 5.0 4.8
1.2.  Corporate 
income tax 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 3. Pensions 14.8 14.2 13.5 13.4
1.3. VAT 13.6 13.1 12.8 12.6 4.  Social protection 2.9 2.7 2.6 2 .5
1.4. Excise 5.3 4.8 4.7 4.7 5. Subsidies 4.7 4.4 4.0 3.8
1.5.  Customs 
duties and 
other taxes on 
imports
2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 6.  Capital investment 2.7 2.9 3.4 3.9
1.6.  Other tax 
revenue 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4
7.  Public debt 
service 3.7 4.2 4.4 4.2
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Therefore, the sequencing and pace of the envisaged cuts in public 
spending sound rather unconvincing. Namely, the party structures, instead 
of first carrying out “self-disempowerment” by privatizing public enterprises, 
and thus sending a clear signal that financial discipline will be introduced, 
they first impose the said discipline on everyone else, and on themselves only 
upon the end of the government’s term in office. such sequencing simply 
points to the well-known practice pursuant to which all but reformers and 
their political cronies will be reformed, which is a practice doomed to failure, 
as a rule. The signals which are in this manner given to the judiciary, which 
should perform a “self-reform” and produce the most important public good – 
legal security and protection of property rights – will not be an encouragement 
for the improvement of the investment climate in the country. The presented 
sequence makes it quite obvious that this plan was imposed by the imF, that 
the government itself is not convinced that such measures are necessary, and 
this sequence of steps is in fact nothing else but an “answer of a bad scholar 
to get the lowest passing grade.” recalling here that it is necessary to have 
annual GDP growth rates of at least 5 percent, export growth rates of at least 
25 percent, the question is raised as to the environment in which something 
like that is achievable, and the announced order of fiscal reforms related to this 
issue does not inspire confidence in the resolve of the authorities to implement 
these measures precisely and within the set time limit. 
Two illustrative World Bank scenarios point to the fact that inconsistency 
in reforms is very expensive (SEM, 2004). According to the first scenario, 
which includes “high quality fiscal adjustment”, the all too often mentioned 
target of a GDP growth rate at around 5 percent a year could be achieved. This 
would boost private investment and a fast rise in productivity would come as 
a result of structural reform, privatization and enterprise restructuring and a 
strong inflow of foreign direct investment.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
1.7. Contributions 12.1 11.9 11.6 11.3 8.  Other expenditures 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
2.  NON-TAX 
REVENUE 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.2
3.  CAPITAL 
REVENUE 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
source: ministry of Finance, memorandum on the budget
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The second scenario of decelerated reform would generate by 2010 per 
capita GDP which would be by around 17 percent lower than under the first 
scenario and consumption would be falling, while public spending would 
maintain its overly high share, but would remain at a lower absolute level 
than in the first scenario.
For that reason, further implementation of inconsistent fiscal adjustment 
easures would bring serbia dangerously close to the second scenario, which 
would make the continuation of reform thereafter much more expensive and 
uncertain. 
The fear of extremely unequal distribution and “impoverishment of 
the poor, and enrichment of the rich” in the scenario of faster growth is not 
justified, in spite (or, precisely because) of the fact that, in such a case, the 
table 6.  two illustrative World Bank scenarios of possible outcomes of 
fiscal and structural reform
Scenario 1 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP growth 3.0 4.4 4.5 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.0
Real per capita GDP 
(2004=100) 104.4 109.0 114.4 120.6 127.8 135.4
Total public spending* 46.8 47.0 44.9 42.4 41.6 40.8 39.8 39.0
Subsidies and transfers* 24.1 25.1 21.8 20.6 20.0 19.6 19.2 18.8
FDIs* 6.7 3.1 5.0 4.0 3.4 3.4 3.1 3.1
Financing needs*** 3.247.5 2,583.3 2,418.6 2.638,7 2,920.0 3,292.9 3,453.0 3,382.5
Scenario 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP growth 3.0 4.4 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0
Реални БДП по стано-
внику (2004=100) 100.0 103.4 106.4 109.0 111.1 113.3 115.5
Total public spending* 46.8 47.0 47.1 46.7 46.5 46.7 47.0 47.3
Subsidies and transfers* 24.1 25.1 24.9 24.4 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5
Total public debt* 79.0 65.0 63.8 64.8 66.6 68.7 71.0 73.3
FDIs* 6.7 3.1 2.9 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.4
Financing needs*** 3,247.5 2,583.3 2,9621 2,605.0 2,924.3 2,899.8 2,762.7 2,505.5
* % GDP; ** excluding grants; *** in millions of U.s. dollars.
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state will intervene much less and subsidies to non-viable companies will 
seize. The experience has shown that accelerated reforms increase inequality 
to a lesser degree, while slow reforms exacerbate it. The Gini coefficient in 
Poland rose from 28 to 3, but in russia, where reforms were slower, Gini 
grew from 26 to 5, in Azerbaijan leapt from 29 to 50; in Ukraine from 24 to 
46. Therefore, it makes sense to say the inequality grows faster when there is 
no reform, than when reforms are carried out at an accelerated pace. A large 
number of surveys indicate that the only way out of poverty is accelerated 
growth and human capital building (cf. PrsP, 2003, 2004). yet, the fact remains 
that one should expect further deepening of inequality in serbia, as well as 
relative (but certainly not absolute) deterioration of the situation of the elderly. 
However, it is well-known that the best protection of the living standards of 
the most vulnerable segments of the population is economic growth, reform 
of the judiciary, inflow of FDis and job creation in the private sector and the 
resulting accelerated economic growth, which generates sufficient revenue for 
health care and social protection, education and further (this time sustainable) 
growth in the standard of living. 
Foreign trade policy
In four years of transition, Serbia went through four divergent phases of 
foreign trade liberalization: (i) initial foreign trade liberalization in 2000 and 
200 (ii) further and unwillingly carried out liberalization aimed at (enforced) 
harmonization with montenegro (iii) reversal of the measures adopted during 
harmonization with montenegro, insisting on non-tariff barriers with a view 
to narrowing the widening trade deficit and increasingly strong rhetoric 
about the need for protection against uncontrolled imports, with concurrent 
(iv) application for membership of the World trade organization, signing 
of numerous bilateral free trade agreements with neighboring countries, as 
well as the initiation of the stabilization and Association process with the EU. 
The “stop-go” policy has led to considerable confusion in this area as well, 
regarding true intentions of the government and its possible future steps. 
Although initial liberalization in January 2001 is often called the neo-
liberal shock therapy, the weighted tariff rate was reduced on that occasion 
by a mere 2 percentage points (from 9.7 to 7.5 percent) so that the level of 
protection after “shock therapy” stayed by far the highest in the region of the 
Western Balkans (Michalopulous, 2003). The main objective, namely, was to 
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eliminate all non-tariff barriers (quotas, licenses), and to reduce the dispersion 
of tariff rates (the number of tariff rates was reduced to only 6 rates, with a 
range of  to 30 percent), while simplifying the entire system of foreign trade to 
a maximum38. The maximum rate of protection is envisaged for the products 
on which quantitative restrictions have been abolished, and all other goods 
have been classified according to the following methodology. 
the greatest “winners” of this liberalization were producers of food, 
furniture, cars and mineral fuels, while protection was reduced the most in 
the sector of primary products (meat, zinc, wood, etc.). cars and tractors were 
accorded two times higher protection than it is envisaged by the methodology 
(20, instead of 0 percent), while for a larger number of primary products a 
drop in the degree of protection was more substantial (agricultural products, 
sugar, meat, cereals, zinc, wood, aluminum, etc.)
It is interesting to present here the experience of Serbian agriculture 
which systematically improves its trade balance, but not due to falling 
imports owing to increased protection. On the contrary, balance improves 
due to the permanent export growth. As a consequence of liberalization, a 
deficit in the trade balance of agricultural products and foodstuffs had grown, 
and for that reason, in 2003 the Government introduced protective measures 
again. However, figure 3. shows that balancing after liberalization was not 
achieved through lower imports, but through higher exports, which could by 
no means be affected by liberalization. still, bearing in mind serbia’s endeavors 
38.  Amendments to the law on Foreign trade of December 2000, decreased a large number of 
administrative barriers to trade, by eliminating numerous unnecessary controls, including the 
minimum value of company’s fixed assets and employment, the annual fee for registration of trade 
companies in the amount of Dm 000, and the obligation to file a tax return and pay the tax on 
import/export transactions to the Federal ministry of Foreign Economic relations, etc. 
table 7. methodology for setting customs tariffs
tariff rates 
(%) Products
 intermediates and equipment which is not produced in the country 
5 intermediates produced in the country
0 machines and equipment produced in the country
20 consumer goods  not produced in the country 
30 consumer goods  produced in the country and luxury items 
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to become a member of the Wto, one could not expect that the existing level 
of protection can be maintained. in essence, protection has sent a wrong signal, 
so inevitable adjustments, which could make the sector more competitive on 
domestic and foreign markets, were unnecessarily delayed (cf. ministry of 
Agriculture, 2004).39
Further liberalization of Serbia’s foreign trade regime was initiated in 
2003 by means of an Action Plan for the Harmonization of the Economic 
Systems of Serbia and Montenegro. Through the process of harmonization, 
the average level of customs tariffs in serbia slightly decreased (from 7.5 to 
6.), which placed serbia in the middle of the list of transition economies.40 
The adopted liberalization measures stirred up a lot of odium even among 
economic policy makers themselves, and the campaign for return to higher 
levels of protection in late 2003 became a trade mark of the election campaigns 
39  in late 2000 the European commission approved the exemption from customs duties of all 
agricultural exports to the EU market (with the exception of baby beef and wine, to which tariff 
quotas apply, as well as to certain fishery products). one of the conditions was not to increase barriers 
for their agricultural products. yet, serbia has increased import protection for certain products 0 
to 40 times, and for certain products (tomato, peas, spirits and tobacco) introduced special import 
levies which had not existed before.
40  The average tariff rate in the countries of south East Europe in 2002 was 8.5 percent. The lowest 
rates were in croatia and moldova (5 percent), followed by Albania (7.4 percent), Bosnia (6 percent), 
Bulgaria (9.7 percent), macedonia (2.6 percent) and montenegro (6. percent in 2003)
Figure 34. trade in agricultural products, 2000-2005
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of all opposition parties. thus, with the coming into power of the new 
government, the quashing of all the measures adopted in 2003 was immediately 
announced, and after a twin-track approach was adopted in october 2004 in the 
negotiations between the EU and serbia and montenegro on the stabilization 
and Association Agreement, that was actually done.4 
Part of the delay in liberalization is certainly a consequence of lobbyist 
pressure (from certain non-competitive domestic producers), but the fact 
that newly arrived strategic investors are also accepting such practice should 
not come as a surprise, either. Thus, the multinational company Henkel, which 
bought Merima of Kruševac in 2004, will be remembered for its statement 
in which it accused the state of not taking into account interests of foreign 
companies that have already invested money in serbia. The biggest grudge that 
the management of Henkel-Merima had against the serbian authorities was 
related to their liberalization of the imports of goods produced by that factory, 
which has exposed them to too much foreign competition, as if Henkel was not 
a company which formed and acquired its capital, reputation and expansive 
development strategy within the EU, and, as such, was used to “foreign 
competition”. likewise, very often there are discussions about uncontrolled 
imports of foodstuffs and consumer goods which directly affect the development 
4  Parallel to the increase in the number of tariff lines, tariff rates for 70 products have been increased 
(in fact, they were returned to the level at which they were before harmonization with montenegro), 
and reduced for 64 products (mainly for those produced predominantly or exclusively in 
montenegro and which we were protecting here in serbia). The increased rates referred mostly 
to leather, furniture, electrical appliances, and the reduced ones to raw materials, such as ferrous 
metallurgy, wood, aluminum, textiles. The total effect of these three changes (the increase in the 
number of lines and the parallel reduction, i.e., increase in rates) is a drop in the nominal average 
tariff rate from 8.8 percent to 8.7 percent. There were no changes in the weighted rate – it is still 
around 6.3 percent. of course, if one took into account all the free trade agreements, the rate would 
certainly be considerably lower, which indicates that the time of customs protection is definitely 
history.
table 8.  movements in average nominal and weighted tariff rates in 
serbia
tariff rate initial situation 2000
liberalization 
200
Action plan 
2003
revision in 
2005
weighted  9,7 7,5 6. 6,
non-weighted 4,4 9.5 8,8 8,7
source: WB, 2004, customs Administration, 2005
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of domestic production, and that same rhetoric is used whenever there is a 
need to secure higher protection for one’s own production. 
Parallel to the strengthening of protectionism and the announcement 
of introduction of non-tariff barriers, Serbia continues to negotiate about its 
membership of the WTO, continues to use preferential treatment in trade 
with EU countries and expands free trade with Western Balkans countries. 
therefore, it is obvious that the time of the closed economy and autarkic 
ideas is almost over and the rhetoric according to which “liberalization is a 
good thing, but the time is not right yet” could be expected to fade out before 
specific commitments stipulated in the documents referring to the Wto 
membership and in the future stabilization and Association Agreement with 
the EU. Bearing in mind that these documents are almost exclusively related 
to specific steps in and pace of liberalization, economic policy in this field will 
become endogenous, which will make the economic environment much more 
transparent, and without doubt significantly facilitate to economic agents the 
assessment of profitability of their possible business decisions.
Integration into the world economy is the key to further economic 
growth of Serbia, which will inevitably lead to further systematic reductions 
in the degree of protection. Basically, it is in line with the tendency to attract 
FDIs, which certainly do not need measures for infant industry protection 
although they will be glad to take advantage of them, if available, like in the 
previously mentioned case of Henkel-Merima. Therefore, it is in serbia’s best 
interest (i) to make a definite break with “stop-go” policies and (ii) to make its 
policy for and pace of opening up endogenous, meaning, independent from 
future elections, future ministers, and, which is the most important thing, 
independent from the influence of lobbyist groups, which have so far not only 
halted every liberalization, but also systematically brought it back to square 
one. in this manner, a possibility will be opened to finally abolish the monopoly 
on oil imports, introduced at the very beginning of transition. This abolition, 
despite several dozen announcements, remains uncertain.42
In such a scenario of economic opening up and intensive FDI inflows 
there will be no room any longer for writing lengthy export strategies or for 
providing incentives to particular exporters (instead of creating a good export 
environment). namely, positive effects of the arrival of foreign investments 
are realized only if a country has solid macroeconomic stability, high quality 
42  The monopoly was introduced with an explanation that only in that manner illegal importation of 
crude oil can be combated, which, together with cigarette smuggling, was the most lucrative business 
in the gray economy of that period. of course, the influence of the serbian oil industry (nis), which 
yields almost one quarter of the serbian budget, probably was decisive here.
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human capital and good infrastructure (sEm, 2004). serbia has this potential, 
still, as mentioned several times, microeconomic reforms are lagging behind 
and calling into question the entire scenario, feasible in principle, of accelerated 
export-led economic growth. 
Incomes and employment policies 
Incomes policy will be key for deceleration of inflation, containing of 
domestic demand and growth in competitiveness. in all four years of 
transition, the only economic magnitude which had a systematic high 
upward trend were – wages of employees, whose pace vastly exceeded labor 
productivity and thus systematically increased inflationary pressures and 
fueled inflationary expectations. Therefore, the government was forced, for 
the purpose of preserving macroeconomic stability, to limit wage growth and 
announce its future much more moderate growth.
Since the government is the largest employer in Serbia, directly 
employing more than 30 percent, and indirectly almost half of the total 
number of employees, its behavior in this area will crucially determine 
the future inflation rate. This is all the more true, because the completion 
of privatization is envisaged for as late as end-2008, so the wage bills in state 
owned and public enterprises have to be strictly controlled in the meantime. 
the problem is additionally aggravated by a high level of overstaffing in 
table 9. Degree of openness and economic growth rates, 2004
openness (% GDP) GDP growth (%)
Estonia 77,7 6,0
slovak republic 52,7 4,4
czech republic 32,0 2,0
Belarus 43.4 4,7
Hungary 3, 3,3
Bulgaria 2,9 4,8
slovenia 4,4 3,0
latvia 0,5 6,
lithuania 3,9 6,7
source: WiiW, 2005
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these companies, for which reason it was announced (and agreed with the 
imF) that the public sector employment will be reduced by 0 percent in the 
course of 2005. in this manner, nearly 60,000 workers would be laid off, which 
would make room for wage increases (but also wage decompression) in the 
administration, which would help to keep highly qualified staff and prevent 
them from searching for better paid jobs in the private sector.
The current minority government which has gained the reputation of a 
silent guardian of clientelism, in essence will have a problem with accepting 
any policy which infringes upon acquired workers’ rights, hence the main 
applied method is voluntary lay-offs, against redundancy payment, which 
partly compensates for the loss of future wages. Thus, in the course of 2005, 
some csD0 billion will be paid to workers as severance payments (five billion 
dinars has already been allocated to the transition Fund, another three billion 
is expected there after the revision of the budget, while two billion dinars will 
be secured from privatization proceeds)43. Although this amount of resources 
constitutes a huge burden, it is, according to its character, a one-off payment, 
and relieves the state of the obligation to pay in the future 
Unemployment is certainly the greatest problem of the state, which will 
be inevitably exacerbated by additional lay-offs, and it is not very likely 
that new employment will be generated out of the resources set aside for 
severance payments. namely, the expectations of the government that workers 
will finance their own new employment out of severance payments were 
absolutely unrealistic, mainly because the largest number of workers who 
voluntarily left their companies against severance payments already had jobs 
in the gray economy, or have simply given up on searching for a new job due to 
inadequate qualifications, age, etc.
The ambitions of the government that workers would finance their own 
new employment out of severance payments proved unsuccessful largely 
because political consensus has not yet been reached on the very essence 
of the reform, transition package. Firstly, the environment is still not 
conducive to investment. if the government is not able to implement hard 
budget constraints and thus ensure financial discipline, it is hard to believe that 
inexperienced yesterday’s workers would dare venture into self-employment, 
where there are no guarantees from anywhere that they will be able to collect 
their claims, in an environment where being a debtor still pays off better than 
being a creditor, and where any transparency of business operations, even the 
43 news bulletin of the ministry of Finance, may 2005 
05Economic Activity And Macroeconomic Policies In Transition
publication of a list of illiquid companies, is met with resistance, including 
from the minister of Economy. Against such backdrop, it is obvious that the 
environment for foreign direct investors who would jump-start a chain of 
healthy, export demand, stands no chance of becoming a priority. on the other 
hand, the government itself has left the restructuring of “its own” companies 
for the end of its term, or even for the beginning of the term in office of 
some other government, thus announcing that it has no intention of giving 
up on the current clientelistic management model. Transition is, namely, a 
holistic (comprehensive) process and individual good measures cannot be 
a replacement for not making other, equally important reform steps. in the 
absence of decisive and consistent measures in privatization of “own” public 
enterprises, the signal which is sent to the population and economic agents 
is that radical reforms are being postponed for some other, more favorable 
times. The only remaining question is – how to achieve economic growth of 
5 percent a year, export growth of more than 25 percent a year and be current 
on payment of obligations to creditors which will fall due in the absence of such 
reforms. 
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Appendix .  main sources of real GDP growth in the first four years of 
transition
source:  memorandum mEmorAnDUm on tHE BUDGEt AnD Economic AnD 
FiscAl PoliciEs For 2006 WitH ProJEctions For 2007 AnD 2008
main sources of real GDP growth in the first four years of transition 
were:
 in 200, growth in agricultural production of 8.7 percent, growth in 
retail trade sales of 9.7 percent, growth in Ptt and telecommunications 
of 20.9 percent and a rise in the volume of transport services of 9.6 
percent;
 in 2002, industrial production growth of .7 percent, growth in retail 
trade sales of 23.9 percent, a rise in the volume of transport services 
of 6.9 percent and growth in Ptt and telecommunications of 3. 
percent;
 in 2003, growth in retail trade sales of 2.6 percent, growth in Ptt and 
telecommunications of 6.2 percent, a rise in the volume of transport 
services of 5 percent and growth in the construction industry measured 
by hours of work of 0.8 percent;
 in 2004, industrial production growth of 7. percent, growth in agricultural 
production of 9.8 percent, growth in Ptt and telecommunications 
of 29.9 percent, growth in retail trade sales of 7.9 percent, a rise in the 
volume of transport services of 5.2 percent, in the construction industry 
measured by hours of work of 3.5 percent.
in the past four years of transition, to real GDP growth contributed:
 in 200, real growth of value-added in agriculture of 7.5 percent and 
in the service sector of 3.5 percent;
 in 2002, real growth of value-added in the service sector of 4.5 percent;
 in 2003, real growth of value-added in the construction industry of 
0.8 percent and in the service sector of 5.6 percent;
 in 2004, real growth of value-added in agriculture of 9 percent, in 
industry of 7.5 percent, in the construction industry of 3.5 percent and 
in the service sector of 8 percent.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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long-term and medium-term debt, which accounts for around 97 percent 
of total debt, amounts to Us$ 3,740 million (stock at end-April), of which the 
Appendix 2.  serbia’s external debt – stock at end-April 2005 (in millions 
of U.s. dollars)
Foreign creditors Principal Regular interest
Late 
interest Total 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 4,817 5 8 4,831
IMF 870 870
IBRD 2,342 2,342
IDA 430 430
EUROFIMA 152 152
IFC 98 5 8 111
EIB 272 272
EC – European Community 336 336
EUROFOND – CEB 27 27
EBRD 291 0 291
GOVERNMENTS 3,371 172 106 3,649
PARIS CLUB 2,946 0 0 2,946
Consolidated debt 2,713 2,713
Loans contracted after December 
20th 2000 233 233
OTHER GOVERNMENTS 425 172 106 703
LONDON CLUB – reconciled debt 1,077 1,077
LONDON CLUB – unreconciled debt 42 32 12 85
OTHER CREDITORS 2,700 84 314 3,099
SHORT-TERM DEBT 1,286 1 1,286
CLEARING 93 13 106
TOTAL DEBT 13,384 307 440 14,132
Of which Kosovo: 1,147 21 62 1,229
nBs data
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largest part is debt to iFis (Us$ 4,83 million in total). it is noted that the stock 
of debt to iFis at end-2002 was Us$ 3,355.5 million, while at end-2003 was by 
more than one billion dollars higher, i.e. amounted to Us$ 4,533.5 million. At 
and-2004 it amounted to Us$ 5.089 million.
long-term and medium-term debt, relative to December 2004, was higher 
by more than Us$ 800 million at end-April 2005, while short-term debt was 
higher by Us$ 230 million (at end-April it amounted to Us$ ,229 million). 
Debts to the World Bank (Us$ 2,342 million) and the international monetary 
Fund (Us$ 870 million) account for a dominant part of the debt to iFis.
source:  serbian chamber of commerce, January-may 2005, 
http://www.pks.co.yu/pks/pdf/mep/mepmaj2005.pdf
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Appendix 2 (continued)
source: imF country report no. 05/233, July 2005, page 36
 - 36 -  
Total
Creditor          Debt Principal Interest Late Total
Interest Arrears
Total debt 14,876 1,593 347 465 2,405
Of which:
Serbia 14,099 1,543 332 428 2,303
Montenegro 777 51 15 37 103
Multilateral institutions 5,554 10 5 9 24
IMF 962 0 0 0 0
IBRD 2,839 0 0 0 0
IDA 462 0 0 0 0
EUROFIMA 170 0 0 0 0
IFC 134 10 5 9 24
EIB 313 0 0 0 0
European Community 361 0 0 0 0
EUROFOND - CEB 33 0 0 0 0
EBRD 280 0 0 0 0
Official bilateral creditors 3,923 288 177 102 567
Paris Club 3,227 0 1 0 2
Other official bilateral creditors 697 288 176 102 565
Commercial creditors 4,400 652 164 355 1,170
London Club 1,164 27 31 11 69
Other commercial creditors: convertible currencies  3/ 3,052 466 108 344 917
Other commercial creditors: nonconvertible currencies  3/ 184 159 26 0 184
Short-term debt  3/ 999 644 0 0 644
Trade credits on oil & gas imports 4/ 240 240 0 0 240
Other short-term debt 759 404 0 0 404
Sources: SM authorities, and IMF staff estimates.
1/ Debt figures reflect the Paris Club debt rescheduling agreement (November 2001) and London Club restructuring (signed in July 2004).
    2/ Regular and late interest calculated in accordance with terms of original agreements.
3/ Debt is not owed by government and does not have government guarantees.
4/ Overdue obligations (trade credits) owed to oil and gas enterprises in Russia.
Table 11. Serbia and Montenegro: Stock of External Debt at December 31, 2004  1/
     (In millions of U.S. dollars)
Of which:  Arrears  2/
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Appendix 2 (continued)
two illustrative World Bank scenarios
movements of selected variables under two illustrative scenarios, 2003-
200
Scenario 1 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP growth 3.0 4.4 4.5 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.0
Gross domestic 
savings* -7.0 -4.0 -2.5 0.1 2.5 4.0 5.2 6.1
Real per capita GDP 
(2004=100) 100.0 104.4 109.0 114.4 120.6 127.8 135.4
Total public spending* 46.8 47.0 44.9 42.4 41.6 40.8 39.8 39.0
Wage bill* 10.3 10.6 10.1 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.7 8.7
Subsidies and 
transfers* 24.1 25.1 21.8 20.6 20.0 19.6 19.2 18.8
Public investment* 2.1 2.9 4.0 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.1
Government deficit* ** -4.2 -3.4 -2.4 -0.9 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1
Total public debt* 79.0 65.0 63.0 59.5 56.1 52.5 49.1 45.6
Imports* 41.9 41.2 42.8 43.5 44.2 45.1 45.5 46.0
Exports* 19.2 20.4 22.8 24.0 25.5 26.9 28.0 29.2
Current account 
balance* ** -12.6 -11.0 -9.8 -8.8 -8.1 -7.6 -6.9 -6.2 
FDI* 6.7 3.1 5.0 4.0 3.4 3.4 3.1 3.1
Total external debt* 68.2 64.0 64.0 63.2 63.9 64.5 64.6 64.2
Debt service/ Total 
exports  7.4 13.8 11.0 8.9 12.1 12.8 12.3 11.4
Financing needs*** 3,247.5 2,583.3 2,418.6 2,638.7 2,920.0 3,292.9 3,453.0 3,382.5
Scenario 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP growth 3.0 4.4 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0
Gross domestic 
savings* -7.0 -4.0 -4.1 -3.7 -3.1 -1.9 -0.4 1.2
Real per capita GDP 
(2004=100) 100.0 103.4 106.4 109.0 111.1 113.3 115.5
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Scenario 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total public spending* 46.8 47.0 47.1 46.7 46.5 46.7 47.0 47.3
Wage bill* 10.3 10.6 10.7 10.9 10.9 11.0 11.0 11.1
Subsidies and 
transfers* 24.1 25.1 24.9 24.4 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5
Public investment* 2.1 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
Government deficit* ** -4.2 -3.4 -4.6 -4.6 -5.1 -5.4 -5.7 -6.0
Total public debt* 79.0 65.0 63.8 64.8 66.6 68.7 71.0 73.3
Imports* 41.9 41.2 40.8 40.2 39.5 38.8 38.1 37.4
Exports* 19.2 20.4 20.6 20.8 21.3 22.1 22.8 23.7
Current account 
balance* ** -12.6 -11.0 -10.8 -9.9 -9.0 -7.8 -6.6 -5.2
FDI* 6.7 3.1 2.9 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.4
Total external debt* 68.2 64.0 65.4 66.5 69.7 72.4 74.1 74.9
Debt service/ Total 
exports  7.4 13.8 12.6 11.1 14.6 15.7 15.3 15.1
Financing needs*** 3,247.5 2,583.3 2,962.1 2,605.0 2,924.3 2,899.8 2,762.7 2,505.5
* % GDP; ** excluding grants; *** in millions of U.s. dollar
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Public Finance Policies
INTRODUCTION
Changes that Serbian public finance underwent in four years of transition have 
covered all its elements: policies as such, the manner of their implementation 
and the implementing institutions.
Serbia embarked upon an overhaul of public finance with a completely 
disintegrated budget system and practically non-existent policies of public 
revenue and expenditure. The lack of transparency of public finance was 
complete. More than 40 percent of public revenue went into a multitude of 
extrabudgetary funds, which were financed out of over twenty different 
earmarked taxes. In the course of the 1990s no serious tax policy was pursued 
to begin with. Instead, one could say that the efforts of the policymakers 
were focused on identifying a possible base for taxation for the purpose of 
immediate collection of public revenue. For example, in 1998, 1999 and 2000, 
tax revenue (consumption taxes, corporate income tax, personal income tax 
and property taxes) accounted for a mere third of total public revenue, while 
around 14 percent of public revenue was collected from various fees and levies. 
New public dues were introduced by virtue of bylaws, while in tax laws multiple 
tax rates and sectoral tax policy were a rule. The responsibility for assessing, 
collecting and controlling public revenue was shared among three mutually 
completely uncoordinated institutions: the Republican Public Revenue Agency 
(PRA), the Financial Police (FP) and the Payment and Clearing Bureau (ZOP). 
Tax compliance was almost non-existent, while selective and biased write-offs 
of tax debts and offsets, which accounted for as much as 25 percent of the 
Republican budget’s revenue, were standard practice. The role of the Ministry 
of Finance in budget execution reached as far as transferring the resources to 
the accounts of budget beneficiaries. Individual budget beneficiaries managed 
the transferred budget allocations autonomously, spent them or deposited 
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them in banks as “savings”. That is how an absurd situation was created, that 
the Republic was running a budget deficit, while the beneficiaries of budget 
resources had excess funds sitting in banks.
A logical consequence of this situation in Serbia’s public finance were 
irregular and unreliable payments from the budget, arrears and failure to 
meet obligations, and all that has ultimately resulted in accumulated internal 
indebtedness to households and businesses, amounting to over 5 billion euros 
(frozen foreign currency deposits, social security funds, arrears to suppliers) 
and foreign debt, which was estimated at more than 10 billion euros (Paris 
Club, London Club, World Bank, as the largest creditors).
Macroeconomic stability is one of the essential prerequisites for 
transition. Stability and reliability of public finance are, on the other hand, the 
key to macroeconomic stability. For that reason, the issues of stabilization and 
establishment of a public finance system, of definition and implementation of 
public revenue and public expenditure policies, naturally arise at the beginning 
of a transition process as the most important ones for the success of transition 
as a whole. Concurrently, huge expectations of the population with respect 
to immediate improvement of the living standards, the political sensitivity 
of policy choices that, in the nature of things, constitute a redistribution 
among social groups, coupled with an inherited and deeply rooted tradition 
of soft budget constraints among all economic stakeholders – the population, 
economy and state at all levels of government, made up a very complex set of 
restrictions in opting for policies. 
Furthermore, the changes brought about by transition, such as privatization 
or reform of the judiciary, were logically putting some specific requests, too, 
before the policies of both public revenue and public expenditure. Changes in 
the structure of the state had a direct impact on the organization and even choice 
of public finance polices, namely both the formal cessation of the existence of 
the federal state and the formation of the present-day State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro, as well as the changes in the status of Vojvodina. The first 
change meant new competences for Serbia, the second one for Vojvodina, and 
both posed new questions for the organization of public finance. In addition, 
the unresolved state status of Kosovo and Metohija, a province over which 
Serbia has no jurisdiction, but has the obligation to provide financial assistance 
for the stabilization of conditions of living there, poses another problem. 
Moreover, the fact that Montenegro and Kosovo and Metohija are separate 
tax jurisdictions within what is formally a single State Union requires special 
solutions, particularly in the implementation of tax laws. 
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In brief, those were the circumstances in which the transition of Serbia’s 
public finance was initiated and carried out. This paper will describe it, and 
evaluate its achievements and results through a discussion about critical issues 
it endeavored to resolve and objectives set before it. In other words, the analysis 
of public finance policies in this paper will not follow the chronological order 
of events, but will focus on the analysis and assessment of the successfulness 
of the outcomes of the chosen policies. The analysis will first deal with public 
revenue policy, and within it, primarily with tax policy, and then with public 
expenditure policy, focusing on the budget system.
However, in order to enable the reader to get an impression of sequencing, 
a concise chronology of the most important steps in changing Serbia’s public 
finance will be presented first.
A CONCISE CHRONOLOGY OF THE MOST 
IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 
The entire year 2001 was devoted to tax policy. In March and April 2001, 
new laws were adopted on the sales tax, excises, personal income tax, corporate 
income tax, property taxes, in a word, on all tax forms which are governed by 
laws. The Law on Public Revenue and Public Expenditure was amended, too. 
The most important changes include the introduction of a single sales tax rate 
of 20 percent and the establishment of the concept of gross wage as a base 
for taxation. Likewise, the Law on the Wage Bill Tax, Law on the Financial 
Transaction Tax and Law on Taxes on Use, Possession and Carrying of Goods 
were enacted. The first one defined a new source of financing for local budgets, 
while the other two basically constitute the integration of the tax system 
through statutory regulation of levies previously governed by decrees. In June 
2001, the Law on the One-off Tax on Extra Profit and Extra Property Gained 
through the Use of Special Privileges was also adopted. 
The year 2002 was marked by the adoption of procedural laws: the Budget 
System Law (Organic Budget Law) and the Law on Tax Procedure and Tax 
Administration. These laws have set procedural and institutional foundations 
for budget preparation and execution and application of tax laws. In the said 
year, all material tax laws were also amended, both in order to harmonize them 
with the adopted procedural tax law, and in order to pursue a policy of reducing 
the tax burden and increasing tax incentives for investment and employment. 
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In the mentioned year, a new Payment Operations Law was adopted, which 
provided for the elimination of the Payment and Clearing Bureau in 2003 and 
the transfer of payment transactions to commercial banks. In 2002, another 
two laws were adopted, whose implementation put the budget of the Republic 
under a long-term obligation. These are the laws on the regularization of 
FRY’s public debt arising from frozen foreign currency deposits and on the 
regularization of FRY’s public debt arising from contracts on foreign currency 
household deposits placed as term deposits with Dafiment banka and Banka 
privatne privrede (Private Business Bank). These laws have obliged Serbia to 
issue foreign currency bonds which it will be purchasing according to the 
statutory schedule by 2016.
Of 2003 it can be said that it primarily was the year of the implementation 
of the already adopted laws. In early 2003, the application of the Law on Tax 
Procedure and Tax Administration commenced and the Tax Administration, an 
organizationally and functionally completely new institution that was founded 
on the strength of it, began its operation. In that year payment operations were 
moved to banks, and the Public Payment Agency started to work, entrusted 
with the tasks of performing payment operations for budget beneficiaries and 
administering the treasury single account system. In 2003, the preparations 
also began for the introduction of fiscal cash registers. The most important 
law adopted in that year was a new Customs Law, which governs customs 
procedures and provides for the incorporation of the Customs Administration 
into the Ministry of Finance, which legislation-wise has rounded off the transfer 
of competences in this domain from the former federal state to Serbia. Some 
tax laws were once again amended in that year. The most important changes 
include amendments to the Law on Excises, which eliminated a number of 
excises and defined a long-term excise policy vis-à-vis tobacco products.
In 2004, two new, extremely important laws were passed: the Law on the 
Value Added Tax and the Law on Contributions. The first one has completely 
changed the method of taxing consumption, while the other one has defined 
contributors, bases and rates for mandatory social security contributions in a 
single piece of legislation, and established a single minimum base. That year was 
important also because of the elimination of the financial transaction tax and 
wage bill tax. The elimination of the second one coupled with the introduction 
of the value added tax (VAT) sharply underlined the necessity to resolve the 
issue of financing local self-governments, which were also faced in the said 
year with the beginning of the implementation of the Budget System Law as 
well as with the setting up of their own treasuries and application of relevant 
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procedures. All material tax laws were amended in 2004 as well, both because 
of the harmonization with the value added tax and the implementation of 
the policy of further tax burden reduction. Similarly, the Law on Fiscal Cash 
Registers was adopted, which replaced a decree with the same name, whose 
legal grounds were in the Law on the Sales Tax, supplanted by the VAT Law. In 
late 2004, almost unobtrusively, another completely new tax law was passed, 
which introduced a new and, as it seems, completely unorthodox tax form into 
Serbia’s tax system: taxation of non-life assurance premiums. In 2004, with the 
adoption of the Law on the Regularization of Obligations of the Republic of 
Serbia Arising from the Loan for Economic Recovery, a method was prescribed 
for the repayment of yet another part of the state’s public debt to households, 
and the budget of the Republic was put under an obligation to repay a total of 
56 million euros of this debt by 31 July 2007. 
In all these years the central government annual budgets were adopted 
under the watchful eye of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose 
approval was one of the implicit, yet key prerequisites for submitting the budgets 
to the Parliament for adoption. It was not easy to reconcile the key requirements 
related to the deficit levels and hard budget constraints on public expenditure 
with wishes of budget beneficiaries and social and political demands. On the 
whole, however, it should be noted that the crucial IMF’s requests were support 
in the establishment of stable public finance in Serbia, rather than an obstacle 
to it. This does not mean that all the IMF’s recommendations, and in particular 
the suggested policy mix for the achievement of a particular objective, were 
always appropriate for the Serbian circumstances, but it does mean that the 
IMF played a role of an additional safety catch for the preservation of still very 
fragile stability of Serbian public finance. 
PUBLIC REVENUE POLICIES
Developments in the field of public revenue 
collection and structure 
It should be noted at the beginning of the analysis of public revenue 
policies that the basic indicator of the validity of a tax policy – in its normative 
and administration parts alike – is very measurable – and that is the size of 
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government tax revenue. Tax policy sets the rules of the perpetual (mainly 
uncooperative) game between the state and taxpayers. The outcome of this 
game is reflected in the ability of the state to finance its expenditures. This 
outcome also constitutes the most important comment on all tax laws, both 
past and present and future.  
Therefore, table 1 presents the data on the size, dynamics and structure 
of tax and quasi-tax revenues in Serbia in the period from 1998 to 2004. 
The need to compare this final result of tax policy in the transition period 
with the one of tax policy in the previous period imposed the choice of 
collection indicators. Due to significant changes in the definition, coverage and 
distribution of public dues among different levels of government, it is possible 
to measure only the data on gross collection and groups of tax and quasi-tax 
forms. The piece of data on gross collection of public dues indicates the size 
of the revenue collected in the territory of Serbia, irrespective of whether that 
was the revenue of the republican, municipal or city budgets or of one of the 
funds for mandatory social insurance. Other taxes include: the wage bill tax, 
the financial transaction tax, taxes on lottery, taxes on the use, possession and 
carrying of goods, the tax on the use of motor vehicles and the extra profit tax. 
The fees include administrative, court and utility fees, while levies constitute 
a sum of royalties for the use natural resources, road tolls and fees for the use 
and development of buildable land. Fees, levies and contributions could be 
considered quasi-tax forms. 
The data are self-explanatory. In 2001 and 2002, total revenue was doubled 
in real terms, while in 2003 and 2004 it rose by 25 and 27 percent, respectively. In 
the first two years of transition the revenues from all the taxes were more than 
doubled, while the most significant contribution to the rise in total revenue was 
made by the increase in the consumption tax revenue, whose share accordingly 
increased the most. Similarly, in all the years between 2001 and 2004, strong 
growth was registered of revenues from all the taxes, several times higher than 
real GDP growth. Since the changed tax laws have not provided for practically 
any rise in tax rates - on the contrary, certain tax rates were cut - the rise in 
revenue is indubitably a result of changes in tax policy and improved public 
revenue collection, which also reflects a significant improvement in the work 
of the tax administration. 
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The data obviously testify to the fact that Serbia has not only avoided a drop 
in budget revenue so common for transition countries, but has consolidated 
and stabilized its public finance already in the first years of transition. This 
apparent success of public finance policies has at the same time created the key 
prerequisites for the accomplishment of the monetary policy objectives as well, 
and not only of them, but also of the structural transitional policies, which 
stand no chance of success without stable and reliable public finance.
For this reason, a general assessment of the significant progress and great 
success achieved in the revamping of the entire tax system of Serbia in the 
first years of transition is not in any way undermined by certain vagaries and 
mistakes which will be discussed in the analysis of choices and arrangements 
in the designing of certain taxes, or by the fact that a lot still remains to be 
done.
Taxing consumption
The basic forms of consumption taxation in Serbia’s tax system are the 
sales tax, which was replaced in January 2005 with the value added tax, and 
excises.
For the sake of precision, it should be noted that some other tax and 
quasi-tax forms have similar characteristics or essentially constitute the 
taxation of consumption. For example, the tax on transfer of absolute rights 
(title assignment) has the features of an indirect tax – the burden is shifted on 
the buyer, although the taxpayer is the seller, like in the case of the sales tax, i.e. 
the VAT. The base for this form, however, are transactions with property rights 
to statutorily defined forms of assets (real estate, shares…). The very nature of 
the base, hence, excludes it from the group of consumption taxes, and that is 
why this tax form will be analyzed as part of the group of other property taxes. 
Similarly, some levies, such as the royalties for the use of mineral resources or 
forests, due to the collection method, essentially constitute special sales taxes, 
accordingly excises. Owing to their negligible revenue effect, as well as to the 
fact that they essentially do not belong to taxes, which gives rise to other non-
tax issues in relation to them, they will not be discussed in this section. 
The sales tax. The Law on the Sales Tax adopted in March 2001 constituted 
a truly fundamental positive change relative to the hitherto system of taxing 
trade in goods and services. The previous seven different rates were replaced 
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by a single 20 percent rate, comprising 17 percent of the republican tax and 
3 percent of the federal tax. In addition to exemptions from taxation of trade 
in goods at the stages which precede the retail sale, i.e. the final consumption, 
which is typical of the sales tax,  the manner in which the eligibility for 
exemption from taxation has been defined also points to the intention of the 
lawmakers to provide sufficient normative grounds for preventing tax evasion 
by fraudulent presentation of retail sales as wholesales. 
The number of unconditional exemptions was considerably reduced. In 
the original version of the Law, they were really reduced to the minimum for 
Serbian circumstances. If one leaves out the exemptions of bread and milk, 
publications of special interest to science, arts and culture, trade in agricultural 
produces when the seller is a farmer – natural person (farmers are anyway 
technically practically impossible to cover by taxation in Serbian circumstances) 
and humanitarian aid, internal turnover of other goods exempted from taxation 
cannot be considered to be final consumption to begin with.1
Another novelty that was introduced by this Law was the obligation to 
install fiscal cash registers for recording transactions and to issue receipts for 
all retail purchases.
Subsequent developments have shown that the strictness of the law was 
too much for Serbian circumstances, and after the initial shock the advocates 
of the maintenance of the living standards through exemptions from the sales 
tax, as well as foreign donors, quickly came to and organized pressures to 
amend the law. Thus, all four amendments to this law in less than four years of 
its period of validity laid down new exemptions.
Already in late 2001, meaning in the same year in which it was passed, 
the Law was amended in order to integrate the former federal 3 percent sales 
tax into the single general sales tax with a rate of 20 percent. However, the 
amending of the Law has also resulted in the unconditional exemption from 
the sales tax for fruits and vegetables, drugs from the special list, firewood 
1  The list of eliminated exemptions from the sales tax included edible oil and lard, 
imports intended for  sales in duty free shops at border crossings, products procured 
through special committees and headquarters set up for the purpose of redressing the 
consequences of natural disasters, wars and the like, medicines, textbooks, teaching 
aids, stationary, books, brochures, newspapers and magazines, tourist-information-
advertising material, potable water (from the water supply system), orthopedic aids, 
fuel and energy from renewable sources, coal and firewood, services in air traffic, 
railroad transport, public transportation and commuter traffic, utility services, 
services in agriculture in soil cultivation, leasing out open-air green market stalls, 
services in the field of water and air pollution prevention, catering and construction 
services, and insurance services.
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and utility services. As an attempt to at least formally preserve the impression 
that the strictness has been maintained, these exemptions were limited to 2002 
and 2003. Yet, this only created trouble in late 2003, when it was necessary 
to extend these exemptions in the circumstances in which the government 
was a caretaker one and the parliament was not constituted. To which extent 
the non-payment of the sales tax on these goods was considered an acquired 
and inviolable right can be inferred from the fact that the extension of the 
validity of these exemptions by virtue of a decree, inadmissible from the legal 
standpoint, was tacitly accepted as the only proper solution, which was pushed 
through without any criticism whatsoever.
The second amendment of the Law which took place in 2002 is, for all 
practical purposes, related only to the definition of new exemptions, because 
apart from not so significant specification of the already existing provisions 
on fiscal cash registers and fines for those buyers who fail to take receipts, all 
other changes constitute new exemptions. The winners on this occasion were 
consumers of edible oil and sugar, enterprises and shops which use masut as 
production material (as propellant or for heating), foreign donors – because 
both goods and services which are procured out of the resources of foreign 
grants are exempted from the sales tax, and lessors natural persons because no 
sales tax on trade in services is levied on rents if the lessor is a natural person. 
Admittedly, this last exemption may be considered a rational decision of 
the lawmaker and not his giving in to pressures, bearing in mind that levying 
a consumption tax on rental fees is, generally speaking, dubious. On top of 
that, in situations where, like in Serbia, rents are first taxed by the personal 
income tax withheld at an effective rate of 16 percent, and then by the sales tax 
at a rate of 20 percent, and in the conditions where administrative capacities 
of the tax administration are weak, the willingness of the citizen - lessor to file 
a tax return on his own too feeble and the possibility to operate in cash huge, 
this was the right thing to do, with a view to creating a prerequisite to, at least, 
make the payment of the personal income tax acceptable.
Not even the third amendment of the Law in 2003, which was necessary 
to define the tax status of financial leasing as a new form of transactions in 
which the recipient of the good does not become its formal and legal owner at 
the point of taking over the good could not be spared from a new exemption. 
This time the press breaded a sigh of relief, because dailies and periodicals 
were exempted from the sales tax.  
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The fourth amendment of the Law in 2004 was passed by the new 
parliament at the proposal of the newly elected government, at the point when 
it was clear that, due to the adoption of the Law on the Value Added Tax, the 
sales tax would cease to exist in less than six months. This time, the only change 
referred to authorizing the Government to exempt individual taxpayers at a 
joint proposal of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade from the 
obligation to install fiscal cash registers, namely those taxpayers with respect 
to whom these two ministries have assessed that “due to the specific nature of 
their activities, they are not able to develop software applications in line with 
the technical and functional properties of the fiscal cash register.”
This provision has exempted certain taxpayers, to be subsequently 
identified in a decree, from the obligation to record their business transactions 
in a manner which would transparently enable the Tax Administration to 
review the tax base. Since the value added tax, fortunately, is less convenient for 
tax evasion through a simple concealment of the base, such amendment does 
not have too great tax significance. It represents, however, a visible sign of the 
inclination which the newly elected government cherishes toward discretion, 
and which will be repeated in the case of amendments to some other tax laws, to 
be discussed below. In this case the government proposed, and the Parliament 
accepted, for the selection of taxpayers to be more specifically elaborated in the 
process of defining the manner in which the law is to be implemented, which 
practically means in a bylaw, despite the fact that it is one of the fundamental 
issues whose definition directly affects the material status of taxpayers, hence 
it should be enshrined solely in the law.
Although it is no longer relevant from the standpoint of the future, because 
the sales tax has been replaced by the value added tax, it is still necessary to 
point to certain dilemmas, even mistakes which, from the viewpoint of fiscal 
policy, existed in the regulation of the sales tax. 
The fundamental dilemma is related to the choice regarding the level of 
the tax rate. Comparative research into the sales tax and value added tax has 
shown that the sales tax rate of 10 percent is a maximum from the standpoint 
of its vulnerability to tax evasion. Anything above that rate in the sales tax 
regime creates a strong incentive for tax evasion which is, taking into account 
the number of possible taxpayers, irrespective of the capacities of the tax 
administration, very difficult to curb. This is, in fact, the reason why the VAT 
enjoys great popularity among tax officials, being far more resistant to tax 
evasion due to the collection technique which makes tax evasion too expensive 
even at considerably higher rates of taxing consumption. 
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Bearing in mind a very strong rise in the revenue from this tax,2 which in 
2001 rose by 146 percent in real terms relative to 2000, in 2002 by 134 percent 
against 2001, and in 2003 and 2004 by a very solid 26 percent, it is obvious that 
the integration of different surcharges in a single tax rate, a reduction in the 
number of exemptions and the consolidation of the tax administration, as well 
as of the entire state for that matter, have significantly increased risks involved 
in tax evasion. Therefore, the incentive for evasion created by the high tax rate 
did not have a significant impact from the revenue standpoint in the four years 
during which the Law on the Sales Tax was in force. 
Nevertheless, what certainly is a mistake when it comes to the level of 
the tax rate is the setting of the same tax rate for trade in services and trade in 
goods. The mistake is in the fact that the taxation of services in the sales tax 
regime is necessarily multiple, because due to the intangible nature of services 
it is not possible, like in the case of goods, to conditionally exempt them from 
the sales tax even when they economically constitute an indispensable input, 
just like intermediate goods, for the production of another good or service. 
Thus, even in those cases where a service was rendered in only two phases of 
trade the effective tax rate was going up to 44 percent. In addition to the fact 
that such an arrangement in principle constitutes a distortion, it is certain that 
it has also pushed a fair share of the service sector either into the gray area or 
out of business. 
Likewise, defining the service of wholesale as the subject of taxation is a 
major inconsistency in the Law. If trade in goods intended for further sale is 
conditionally exempted from taxation, the taxation of the wholesale margin 
cannot be considered to be the sales tax, but some sort of withholding tax on 
total income. Although the idea behind defining the price differential as the 
base for taxation was to collect part of the tax revenue from wholesalers who 
were crucial in the sales tax avoidance chain, nothing relevant was achieved 
through this, except for the unnecessary inconsistency in the Law.  First, 
major tax evaders had founded wholesale companies for a limited number of 
“business deals” and then they closed them, i.e. abandoned them. Second, big 
wholesale companies which were in this business permanently were given a 
strong incentive for tax evasion. 
Regardless of these mistakes, as well as some predominantly administrative 
awkwardness in the Law, which are not worth mentioning in the present-day 
context, the Law on the Sales Tax passed in 2001 constituted a safe and big step 
toward transformation of the revenue side of Serbian public finance. 
2 Data on the revenue from this and other tax forms are presented in Table 1. 
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The value added tax. As of the adoption of the Law on the Value Added 
Tax in July 2004, and the commencement of its implementation in January 
2005, consumption in Serbia has been taxed in the manner long in place in 
other European countries.3 The law itself is the so-called “EU model” VAT, 
which is collected at all stages of the production and sales cycle, i.e. the model 
which is in accordance with the 6th EEC Directive on the common value added 
tax system of the member states. It means the following: the VAT introduced 
in Serbia is a consumption type VAT which is not levied on the procurement of 
capital goods, hence the macroeconomic base is equal to private consumption. 
In assessing tax liability, the so-called credit method is applied, which defines 
tax liability as a difference between output tax (calculated on sales) and input 
tax (calculated on purchases). Consumption is taxed according to the principle 
of destination, which means that exports are exempted from taxation, and 
imports are taxed.
In comparison with the sales tax, the VAT Law has significantly broadened 
the tax base, which, combined with its superiority in the identification of the 
tax base, essentially enables the revenue neutral VAT rate to be considerably 
lower than the sales tax rate. 
The tax base has been broadened not only by including in the taxable 
base the trade in those goods and services which in the sales tax regime were 
exempted, but also by the manner in which the taxpayer is defined. Unlike 
the sales tax in which an individual who had no registered business entity (an 
enterprise or a shop) practically could not become a taxpayer, in the value 
added tax an individual who generates annual income above the statutory 
threshold (presently 2 million dinars) by working independently automatically 
becomes a VAT payer and has an obligation to register for the VAT. 
Still, the VAT Law has abandoned the principle of a single tax rate and 
thus consumption is now taxed at four rates, depending on the type of the 
product (18, 8, 5 and 0 percent) compared to the two tax rates which existed in 
the sales tax system (20 and 0 percent). 
The 18 percent rate is the standard value added tax rate, applied to all the 
services, supplies and imports of goods which are not in the special 8 percent 
rate regime.4
3  In Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is now the only European country where the VAT has not been 
introduced, the Law on the Value Added Tax was adopted in October 2004, and the Law has specified 
July 1, 2005 as the day on which its implementation is to begin. Yet, there is a high probability that its 
implementation will be postponed until January 1, 2006 due to the insufficient preparedness of the 
newly established tax administration at the B/H level. 
4  The special rate is applied to supplies of bread, milk, flour, sugar, edible oil and fats; of fresh and 
cooled fruits, vegetables, meat, fish and eggs; drugs on the special list; fertilizers, plant protection 
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The reasons for taxation at a reduced rate of the products which were 
previously exempt from the sales tax, as well as of the products used in medical 
treatment, which in the sales tax were in the regime of conditional exemptions, 
accordingly purchased without tax provided that the statutory conditions had 
been met, may be clear. Their taxation at the standard rate would objectively 
mean a rise in their prices of 18 percent with a proportional impact on both 
the general price level and the cost of living, i.e. medical expenses. Therefore, 
the opting for a lower rate means at the same time a commensurately lower 
price impact, which could be a valid reason for this decision. However, it 
remains unclear why it was necessary to reduce the tax rate on tourist services 
of accommodation from 20 percent, which was the sales tax rate, to 8 percent 
of the VAT. Whether the lawmaker wanted to make vacation more affordable 
to the wider population and whether something like that can be done at all by 
setting a lower VAT rate, are the questions which will remain unanswered on 
this occasion. 
The compensation which is paid to farmers at a rate of 5 percent is 
essentially a separate tax rate, too. This compensation has been defined as an 
obligation of VAT payers to increase by 5 percent the level of the price they 
pay for purchasing staple agricultural produces from individual farmers 
not registered as VAT payers. The purpose of the introduction of the VAT 
compensation for farmers is to provide compensation to this category of 
producers for the VAT paid on inputs, irrespective of the tax status. 
There are three main arguments for the introduction of this compensation. 
Firstly, irrespective of the formal status of farmers, agricultural production, 
based on its economic nature, is not consumption, hence it should not be taxed 
as such in the first place. Secondly, due to the very system of VAT collection 
this problem cannot be resolved in the manner in which it was solved in the 
sales tax regime, where most of the inputs and outputs in agriculture were 
unconditionally exempt. Thirdly, farmers by rule are not eligible to become 
VAT payers and most of them for technical reasons, on account of their 
inability for, or lack of practice in, maintaining books and keeping records 
in connection with the VAT, will not use their right to voluntarily register as 
VAT payers. It means that in the VAT regime they will, on the one hand, pay 
the tax on their inputs, while on the other hand, they will not be able, as a rule, 
products, propagation seed, planting material and breeding stock; textbooks and teaching aids; 
daily newspapers; monographs and serial publications; firewood; utility services; orthotic aids and 
prostheses, and surgically inserted medical implants; dialysis materials; services of accommodation 
in hotels, motels, vacation homes, residences and camps. With the exception of the last three groups 
of products, all other products were unconditionally exempted from the sales tax in the sales tax 
regime. 
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to compensate for that from the VAT collected on their outputs, because they 
will not meet the requirements. In order to resolve this problem at least with 
respect to the part of supplies of agricultural produces which obviously has 
the character of intermediate trade, in other words in the case of supplies of 
staple agricultural produces to VAT payers, the VAT compensation should be 
equal to the level of the tax rate levied on basic agricultural inputs,5 which is, 
however, set at the level of 8 percent. By differently defining the relative levels 
of the VAT compensation and the VAT rate which is applied to the purchases 
of agricultural inputs, the possibility has been diminished of achieving by 
means of this compensation the objective for which it was introduced, while 
the number of tax rates has been unnecessarily increased.
The VAT Law has stipulated three groups of tax exemptions: with the 
right to deduction of the input tax, without the right to deduction of the input 
tax and tax exemptions for imports of goods.
The zero tax rate is only the exemption from the VAT with the right to 
deduction of the input tax, while the exemption from the VAT without the 
right to deduction of the input tax basically constitutes the exclusion from 
the VAT system, for which reason the suppliers of goods the trade in which is 
exempted without the right to deduction of the input tax are accorded the tax 
treatment of end-consumers. In the case of exemptions of imported goods, 
these refer either to special customs procedures within which the goods, in 
effect, are not freely sold on the domestic market or to valuables (gold for the 
NBS, securities, money).
With one exception, the selection of goods classified in all three groups 
followed the logic of the chosen VAT model and common guidelines applied 
by the EU member states.
The zero tax rate laid down for the bringing in of goods into free customs 
zones and the provision of services to the users of free customs zones is the 
above mentioned exception. Namely, the legal frameworks of the EU member 
countries which have tax exemptions for the bringing in of goods into free 
zones regulate the free zone itself and the operation in the zone in a different 
manner. First and foremost, the very area of the free zone has an extraterritorial 
status within the country where it has been set up, hence the very bringing in of 
goods into the zone may be considered exports. The basic precondition for the 
establishment of the zone in the first place is that the bulk of the zone’s output 
is exported, therefore the share of exports in total output of the zone, as a rule, 
5 Fertilizers, plant protection products, propagating seed, planting material and breeding stock.
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has to be 65, 70 or more percent. The manner in which the establishment and 
operation of free zones in Serbia is presently regulated results, on the whole, 
in imports by the users of free zones being several times higher than exports. 
At this point, they constitute, at best, the manner in which importers postpone 
the payment of customs duties and taxes on the goods they are importing. 
However, it is not so rare that free zones are used to simply avoid the payment 
of taxes, because the existing rules do not create conditions for control.
It means that this exemption has practically introduced a zero rate in 
domestic trade, which opens an obvious and easy possibility to prolong the 
time limits for the payment of the tax, even for tax evasion. This tax exemption 
should not have been introduced before regulations have been adopted and 
implemented, which would in an adequate manner govern free zones and 
operations in them, and establish strict controls over the turnover of goods 
brought into the zone, as well as over the turnover taking place in the zone 
itself. Only with a proper legal framework there could be a rationale for this 
tax exemption.
On the other hand, the provision which certainly needs to be changed 
as soon as possible is the one on the level of the threshold of total turnover 
above which a person (an enterprise, shop or an individual) becomes a VAT 
payer. The Law sets it at a mere 2 million dinars, which at the present euro rate 
amounts to slightly more than 24,000 euros. Such a low statutory threshold 
implies high administrative costs for the Tax Administration for covering small 
taxpayers by any sort of control, yet without any revenue impact. By defining 
a considerably higher threshold, amounting to, for instance, 10 million dinars, 
the VAT revenue would not be threatened at all, bearing in mind that all 
the persons generating incomes below this threshold would have the status 
of end-consumers, i.e. they would pay the VAT on their inputs. By allowing 
voluntary registration for the VAT system, a possibility would be offered to 
small manufacturers of goods or providers of services to use its advantages, 
and their self-registration would at the same time automatically create a 
database on them in the Tax Administration, thus enabling their control as 
well. Bearing in mind that good and efficient administration of the VAT is 
critical for the successful implementation of the VAT, it is not wise to direct the 
already overstrained capacities of the Tax Administration, without adequate 
IT support, to the tasks which are insignificant in terms of revenue they would 
bring, which is basically the consequence of such a low statutory threshold for 
mandatory inclusion in the VAT. 
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Of paramount importance to the credibility of the whole VAT system, and 
the basic prerequisite for its neutral effect on economic activity, are regular 
and consistent with the Law VAT refunds made in a timely fashion to those 
taxpayers who had higher input tax than the output one in the tax period. 
Therefore the fact that already in the second month of its implementation such 
refunds were made really augurs well. The procedure applied on that occasion 
– the issuance of temporary decisions – admittedly points to a certain lack 
of understanding of the basics of the VAT, in which the refund is part of the 
system, rather than a consequence of a mistake of either the taxpayer or the 
tax administration, which is the case with other tax forms, when a decision is 
necessary as an act of the administrative procedure. Having in mind, however, 
that the period of implementation was really very short, both this and some 
other administrative vagaries, and in particular total lack of preparation of the 
Customs Administration for the administration of the VAT, may be rectified 
after gaining some experience, in which case they will not undermine the 
overall positive assessment that the introduction of the VAT in Serbia has 
deserved. 
Excises. A new Law on Excises was passed concurrently with the Law 
on the Sales Tax, in March 2001. It could be said that the greatest asset of 
this Law relative to the previous one, from the standpoint of fiscal policy, is 
the fact that, within the prescribed amounts of excises, it has integrated all 
earmarked surcharges that had been levied under special decrees issued by the 
Government of the Republic of Serbia. In such a manner, the bulk of earmarked 
taxes governed by bylaws has been eliminated from Serbia’s tax system. A 
change in the base for the calculation of excises, which under the new Law 
is a measurement unit, instead of the selling price, as well as an appropriate 
change in the manner of determining the level of the excise burden, which has 
been defined as a specific excise for each excisable good, and not as ad valorem 
excise, resulted in significant simplification of the assessment and control of 
the excise liability.6 Additionally, a provision prescribing that cigarettes and 
6  The only exception is excise on luxury items, for which the selling price of a product 
has been set as a base, while the excise is defined as a percentage whose level depends 
on the “type” of the luxury item. This differentiation in the level of the excise burden 
(20 and 30 percent), depending on the “type” of the luxury item, is the only innovation 
in the domain of excises on luxury items relative to the old law. Being of a negligible 
revenue impact, this innovation could be interpreted only as a symbolic populist step 
of the new authorities. It is not very likely, however, that (symbolic) benefits from this 
step are larger than (actual) costs of administering this inefficient fiscal instrument.
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alcoholic beverages are to be marked by duty stamps printed exclusively in the 
National Bank of Yugoslavia’s printing house, constitutes an almost decisive 
improvement in efficiency of control over the calculation and payment of 
excises for these two groups of excisable goods. At the same time, as a penalty 
for the taxpayer who sells cigarettes and alcoholic beverages not specially 
marked by control duty stamps, a ban on the performance of the activity has 
been introduced. 
An increase in the number of products on which excises are paid, which 
include lamp oil, motor and jet oils, mineral and other lubricants and soft 
drinks made from fruit bases, and the keeping of excises on salt, ethanol and 
coffee, however, can not be assessed as good or reform-oriented actions. In 
principle, excises are introduced as a special consumption tax whose objective 
is to additionally tax the consumption of products for which demand is 
high and inelastic with respect to prices, hence the expected tax revenue is 
generous, and which do not belong to the group of basic foodstuffs. None of the 
mentioned excisable goods has all these features at the same time. Therefore, 
it does not come as a surprise that the revenue collected from excises on the 
mentioned products is either negligible or relatively low. Moreover, common 
EU excise policy recognizes as excisable goods only petroleum products, 
tobacco products and alcoholic beverages.
On the whole, the amendments to the Law on Excises have produced a 
huge increase in excise revenue. In 2001 alone, the excise revenue increased 
as many as 10 times in real terms relative to 2000. One should, however, 
take into account that this rise was a result of not only indubitably great 
administrative improvements whose contribution was significant, but also 
of a different coverage of excise revenue.7 In addition to the impact of the 
amendments to the Excise Law on this increase, one should not disregard the 
impact of the Decree on Special Terms and Manner of Importing and Refining 
Crude Oil, i.e. Petroleum Products on the rise in the revenue from excise on 
petroleum products, which was passed at the same time as the Law on Excises, 
providing for a ban on free imports of petroleum products. Without making 
any assessment on this occasion of this to the competitiveness of the market 
harmful decree, the fact remains that, as a consequence of its implementation, 
the only payers of excise on petroleum products were refineries, which brings 
the sophistication and costs of control to the minimum.
7  Part of the revenue, which in 2000 was classified as revenue from fees, in 2001 was excise revenue, 
while earmarked fees and surcharges were eliminated, which explains a drop in these revenues in 
2001 (Table 1).
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A subsequent rise in revenue: its triplication in real terms in 2002 relative 
to 2001, and further considerable growth of revenue in 2003 and 2004, should 
be attributed rather to rises in the amounts of excises than to significant 
changes in excise policy as such, despite the fact that the Law on Excises 
underwent seven changes in the four years that have elapsed since its passage. 
In the mentioned period excises on gasoline and diesel were increased four 
times, and excise on tobacco products three times. 
From the standpoint of excise policy the amendment in mid-2003 was 
significant, as were all three amendments in 2004. In July 2003, excises on 
salt for human consumption and luxury items were eliminated, which can be 
considered a step forward toward a rational selection of excisable goods, as 
well as the excise on wine, which is an attempt to improve the competitive 
position of domestic wine producers. Through this amendment of the Law, a 
long-term excise policy for cigarettes has been laid down as well, which has 
defined a schedule of cigarette excise increases in the period from 2005 to 
2010. Important changes set out in the long-term excise policy for cigarettes 
are as follows.
As of 2005, the method of setting excises on cigarettes depending on the 
quality group they belong to has been eliminated. According to this method, the 
excise was lower for cigarettes in lower quality groups. In practice, this method 
for setting the level of the excise burden effectively constituted a higher excise 
burden on imported cigarettes (which were all classified in the highest quality 
group) and a lower excise burden on domestic cigarettes (which all, with the 
exception of one brand whose volume of sales is negligible, were classified in 
the other two lower quality groups). The competence over the classification of 
cigarettes into quality groups belonged to the Ministry of Finance based on the 
opinion of the Ministry of Agriculture. Depending on that decision, i.e. the 
opinions of these two Ministries, was also the level of excise levied on certain 
types of cigarettes. It was not a good arrangement, bearing in mind that it 
created a great incentive to manufacturers and importers to try and influence 
the decisions or opinions of these two Ministries in various ways, i.e. it created 
a direct incentive to corruption. Therefore, the elimination of this method for 
setting the level of excises was a good decision. 
For 2005, the introduction of the so-called excise duty stamps was also 
envisaged, which would entail the payment of excises before taking over excise 
duty stamps. It means that it has been prescribed that as of 2005 the payer of 
excise on cigarettes will be obliged to submit a calculation of the retail price 
137Public Finance Policies
which would be indicated on the excise duty stamp and which would be a 
base for the calculation and payment of excise when ordering excise duty 
stamps. In such a manner the excise revenue of the budget would depend only 
on the volume of cigarette production, while the entire risk of sales would 
be shifted to the producer. At the same time, the costs of selling cigarettes 
on the black market would be significantly increased, manipulations with the 
level of the retail price for the purpose of reducing the absolute amount of the 
excise burden would have no point, and a strong incentive would be created 
for manufacturers to influence the curbing of the black market for cigarettes 
through their business decisions. On the other hand, bearing in mind the 
financial strength of the industry, the initial impact on liquidity which would 
be created through the shifting of the obligation to pay excise to the point 
of taking over excise duty stamps, instead of the point of supplying goods to 
the buyer, the industry would relatively easily overcome. This change can be 
assessed as good administrative support to the setting of excise as a percentage 
of the retail price, which is envisaged to enter into force in 2005 as well. 
The structure of the excise burden, the combination of specific and ad 
valorem excises, has been defined in keeping with the guidelines for excise 
policy, which apply to the EU member countries. The schedule of increases 
in ad valorem excises, with an appropriate amount of specific excise, has been 
defined in a manner which will enable a gradual fulfillment of the requirement 
set out in the EU guidelines, according to which the excise burden on cigarettes 
should not be lower than 57 percent of the retail price of the best-selling brand 
of cigarettes. A deviation from the standards of EU excise policy, as well as 
from neutral tax policy, was the introduction of different levels of specific 
excises on imported and domestically produced cigarettes. Although it has 
been envisaged that this difference, which for 2005 has been defined as 1 to 10 
ratio (1 dinar of excise per pack of domestically produced cigarettes relative to 
10 dinars per pack of imported cigarettes), should be gradually reduced, to be 
totally eliminated in 2010, in the described manner a five year period has been 
defined in which domestic production of cigarettes will be greatly favored over 
imports through a lower excise burden. 
The choice of such a policy was a clear incentive for privatization of the 
tobacco industry in Serbia carried out in 2003, namely, the point was not 
only in establishing a difference in treatment between domestic producers 
and importers. The very fact that a long-term excise policy, which sets out a 
schedule of cigarette excise increases, has been stipulated in a law essentially 
points to an attempt to establish certainty of the future influence of tax policy, 
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very significant for this industry, on the structure of the product price, and 
thus indirectly on the pricing policy and competitive position on the domestic 
and regional markets. The enhanced certainty of future tax policy definitely 
provided the then potential buyers in the privatization of the Serbian tobacco 
industry with some clear indicators for decision-making. In view of the fact 
that in the autumn of that year the Tobacco Factory in Niš was bought by 
Philip Morris and Tobacco Factory in Vranje by British American Tobacco, 
and that relatively high privatization proceeds were generated in these deals, it 
can be noted that the adoption of the long-term excise policy on cigarettes in 
2003 has achieved one of its possible immediate objectives. 
Nevertheless, the amendments to the Law on Excises in 2004 create an 
impression that the entire excise policy has assumed the form of some kind 
of tariff policy. The manner in which excise on alcoholic beverages has been 
determined, though not formally differentiating between domestic production 
and imports, results in a significant increase in the difference in the excise 
burden between traditionally domestic alcoholic beverages and those which 
are normally imported, making the absolute burden on the former group two 
and a half times lower than on the latter one. Similarly, an explicit obligation has 
been introduced of paying excise only on imported non-alcoholic beverages. 
Taking into account that the decree prohibiting imports of petroleum products 
is still in force, pursuant to the existing excise policy practically just in the 
case of beer no difference is made in the level of excise on the basis of origin 
(imported or domestic). 
The elimination of excises on jet fuel and kerosene, motor oils and 
lubricants, liquefied oil gas and lamp oil, and on ethanol constitutes a good 
move for the reasons explained above. The elimination of excise on heating 
oil, however, once the ban on imports of petroleum products is lifted, may 
open an opportunity for a fraudulent presentation of diesel as heating oil to a 
larger number of excise payers, who would be proportionately more difficult to 
control than now, when only refineries are subject to control, bearing in mind 
that these are identical products, different only in color. This difference has 
actually been prescribed in an effort to exempt certain uses of diesel from excises 
and that is how, in fact, heating oil came into being as a separate petroleum 
product. From the standpoint of efficiency in the collection of excises, as well 
as for the purpose of achieving the objective of exempting heating oil from 
excise, it would be more appropriate to introduce the same excises for all 
types of diesel, including heating oil, while at the same time securing adequate 
budget resources for the procurement of necessary quantities of heating oil 
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for target groups of consumers financed out of the budget (hospitals, schools, 
army barracks and the like).
The introduction of the possibility to receive reimbursement, in other words 
a refund of the paid excise, for diesel used as propellant for tractors, building 
machines and cargo ships, was an effort to exempt from excise, as a production 
input cost, those producers who use the mentioned means. Considering 
that such efforts always create the need for a lot of administration in order 
to prevent the abuse of the facility (this time authorized distributors, general 
rules regarding consumption and the procedure for the exercise of the right 
have been prescribed), total budget losses (direct in the form of administration 
costs and indirect in the form of forgone revenue due to errors or corruption 
in administration) are normally larger than the sum of gains for the target 
groups. On top of it, the issue which is always raised is the issue of selection 
of target groups, hence one could rightfully ask why this time transportation 
by ship was accorded a better tax treatment than road transport, or why the 
construction industry was favored over, say, open pit mines. Therefore this 
excise policy measure cannot be considered appropriate. 
The amendments to the Law on Excises have also eliminated the obligation 
to introduce fiscal duty stamps in 2005, and the obligation of calculating and 
paying excise has been, contrary to the initial idea of the quashed decree, 
postponed to the point of delivery of excisable goods from the excise warehouse. 
Bearing in mind that in 2005 the implementation of the combination of 
specific and ad valorem excises on cigarettes began, this change has imposed 
additional administrative costs for controlling the calculation of excise in the 
case of domestic producers. It is not very likely that the provision setting out 
that the Finance Minister shall issue licenses for dispatching products to the 
excise warehouse will improve the efficiency of control, but it is quite certain 
that it has increased the paperwork and costs of administration.
In the end, one can conclude that the future promotion of excise policy 
certainly implies the elimination of the remaining inefficient excises, 
such as excises on imported non-alcoholic beverages and coffee,8 complete 
discontinuation of discrimination against imported goods in favor of the 
products with domestic origin9, elimination of reimbursement of excise for 
certain consumers and general improvement of administration of this tax form. 
8  The revenue from excises on imported non-alcoholic beverages in 2004 accounted for 0.004 percent 
of total tax revenue, while excise on coffee accounted for 0.3 percent of total tax revenue. 
9  That could be achieved while completely eliminating excise on non-alcoholic products, by introducing 
excise which would be set in a specific amount according to the percentage of alcohol content per 
measurement unit, which is how excise on alcoholic beverages is defined in the EU countries now.
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Taxation of corporate and personal income 
Taxation of corporate income. Unlike the new taxes on consumption 
which introduced major changes in taxation of consumption, no significant 
changes took place in the taxation of corporate income with the adoption of a 
new Law on the Corporate Income Tax in March 2001.
The definition of a resident taxpayer has remained the same, while the 
definition of a non-resident taxpayer has been slightly changed, in terms of an 
attempt which was made to more precisely define permanent establishment 
that the non-resident taxpayer has in Serbia, whose income constitutes the 
subject of taxation. Bearing in mind, however, that neither the previous 
Enterprise Law, nor the present Company Law, provide for an adequate 
legal form of the permanent establishment of a non-resident legal entity, the 
provisions of the Law on the Corporate Income Tax applying to the permanent 
establishment of a non-resident taxpayer have so far remained without any 
practical significance.
Taxable income as a tax base has been defined in an identical manner, as 
well as the adjustment of income for the purposes of assessing taxable income. 
Slightly changed are the provisions on the adjustment of expenses, in that 
revaluation expenses, grants for financing the reconstruction of the country, 
provisions for non-performing claims have been excluded from expenses, 
expenses for health, humanitarian, religious, environmental protection and 
athletic purposes are recognized as expenses in the amount of 3.5 percent instead 
of 3 percent of total income, expenses for investing in culture are recognized as 
expenses in the amount of up to 1 percent of total income, while the restriction 
on the recognition of expenses for promotion and advertising together with 
entertainment costs has remained unchanged, that is 3 percent of total income. 
In addition, in the case of banks, the required reserve in accordance with the 
Law on Banks has been recognized as an expense, while a positive result of 
revaluation has been included in the tax balance with one third.
The new law has ceased to differentiate between long-term and short-term 
capital gain and loss, hence the possibility to include in the taxable income 
just 50 percent of capital gain generated through the sale of assets which have 
been in the company’s possession for more than 1 year no longer exists. The 
provisions on preventing thin capitalization have been made more specific, 
while the provisions on transfer prices and tax consolidation have remained 
the same. 
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The proportional tax rate of 20 percent has remained the same, as has the 
procedure for the assessment of tax liability by virtue of a decision of the Tax 
Administration on the basis of a tax return and a balance sheet submitted by 
the taxpayer.
As regards tax incentives, the new law defines their objectives in a 
somewhat different manner. In addition to the same commitment to boosting 
economic growth, employment and environmental protection, the new law 
explicitly refers to encouraging small enterprises and concessions, while 
investment of foreign capital has been excluded from tax incentives. 
With the appropriate measure of eliminating discrimination between 
domestic and foreign investors, i.e. establishing equal tax treatment of 
investments irrespective of whether the origin of invested capital is domestic 
or foreign, it could be said that the new law has in effect narrowed the scope 
of tax incentives.
The right to accelerated depreciation, tax exemptions for non-profit 
organizations, concessions, enterprises for vocational training and employment 
of persons with disabilities, business units in underdeveloped areas, as well 
as a reduction in tax liability in case of new employment, have remained the 
same, while the previous exemption from the corporate income tax of newly 
established companies for a period of three years, or five years in the case of 
their establishment in underdeveloped areas, has been eliminated.
As regards tax incentives for investments, the new Law has limited the 
right to tax relief only to investments in fixed assets, reduced the amount by 
which the corporate income tax can be decreased from 100 percent to 10 
percent of the investment made and kept the amount of maximum tax relief 
at 50 percent of the total liability, while granting the right to carry forward the 
unused amount of the tax credit for five subsequent years. A more favorable tax 
treatment of small enterprises is reflected in the right to tax relief of 40 percent 
of the amount of the investment made, with a ceiling which is 70 percent of the 
assessed liability in this case. The provision on the possibility to levy a flat-rate 
tax on small enterprises’ income was rightfully left out of the new Law.
However, the amendments to the Law on the Corporate Income Tax 
of 2002 defined a new policy of taxing corporate income in Serbia. The 
primary objective of this policy was boosting economic activity, in particular 
investment and employment. The tax rate was cut from 20 percent to 14 
percent, the previously existing tax incentives were increased, and some new 
ones were introduced. The amount by which the tax liability can be reduced 
142 Milica Bisić
was increased from 10 percent to 20 percent of the value of the investment, i.e. 
from 40 percent to 100 percent of gross wages of the newly employed, while 
the period has been extended from five to ten years, in which the right to pay 
lower tax on account of an investment may be carried forward. A special tax 
incentive was formulated for the so-called large investment (an investment 
which is worth at least 600 million dinars). This incentive allows a reduction in 
the tax liability commensurate with the share of the investment value in total 
fixed assets of the company in a ten year period, starting from the first year 
in which the company made profit. Similarly, a special tax incentive was laid 
down for investing in the so-called areas of special interest to the Republic. In 
this case, provided that the investment is worth more than 6 million dinars, the 
tax liability will be reduced commensurate with the investment in a five year 
period, starting from the first year in which the company made profit.
Through these amendments to the law, Serbia obtained one of the lowest 
corporate income tax rates in Europe10. It has indubitably given Serbia a 
comparative advantage over the region, without undermining budget revenue, 
bearing in mind a relatively high rate of the taxes on consumption which 
account for the most significant part of tax revenue11. Additionally, the low tax 
rate, along with a simultaneous increase in costs of misrepresenting the actual 
tax base, which is a result of improved work of the tax administration, as well 
as of the setting of stricter lending criteria in the domestic banking system, 
constituted another incentive to accurately account for taxable income. As a 
result, revenue from this tax has significantly risen. 
However, the question arises of the appropriateness of the mentioned tax 
incentives. This question, in addition to its principled dimension, also has a 
practical one.
On the one hand, the principle of neutrality of tax policy is based on the 
well-known theoretical finding that losses in efficiency due to the introduction 
of taxes basically come from their impact on relative prices, and thus on 
economic choices that individual economic agents are making. Therefore, a 
neutral tax policy, meaning the policy pursuant to which the size of the tax 
liability depends solely on the size of the tax base, which is defined in the same 
manner for all taxpayers, minimizes the losses in efficiency.
10  In 2002 in Republika Srpska the corporate income tax rate was lower and amounted to 10 percent, 
while in 2004, the corporate income tax rate in Montenegro was cut to 9 percent. 
11  The share of consumption taxes, the sales tax and excises, is more than one third of total public 
revenue and more than two thirds of total tax revenue, while the corporate income tax accounts for 
about 1 percent of total revenue, and about 2 percent of tax revenue.
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On the other hand, empirical evidence shows that the connection between 
tax incentives and the desired developments or actions of economic agents 
who are the targets of the incentives is very weak or non-existent. If one adds 
to that the unavoidable increase in the administration costs caused by the need 
to check, i.e. prove, the fulfillment of the requirements for exercising the right 
to tax relief, it seems quite certain that tax incentives result in losses of tax 
revenue and increased administration costs, while failing to accomplish the 
objective for which these costs were incurred in the first place. 
Such an outcome should not come as a surprise, if one takes into account 
that decisions on investing in the capital and/or labor production factor 
primarily depend on the projection of future economic developments and it is 
highly unlikely that they can be crucially influenced by a tax incentive which 
exists in the present, in particular because there is no certainty that it will exist 
in the future as well. A good argument to corroborate this statement is the 
fact that in the past three years there was not a single company which took 
advantage of the tax incentive for the large investment. Not a single company 
has availed itself of the tax incentive for investments into the areas of special 
interest to the Republic either, which, admittedly, can be explained by the fact 
that such areas have not been defined at all, hence it is not clear who could 
qualify for this incentive. 
The amendments to the Law on the Corporate Income Tax of April 2003 
provided for the harmonization of taxation of corporate income generated by 
banks and other financial organizations with the application of the International 
Accounting Standards (IAS), which for banks started in the mentioned year, 
hence that was a technical adjustment. Additionally, the procedures for 
the exercise of the right to tax credit in the case of a large investment or an 
investment in a region of special interest to the Republic have been simplified, 
i.e. the authority to control the fulfillment of requirements for exercising these 
rights was vested in the Tax Administration, while the issuance of a decision 
by the Government was dropped, since it would anyway be an unnecessary 
administrative step.
There are two basic groups of changes introduced by amendments to the 
Law on the Corporate Income Tax in 2004. 
The first group may be positively assessed, regardless of certain technical 
shortcomings. These are the provisions dealing with the harmonization of the 
procedure for taxation of corporate income with the International Accounting 
Standards whose application was extended as of the said year to include 
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companies as well, with the related definition of the rules for calculating tax 
depreciation and, what could be the most significant positive change, with 
a switch to self-assessment as a method for establishing the level of the tax 
liability. In addition to a significant decrease in the administration costs, the 
switch to self-assessment means also a different division of responsibilities 
between the tax administration and taxpayers. The right to assess the tax 
liability was taken away from the Tax Administration and granted to the 
taxpayer. However, the responsibility for the accuracy of the assessed tax 
liability has also been shifted to the taxpayer, while the Tax Administration is 
entitled to check the mentioned accuracy at any point in time without being 
obliged to institute a renewal of the procedure, which was a necessary step 
when the corporate income tax was assessed by virtue of a decision of the Tax 
Administration. In addition to the administrative change in the method of tax 
collection, this change has additional significance in Serbian circumstances. It 
has, at least in this tax domain, fundamentally changed the attitude of the state 
to the individual: the proceeding point is the assumption that the individual 
is able to independently, conscientiously, responsibly and truthfully honor his 
obligations and bear full responsibility for his decisions. 
The second group comprises changes related to a cut in the overall tax 
rate and additional tax incentives, which were introduced despite the already 
existing generous tax deductions. 
Apart from delivering on election campaign promises on the reduction of 
the tax burden, where this reduction will be the least painful for the budget, it 
is difficult to find other reasons for the cut in the tax rate from 14 to 10 percent. 
The 14 percent rate is already extremely low in comparison with European 
tax systems, therefore no major broadening of the tax base can be expected 
as a response to the lowering of the rate to 10 percent. In addition, one could 
not expect this reduction to increase the attractiveness of investing in Serbia 
to both domestic and foreign investors, because the level of the tax rate of 
14 percent cannot be considered an obstacle. An investment growth could 
be expected only as a result of confidence to be built into the stability of the 
overall economic and political system in Serbia. Among other things, it cannot 
be built through frequent changes in tax rates, even if these changes mean 
lowering tax rates. 
Special tax incentives for certain economic activities introduced through 
these amendments, however, in addition to being demagogic, also constitute 
a step backward in the setting up of a good tax system. They glaringly breach 
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one of the fundamental principles of efficient tax policy, and that is its sectoral 
neutrality. Not to mention the questions which necessarily come to mind 
whenever government is trying to pursue any sort of sectoral policy. For 
instance, why would an investment in the production of textile yarn and fabrics 
be more important to the state than an investment in software development? In 
such circumstances, the choice of activities is always political, i.e. completely 
arbitrary from the economic viewpoint, because there are no positive economic 
criteria which would enable any sort of objective selection in the first place. 
Furthermore, whoever was involved in tax policy or tax administration, 
however little, is aware that providing more tax incentives to particular 
activities does not yield any results, except for increased administration costs 
and opportunities for abuse. 
Discrimination in the exemption from double taxation of corporate 
income, first as corporate income and then as dividends, based on who receives 
the dividends, is not good either. The domestic taxpayer is exempted from the 
obligation to pay tax on dividends and shares in profits if he is paying them 
to residents that are not individuals. Non-residents and resident individuals 
are still taxed twice on this basis. The principle of equal conditions for doing 
business requires that the tax treatment of domestic and foreign investors 
should be the same. It means that if no withholding tax is paid on dividends and 
shares in profit of the company, which were realized by the founder – domestic 
company, this tax should not be paid on dividends and shares in profit of the 
company, which were realized by the foreign founder. The principle of taxation 
of corporate income in the tax jurisdiction in which the income was generated 
would not be undermined by such equal treatment, because both dividends 
and shares in profit are paid after taxation of income. 
The maintenance of double taxation of corporate income in the case of 
owners individuals (under the Law on the Personal Income Tax, personal 
income from dividends is taxed at an effective rate of 10%), could be interpreted 
as an endeavor to encourage reinvestment. It is difficult to conceive that this 
measure can achieve the set objective. Since, at the end of the day, corporate 
income constitutes income of an individual, it is not going to be difficult for 
shareholders, i.e. owners who exert a significant influence on business decisions, 
to ensure a desired amount of income for themselves by using legal methods, 
i.e. through costs. On the other hand, double taxation of these incomes is 
objectively a disincentive for the development of stockholding and the financial 
market, where decisions by individuals to invest in securities which give the 
right to income from dividends are actually decisions on savings. 
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Still, the one provision of the Law whose nature remains by far the most 
problematic is the provision according to which the government is authorized 
to prescribe, in case a separate law has set out “public interest in encouraging 
the development of a certain activity”, additional incentives for “encouraging 
the development of that activity”. It gives rise to many questions as to the 
direction in which overall economic policy, and not just tax policy, will go and 
the manner in which it will be pursued. Does it mean that the government 
intends to propose a law which prescribes that a particular economic activity is 
of public interest in terms of boosting development? What would the contents 
of this law look like and in which manner would these activities be identified 
and who would identify them? In addition to tax incentives, are there any other 
incentives? One could infinitely go on with questions, but answers can hardly 
have any economic rationale. 
Furthermore, it is also important to stress a major formal-legal short-
coming of this provision, under which the Parliament has delegated to the 
Government an authority which should not at all be vested in it as the executive 
branch. The government may not be authorized to prescribe tax incentives. 
It is the subject-matter which is governed exclusively by laws. The present 
arrangement gives the government discretionary power which does not 
belong to it, opens opportunities for corruption and pressures from different 
interest groups and introduces instability and uncertainty into the tax system 
of Serbia. 
Taxation of personal income. The Law on the Personal Income Tax 
which was in force before the adoption of a new law in March 2001, was 
amended more than ten times, some of its provisions which resulted from 
these amendments were declared unconstitutional by virtue of decisions of the 
Federal Constitutional Court of March 2000 and the Serbian Constitutional 
Court of October 2002, either because they were not consistent with other laws 
or due to their unconstitutional retroactive effect. If nothing else, the passage 
of a new Law on the Personal Income Tax was welcome for the mentioned 
reasons. 
Apart from elimination of obvious illogicalities in the old law, the new law 
has not introduced any major novelties from the standpoint of overall policy 
of personal income taxation. The most important change was the change in 
the tax base which the new Law defines as the gross amount of income. It 
means that, depending on the type of income, on which the level of the tax 
rate and the procedure for assessment and payment have remained to depend 
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in the same manner as in the old law, the tax rate is applied to the amount 
of gross personal income which, in addition to the net amount received by 
an individual, also comprises the tax and contributions for mandatory social 
insurance. This change, however, is just a formal change from the viewpoint of 
the one who carries the tax burden, and as such it does not alter his position. 
Only in the case of wages a really significant change has occurred in 
the tax base, which now includes besides the take home wage all the cash 
benefits that the employee receives from the employer, meaning the hot meal 
allowances and vacation vouchers. After this change the wide-spread practice of 
redirecting take home wages into various forms of cash benefits for employees 
in order to avoid the total tax burden on labor, which had been really high 
before that, including not only taxes but also contributions for mandatory 
social insurance, no longer paid off. At the same time, measured in relation to 
the net wage, the total tax wedge has been reduced from around 105 percent to 
around 72 percent.  Nevertheless, if one adds to this tax wedge also the wage 
bill tax, which was introduced in the same year for the purpose of securing a 
relatively generous tax revenue for local self-government units, and which was 
eliminated in 2004, taxes and contributions amounted to 77.2 percent of the 
net wage. These changes present a good example of the lowering of the tax rate 
while widening the tax base, and at the same time reducing the proportions 
of the distortions which exist in the taxation of personal income. However, if 
one excludes contributions for mandatory social insurance, that is, if the tax 
burden in its strict sense is observed, it has increased since the tax rate has 
remained the same, 14 percent, but what used to be non-taxable income is now 
included in the tax base. 
The new law has maintained the taxation of personal income by type of 
income, as well as the definitions of different incomes and levels of tax rates. The 
tax rate on wages has remained 14 percent, and 20 percent on all other types of 
personal income: from agriculture and forestry, self-employment, copyrights 
and industrial property rights, capital, real estate, as well as on capital gains 
and the so-called other incomes. However, a change has occurred with respect 
to the level of standardized costs for some types of personal income. Bearing in 
mind the administrative complexness and limited use of the existing possibility 
to prove actual costs, this change has basically resulted in a change of their 
respective effective tax rates. In the case of incomes from rents and personal 
service contracts, the effective tax rate has gone up because standardized costs 
have been reduced from the former 35 percent to 20 percent, while on income 
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from dividends it has been cut, because tax deduction has been increased to 50 
percent instead of the previous 10 percent of the paid dividend. 
The progressive tax rate (10, 15 and 20 percent) on annual income of 
individuals has also been maintained, as was the method for assessing and 
paying this tax. The only special tax relief that was introduced relates to alien 
residents employed by domestic legal or natural persons and sets their annual 
non-taxable income at a level which is almost five times higher than the one 
for Serbian citizens. The purpose of this much more favorable tax position 
of alien residents is to a certain extent understandable. The threshold above 
which the tax is paid on annual income is relatively low because incomes in 
Serbia are low relative to the European average, and therefore all alien residents 
would become payers of this tax. Although it is true that Serbia needs foreign 
investors because of economic growth and not for the purpose of increasing 
the number of individual taxpayers, after taking into account the relatively low 
rate of the tax on annual income, this provision which discriminates taxpayers 
based on their nationality cannot be considered justified.
Through amendments to the Law on the Personal Income Tax of 2002 the 
tax rates on income from agriculture and forestry and from self-employment 
were reduced to 14 percent, concurrently with the cut in the corporate income 
tax rate. These amendments have also defined a tax exemption for severance 
payments to laid off redundant workers, and in this manner tax policy has made 
its contribution to the facilitation of enterprise restructuring. The progressive 
rate in the taxation of annual income has been repealed and replaced by the 
proportional one, set at 10 percent. In addition, a new category of income has 
been introduced, the so-called incomes of athletes and sporting experts, whose 
effective tax rate has been practically reduced from 16 percent to 10 percent 
by setting the level of standardized costs at 50 percent. This was an attempt to 
capture significant amounts of money from transactions in sports and include 
them into legal flows by reducing the tax burden. Although insignificant in 
terms of the relative amount (revenue from this source accounts for some 
0.2 percent of the personal income tax), the fact remains that in 2003, 214.6 
million euros from transactions in sports was covered by taxation on this basis, 
while in 2004 the amount was 242.3 million euros. These data corroborate the 
thesis that the tax base in Serbia is elastic to changes in tax rates, and that the 
low tax rate policy has been a good choice. It should, however, be applied to 
all types of income, and not only in the case of those taxpayers whose power 
to exert influence and ability to conceal the tax base is relatively high. Through 
such discrimination of taxpayers those compliant ones are punished and their 
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reluctance to pay taxes intensified, which can by no means be considered a 
desired outcome. 
The Law on the Personal Income Tax was amended in 2004 as well. The 
tax rate on income from self-employment has been reduced to 10 percent, 
which constitutes harmonization with the change of the same kind in the 
corporate income tax rate. The position of entrepreneurs who maintain their 
business books according to the system of double entry bookkeeping has been 
equalized from the tax standpoint with that of enterprises, and those who 
opt for inclusion in the VAT are put under an obligation to maintain their 
books in this manner, irrespective of the volume of turnover or type of activity. 
Similarly, the tax treatment of entrepreneurs was also accorded to taxpayers 
who generate income from agriculture and forestry, if they are VAT payers or 
have opted for becoming VAT payers. 
The number of effective tax rates in taxing income from copyrights and 
related rights, resulting from different amounts of standardized costs, has 
also been reduced by classifying all these incomes according to the level of 
standardized costs into three, instead of former five groups; the rights related 
to the copyright have been defined, and flat-rate taxation of income from 
performing pop and folk music has been eliminated. Income from interest on 
dinar term deposits has been exempted from taxation, which was the end of 
the taxation of interest on dinar savings deposits on the whole, since dinar 
demand-deposit savings had been exempted from taxation prior to that. 
This ends the list of positive changes in the taxation of personal income 
which were brought about by amendments to the Law on the Personal income 
Tax of 2004. Other changes are either obviously demagogic or unnecessarily 
create new distortions in the taxation of personal income.
The demagogic changes include introduction of a tax incentive for just one 
year,  which is utterly unusual in tax policy. Namely, employers who in 2005 
hire new workers on a full-time basis will be exempt from the payment of the 
payroll tax on the wages of their new employees. Not only that the probability 
is close to zero that this short-lived incentive will encourage employers to hire 
new workers, but it is also in complete contradiction, according to the manner 
in which it has been defined, with the concept of gross wage, introduced in 
early 2001. Namely, the payroll tax is an integral part of the gross wage, i.e. the 
taxpayer is the employee and not the employer. It implies that the benefit from 
this incentive should accrue to the newly employed worker, in the sense that 
he will receive the net wage which has been increased by the entire amount of 
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the tax from the payment of which he has been exempted. In such a manner, 
of course, labor costs for the employer would not be lowered, which seems 
to be the basic purpose of this incentive. This purpose, however, has been 
achieved in that the state authorized the employer, by virtue of a tax law, to 
appropriate something that is an integral part of the employee’s wage. This is, 
to put it mildly, improper and one could even find arguments which point to 
the unconstitutionality of such provision. The fact that trade unions, which 
should be interested in defending the rights of employees, have not protested 
against this provision, probably indicates that in the minds of employees there 
still exists only the right to the net wage, while the tax they pay on it and 
mandatory social security contributions they perceive as an obligation of the 
employer, and not their own right and duty. 
Recognition of higher standardized costs for income from rents, when 
lessees are travelers and tourists for whom the tourist tax has been paid, in the 
amount of 50 percent instead of the previous 20 percent, which has reduced 
the effective tax rate from 16 to 10 percent, could be interpreted as an incentive 
to the legalization of personal income from tourism and collection of the 
tourist tax. The effects of this incentive remain very uncertain. What is certain, 
though, is that a new distortion has been created, with an inevitable increase 
in costs of administration.
However, the tax exemption of interest on debt securities only if the issuer 
is government (the Republic, Autonomous Province or a self-government 
unit), or the National Bank of Serbia, constitutes a very bad discriminatory 
measure in the field of taxation of income from capital (dividends, interest, 
capital gains), which is problematic both from the standpoint of the concept 
of tax policy and from the standpoint of overall economic policy (encouraging 
saving, discouraging borrowing, developing the financial market, etc.)
First, the clear commitment to taxing consumption as the most important 
tax source is in obvious contradiction with any type of taxation of returns 
on savings, which in their economic essence constitute future consumption. 
Through the taxation of interest on money deposits and interest on debt 
securities, future spending is practically taxed twice, the first time as return on 
savings in the present, and the second time through taxes on consumption at 
the point of spending the savings in the future.
Second, it lowers relative prices and thus encourages spending in the 
present. It is certainly not the objective of the current economic policy bearing 
in mind the ongoing efforts to contain spending by households, both through 
151Public Finance Policies
monetary policy measures aimed at discouraging borrowing and through wage 
controls in the public sector and administration. 
Taxation of return on risky securities, that is dividends, in the countries 
with developed stockholding, i.e. this segment of the financial market, has 
the same effects as taxation of interest. In Serbia, where the largest number of 
shareholders have received shares for free through the process of privatization, 
possible return that they bring to such holders cannot really be considered 
returns on savings, bearing in mind that the very ownership of them was 
not created by investing in shares, which implies refraining from present 
consumption. However, by persistently taxing dividends, one persistently taxes 
this income twice, the first time as corporate income and the second time as 
personal income of an individual owner, and therefore the effective tax rate on 
this revenue, which amounts to 19 percent (10 percent of the tax on dividends, 
paid after taxation of income at a rate of 10 percent) is now among the highest 
rates at which personal incomes are taxed (the only higher rates are those of the 
tax on interest on foreign currency savings deposits, on capital gains, lottery 
prizes and on incomes from insurance against forgone earnings, which are 20 
percent). From the perspective of overall economic policy, this perseverance 
discourages the development of stockholding and of the financial market as 
a whole, which is certainly in contradiction to the proclaimed objectives of 
economic policy, to say the least.
Similar questions can be raised also with respect to taxation of capital gains. 
Although the most recent amendments to the Law on the Personal Income 
Tax have provided for tax exemptions of incomes generated in transactions 
with rights, if the property rights have been acquired through inheritance or if 
transactions are performed among relatives in a direct line or between present 
or ex spouses, the manner of taxation of capital gains in the Serbian tax system 
remains problematic concept-wise. In addition to the questions raised with 
respect to taxation of returns on deposit savings and securities, in the case of 
taxation of capital gains the very selection of the taxpayer is problematic. From 
the tax standpoint the only justification for the taxation of this income may be 
found in the case where the purpose of the transaction with property rights 
is the income from that transaction, i.e. the situation in which an individual 
generates his personal income from this activity. A sign which could signal 
that this situation exists, though not completely reliable, is the fact that the 
property right which is the subject of the transaction has been in the ownership 
of the seller for a relatively short time. The conclusion that directly follows is 
that the taxation of capital gains would have to be limited to transactions with 
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property rights which an individual acquired in the previous relatively short 
period of time. Before the adoption of the new Law on the Personal Income 
Tax in 2001, such a provision existed, stipulating that there was no capital gain 
in those cases where property rights were in the portfolios of individuals for 
more than five years. This provision was without any justified reason replaced 
by a provision under which capital gain does not exist only in those cases where 
property rights were in the possession of an individual before 24 January 1994. 
Conceptually, this is not linked to tax policy, but has to do with the problems 
of denominating the purchase price in a currency which after hyperinflation in 
1993 could no longer be used as a standard. 
As for the tax exemption of interest on debt securities which depends 
on the issuer, in this specific case some direct questions can be raised. Firstly, 
it directly discriminates in favor of government and the NBS against all 
other issuers. Secondly, perceived from another angle, the present owners 
of these securities are generously rewarded. Bearing in mind that these are 
predominantly frozen foreign currency savings bonds, the question may be 
put whether the adoption of this tax incentive is a result of the influence of 
a potentially very powerful interest lobby in whose portfolio these bonds are 
concentrated through trading on the secondary market? 
The amendments to the Law on the Personal Income Tax stipulate also 
that the income from agriculture and forestry will not be taxed in 2004 and 
2005. This has just postponed the solving of the problem of taxation in this 
field, whose tax treatment, with the exception of adjustment to the introduced 
VAT, has remained completely the same as it was before tax reforms in 2001. 
From the administrative standpoint, this measure, provided that it is temporary, 
may be considered justified, bearing in mind that tax revenue is negligible, 
primarily due to decades of underestimating cadastre income as a base for 
taxation, and costs of assessing tax liability by virtue of a decision issued by 
the Tax Administration are probably higher, hence net tax revenue is in all 
likelihood negative. However, it would be very bad if this measure was just 
continuation of the practice to conduct a demagogic fiscal policy toward this 
politically important grouping of taxpayers, bearing in mind how numerous 
it is. In this manner, agricultural households pay extremely low taxes, which 
is unjust to other taxpayers and which at the same time slows down structural 
changes in agriculture. 
On the whole, taxation of personal income and taxation of corporate 
income, which is ultimately nothing else but personal income as well, are 
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areas where the most significant distortions are concentrated. In the corporate 
income tax they are created by different levels of exemptions which depend 
on the size and activity of the taxpayer, as well as on the territory in which 
it invests. In the personal income tax, the source of distortions are different 
levels of effective tax rates depending on the source of income of an individual. 
Although taxation based on the type of income may be explained by the fact 
that the tax administration, for a number of reasons, still does not have high 
quality and comprehensive data on incomes of individuals, which means that it 
would be very difficult for it to measure and control the tax base for the taxation 
of the so-called global income of an individual, the existing differences in the 
tax burden on different sources of income and different taxpayers may not be 
justified by this administrative reason. The differences in the levels of effective 
tax rates and in the treatment of taxpayers in the case of the same base testify 
to the existence of a totally inconsistent system which was created as a result 
of different one-time changes and intentions, and without a comprehensive 
approach to taxation of personal income. The table below is the best illustration 
of the accuracy of the above observation. 
Table 2. Effective tax rates on personal income 
Effective 
tax rate Personal income
20% - interest on foreign currency deposits
-  interest on debt securities not issued by government or the NBS 
- capital gains 
- lottery prizes
- insurance premium for forgone earnings 
19% - dividends
16% -  rent when the lessees are not travelers or tourists for whom the 
tourist tax has been paid 
- incomes from personal service contracts and work on the side 
-  remuneration to members of management and supervisory 
boards, members of the Parliament, bankruptcy trustees, court 
experts, lay assessors and sworn-in court interpreters 
14% - wages and other receipts arising from employment 
- income from agriculture and forestry
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Effective 
tax rate Personal income
12% -  income from copyrights and related rights, royalties for pop 
and folk music performances, production of phonograms, 
videos, broadcasts, databases
-  income from the sale of materials for recycling, forest plants 
and medicinal herbs
10% - income from self-employment 
-  income from copyrights and related rights for paintings and 
graphic works, works of applied art and architecture, scientific, 
technical and non-fiction works 
-  rent when the lessees are travelers or tourists for whom the 
tourist tax has been paid
- income of athletes and sporting experts
8% -  income from copyrights and related rights for sculptures, 
tapestries, artistic ceramics, fresco paintings made by application 
of special techniques, fashion designs and artistically processed 
textile
0% - interest on dinar deposits
- interest on debt securities issued by government or the NBS
The wage bill tax was not a separate fiscal instrument in relation to the 
payroll tax, because the tax base was the same – the gross wage of the employee. 
Although the reason for the introduction of this tax can be understood, 
which is securing revenue for local self-governments, this tax had significant 
shortcomings both from the standpoint of tax policy and from the standpoint 
of overall economic policy. First, it was yet another source of distortions in 
the taxation of personal income, which created additional administrative costs 
for companies at that, since they were forced to calculate, separately account 
for and pay two types of taxes and three types of contributions on the same 
base. Second, this tax was further increasing the already high burden of labor 
taxes, made job creation more expensive and created incentives for avoiding 
formal employment. For these reasons, its elimination in March 2004 was a 
good decision, irrespective of negative reactions which it naturally caused with 
local self-governments. 
Contributions for mandatory social insurance have very high relative 
importance in Serbia’s public finance: contribution revenue accounts for more 
than one quarter of total public revenue, while expenditure for these purposes 
accounts for about two fifths of total public expenditure. Although, strictly 
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speaking, contributions for pension insurance, health insurance and insurance 
against unemployment should not be considered taxes, bearing in mind that 
by paying them the contributor acquires specific and defined rights, in Serbia, 
in terms of their character, they are rather a tax on personal income than 
insurance. The tax character is derived from their obligatoriness and, with the 
exception of pension insurance to a certain extent, from the absence of a link 
between the level of payments and scope of rights. Due to their importance to 
public finance and taking into account their now predominantly tax character, 
without any pretension to analyze the system of insurance as such, this part is 
devoted to discussing changes in the method of establishing the base and rates 
of contributions, hence to strictly fiscal issues. 
Insurance against unemployment practically amounts to an earmarked 
tax paid by employees (as some kind of imposed solidarity), whose purpose 
is to finance different forms of assistance to those who have been laid off. The 
very obligatoriness of this contribution makes it a tax, and as long as it exists, 
the tax character of this contribution will not be changed, irrespective of its 
possible modifications. 
In the case of health insurance, the situation is somewhat different. The 
contribution for health insurance could assume the character of insurance 
through appropriate changes, first and foremost through the establishment 
of a link between the level of payment and the scope of medical services to 
which the contributor-insured person becomes entitled, which it essentially 
does not possess now due to the absence of this link. These changes, however, 
would have to provide for an opportunity to opt for the level of the obligation 
for insurance, consequently to introduce elements of voluntariness in the 
entire system. In such a case, this contribution would preserve the character 
of an earmarked tax the revenue from which is used for financing medical 
services in the part in which a mandatory minimum rate of health insurance 
contribution would be prescribed, while in the part in which a choice would be 
free, it would assume the features of insurance. In the present circumstances, it 
has entirely the character of an earmarked tax. 
The reform which was carried out in the first four years of transition in 
the domain of pension insurance enabled this contribution to have the largest 
number of insurance features. Considering that the replacement of the present 
pay-as-you-go system of financing pensions by a funded pension system 
requires the resources which are non-existent for the time being to finance 
the switch from one system to another, the changes made so far are beyond 
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doubt a maximum in terms of making progress against the backdrop of given 
limitations. This is also the only contribution where there is a link between 
the level of contribution payments and the level of pension benefits to which 
one is entitled, as well as a defined maximum annual base for the payment of 
contributions, in addition to the minimum one, while payments above that 
maximum give the right to a refund of the contributions paid in excess. 
In order to understand the changes introduced by a new Law on 
Contributions adopted in 2004, it is necessary to make a short reference to 
the previous situation. Before the adoption of this Law, the insured person, 
the contributor and bases were set out in the laws governing the rights arising 
from insurance. The rates at which contributions are paid were not laid down 
in laws, but the power to set their levels was vested in relevant funds. These 
are four pension funds: for employees, for the self-employed, for farmers and 
the military pension fund; the Republican Health Insurance Fund and the 
National Employment Service. 
So, the minimum bases for different categories of contributors were laid 
down in three laws, while the funds had an obligation to periodically prescribe 
their levels. The minimum bases were mutually harmonized between the Law 
on Pension Insurance and the Law on Employment and Insurance against 
Unemployment, which were amended in 2003, and they were defined as a 
percentage of the average wage earned in the Republic in the previous quarter. 
In the Law on Health Insurance, which was not amended on that occasion, the 
system of determination through coefficients remained, therefore in practice 
the amounts of minimum bases were harmonized among funds, but only in 
those cases where bases for insurance were the same.   
Although the basic principles were the same for all three types of 
mandatory insurance, they were applied in practice in different manners, 
making the whole system extremely complicated both for the payment by 
contributors and for the control by the Tax Administration. There were as 
many as thirty five different bases and twenty different rates. For the basic, 
that is, predominant basis for insurance, employment, eight minimum bases 
were established, depending on professional qualifications. The assumption 
that bases for insurance in all the cases should be in a positive correlation with 
the level of education, in the same manner in all the activities and with all the 
employers at that, clearly was not realistic, nor should the base for insurance 
necessarily depend in this manner on the formal level of education. 
Therefore, the adoption of the Law on Contributions for Mandatory Social 
Insurance constitutes major progress and a necessary step in the consolidation 
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of the area which, on the one hand, constitutes the largest individual item on 
the revenue side of Serbia’s public finance, and on the other hand, one of the 
most sensitive items on its expenditure side. Generally speaking, the main 
improvements brought about by this Law are the elimination of the complicated 
system with eight minimum bases related to educational levels, the definition 
of all insured persons, i.e. contributors in one instead of three different laws, 
as was the case before, and the fact that mandatory contribution rates are laid 
down in a law, as it should be, and not in decisions of the funds. 
The established levels of the contribution rates, however, contrary to the 
expected cut, resulted in an increase in the burden on wages of employees, 
i.e. a rise in the labor costs. Now the burden amounts to 35.8 percent on a 
cumulative basis, and relative to the previous 33.6 percent it is an increase of 
2.2 percentage points. Generous promises from the 2003 election campaign 
that 2004 would see radical cuts in expenses for public dues which burden the 
wages have thus boiled down to the modest 1.3 percentage points, when one 
takes into account the elimination of the wage bill tax. 
This outcome, however, does not come as a surprise, because even 
superficial knowledge of the subject matter of the social security system in Serbia 
would be enough to conclude that only a radical reform of the expenditure 
side, i.e. of the insurance system per se, can make possible a reduction in the 
fiscal burden on wages on this basis. 
Taxation of property
After the adoption of a new Law on Property Taxes in 2001, these taxes 
continued to cover a) the tax on property rights to real estate, shares and 
stakes, b) the tax on assignment of these property rights, as well as of the rights 
to industrial property, used cars and the permanent right to use city buildable 
land, and c) the tax on inheritance, i.e. gift of these rights, as well as on movable 
properties, money deposits and cash money inherited or received as a gift. 
The tax base in all the cases has remained the market value of the property 
right which is owned, i.e. which is the subject of the transaction. Definitions 
of the taxpayer, who is defined as the owner of the right, donee or inheritor, 
i.e. the seller of the established property rights, have also been maintained. 
The exemptions from taxation, as well as tax credits, concept-wise have also 
remained the same.
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In cases where an immovable property is part of business assets of 
the taxpayer, the tax rate has remained 0.4 percent, while in the taxation 
of immovable properties whose owners do not maintain business books, 
a progressive tax rate has been introduced with the following scale: if the 
market value of an immovable property is up to 6 million dinars, the rate is 0.4 
percent, if it ranges between 6 and 15 million dinars, the rate is 0.8 percent for 
amounts exceeding 6 million, if it ranges between 15 and 30 million, the rate 
is 1.5 percent on amounts exceeding 15 million, and if the market value of the 
immovable property has been appraised at more than 30 million dinars, the 
tax rate is 2 percent on the value exceeding the said amount. The new Law has 
preserved the already existing progressiveness in the taxation of inheritance 
and gifts, but has laid down a higher tax rate for inheritors and donees who are 
not related to the testator, i.e. donor, which rose from the previous 3 percent to 
5 percent, reaching the same level as the tax rate on transfer of absolute rights 
(title) to real estate. 
The tax on immovable property, as well as the tax on inheritance and 
gift, are consequently the only taxes in Serbia’s tax system with progressive tax 
rates. Without the intention to get into a debate in principle about theoretical 
reasons, as well as about practical advantages and disadvantages of progressive 
taxation per se, as in the case of the concrete tax base, it does not appear that 
this progressiveness in Serbia has yielded any significant practical results. With 
the exception of the political message that the rich must shoulder a relatively 
higher tax burden, revenue effects of progressive taxation of real estate and 
inheritance and gifts are almost negligible. Since inheritance and gifts are by 
their nature a sporadic tax base from which no generous tax revenues can be 
expected, the most important reason for proportionately low revenue from the 
tax on real estate is the method used to determine the market value as a base 
for taxation.
Although the Law has prescribed that the tax base shall be the market value, 
the tax administration, in whose competence the assessment of tax liability falls, 
in following the rules prescribed by a bylaw issued by the Ministry of Finance, 
has been assessing the tax liability, as a rule, by heavily underestimating the 
tax base. The immediate proof of that is also the fact that the tax base for the 
transfer of title to real estate, also determined by the tax administration, is 
eight to ten times higher for the same immovable property.12
The reason for these instructions to the tax administration is not so difficult 
to understand, irrespective of whether it is justified or not. Namely, in Serbia, 
12 See the study B. Begović et al, Reform of the Tax System (2), CLDS, Beograd, 2004. 
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in the first years of transition preceded by decades of economic devastation, 
two hyperinflations, sanctions and war, as well as by the privatization of 
apartments previously socially owned, which were granted to employees by 
their companies in line with the then socialist self-management practice, who 
then became owners of those apartments on privileged terms after inflation 
had eaten up their value, the market value of immovable property could hardly 
be an indicator of wealth for the majority of the population. On the other hand, 
the fact that the number of citizens who are taxpayers, and who are in principle 
unaccustomed to paying taxes, is large makes the assessment of tax liability a 
politically sensitive issue. In addition, unorganized, incomplete and non-up-
to-date records on ownership of real estate prevent full coverage of taxpayers, 
which additionally creates disgruntlement on the part of those who are paying 
this tax.
In light of all these problems, a policy which would produce higher revenue 
effects in taxation of ownership of immovables should aim at realistically 
evaluating the tax base and at ensuring full coverage of all taxpayers, and 
abandon progressiveness which in the present circumstances is just paying lip 
service. That would enable this tax to become a more significant pillar of the 
financing of the functions of local self-governments, whose revenue it is. This 
objective would have to be one of the priority objectives of tax policy in order 
to strengthen local finances and reduce their pressure on the central budget. 
Although in 2004 certain progress was made toward a more realistic evaluation 
of the tax base for the taxation of real estate, it cannot be considered sufficient, 
particularly because essentially it is not based on a system which would enable 
permanent and unbiased measuring of the tax base.
As for the taxation of ownership of shares and stakes, this tax base is in 
essence a legacy from the previous socialist system where private ownership 
of companies was not an indicator of wealth, but a socially unacceptable 
symbol. An analysis of its harmful consequences for the development of 
stockholding and the financial market, as well as from the standpoint of tax 
policy of improper multiple taxation which it caused, is almost identical to the 
one already discussed in the case of taxing income from capital. Therefore, it is 
good that this base for taxation was eliminated by amendments to the Law on 
Property Taxes in 2004.
The transfer of shares and stakes has, unfortunately, remained the subject 
of taxation even after the Law on Property Taxes has been amended in 2004. 
This tax only increases transaction costs of trading in securities, which are 
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substantial even without this tax, bearing in mind the regulation of trade in 
securities and the imposed obligation to trade through authorized brokers, 
who are charging not so insignificant commissions, and on the stock exchange. 
Based on amendments to the Law on Property Taxes, the Central Securities 
Registry is even under an obligation to automatically collect this tax and is 
authorized to charge the seller of shares a fee for that. Bearing in mind that the 
revenue from this tax both in 2003 and 2004 accounted for a mere 0.02 percent 
of total tax revenue, it is definitely not clear why one persists on the taxation 
of these transactions. 
The amendments to the Law on Property Taxes have also introduced a 
new lower rate for taxing transfer of ownership of used cars and agricultural 
land, which is now 2.5 percent, while the rate of the tax on transfer of real 
estate has remained at 5 percent. This differentiation in tax rates can hardly be 
considered a reflection of a well-thought-out tax policy. It can be understood 
only as a compromise between a promise given earlier on, that the tax rate on 
transfer of ownership will be reduced from 5 percent to 2.5 percent, and the 
importance which the tax on transactions with immovable property has in 
financing budgets of local self-governments. A cut in the tax rate for transfer 
of real estate to 2.5 percent would have left local self-governments with halved 
revenue from this tax, and all that would have happened in the run-up to the 
introduction of the VAT, on account of which they were already faced with a 
loss of revenue from the sales tax, when the effects of the VAT introduction 
were uncertain, and local self-governments without too much confidence 
that the previous revenue from the sales tax would be compensated through 
transfers from the republican budget. 
In principle, the taxation of capital transactions discourages trading 
in capital/assets, which is a source of inefficiency, and encourages further 
irrational resource allocation. Therefore, except in those cases where there are 
compelling fiscal reasons, such taxes should not exist at all. From the fiscal 
standpoint the only significant revenue, and only for local self-governments 
at that, is the revenue from the tax on transfer of real estate, which accounts 
for around 1.5 percent of total tax revenue, hence before its elimination a 
possible tax source should be identified, which would be compensation for the 
loss of this revenue. In all other cases the revenue from the tax on transfer of 
absolute rights is negligible, hence, there are no fiscal reasons for its existence 
whatsoever. 
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Specific tax forms 
The tax on financial transactions which in 2001 was created as a 
replacement for two levies that had existed before, the solidarity “fee” and 
the solidarity “contribution” on payment transactions, from a narrower tax 
standpoint certainly constituted an improvement because instead of two 
earmarked quasi taxes, a single tax was introduced as a budget revenue without 
a predetermined purpose, while the tax burden on payment transactions has 
not been increased. Its economic effect, however, was bad in many respects. 
Firstly, the price of using an already scarce and expensive input – capital was 
going up. Secondly, the performance of financial transactions through legal 
channels was discouraged in a situation where business operations carried 
out in cash and outside the legal payment system already constituted a big 
problem. Thirdly, the circulation of money was slowed down and costs were 
shifted to the entire legal economy at high speed. Additionally, in those days 
when payment operations were carried out through ZOP this tax could be 
regarded an efficient fiscal instrument, whose collection did not produce 
additional administrative costs to the tax administration. After the transfer 
of payment operations to commercial banks and after a cut in rates in late 
2002 and numerous exemptions in 2003, this instrument became extremely 
complicated for administration which banks, rightfully, did not want to take 
over. The outcome was its fiscal inefficiency on top of everything. Therefore, 
the decision on its elimination, formally passed in the Parliament in 2004, was 
absolutely right.
The passage of the Law on the Tax on Use, Possession and Carrying of 
Certain Goods constituted a replacement for numerous levies introduced by 
virtue of decrees in the period before 2000, which, for the most part, were 
various extrabudgetary earmarked revenues. To the extent to which this Law 
has integrated the tax system, it can be considered an improvement of the tax 
system. The maintenance of tax forms, though, which can be understood in no 
other manner but as an attempt of the lawmaker to specially and additionally 
tax richer individuals by using selected indicators (proxies) in the absence of 
an information base and a method to progressively tax personal income in an 
efficient manner, definitely can not be considered justified. 
The first problem with this tax is a difficulty to accept such method of 
estimating a base for taxation on principled grounds. The second problem is 
the selection of goods as such, whose use or possession is taxed. It is true that 
cars, mobile phones, boats and yachts, as well as arms to a certain extent, are 
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usually possessed and used by relatively rich citizens of Serbia. However, their 
number, after excluding owners of cars and mobile phones, is negligible and 
therefore revenue on all bases in 2002, 2003 and 2004 on average accounted for 
around 1.3 percent of total tax revenue.
A good illustration of the applied logic of taxation is a very instructive 
example of the charges for stay and mooring of boats, boat-restaurants, and 
other facilities for catering, entertainment and recreational purposes (vacation 
and excursions). These charges are paid on as many as three bases. Firstly, a 
charge is paid to the public water management company, which is one of the 
charges for water supply, although it is definitely unclear why and for which 
service exactly. Secondly, the Law on Local Self-Government has prescribed 
that the local self-government units may introduce utility fees in almost 
identical cases. Although this arrangement is not the best there is, this fee is 
at least part of public revenue of local self-governments. Consequently, some 
kind of local tax without a specified pre-defined purpose, admittedly with a 
fairly retrograde method for the selection of the tax base. Thirdly, the Law 
on the Tax on Use, Possession and Carrying of Goods also provides for the 
payment of a tax in similar situations, the revenue from which belongs to the 
budget of the Republic, hence the owners of these facilities are taxpayers of 
the Republic as well. And so, it turns out that the owners of these facilities are 
the most important taxpayers in Serbia, at least judging by the number of fees, 
charges and taxes they are paying. 
This Law should by all means be repealed, thus eliminating from Serbia’s 
tax system a conceptually unfounded and fiscally inefficient tax. Instead of 
being repealed as a whole, this Law was amended in 2004 in that the tax on 
mobile phones paid by post-paid subscribers, which, by the way, accounted 
for almost half of the revenue from this tax, was eliminated. Furthermore, the 
amounts paid by owners of cars have also been changed in that they have been 
reduced for all cars of up to 1600 cm3, and increased for cars of more than 2000 
cm3, the tax on boats has been eliminated, but remained on vessels of other 
kind. By way of illustration, even when boats were taxed, tax revenue did not 
account for as much as 0.5 percent of the revenue from this tax (in an absolute 
amount, the revenue from the tax on boats, vessels and yachts amounted to 
6.3 million dinars). Therefore, apart from political demagogy, this tax has no 
reason whatsoever to exist.
In late 2004, almost unobtrusively, the tax system in Serbia got a rather 
unusual tax: the tax on non-life assurance premiums. This Law of 13 Articles 
has laid down as a base on which a tax is levied at a rate of 5 percent the 
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amount of the total insurance premium stipulated in a contract on non-life 
assurance transactions. The taxpayers under this Law are insurance companies. 
Exempt from the tax are: insurance against an accident, injury at work and 
occupational disease, voluntary health insurance, insurance of motor vehicles 
whose owners are persons with disabilities, insurance of residential and export 
loans, insurance of loans which households are repaying in installments and 
insurance of agricultural loans. These exemptions, under the circumstances 
prevailing in Serbia, are practically leaving only the insurance of immovable 
and movable property as a base. 
With the exception of purely fiscal arguments, which are difficult to 
evaluate at this point, in the principles of tax policy or in tax practice of 
European states it is not possible to find arguments for this Law. It is obvious, 
though, that the logical shifting of this obligation to an insured person will 
further slow down the already very slow development of the insurance market 
in Serbia. Therefore, this Law should not have been adopted in the first place, 
and it would be advisable to rescind it as soon as possible.
The famous Law on the Tax on Extra Profit, whose full title is the Law on 
the One-off Tax on Extra Profit and Extra Property Gained through the Use 
of Special Privileges, from the standpoint of tax policy constitutes the largest 
and maybe the only total failure in the period of transition. This is not a tax 
law at all, but a political attempt to do justice post festum through retroactive 
taxation. The tax that should have been collected on the strength of this Law 
is not actually a tax, but a fine whose amount was supposed to depend on 
the extent of “special privileges” which individuals or companies enjoyed in 
the previous regime. This is the fundamental problem of this Law. A tax is 
not a fine, but a regular, statutorily defined, known in advance and certain 
duty of the citizens of a country, by whose fulfillment they contribute to the 
production of public goods and services they themselves use. 
It was logical for an attempt to subsequently redress or punish injustice or 
undeserved political privileges by levying a special tax designed particularly 
for that purpose to get entangled in the issue of defining the tax base, on which, 
for all practical purposes, the selection of taxpayers directly depended. And 
the base could not be defined in a manner which would enable unambiguous 
and accurate assessment of tax liability, because there was no such tax liability 
to begin with at the time when “special privileges” were used, hence there 
are no relevant records. For that reason, most of the rulings were quashed in 
administrative disputes before the Supreme Court. An absurdity which is also 
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a logical consequence of reaching for a means inappropriate for the underlying 
intention is the fact that tax liability was assessed to socially owned companies 
which were neither able to pay it, being either in or on the verge of bankruptcy, 
nor had any real benefits as companies from “special privileges” that their 
managements could have at the time of the previous regime. 
In the end, it is necessary to note that the rule of law in any democratic 
state implies that a penalty is pronounced in regular judicial proceedings 
and for a proven criminal offence or a petty offence. Hence, the issue whose 
resolution was attempted through the adoption of this Law should have been 
resolved in such a procedure, instead of involving the Ministry of Finance and 
Tax Administration into tasks which are not, and neither could nor should be, 
in their competence. 
It remains to be seen when the Government and the Ministry of Finance 
will muster the courage and propose the rescinding of this Law, which is, in 
effect, nothing else but a demagogic, populist step from the first days after 
the toppling of the previous regime, and which was presented to the people 
as justice finally done. If for no other reason, then because of the fact that too 
much time has already been spent on establishing all possible bases prescribed 
by this Law, hence both its revenue-yielding and political uses have been 
exhausted. 
Instead of investing efforts in such undertakings, Serbia desperately needs 
investing of efforts in establishment of permanent tax institutes and institutions 
and in building of administrative capacities, which will enable their consistent 
and comprehensive implementation. 
Local public revenues
Sources of financing of local self-government units are governed by 
the Law on Local Self-Government, adopted in early 2002. Guided by the 
commitment to initiating the process of fiscal decentralization, this Law has 
stipulated that the revenue from the tax on the wage bill, as well as revenues 
from rents should be ceded to municipalities and cities, in addition to the 
revenues which have already been ceded to them or which are shared with 
local budgets (property taxes, part of the sales tax and part of the payroll 
tax, and the total revenue from taxing other sources of income). It has also 
defined originally local revenues (the tourist tax, local utility fees, self-imposed 
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taxes), and provided for additional sharing of the revenue from some fees. 
The latter, however, was not harmonized with the laws introducing these fees, 
which have stayed unchanged, or with the Law on Public Revenue and Public 
Expenditure, which is a basic law stipulating to which level of government 
different public revenues should accrue. Upon eliminating the wage bill tax, 
and after introducing the value added tax, as a replacement for the revenue 
from the sales tax and the wage bill tax, the share of local self-government 
units in the payroll tax has been increased and transfers from the budget of the 
Republic established.
Local self-government units have become significantly more independent 
since 2002, particularly in the budget procedure, under which they 
autonomously decide on the size of their budgets, which was not the case 
before. The local public revenues per se, which are divided into shared and 
originally local revenues, however, have not undergone any major conceptual 
changes, except for the changes necessitated by the introduction of the VAT.
Shared public revenues of local self-governments, and these are relevant 
parts of revenues from taxes and fees for which the tax rate, or the amount 
of the obligation, is governed by laws, government acts or acts issued by line 
ministries, on average account for three quarters of current revenue of local 
self-governments. More than half of their original revenues, which comprise 
revenues from fees and charges for which the level of the obligation (a rate or 
an absolute amount) is established by the bodies of a local self-government, is 
yielded by the fee for using and the fee for developing buildable land, which 
are regulated by the Law on Planning and Construction, i.e. a non-tax law. 
As much as four fifths of the total originally local revenue is yielded by these 
two fees, two utility fees – for putting signs displaying names of firms and for 
possession of motor vehicles, as well as by the rent which local budgets collect 
from leasing out real estate.
Therefore one could say that the changes in Serbia’s public finance 
policy have just opened issues concerning the method and sources of local 
self-government financing. Before addressing these issues, as a preliminary 
problem, the link has to be analyzed between the real economic power, i.e. the 
resulting fiscal capacity, and the scope of their competences. Only after settling 
this preliminary issue, one could more seriously proceed with selecting the 
measures for fiscal decentralization and its forms, as well as with defining the 
relations between local governments and the central government in whose 
competence, in the nature of things, the levers of fiscal policy have to remain.
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In this selection it is necessary to bear in mind two following facts. First, 
the largest number of local self-governments in Serbia are fiscally unsustainable 
on their own. Second, the whole of Serbia is economically and territorially 
relatively small for establishing sustainable fiscal federalism and territories 
larger than the existing municipalities and cities without calling into question 
the effectiveness of the country’s fiscal policy, and even the country itself in 
the political and territorial sense. Therefore, it is neither realistic, nor justified, 
to search for the solution to the problem of financing functions of local self-
governments in the introduction of special local taxes with respect to which 
they would be independent in defining taxpayers, the tax base and rate.
Therefore, it seems that the most appropriate thing to do, instead of 
trying to invent and introduce some special originally local taxes which 
would be in the jurisdiction of local self-governments, is to invest efforts 
into formulating criteria and procedures which would be used to determine 
the level of transfers from the central budget to each of them. Now, after the 
introduction of the VAT, these transfers are practically the most important 
individual revenue of local self-governments. Also, it is possible to make those 
taxes from which the revenues already now fully accrue to local budgets more 
generous by introducing appropriate changes in their regulation (for example, 
by determining a real value of the tax base for the tax on immovable property)13, 
to grant partial autonomy to local self-governments in setting tax rates (for 
instance, by prescribing in a law a range within which the level of the tax rate 
may be set) and to enhance the coordination of operations between the Tax 
Administration and relevant bodies of local self-governments in controlling 
and collecting these taxes.
However, the manner in which original revenues of local self-governments 
are regulated now also deserves attention. Belonging to those with the largest 
number of tax features are local utility fees. In this domain, there practically 
has been no change relative to the previous period, because the section of the 
Law on Local Self-Government, adopted in 2002, which deals with local utility 
fees, is just a slightly changed relevant section of the Law on Utility Fees and 
Charges adopted in 1992, as amended in 2000.
Pursuant to the existing arrangements, a local self-government may 
introduce utility fees for using rights, objects and services. In principle, the 
payer of this fee is defined as the user of the rights, objects and services, for 
the use of which the payment of the said fee was prescribed. The day of the 
commencement of the use of the right, object or service, for the use of which 
13 See B. Begović et al, Reform of the Tax System (2), CLDS, Beograd, 2004. 
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the payment of the fee has been prescribed, is defined as the point in which the 
obligation to pay the fee is generated and this obligation will be in force for as 
long as the use of the right, object or service lasts. A local self-government is 
entitled to set different levels of the same fee, depending on the type of activity, 
area and technical characteristics of facilities, and on the parts of the territory, 
i.e. on the zones, in which facilities or objects are, or in which services are 
rendered for which fees are levied. Likewise, it has been prescribed which local 
utility fees are set in daily amounts, and which in annual amounts. 
The issue of time limits and frequency in changing the levels of these 
fees is not regulated in any way, thus local self-governments can, in principle, 
keep changing the levels of these burdens all the time. Bearing in mind that 
these are fiscal obligations after all, this situation creates uncertainty among 
economic agents with respect to the amount of total costs for public dues. It 
also creates big problems for the Tax Administration in administering this type 
of public revenue, with an additional aggravating circumstance being the fact 
that local self-governments have differently defined the competences of the tax 
administration in the procedure for collection of these public dues. 
A legal definition of the bases for the introduction of local utility fees is 
completely vague. Thus, for example, it is not clear on the use of which right, 
object or service the fee for displaying a sign with the name of the firm on the 
business premises is paid. Is it the right to publicly display the name of the firm? 
The question is then raised: How does one acquire this right? Is it acquired 
by the establishment of the company, i.e. registration of an entrepreneurial 
activity? The same or similar questions can be put with respect to any of these 
fees. A logical consequence is the variety which now exists among local self-
governments in respect of the choice of the base, payers and levels of fees. A 
recent survey14 has shown that there are, firstly, huge differences in the levels 
of the fee for the same base in different local self-governments; secondly, that 
local self-governments differently define payers of the same fee; thirdly, that 
differences in the incidence of fees in various local self-governments are very 
substantial; fourthly, that local self-governments are not able to project revenues 
from individual fees, which is the best indicator of how much uncertainty there 
is with respect to these fees; and, fifthly, that some local self-governments also 
introduce utility fees which are not laid down by law. 
In principle, all presently existing local utility fees may be classified into 
three groups which concurrently point to the relevant changes in the regulation 
as well. 
14 See B. Begović et al, Reform of the Tax System (2), CLDS, Beograd, 2004. 
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A fee for displaying a sign with the company name on business premises 
is the only fee which essentially constitutes a local tax. Its characteristic is 
the payment obligation which is not related to the use of a public good or 
service, but the base for the payment of the fee is the business activity or 
assets of the payer. In the case of this fee, it would be necessary to establish 
in a law the base, the payer and a range within which local self-governments 
could independently set the rate, i.e. the amount of the obligation, as well as 
a procedure for assessment and collection, so that some certainty could be 
created as to the magnitude of this levy, which at the same time constitutes the 
cost of the payer. By way of illustration, the revenue from the collection of this 
fee, recalculated on the cumulative base of the corporate income tax and the 
personal income tax on the income from self-employment, gives an average tax 
rate of about 3 percent. The fact that the rates of the corporate income tax and 
of the tax on income from self-employment are now 10 percent corroborates 
the fact that this fee needs to be regulated in the above-described manner. 
The second group comprises local utility fees for which the payment 
obligation is generated only if the payer uses a public good or service. The fees 
from this group should be eliminated as local utility fees, and the base for the 
collection of these revenues redefined into an adequate form. The adequate 
form, depending on the base for payment, may be rent, payment for a service 
in those cases where the service itself is clearly identified or the payment for a 
license for starting up and performing a particular economic activity.15
The third group is comprised of local utility fees which are simply 
unsustainable, and should be eliminated. This group covers all those fees for 
which no service is provided nor can it be provided, or for which identification 
of the base or payers requires inappropriately expensive administration, or 
those which introduce multiple taxation of a specific economic activity.16 
15  This group includes fees for using public areas for business purposes, billboards, parking lots for 
parking road motor vehicles and trailers on regulated and marked places, free areas for camps, for 
the setting of tents or other forms of temporary use, for the use of the coast for business or any other 
purposes, showcases for displaying goods outside business premises, as well as for restaurants and 
other catering facilities on water, possession and use of vessels and other facilities on water, with the 
exception of quays used in border river traffic, boats and rafts on water, with the exception of boats 
used by the organizations which maintain and mark navigation routes and possession of gambling 
machines (jackpots). 
16  This group includes fees for: displaying and writing a sign with a company name outside business 
premises on facilities and areas which belong to the municipality (road surfaces, sidewalks, lawns, 
lampposts and the like), occupation of a public area with building material, organization of musical 
programs in restaurants and cafes, the keeping of pets or exotic animals, and the possession of 
motor road vehicles and trailers, with the exception of agricultural vehicles and machines. The 
revenue from the last one, which for local self-governments is not negligible, could be compensated 
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Building the tax administration
In 2003, the implementation of the Law on the Tax Procedure and Tax 
Administration (LTPTA) commenced. That is also the year in which the 
Tax Administration, set up pursuant to this Law, simultaneously initiated 
two complex processes, the first one being the transformation of the tax 
administration itself, while the second one was the consistent implementation 
of material tax laws in accordance with a comprehensive procedural tax law 
adopted for the first time.  
The transformation of the Tax Administration and full establishment of all 
the functions provided for by the LTPTA implied large-scale and far-reaching 
changes in all the domains of its operation. This transformation began in the 
circumstances in which the prevailing method for assessing tax liabilities was 
the issuance of decisions, without IT possibilities to automatically monitor 
compliance, without off-site controls, with almost exclusive reliance on on-
site inspections in which the choice of taxpayers to be audited was mainly 
haphazard, and as often as not political, too, and which was carried out by the 
organizational part of the administration (financial police) which had almost 
no operational connections with other functional parts of the administration 
(Republican Public Revenue Agency) and against the backdrop of an almost 
confederation-like decentralized territorial organization.    
One of the most important possible problems from the operational 
standpoint faced by the Tax Administration, which is a logical consequence of 
the previous situation and previous organization of the administration itself, 
is the absence of a centralized tax accounting. Centralized tax accounting 
should provide a comprehensive picture of the opening stock, current liability 
and payments of an individual taxpayer with respect to all his tax obligations. 
Non-updated and unreliable parts of this picture existed in territorial units, 
and when it comes to current debts for the sales tax, excises (excluding those 
collected at the customs) and withholding taxes and contributions, data were 
available on current liabilities and payments, but without opening stocks. In 
other words, on the basis of tax accounting itself it is still not possible to obtain 
a precise enough piece of information on the composition and level of debts 
of individual taxpayers, or on the composition and level of the total tax debt of 
registered taxpayers.
The Tax Administration made a huge step in 2003 toward setting up 
an information system necessary for efficient and impartial implementation 
by doubling the annual fee for road motor vehicles, whose level under the presently applicable 
regulations is set by the government, but the revenue belongs to local self-governments.
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of tax laws. Before end-2003, a single registry of taxpayers was established, 
by assigning tax identification numbers to around 400,000 taxpayers legal 
entities and entrepreneurs. By assigning tax identification numbers and by 
introducing them into payment transactions through the mediation of banks 
and the NBY, a basis was created for the building of an integrated information 
system of the Tax Administration and automatic booking in tax accounting. 
Centralization of tax accounting was carried out for withholding taxes and 
sales taxes. In January 2004, for the first time all payers of incomes were under 
an obligation to submit to the Tax Administration tax returns containing data 
on all the payments to all individuals. In such a manner, the foundations were 
laid for the setting up of a database on incomes of citizens, and thus also of an 
adequate information basis for measuring this tax base, and a prerequisite was 
created for the application of the method of cross-assessment of the tax base. 
Parallel to all these processes, preparations for the implementation of the VAT 
were carried out, whose successfulness critically depends on the ability and 
efficiency of the Tax Administration.
Although the Serbian Tax Administration is still faced with many 
problems that it needs to solve, particularly in the building, development and 
use of IT capacities and a comprehensive and uniform system of procedures 
for implementation of tax laws, in a very short period of time it managed to 
create a solid basis for fast transformation into a modern tax administration. 
The basic precondition that has to be met in order for this transformation to be 
carried out in full is complete depoliticization of this institution, which implies 
that all the staff, and in particular the management, are selected exclusively on 
the basis of their professional knowledge and skills rather than on the basis of 
their party affiliation. This is a lesson which, unfortunately, party leaders in 
Serbia have yet to learn.
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PUBLIC EXPENDITURE POLICIES
Public spending 
Data on consolidated17 public spending in Serbia presented in table 3 
bear witness to very limited leeway which budget decision-makers have in the 
given circumstances. At the same time, they also speak about the achievements 
of the policy pursued so far in this area, which, as it appears, has exhausted 
possibilities to accomplish, without truly radical cuts on the expenditure side, 
the stability and orderliness in the meeting of obligations on the one hand, and 
the modernization and efficiency of the operation of the public administration 
and a drop in the share of public spending in GDP, as a genuine indicator of a 
reduction in the tax and quasi tax burden, on the other hand. 
Transfers to households in every year since 2001 have accounted for more 
than 40 percent of total expenditure. These transfers include expenditures of 
the social security funds and expenditures of the budget for these purposes, as 
well as for different types of social assistance. Expenditures for pension benefits 
account for more than two thirds of these expenditures.
Table 3.  Consolidated public spending in Serbia 
(billions of dinars, current prices)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Gross domestic 
product (GDP) 381.7 771.8 998.3 1198.1 1400.6
Rate of retail price 
growth %  91.8 19,5 11,7 10,1
Real GDP growth  5.5 3.8 2.7 7.2
Total expenditure 
and net lending 129.6 100.0 283.9 100.0 445.3 100.0 511.9 100.0 593.0 100.0
17  Consolidated public spending actually constitutes net expenditure. For example, expenditure for 
wages is just net wages, without contributions, which are the revenue of budgetary funds, and 
expenditures for goods and services do not include the sales tax which also constitutes budget 
revenue. For these reasons, the data in this table are not directly comparable with the data on public 
revenue in table x.
172 Milica Bisić
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total expenditure 
and net lending % 
GDP
33.9  36.8  44.6  42.7  42.3  
Total expenditure 
and net lending, 
real growth 
  14.2  31.3  2.9  5.2  
Current 
expenditure 118.6 91.5 266.7 94.0 407.8 91.6 476.5 93.1 555.1 93.6
Expenditure for 
goods and services 61.6 47.6 123.4 43.5 172.3 38.7 201.7 39.4 237.6 40.1
Wages 33.4 25.8 65.4 23.0 95.3 21.4 113.2 22.1 132.9 22.4
Purchases of goods 
and services 28.2 21.8 58.0 20.4 77.0 17.3 88.6 17.3 104.6 17.6
Interest payment 2.2 1.7 5.6 2.0 8.8 2.0 11.3 2.2 17.7 3.0
Subsidies and other 
current transfers 54.8 42.3 137.7 48.5 226.7 50.9 257.2 50.2 290.5 49.0
Subsidies 7.1 5.5 23.1 8.1 42.6 9.6 40.9 8.0 43.1 7.3
Transfers to 
households 47.7 36.8 114.6 40.4 184.0 41.3 216.3 42.3 247.4 41.7
Capital expenditure 11.0 8.5 10.8 3.8 33.4 7.5 27.9 5.5 36.0 6.1
General reserves 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Net lending 0.0 0.0 6.3 2.2 0.6 0.1 7.4 1.4 1.8 0.3
Net transfers from 
Montenegro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
Budget balance -0.8 -0.6 -7.4 -2.6 -42.6 -9.6 -34.9 -6.8 -0.3 -0.1
Foreign grants 0.1 0.1 3.4 1.2 9.6 2.2 1.9 0.4 0.9 0.1
Budget balance -0.7  -4.0  -33.0  -33.0  0.5  
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 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Budget balance % 
GDP -0.2  -0.5  -3.3  -2.8  0.0  
Financing 0.7 0.5 4.0 1.4 33.0 7.4 33.0 6.5 -0.5 -0.1
Domestic financing 0.7 0.5 4.0 1.4 -2.1 -0.5 -29.2 -5.7 -20.1 -3.4
Banking system 0.3 0.3 5.2 1.8 -2.1 -0.5 -17.5 -3.4 0.0 0.0
Non-bank 0.4 0.3 -1.2 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -11.7 -2.3 -20.1 -3.4
Foreign financing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.2 3.9 12.9 2.5 12.3 2.1
Privatization 
receipts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.9 4.0 49.3 9.6 7.2 1.2
Source: Serbian Ministry of Finance, IMF
More than half of the subsidies are in essence transfers to households. They 
include expenditures for the railroad company, which in this manner ensures 
funds for the wages of its employees, and subsidies to sixty-odd companies 
under restructuring, which also pay wages out of them. It turns out that almost 
half of total public spending is actually used to support, for different reasons, 
economically inactive population. When one adds to that the expenditures for 
salaries of civil servants, accounting for slightly more than one fifth of total 
public expenditures, foreign debt service and repayment of domestic public 
debt, it is clear that not much leeway is left in opting for public expenditure 
policies.
Additionally, the following facts should be taken into account.
Firstly, the share of public spending in gross domestic product has 
remained high, hence its reduction should be a logical objective of public 
finance policy. 
Secondly, apart from the effects that the introduction of the VAT will have 
in 2005, in the coming years public revenue cannot be expected to grow much 
faster than GDP. It turns out that a leap in public spending typical of 2001 and 
2002 cannot be repeated. 
Thirdly, in the coming years, repayments of both domestic and foreign 
sovereign debt will increase. Namely, Serbia is yet to make repayments of its 
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debts to the Paris Club (a debt amounting to around 2.5 billion), the London 
Club (a debt amounting to around US$1 billion), and the World Bank (a debt 
amounting to US$2.1 billion); out of the total value of issued frozen foreign 
currency savings bonds amounting to around 4.2 billion euros a mere 15 
percent has been paid out, another 56 million euros has been included into the 
domestic regulated public debt arising from the loan for economic recovery, 
while a debt to households, mainly to the social security funds, in the amount 
of around 55 billion dinars, has not yet been regulated, and the same applies to 
the 20 billion dinars of debt to enterprises, i.e. to suppliers of the budget.
On the basis of the above facts, a conclusion inevitably follows that 
further reduction of the share of public spending in GDP and changes in its 
composition fall beyond the realm of real power of public finance policies to 
exert influence. An absolute precondition for the accomplishment of these 
objectives is the political will to undertake radical reform, primarily of the 
social security system and public administration, as well as to accelerate the 
transition of the real sector of the economy. Only then one can expect to see 
in the government coffers substantially more resources than what is needed 
to cover the costs of the public administration, transfers to the social security 
funds and debt repayment.
It also means that, in the existing situation, all the statements about 
strengthening the so-called development component of the budget are just 
wishful thinking or political demagogy. However, it does not mean that such 
statements should be disregarded. If the development component implies 
so sorely needed modernization of the operation of government services, 
necessary for efficient and proper provision of public services, and investment 
in infrastructure, it will certainly be very welcome. If the development 
component is a screen for government interventionism, which means using 
tax revenue to arbitrarily reduce operating costs of the selected champions of 
economic development, as a rule through various funds, it can be a threat to 
the stability of public finances, built with so much effort and still fragile. And 
this is not all. Such steps would be in direct contradiction to the fundamental 
assumption of sustainable economic growth – which is growth in the efficiency 
of operation of domestic companies. 
175Public Finance Policies
Regulation and establishment of the budget system 
The establishment of a comprehensive system of public spending started 
with the adoption of the Budget System Law. This Law constitutes one of the 
most important system-related laws, which completely reforms the budget 
system and governs the management of public finances in the entire country. 
Under this Law, Serbia’s budget system consists of the central budget, budgets 
of local self-government units and financial plans of the organizations for 
mandatory social insurance (Republican Fund for Pension and Disability 
Insurance of Employees, Republican Fund for Pension and Disability Insurance 
of the Self-employed, Republican Fund for Pension and Disability Insurance 
of Farmers, Republican Fund for Health Insurance and National Employment 
Service).
The primary objective in passing this Law was to establish uniform 
procedures for adoption and execution of the budgets. Consequently, it 
regulates in a uniform manner for all levels of government, the Republic, 
Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and local self-government units, as 
well as for the organizations for mandatory social insurance, the planning, 
preparation, adoption and execution of budgets and time limits for individual 
stages of the budget process, budget accounting and reporting, borrowing, 
issuance of guarantees and debt management, as well as control and audit of 
the budget, budget beneficiaries and enterprises in which the Republic or local 
self-governments have direct or indirect control.
With respect to institutions, the most important novelty introduced by this 
Law is the setting up of a treasury whose main functions are: direct execution 
of the budget, cash management, debt management and budget accounting 
and reporting. The Treasury of the Republic was established immediately after 
the adoption of the Law, while local self-governments were obliged to set up 
their respective treasuries before January 2004, after which date they also have 
the statutory obligation to apply the treasury system in the execution of their 
budgets.
The most important technical change brought about by the Law is the 
setting up of a treasury single account. The treasury single account constitutes 
one or more accounts into which budget receipts are paid, in which they are 
deposited and from which budget expenditures are paid. A set of treasury 
single accounts of all the treasuries in the Republic constitutes a system of 
treasury single accounts. 
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This Law has also established the Public Payment Agency, entrusted with 
the task of administering treasury accounts, performing payment transactions 
on behalf of budget beneficiaries, recording and distributing public revenues 
to appropriate levels of government to which they belong, and executing and 
recording expenditures of the budgets at all levels of government (Republic, 
local self-governments). The Public Payment Agency has inherited the infra-
structure and around one thousand two hundred employees of the former 
ZOP.
On the whole, this Law is a major step and a good basis for further 
development of the system for managing Serbia’s public finance, as it sets the 
rules and defines the institutions, instruments and information necessary for 
an effective conduct of public expenditure policies.  
Besides certain technical deficiencies, first and foremost the vagueness 
of certain terms, of which one could not say that they vitally affect the above 
assessment, this Law contains certain provisions which need to be amended, 
however, in order to ensure smooth development of the public finance system. 
An acute problem is posed by the scope of competences that the law has vested 
in the Public Payment Agency, which will be discussed in more detail below.
At the very beginning, the Republican Treasury faced challenges in 
the restructuring of the payment system of the country; preparation and 
introduction of the general ledger and a system for budget execution. Major 
successes include automation of budget execution, electronic control of its 
execution and cash management planning through appropriations and quotas. 
The established system enabled daily monitoring of budget execution, so that 
the information is available at any point in time on how much resources have 
been transferred, to which beneficiary and when. In this manner, the quality 
of control that the government and the National Assembly have over the 
execution of the Republic’s budget has been significantly improved. 
One of the major successes of the establishment of the budget system, or 
to be more specific, of the setting up of the Treasury of the Republic, was the 
consolidation and control of government deposits in commercial banks. In 
January 2003, the treasury single account showed 11 billion dinars of surplus 
cash sitting in the accounts of budget beneficiaries. As a rule, these resources 
were deposited in non-interest bearing accounts with banks. In order to 
preserve the stability of the banking system, which could be threatened by a 
sudden withdrawal of these funds, the Treasury first prepared and concluded 
contracts on deposits with commercial banks, stipulating an interest rate at 
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the level of 1/3 of the discount rate. In this manner, more than 300 million 
dinars of budget revenue was generated over a period of six months. Before the 
end of 2003, all deposits of beneficiaries of the central budget were transferred 
to the NBS. It was accomplished without undermining the liquidity of the 
banking system or financial security of the budget beneficiaries. That is how 
an absurdity was finally ended that the Republic was running a budget deficit, 
while users of budget resources had surpluses.
In early 2004, a similar effect was produced by the obligation on the part 
of local self-government units to set up treasuries. Through the consolidation 
of the accounts of their budget beneficiaries, they have obtained an efficient 
instrument for cash management, and the interest rate on deposits with banks 
at a minimum has to be equal to the interest rate given by the NBS on the 
available resources on the treasury single account of the Republic.
A remarkable success is also the fact that the Republic of Serbia, on 
15 April 2003, for the first time since the Second World War, financed the 
budget deficit on the domestic capital market, by using contemporary debt 
instruments. Since that date, the Treasury has regularly held auctions, and it 
raised over two billion dinars from domestic sources of financing until end-
2003. The financing of the budget by market instruments has laid the necessary 
foundations for credit growth, and created benchmarks for investment. The 
level of the interest rate at which Treasury borrowed, amounting to around 
20 percent a year on average, which corresponds to the adjusted foreign 
exchange interest rate, i.e. the price of frozen foreign currency savings bonds 
denominated in euros, however, testifies to the still high risks attached to 
investing in government securities. 
One of the most important ultimate goals of the establishment of the 
Treasury is centralized payment directly from accounts of the budgets at 
relevant levels of government for the execution of functions or for budgeted 
expenditures of budget beneficiaries. It means that budget beneficiaries do not 
make payments themselves, hence they have no need to have any accounts or 
perform any payment operations. Instead, the relevant treasury, upon their 
order and in keeping with the budget, effects all the payments. 
Yet, the accomplishment of this final goal of the establishment of the 
treasury implies extremely well developed IT and administrative capacities of 
the treasury, which were non-existent at the time when the Budget System Law 
was adopted, and which require several years of preparation and development 
of capacities. That was one of the reasons why in the Budget System Law the 
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lawmaker resorted to a transitional arrangement according to which all budget 
beneficiaries have been defined as direct or indirect. 
However, on the basis of the definition of direct and indirect budget 
beneficiaries as such, on the basis of the statutory obligation to quarterly publish 
a list of direct and indirect budget beneficiaries, and particularly on the basis 
of the list itself, it is obvious that the above mentioned technical reason for 
the transitional arrangement was not the only reason, neither was it the most 
important one, as it seems. 
As direct budget beneficiaries, the Law defines agencies and organizations 
of the Republic and local authorities, while the group of indirect budget 
beneficiaries, as defined by the Law, is very heterogeneous and includes judicial 
bodies, institutions founded by the Republic, i.e. the local authorities, run and 
managed by the founder, in conformity with the Law and through direct users 
of budget resources.
The list of budget beneficiaries includes even some theaters, museums, 
cultural and artistic clubs, state owned pharmacies, rehabilitation centers, 
some soccer clubs, Institute for Nuclear Sciences Vinča, Institute Torlak and 
the like.
The very idea that the list of budget beneficiaries should be refreshed and 
quarterly published in the Official Gazette shows that a good portion of these 
budget beneficiaries does not really have any connection with the budget. 
Otherwise, any refreshment of the list would require a corresponding revision 
of the budget adopted by a relevant assembly.
It is obvious that in anticipation of the abolishment of ZOP and transfer 
of payment operations to banks, one of the most important probable motives 
was to maintain a centralized insight into the revenues and expenditures of 
different entities established by the state at some point in time, irrespective of 
the nature of their functions as such. In order to ensure this insight all budget 
beneficiaries were put under a statutory obligation to open their accounts with 
the Public Payment Agency.
This is how a big confusion was created as to what is the real function of the 
Public Payment Agency, with which more than 23,000 accounts were opened 
for the operation of around 10,000 beneficiaries. Thus, instead of devoting its 
efforts to the development of administrative capacities for the execution of 
the budgets of the Republic and local self-governments, the Public Payment 
Agency has remained a mini ZOP. 
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Therefore, for the accomplishment of the main objective of the 
establishment of the treasury it is necessary to redefine the notion of budget 
beneficiary and remove from this group all the entities which are not part of the 
government apparatus, that is, which perform activities of such a nature that 
they generate revenue on the market by rendering services or producing and 
selling goods. It does not mean that the government cannot be a buyer of these 
services or goods, or that it cannot regulate the activities and obligations of 
these entities by virtue of a law, but this, however, does not make them budget 
beneficiaries. In addition to the damage inflicted by the confusion they create 
in the budget system, as well as by maintaining unneeded functions of the 
Public Payment Agency, such a position is detrimental also to these entities, 
because as budget beneficiaries they are obliged to have budget accounting 
of the type appropriate for budget institutions and not for operations on the 
market.  
Another big confusion was created when payment operations were 
transferred from ZOP to banks, and it is related to the definition of the method 
for making payments of public revenue. Namely, with the intention to apply 
the GFS (government fiscal statistics) classification to public revenues, despite 
the fact that in essence it has nothing to do with the pay-in account for public 
revenues, a very complex procedure has been defined for identification of the 
type of public revenue and a municipality to which the revenue may belong. 
Practically every fiscal instrument has its own pay-in account, and the burden 
of administering analytical data on public revenues has been unnecessarily 
shifted to the taxpayer, whereas it should be an obligation of the state and not 
of the taxpayer. Since the Public Payment Agency is also in charge of recording 
public revenues, more than 57,000 pay-in accounts for public revenues have 
been “opened” with it, of which 720 are the so-called synthetic ones (for the 
same number of public revenues), and others are analytical, for the needs of 
municipalities, cities, autonomous provinces, the Republic and organizations 
for mandatory social insurance. 
In this arrangement, almost everything is wrong. The fact that each type 
of public revenue has its own pay-in account and the fact that these accounts 
are administered by the Public Payment Agency alike.
The existing rules for performing payment operations also enable the 
creation of an individualized order, or an individualized part of a payment 
order, which could be used for paying taxes and other public dues. Through a 
rational distribution of elements that it needs to contain, the existence of only 
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one account for public revenue would be made possible, while concurrently 
recording the payer, the type of public revenue and the level of government 
to which it belongs (the Republic or a self-government unit). This would 
simplify and facilitate the administration both to taxpayers (who now have to 
calculate their pay-in accounts by applying special methods), and to the Tax 
Administration, which should take over the responsibility of recording public 
revenues. 
Namely, it is totally illogical for the Public Payment Agency, which does 
not have any competences in the tax procedure, nor does it maintain tax 
accounting, to record and distribute public revenues according to the level to 
which they should accrue. This is even clearer when one takes into account 
that only net tax revenue is available for expenditures, i.e. that only net tax 
revenue goes into a relevant budget, meaning the revenue left after refunds on 
the basis of decisions, or on the basis of tax returns in the case of the VAT.
It is completely natural for the public revenue account to be administered 
by the Tax Administration, which would also be in charge of distributing public 
revenues to relevant budgets, since it is already responsible for the refunds 
of public dues which were paid in excess or by mistake. At the same time, 
it would enable automatic, electronic booking in tax accounting maintained 
by the Tax Administration on an individual basis for each taxpayer. Not only 
that such an arrangement is normal in public finances of other countries, but 
there is also good experience of the Large Taxpayers Unit, which keeps records 
of the payments of large taxpayers, bearing witness to the ability of the Tax 
Administration to take over this task.
It means that for the establishment of efficient and appropriate 
administrative support to public finance management in Serbia such an 
organizational set up should be established, in which the Tax Administration 
would be responsible for the control and recording of payments of public 
revenues and tax accounting, while the PPA would be in charge of payments of 
public expenditures upon the order of a relevant treasury, budget accounting 
and reporting. The only appropriate role that the PPA can play in the future is 
to perform these duties for the republican and 165 local treasuries. In such an 
organizational setup, the Serbian Treasury, as well as local treasuries, will be 
able, in accordance with their competences, to concentrate on cash and debt 
management, on regular planning of budget expenditure execution, as well as 
on efficient investment of temporary surpluses of cash money on the financial 
market. Without waiting for the necessary amendment of the Law, one can 
181Public Finance Policies
apply some of these solutions immediately, by making slight adjustments (such 
as the method for payment of public revenues and transfer of competences in 
this domain to the Tax Administration), while others require more time and 
sizeable funds for the development of IT and administrative capacities (such 
as full automation of all the payments out of the budget and establishment of 
adequate IT support to local treasuries). However, they have to be implemented 
in order to finally put in place an efficiently rounded-off organizational setup 
of Serbia’s public finance. 
Unfortunately, it does not seem that current decision-makers in the 
domain of public finance have these issues in sight. On the contrary, the role of 
the Public Payment Agency is being continuously expanded to the domains in 
which there are neither conceptual nor administrative reasons for it to have any 
role at all, such as keeping records of pension insurance bonds or registration 
of farmers who are receiving subsidies. In this manner, the Public Payment 
Agency is for no obvious reason moving further away from the only justified 
purpose it can have in the public finance system in Serbia.
CONCLUSION
In order to make a comprehensive assessment of the successfulness of 
any change, thus of the changes carried out in the first four years of transition 
in Serbia’s public finance, a comparison should be made of what has been 
accomplished with two reference points. The first one is the inherited situation, 
and the second one is the targeted situation, i.e. the situation that was or should 
have been the intended result of the undertaken measures. 
In order to make that possible, it is necessary to recall the features of the 
system of public finance that the economic theory considers desirable, which, 
for the sake of simplicity, will be grouped in this discussion into four basic 
virtues. 
The first one is efficiency. It implies a minimization of the influence of 
tax policy on relative prices, i.e. on taking economic decisions, in particular 
decisions on resource allocation. Practical instructions offered by the theory 
in this domain are for tax policymakers to refrain from creating distortions. 
They are created by introducing different tax rates for, in terms of its 
economic nature, an equal tax base, or, what can amount to the same thing, by 
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providing tax incentives which are envisaged by the economic policymakers 
to encourage taxpayers to act in a desirable manner, instead of letting 
market criteria influence their behavior. This virtue implies also prudence in 
defining the proportions of redistribution which is in the domain of public 
expenditure policy. It also requires a careful selection of target groups to be 
granted subsidies. The reasons are the same as those cited for tax policy. A 
minimization of influence on individuals’ decisions, who can choose in such a 
case to direct their efforts toward creating conditions for receiving subsidies, 
rather than toward productive economic activities through which they would 
actually generate revenue.
The second one is simplicity. It recalls that for any revenue, including tax 
revenue, it is necessary to bear certain costs. In the case of collecting taxes, 
direct and indirect costs are incurred. Direct costs are those created by the 
existence and operation of the Tax Administration, and indirect ones are 
those incurred by taxpayers in performing their tax duties, which are, in terms 
of their economic essence, transaction costs. The simplicity of a tax system 
minimizes both direct and indirect costs, and increases net tax revenue. 
The third one is clarity. It is predominantly related to public expenditure 
policies and requires that taxpayers are familiar with the purpose and use 
of taxes they paid. In other words, the public must be familiar with public 
expenditure policy, at least with its global indicators, and the budget process 
must evolve under well-known and clear procedures and within defined time 
limits. Once the annual budget is adopted, discretion in using public revenues 
has to be minimal. 
The fourth one is fairness. It requires, in very simple terms, that equal 
individuals should pay equal amounts of tax. This is a very important principle, 
because in addition to the ethical one, it also has a very substantial practical 
significance. Namely, if taxpayers notice that there are large differences among 
them in the shouldering of the tax burden, be it on account of tax laws as 
such or on account of inefficiency or bias of the Tax Administration, they 
will lose a never too strong desire to voluntarily pay their tax liabilities. In 
a situation in which the tax system is discarded as unjust by the majority of 
taxpayers, it is very difficult and administratively very expensive to secure that 
it is implemented. 
When one compares the features of the inherited situation and of the 
situation in which Serbia’s public finance currently is, with the above virtues, 
major progress achieved in the past four years of transition is obvious. An 
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apparent success is the consolidation and stabilization of the revenue side 
of public finance. A big step was also made in the building of the system of 
public finance which would possess the above-described virtues. However, a 
lot still remains to be done. The text below provides a brief overview of the 
most important achievements and the most significant changes which should 
be carried out.
From the standpoint of efficiency, the most important breakthroughs have 
been made in the field of taxing consumption, first through the consolidation 
of the sales tax, and then through the introduction of the VAT. When it comes 
to the VAT, the greatest challenge is now before the administration, which 
should as soon as possible adapt its knowledge to its demands, where the most 
critical aspect is the lack of preparedness of the Customs Administration for 
administering this complex tax form.
Relative to the initial situation regarding the efficiency criterion, a similar 
thing can be noted also with respect to excise policy. Relative to the targeted 
situation required by this principle, however, it is further away than the VAT. 
The first thing that needs to be done is to eliminate discrimination which now 
exists between domestic and imported excisable goods. At the same time, 
for the sake of both efficiency and simplicity, it is vital to eliminate revenue 
inefficient bases for excises.
Bearing in mind that in the previous period tax policy obviously chose 
the taxation of consumption as the principal source of revenue, low tax rates 
on corporate and personal income are, from the standpoint of the efficiency 
principle, a good choice. In order to eliminate the existing distortions, it is 
necessary, however, to bring the effective tax rates on personal income to the 
same level, regardless of the source of income, and eliminate the taxation of 
income from capital, bearing in mind that it basically means taxation of future 
consumption in the present. It is particularly important to eliminate if not all, 
then certainly sectoral and regional incentives in taxation of corporate income. 
These changes would, at the same time, further simplify the entire tax system.
However, as usual, the fairness criterion is here in contradiction with 
the efficiency criterion. On the one hand, individuals do not have equal 
incomes, i.e. they face different budget constraints in spending. On the other 
hand, the consumption of basic necessities is equal. It follows that unequal 
individuals shoulder an equal tax burden, in that the poorer ones spend 
most of their income, if not all, on these goods, while those richer ones have 
more choices, including investment and saving. Bearing in mind the present 
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revenue (non)generosity of different bases for taxation of income from capital 
or taxation of property, in which progressive tax rates are also applied, as 
well as the objective underdevelopment of relevant markets, which prevents 
them from generating at this point in time potentially significant individual 
or tax revenue, and insufficient administrative and IT capacities of the Tax 
Administration to meet the challenges of progressive taxation of income, it 
seems that it is more important now to observe the efficiency principle.
In the current circumstances, fairness has to be achieved through efforts 
to ensure full coverage of all taxpayers and their equal treatment in conformity 
with the law. From this standpoint, as one of the greatest successes of the policy 
so far, the adoption and implementation of the procedural tax law has to be 
underscored, which clearly and comprehensively sets out rights and duties of 
both taxpayers and tax officials. The biggest challenge in this domain is the 
continuation of the consistent implementation of this Law, full depoliticization 
of the Tax Administration and development of IT and other capacities of this, 
in any country, the most important executive institution.
From the standpoint of clarity, the greatest success is the adoption 
and implementation of the law which governs the budget system. The 
implementation of this Law has established a clear budget procedure, the 
same for all levels of government, and made data on types of expenditures and 
beneficiaries of the central budget available on a daily basis. What remains to 
be done is to do the same thing for each local self-government unit, as well as 
to achieve the ultimate goal of the establishment of the treasury – automatic 
payment on behalf of budget beneficiaries, as they should have no discretionary 
authority in the process of making payments as such, after the adoption of the 
budget. 
A large field which will be one of the greatest challenges in the further 
transformation of public finance in Serbia is the field of local public finances, 
where the revenue domain has yet to see a comprehensive regulation. Likewise, 
it is necessary to do a lot more on enhancing the simplicity of the tax system in 
which there still exist more than one hundred different fiscal instruments and 
many more individual fiscal forms administered by the Tax Administration.
Finally, a real reform of public expenditure policy is yet to happen. 
It implies, first and foremost, making a definite break with subsidies to 
enterprises, reform of the social security system and genuine restructuring of 
public enterprises. Obviously, these are all measures which can hardly be called 
popular, and which, at the end of the day, have been postponed particularly 
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for that reason. The time has come, however, when they can no longer be 
postponed. And just as public finance policy successfully consolidated the 
revenue side in the previous period, and thus enabled the orderly execution 
of the expenditure side of the budget, cushioning in this manner a significant 
portion of the problems which normally arise when structural policies are 
implemented in transition, in that same manner acceleration of privatization, 
implementation of the bankruptcy law and other structural polices, have to 
enable public finance to reduce the pressure which public spending exerts on 
the economy and macroeconomic equilibrium as a whole. 

Boško Mijatović
Privatization of the Real Sector
INTRODUCTION
The fact that social and state ownership are less favorable than private 
ownership need not be proved in Serbia. This is quite obvious. For that reason, 
privatization was adopted by the government, at least formally, already in 1989-
1990 and since then has become part and parcel of transition instruments, 
used with more or less success.
The short and fairly sad history of privatization until 1997 is as follows. 
The first wave was initiated by the federal government of Prime Minister Ante 
Marković in 1989, with the adjustment in 1990. The privatization method was 
capital increase, with discounts related to socially-owned capital, believing 
that even such partial privatization of capital in the company would lead to an 
increase in management efficiency. Privatization was not obligatory, but was 
stimulated by the provision that the employee wage growth could be paid only 
in shares. During the reform year 1990 privatization was widespread (1,200 
companies moved to the status of mixed-ownership companies), partially 
due to technical weaknesses in the model implementation and possibilities of 
abuse. 
In order to improve the model, in 1991 Serbia adopted its own law on 
“ownership transformation” which to a significant extent stalled privatization 
precisely by making the procedures more strict and removing loopholes from 
regulations. A significant slowdown in privatization was also contributed to by 
the war in the area of the former Yugoslavia. 
An unexpected impetus to privatization came in 1993 with high inflation 
which devalued the debt from the purchase of shares in installments. At the 
end of 1993, at the time of hyperinflation, by using the non-existence of the 
provision on debt revaluation due to inflation, a large number of companies 
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were fully privatized. After the price stabilization in early 1994, a question 
arose whether to do anything with these inflation gains and if so, what. In 
the race between SPS and DS for the grand moralistic role, DS won and at its 
initiative, which was admittedly supported by the ruling party, the revaluation 
law was adopted, annulling the inflation gains of citizens, and privatization was 
significantly pushed back. 
The annulment of conducted privatizations based on revaluation presented 
a severe blow to the privatization idea in Serbia, because it demonstrated that 
the political power could, at its will, amend the law retroactively and annul 
privatizations conducted in accordance with the current regulations. For that 
reason, in the following period, until 1997, even later, there was practically no 
privatization in Serbia. 
Privatization Law from 1997
The 1997 privatization concept presented a continuation of the old, 
Yugoslav model of privatization whose basic characteristics were that 
privatization was still autonomous (decentralized), voluntary and directed 
towards employee shareholding. The voluntary nature of privatization was 
combined with incentives, i.e. significant discounts in the limited time period, 
which was supposed to induce workers to privatize their companies. 
The significant solutions were as follows: all employees and former 
employees in the socially- and state-owned sector, including pensioners, and 
insured farmers had a right to free shares in the amount of DM 400 for each 
year of service; a discount of fixed 20% and 1% for each year of service was 
restored, and up to DM 8,000 for shares; maximum 60% of the company’s 
capital could be issued as free shares, 10% of capital was to be immediately 
transferred to the pension fund, and at least 30% of capital was to be sold to 
interested parties; the capital remaining after the subscription of shares was to be 
transferred to the ownership of the state Share Fund.
The voluntary nature of privatization (autonomy of corporate bodies 
in decision-making whether the company will be privatized or not) left the 
process of privatization to a very complex game of motives and incentives of 
the employees and managers. 
Employee shareholding is a highly undesirable concept of privatization 
from the economic aspect, because it leads to the preservation of a staid 
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manner of company operation and significant slowdown of the greatly needed 
restructuring of the Serbian economy in the management, organizational, 
technological, financial and any other sense. It has shortcomings from 
the aspect of economic efficiency. The first weakness lies in the creation of 
companies in which the dominant owners are employees, preserving some 
characteristics of the self-management system – those that work manage, and 
everything remains more or less the same. Second, employee shareholding 
leads to the domination of internal owners and separates the company from 
the capital market, because external investors are not particularly willing to 
invest in companies owned by employees. This is because insiders can, and in 
Serbia they usually do so, conduct a policy which suits only them, but not the 
other owners and company as a whole – profit direction to wages, etc. Third, 
for the efficient management of companies it is necessary to have a certain 
concentration of ownership, so that the owners could and would have an 
interest in monitoring the managers.
Employee shareholding does not provide such concentration; instead, it 
fosters pronounced ownership dispersion, so that the efficiency of management 
suffers. Thus, employee shareholding is an insufficiently efficient ownership 
arrangement, whose long-term maintenance stalled transition and economic 
recovery of the country.
Employee shareholding would not present such a problem if a full sale of 
shares were allowed, because then ownership concentration would be achieved 
in time, but this was not allowed under the provisions prescribing that every 
year only 10, 20 and 25% of shares obtained could be sold during the next six 
year. This solution postponed the creation of the capital market.
Furthermore, this model cannot be considered fair, because it provides 
only one part of population of Serbia free shares and discounts, whereas all 
others (around half of adult population: students, the unemployed, housewives, 
employees in the private sector, etc.) remain without such privileges. Even if 
it had been implemented more widely, this model would not have brought 
efficient or fair privatization in Serbia. A question remains whether it would have 
brought privatization at all, in view of its voluntary nature, which, theoretically 
speaking, perpetuates the inefficient social capital. However, employees and 
managers could find an interest in entering the privatization process. The 
legislator provided for a bait in the form of free shares to employees, hoping 
that it would provide sufficient impetus for privatization. However, it did 
not and privatization did not make progress during the following four years. 
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Employees were both interested and uninterested in privatization. They are 
interested, in order to obtain free shares and acquire assets, and they were not 
interested because privatization brought to them different risks (for example, 
from the loss of employment). Managers were not in favor of privatization in 
longer term because that way they would often lose a favorable position, but in 
short term they could accept that risk, since employee shareholding fostered 
ownership dispersion and enabled them to retain managerial positions.
Until 2000 a small portion of socially- and state-owned capital was 
privatized in Serbia. By autumn 2000, the process of privatization was initiated 
according to the 1997 model in around 350 companies and completed in only 
18. They were mostly small companies, with modest capital, so the total value 
of issued shares reached only 12 billion then dinars. The only large company 
that was (partially) privatized was Telekom, where 49% of ownership went to 
STET and OTE in 1997.
PRIVATIZATION SINCE 5 OCTOBER
Transitional regime
After the political changes of 5 October 2000, the so-called transitional 
government was formed in Serbia, consisting of a technical coalition of parties 
of both the new and the old regime, pending the Republic parliamentary 
elections in December that year, which brought definitive victory of DOS. The 
Minister of Privatization was Oskar Kovač, from SPS, and the old privatization 
law from 1997 continued to be in force. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, Minister Kovač invited the managers and 
employees to initiate privatization of their companies under the existing law. 
His motives could be different: first, ideological, i.e. the belief that the then 
model of privatization was the best, and that the one to be introduced after the 
victory of DOS would certainly be inferior; second, political, in order to protect 
the managers from SPS from the probable dismissal by employee shareholding 
and ensure in such a way that the party would preserve control over part of 
the economy; third, economic, in order to use the opportunities provided by 
the radically increased German mark exchange rate and achieve significantly 
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higher free gains for the SPS managers and employees, calculated in dinars. 
Fourth, also a political motive, to aggravate the position of new authorities 
by ensuring the privatization of the best companies, leaving them with worse 
companies and loss makers.
Thus, many followed the Kovač’s call and initiated the procedure of 
privatization. During the three winter months, for around 500 companies, either 
already partially privatized under the previous laws, or companies exclusively 
socially-owned, a public invitation to share subscription was announced under 
the then prevailing old law. Among them were many sizeable and successful 
companies. From 25 January DOS’s Ministry of Privatization faced a dilemma 
about how to proceed: to tolerate, prohibit or even annul these privatizations, 
because it could not prepare and bring to adoption its own new law, based 
on different principles, within a short period of time. Apart from that, it was 
obvious that, first, the economy was being privatized according to the model 
of employee shareholding, which is bad, and, second, that there was danger 
that almost all decent companies would be privatized according to the old law 
even before the new government started privatization according to the new 
law, which would signify its failure at the start, leaving only bad, loss-making 
companies in the portfolio. 
Already on 12 February 2001 amendments to the Law on Ownership 
Transformation were adopted, temporarily suspending privatization under that 
(old) law, until the adoption of the new law, during not more than six months. 
Privatizations initiated under the 1997 law could be continued and completed. 
A committee was established with a task to check the suspicions that there 
were significant irregularities during these privatizations, but nothing more 
serious was found.
In such a way, privatization according to the employee shareholding model 
was terminated, “preserving” some of the best companies for privatization 
according to the new model and the new law. The work on the new privatization 
model was initiated by a working group even before the formation of the Serbian 
government on 25 January. The selection and implementation of the model 
were, to a certain extent, affected by a text entitled New Model of Privatization 
in Serbia and suggestions of the World Bank experts. 
1 B. Begović, B. Mijatović, B. Živković – New Model of Privatization in Serbia, CLDS, December 2000.
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PRIVATIZATION LAW FROM 2001
Introduction
The Privatization Law was considered and even pronounced a major 
reform law. Despite some exaggeration,2 there was certainly some truth in 
it. From the one hand, the socially- and state- owned sector used significant 
resources, although their value was significantly smaller than it was believed. 
Those resources were to be engaged in a productive way, if possible. On the 
other hand, the socially-owned sector presented an important social factor, or 
better put a problem, whose resolution was inevitable if a functioning market 
economy was to be created in Serbia. Namely, the staid socially-owned sector, 
with prevailing self-management frame of mind and addiction to generous 
government subsidies, presented the largest obstacle to reforms in the political 
and social sense. 
At the end of 2001, the capital structure was dominated by the socially- 
and state-owned sector, and the ownership of the small privatized portion 
was dispersed among a large number of owners, consequently without much 
influence on management. In many companies, old SPS managers were 
replaced by new ones from DOS, but the “party” principle of their appointment 
remained the same. On the other hand, the economy was inefficient, 
technologically outdated, with high surplus labor and overburdened with debt. 
For many companies it was the last moment to attempt saving them through 
privatization, because the only alternative was bankruptcy. The expansion of the 
market role in the resource allocation certainly disabled the old mechanisms 
of maintenance of badly run socially-owned companies.
The new government in Serbia faced the issue of privatization model 
selection. Should the previous model of employee shareholding be continued, 
leading to the perception by many workers that they have created national 
wealth (without debt)? Should the voucher model be selected, which was very 
popular around mid-1990s in some countries in transition? Should the classic 
sale model be selected, as used by developed countries?
2  Laws creating market institutions were underestimated. Also, the transition experience of the 
Eastern European countries has already shown that the new private sector is more important for the 
economic future than the old, even if privatized state sector.
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Basic elements of the model
The new government of Serbia, which came into office on 25 January 
2001, selected a partly modified model of classic sale. The main cause for such 
selection was the previous transition experience of other Eastern European 
countries and experience and circumstances in Serbia itself.
The basic characteristics of the selected model were as follows:
Sale, not free distribution. The distribution of socially- and state-owned 
capital to all citizens through vouchers was a popular option in Eastern Europe 
in mid-1990s, after the swift privatization in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
However, subsequent developments were not so successful: investment funds, 
which were entrusted with most vouchers and shares, turned out not to 
operate as conceived, so the corporate governance of privatized companies 
was not efficient either. The experience of Serbia was even worse, where large 
discounts and gifts led to employee shareholding, an economically inferior type 
of company management. There seemed to be truth in the claims of skeptics 
towards voucher privatization when they stated that an individual would not 
equally successfully manage the assets he obtained as a gift as the assets he 
purchased with cash. 
In other words, the method of sale of socially- and state-owned capital 
was selected with the idea to attempt to find the right buyers, i.e. those that 
would get the most out of the companies that were being privatized (economic 
resources). This is because the standard reasoning in economics is that the one 
who is paying knows why he is paying so much and that the one who is paying 
the most is likely to know best what to do with those resources. This brings 
efficiency.
Naturally, any government is eager to get hold of sizeable budget revenues 
from privatization, so this motive is certainly not to be disregarded. Quite the 
contrary. The Serbian government prepared a socially generous transition 
concept, where the people would respond well to changes because social 
benefits would be significant, with those social expenses being financed from 
privatization proceeds and foreign assistance and other forms of support, at 
least in the first few years. 
Sale as a method of privatization also has a general weakness: it is usually 
slower than the voucher systems, since it implies the preparation of each 
company, which is, in particular in view of the limited resources of government 
administration, a fairly time-consuming process. 
194 Boško Mijatović
Sale to strategic investors. When the sales concept is already selected, 
then the next step - sale to majority strategic investors - is fairly easy. Namely, 
the alternative is the sale of shares by public subscription, which usually 
leads to dispersed ownership and weaker corporate governance. A country 
in transition (Serbia) is not America, so that dispersed ownership would not 
present an obstacle for good management of the company. When choosing 
the privatization model, the government rightfully set great store by corporate 
governance in the postprivatization period, so it opted for the sale of majority 
package (70%) of socially/state-owned capital to a single investor. This enabled 
the takeover of full control over the company being privatized by a majority 
owner that could, in his own interest, manage the company without special 
complications. The idea was to facilitate and make more efficient the very 
complex process of company restructuring in the postprivatization period. 
The experience of not only the transition, but also developed countries, 
shows that the principal-agent problem is always very difficult and that there 
is simply no easy cure. The issue of preventing the management or owners that 
have only a relative majority from making selfish illegal moves is particularly 
complex in the countries in transition, in which the necessary institutions 
(judiciary, registers, stock exchange, etc.) are still underdeveloped. In such 
countries it is better to rely on the majority owner, thus removing at least part 
of the principal-agent issue – the one related to dispersed ownership.3
Smaller part is given for free to citizens and employees. The Privatization 
Law does envisage gifts, this time both to employees and all other citizens. 
Employees are given 30% of shares in companies sold by auction (i.e. in smaller 
companies) and 15% in companies sold on tenders (i.e. in larger companies), 
whereas 15% of shares in latter companies are reserved for citizens. In such a 
way this law is more just than the previous ones, because shares are given not 
only to employees but also to everyone else. Individual right was not changed: 
EUR 200 for each year of service.
However, the question is why there are gifts. The answer is easy: obtaining 
political support for reforms and demagogy, i.e. an attempt to bribe employees 
and citizens with government funds. Such an approach is certainly not 
surprising: reforms are conducted in a political environment and for that 
reason ignoring political motives of main participants is certainly wrong in the 
analytical sense. Most that can be expected from politicians is a combination 
of demagogy and reforms that does push forward, while bold, reform moves 
3 Corporate Governance Improvement, CLDS, 2003
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made regardless of their possible unpopularity surprise us pleasantly, but also 
very rarely. Serbia is no exception in that respect.
It is important that the gift of 30% of the company’s capital, no matter how 
significant numerically, does not alter the model of privatization: there is still 
a majority owner with 70% of capital in newly-privatized companies, which 
is important for corporate governance and, more generally, for the manner 
of operation of the company. This gift essentially presents only a politically 
motivated expense for the budget (gift to citizens instead of sales revenues).
Competitive sales methods. The Law provides for two sales methods, 
both competitive: auction for smaller and weaker companies and tender for 
larger and better ones, intended for foreign investors.4 It is always 70% of non-
privatized capital that is sold (residual after giving away 30% to employees 
and citizens, as stated). It is commendable that direct bargaining between the 
state and the buyer is not mentioned among the sales methods, since, despite 
being theoretically convenient and apparently necessary for bad companies for 
which there is no demand, it is still to risky from the point of view of the state 
as it enables, or rather fosters, corruption. In those bad companies arranged 
restructuring or bankruptcy will be conducted.
Exclusive use of competitive methods of sale were to ensure maximum 
transparency of the process, i.e. prevent corruption and other abuse of the 
privatization outcome. Namely, when public and regulated contest of interested 
parties is ensured under the rules known in advance, then it is truly difficult to 
organize fraud and provide someone with undeserved advantage. 
For larger, bur weaker companies, restructuring is planned (division into 
several companies, reduction of the number of employees, etc.), with a firm 
commitment to avoid what happened in several Eastern European countries: 
financing of loss-making companies for years for political reasons.
The most important novelty refers to the right of the Agency to initiate 
the sale of socially-owned capital in any company, abolishing the voluntary 
nature of privatization in Serbia and ensuring that privatization does end. 
Although the Serbian Constitution has not been amended in the meantime, 
the previously popular claims that it prevents the compulsory and time-limited 
nature of privatization have ceased. 
The privatization model is oriented towards cash payment for the acquired 
company, immediately after the signing of the contract. Still, certain flexibility 
is permitted. The first is related to frozen foreign currency savings deposits, 
4 Obviously, the division is not absolute.
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whose mature bonds are equal to money, with even the bonds that have not 
matured yet accepted if there were no buyers for cash or mature bonds.5 The 
second is related to deadlines: individuals (natural persons) may pay for 
the capital acquired at auctions even in six annual installments. This was to 
encourage domestic buyers, as they did not have to pay immediately for their 
acquisitions; instead, they could pay for it in time from the company profit. 
Nevertheless, this is a risky solution, as the experience showed in several cases, 
as it enabled the unscrupulous to take over a company without any money of 
their own, drain it in a short period of time and leave it to the state to deal with 
it subsequently. 
Some time ago the centralized method of both the sale of capital and the 
entire process of privatization was severely criticized (all done by the Agency 
for Privatization).6 Nevertheless, the question is whether such criticism is 
justified. On the one side, the large role played by the Agency enabled a 
significant increase in the level of professionalism of the privatization process, 
which a decentralized form would hardly been able to provide. On the other 
hand, the distribution of privatization revenues cannot be called centralized, 
because local communities, Vojovodina, the employee pension fund and the 
denationalization fund participate in the distribution. 
Price, investment and social program. It is interesting that neither the 
privatization law, nor the government decrees on tenders and auctions prescribe 
which criteria determining the winner are. Thus, it is left to the Agency for 
Privatization to decide on the criteria in each concrete case. 
Previous practice has shown that the Agency used three criteria in tenders: 
offered price and the level of investment and social program. The price is 
certainly an undisputed criterion, but a question remains whether the amount 
of planned investment and social program should be used as a criterion. Strictly 
economically speaking, the seller, in this case the state, should not be interested 
in anything except the sales price. How much the new owner will invest in the 
company is his business, because the profit will go exclusively to him. A special 
problem, as shown by the experience in the countries in transition, lies in the 
inability of the state to “punish” subsequently the buyer who did not respect the 
contract provision on the investment program. Serbia attempted to resolve the 
problem by being strict: first, a bank guarantee is requested and second, there 
is a threat of privatization annulment without compensation. The latter could 
increase the degree of discharging the undertaken commitments, but it will at 
the same time increase the business risk for the buyer, thereby decreasing the 
5 More than two hindered companies were sold in the second auction, i.e. for bonds not yet matured.
6 Nationalized Privatization, Prizma, May 2001.
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attractiveness of Serbian privatization for potential investors. Essentially, the 
more the commitments (burden) are transferred to the buyer, the lower the 
price he is ready to offer will be. This particularly refers to the social program, 
which, for the buyers, presents a cost equal to the price of the company, so that 
is how he calculates; in other words, the more expensive the social program, the 
lower the offered price. The state realized this in the end so in 2003 it abolished 
an obligation, in tenders, to guarantee employment for the following 3-5 years, 
and in auctions one year; instead, it took upon itself social programs, rationally 
expecting higher sales revenues. Upon reviewing this, both criteria appear to 
be superfluous, and are/were used mostly for political marketing reasons: to 
demonstrate that the government is concerned both with development and 
employees. 
Restitution. Each privatization program must take a position towards 
the idea of restitution/denationalization, because one part of the assets being 
privatized used to be privately owned and was later nationalized. It is not fair 
for the government to sell what should be returned to the previous owners, 
and was nationalized calling for ideologically motivated liquidation of private 
ownership. 
The Privatization Law took a completely pragmatic stance: it provided that 
from each sale, 5% of revenues should be allocated for future compensations 
for nationalized assets. Therefore, the claims of former owners have been 
implicitly recognized, but the privatization law did not preempt legal solutions 
from the law that should completely and comprehensively resolve the problem 
of denationalization/restitution. In such a manner, however, it was decided that 
privatization would not wait for denationalization (that might not even take 
place), and that all assets in the economy, even the nationalized ones, would be 
subject to privatization. Any denationalization of economic assets would not 
be performed in the physical form, but in the form of monetary compensation. 
Therefore, in this way the issue of denationalization was removed from the 
path of privatization.
Later developments were not to the taste of the former owners and 
their heirs. The Denationalization Law has not been adopted, and the 5% of 
revenues are not deposited in a designated account but is spent regularly so 
that it exists only as a potential debt of the budget to the former owners if the 
denationalization law is adopted in the future. In return, restitution requests 
are blocking the privatization of 50-odd companies. 
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Privatization process
The basic data on privatization developments up to 2004 are given below, 
starting with a previous note on why they commence with 2002. Namely, during 
2001 no companies were privatized, so the series begin with 2002. During 
2001 there was no privatization because during that year a new regulatory-
institutional framework was prepared: the Privatization Law was adopted in 
June, accompanying by-laws (decrees and regulations) were adopted by August, 
followed by the formation, or capacity building of the Agency for Privatization 
and Share Fund, which all lasted until the first quarter of 2002,7 which was 
when the privatization activities could really commence. Admittedly, in the 
autumn of 2001 the tender for cement plants was issued, which was supposed 
to present an initial success that would silence the critics and give impetus to 
further privatization.
Number of companies. In these four years 1382 companies were privatized, 
which is two per business day. This is certainly a good pace, but the problem is 
that there are still many companies in the privatization line, so the end of the 
process is nowhere near. It was initially believed, or at least claimed, that the 
privatization of the commercial sector (i.e. without state-owned companies) 
would be completed in 2004, with this deadline lately being pushed back to 
2006. The basic problem, I believe, lies in the previously mentioned weakness 
of the sales method: it requires a lot of technical and administrative resources, 
which is why it is relatively slow, so not even the greatest efforts could result in 
a miracle. 
Table 1. Number of privatized companies
2002 2003 2004 Total
Tenders 12 19 9 40 
Auctions 194 651 262 1,107 
Capital market* 48 121 66 235 
TOTAL 254 791 337 1,382 
*Sale of shares by the Share Fund
Source: Agency for Privatization
7  M. Cvetković – Current Situation in Privatization in Serbia: Inherited Situation, Current Model, 
Results and Prospects, in Z.Vacić and B. Mijatović (ed) – Reform Strategy, CLDS, 2003, p. 332
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Despite the acceleration of privatization during the first half of 2002, Prime 
Minister Đinđić was dissatisfied with the pace and in the summer called for 
additional efforts and privatization of a thousand companies by the end of the 
year. The author of this text was concerned that, for the sake of acceleration, 
the quality would be scarified, but he was wrong: Mirko Cvetković was 
appointed the General Manager of the Agency and speed was increased, while 
maintaining the quality. At the end of 2002 and in early 2003 all records were 
set. In the first quarter of 2003 as many as 329 companies were privatized, the 
record which has remained unbeaten to date. The pace was somewhat slower 
in the following quarters, but remained very high – 200 to 250 companies per 
quarter. Year 2003 is recorded as the best year of privatization in Serbia.
In order to accelerate privatization, some legal amendments were 
introduced. First, in August 2002 the decree on auctions was amended, 
simplifying their procedure, and significantly reducing the high initial prices. 
In such a way the interest in auctions increased considerably, as did the 
successfulness of outcome. Then the amendments of the Privatization Law 
from March 2003 eliminated the need for employees to agree with the sale, 
providing that it is only the state that leads the sale and signs the contracts. It 
was a reaction to several cases (for example, Beočin cement plant) in which 
the employees insisted on their own demands to the ultimate limits, and even 
beyond them, prolonging the procedure and even putting off the buyer. At the 
same time the policy related to social programs for tenders, since there were 
several failures due to excessive demands: from three and five years, the ban on 
layoffs was reduced to only a year, with the government financing severance 
pays, not the buyer. The last element presented a recognition of the reality: if 
at the beginning of privatization, when the best companies were sold, it was 
still possible to set high social demands before the potential buyers, with the 
deterioration of the company offer in the privatization portfolio, this was no 
longer possible. Several tenders were unsuccessful, because the potential buyers 
either did not want to deal with the surplus labor on their own during five years 
or they were ready to pay the minimum price for the company, due to high 
social program costs. With this, no gift was made to the buyers: the cost the 
government pays for the employment restructuring would be recuperated in 
the form of higher sales price, because the company’s price was truly increased 
in such a way.
In 2004 the pace of privatization was significantly slower. This was caused 
by several factors. First, during the change of the government, a significant 
number of professional staff left the Agency, which inevitably slowed down 
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its operation, at least for a while, until the engagement of new staff and their 
acquisition of necessary experience. Second, until his dismissal, the new 
manager of the Agency was more involved in politics than in his own work. 
Third, in time there was a decreasing number of good companies in the Agency’s 
portfolio, and an increasing number of bad ones, which are not only difficult to 
sell at a decent price, but which are also more difficult to prepare for a tender or 
auction (ownership disputes, negative or dubious capital value, etc.). 
Privatization revenues. The total revenues from the sale of capital in 
1,382 companies amounted to EUR 1.5 billion in these three years. This is not 
an amount to be proud of: a medium-sized Western company unknown to 
the public is worth as much. This gives rise to serious questions: did someone 
seriously mess up? How much is what was sold truly worth? Was the method 
of privatization wrong? Is privatization important at all?
Table 2. Privatization revenues, EUR 000
2002 2003 2004 Total
Tenders 201,456 600,269 15,234 816,960 
Auctions 57,139 261,590 121,681 440,411 
Capital market* 81,610 67,768 51,406 200,784 
TOTAL 340,206 929,627 188,321 1,458,154 
*Sale of shares mostly by the Share Fund
Source: Agency for Privatization
First we must examine the reasons why privatization revenues are lower 
in these three years than expected. First, this was a privatization of a smaller 
part of the Serbian economy. Many of the best and most valuable companies 
were privatized according to the 1997 law, so for this wave of privatization 
only a few good and a lot of medium-quality and bad companies remained, 
and smaller ones at that. Then, significant capital is in the group of larger 
companies which have been for a while the restructuring program. Large state-
owned companies, whose value could be considerable, have not entered the 
process of privatization. Second, the price of capital being sold in Serbia is 
certainly reduced by the high political risk of investment. Namely, bad political 
circumstances in the country and around it (ranging from the issue of state 
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borders and the Hague Tribunal to intensive internal political strife, etc.) 
unfavorably affect the country’s attractiveness for investors. Potential foreign 
investors certainly have an impression that Serbia is not a country that is well 
integrated in the world politics and economy. Third, the Serbian market is small, 
with low purchasing power, not particularly dynamic either, so the interest of 
investors is not large. Fourth, the accession to the European Union is constantly 
being postponed further into the future, putting off those investors who are 
searching for a cheap entry into the EU. Fifth, belligerent trade unions, as well 
as employees used to self-management ideology and prone to strikes, did not 
attract investors. The state occasionally played into their hands, avoiding to 
implement the law in order to maintain the political rating of ruling parties 
(the case of Jugoremedija, etc.). 
The low prices realized at auctions and tenders are, in principle, certainly 
realistic, given the conditions. The claim that a company is worth more than 
someone is ready to pay for it does not make sense, since it has no immanent 
value, just market value. A company that might be identical in all other 
respects is worth different amounts depending on its environment: in Serbia 
the circumstances were not favorable, so the obtained prices were not high 
either. 
The question is only whether another privatization model should have 
been selected or changed during implementation, or the sales delayed until 
better times when it was seen that things were not going according to the plan, 
which advice was heard (Danijel Cvjetićanin). 
The author of this text is inclined to give a negative answer to all three 
questions, although it is difficult to provide sufficiently strong arguments 
to support his case. First, at the beginning harmony seemed to reign at the 
political plane (good response to 5 October in the world, good cooperation 
in the course of forming the DOS government), so it was not easy to predict 
all political snags that later to a significant extent led to a considerably smaller 
interest of foreign investors in tender privatization than expected. Second, 
during implementation, it is difficult completely to change a privatization 
program (think of both political and technical problems), in particular in view 
of the belief that unfavorable factors are temporary and that things would be 
resolved quickly. Furthermore, what is the alternative? Employee shareholding? 
Vouchers? They are still inferior from the point of view of economic efficiency, 
and bring the government even less revenues (employee shareholding) or none 
at all (vouchers). 
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Third, it is quite uncertain whether the delay of sales would be a good 
solution. A precise answer to this cannot be given, as we do not know what 
kind of prices would be obtained in the future. Still, there are two questions 
disputing that idea. First: in what kind of shape Serbian companies would have 
greeted those better times, i.e. how many would have still existed then, and how 
many would have even recorded even deteriorated market and financial results 
in the face of competition from the new private sector or from abroad? In other 
words, the inevitable intensification of market competition and interruption 
of subsidies of different kinds would probably have a negative effect on the 
operation of the not-so-well-managed socially- and state-owned companies, 
consequently reducing their value/price. Furthermore, for many companies on 
the verge of bankruptcy swift privatization was the only salvation; stalling would 
have jeopardized their existence. Second: would the future sales price been so 
much higher as to justify the sale delay? Because, if discounting is introduced 
in the analysis, which is necessary, then the future price would have to be much 
higher since Serbia needs (needed) the money as quickly as possible, even 
badly so. If the discount rate is only 10%, then a million euros increase to 1.6 
million in five years, and if it is 20%, then it reaches 2.5 million. Therefore, for 
the delay to be justified from the financial standpoint, the prices of companies 
would have to increase significantly in the foreseeable future, which is not quite 
certain. In some periods and in some places there were instances of successful 
restructuring of state-owned companies, for example in Poland, and there were 
also, admittedly few, successful self-managed companies. However, the overall 
experience with state ownership and restructuring is very negative.8
An alternative method of presenting the successfulness of privatization 
is given in the next table, through the ratio between the offered and sold 
companies in different privatization channels. 
Table 3. Success rate
2002 2003 2004 Total
Tenders 50% 48% 75% 53%
Auctions 76% 84% 81% 82%
Capital market* 55% 57% 54% 56%
TOTAL 69% 77% 74% 75%
*Sale of shares mostly by the Share Fund
Source: Agency for Privatization
8  For references see S. Djankov and P. Murrell - Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative 
Survey, Journal of Economic Literature, No. 2/2002
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This means that three quarters of sales were successful, which is not 
unfavorable. However, it is not good that the success rate in tenders is only about 
a half, since they are the basic sales channel for large companies and should 
bring the state the largest income, while being prepared in most details.
The sale success rate is the highest in auctions, in which buyers are mostly 
domestic. This is caused most probably by the relatively low initial price and 
non-existence of expensive social programs. The low success rate in sales by 
the Share Fund points to the modest interest of investors in minority stakes in 
the companies privatized under the previous laws.
The ratio between the sales price and bookkeeping value does not present 
particularly indicative data in the absolute amount, because the bookkeeping 
value is neither relevant not illustrative in the economic sense. Still, when 
observed in dynamic terms, this data can be useful.
Table 4. Ratio between the sales price and bookkeeping value
2002 2003 2004 Total
Tenders 1.47 1.44 0.23 1.32 
Auctions 0.73 0.81 0.64 0.74 
Capital market* 2.47 1.10 0.85 1.30 
TOTAL 1.37 1.16 0.59 1.07 
*Sale of shares mostly by the Share Fund
Source: Agency for Privatization
From the previous table it is obvious that the ratio is reduced from one 
year to another, for all three methods of sale. In tenders for 2002 and 2003 
and the Share Fund in 2002 there were a few very favorable transactions 
(cement plants, tobacco plants, breweries, etc.), so the value of this ratio was 
high. However, as the privatization increasingly moved towards the areas of 
unattractive companies, the ratio inevitably dropped. It is particularly low for 
tenders in 2004, pointing to a tender privatization crisis. Prospects are not 
favorable either, in particular when the sale of companies in the restructuring 
group is initiated, whose sales price, despite the write-off of government debts, 
will frequently be low, if even exceeding one euro.
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The next table presents compulsory investments, i.e. the investments that 
are part of the sales contracts and present the buyer’s obligation. Naturally, the 
new owner can exceed them. The total amount is around EUR 830 million.
Table 5. Contracted investment, EUR 000
2002 2003 2004 Total
Tenders 305,929 319,939 75,389 701,257 
Auctions 13,591 59,498 48,965 122,053 
Capital market* 5,902   5,902 
TOTAL 325,421 379,437 124,354 829,212 
*Sale of shares mostly by the Share Fund
Source: Agency for Privatization
According to expectations, the amount of contracted investments is the 
largest in tenders, because it presents a criterion in selecting the most favorable 
offer. In auctions a standard request were investments in the amount of 150% 
of depreciation, whereas in the sales by the Share Fund there were no such 
requests (except in a very specific case), since they refer to the sales of minority 
packages.
Restructuring. For companies for which there would be no realistic 
chances of finding a buyer in the present state, the process of restructuring is 
envisaged as a preparation for privatization. Around seventy companies are 
included in the group for restructuring, including RTB Bor, Geneks, Zorka 
(Šabac), IMR, IMT, Viskoza, Magnohrom, Goša etc. There are two basic ideas 
how to assist them: first, to divide some of them into several companies and 
sell attractive ones and initiate bankruptcy in those that do not find a buyer; 
second, to write off part of the debt to the state, so that their value would 
rise above zero. However, the slow progress of restructuring in the past year 
increases the chances of the program being transformed into something it 
should never be: a reserve for bad companies sustained by state subsidies for 
social and political reasons.
Privatization revision? Turning of the privatization process into a 
political issue is inevitable not only in Serbia. Government opponents, in 
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particular those from the left side of the political spectrum, always spend a 
lot of ammunition on ownership changes, accusing the government that 
it is plundering the people’s resources and, under the guise of privatization, 
orchestrating the increase in wealth of its supporters. There is only one step 
from such accusations to the threat of privatization revision in the event of 
coming into power – and it is usually made quite easily in Serbia.9
A revision was already conducted in 1994 under the guise of revaluation, 
which was previously dealt with. During the protests in 1996-97, Zoran Đinđić 
frightened the buyers of Telekom by threatening them with revision when he 
came into power. The Government whose Prime Minister he was immediately 
formed a committee to examine previous privatizations, with no result. The 
most intensive campaign against privatization was on the eve of elections at the 
end of 2003, when the then opposition parties and later ruling parties showered 
the authorities with a barrage of accusations and announcements of revisions 
of that “daylight robbery”. Already the lack of facts in their accusations clearly 
pointed to what happened in the end: there was no review, or a revelation of 
corruption or irregularities in the behavior of government bodies.
Dirty money? One of the accusations against the current privatization 
model is that it enables the tycoons from the Milošević’s period to purchase 
companies for little money. It does seem that no one in Serbia has money 
except them and that, because of that, there is no one else to collect the profit 
from low prices of companies. 
However, this theory has more weaknesses than it seems at first sight. 
First, which tycoons purchased companies during privatization? The leading 
ones certainly did not. Karić did not, since he stuck with the companies he 
had previously established himself. Mišković also created most of his empire 
ab ovo, and only entered the trade chains (Pekabeta already during the 1990s). 
There are also buyers with anti-Milošević inclinations, who are now purchasing 
companies. For example, Zoran Drakulić, who certainly cannot be criticized as 
Milošević’s tycoon or profiteer. 
Obviously, there are many individuals who entered the process of 
privatization with relatively modest amounts (several tens or hundreds of 
thousands of euros) earned under the Milošević’s regime and purchased 
something relatively small, but they are neither tycoons nor is that money 
9  For example, some time ago Vuk Obradović publicly asked for an urgent interruption of the current 
method of privatization and revision of the already completed company sales. According to him, it 
is a “mafia-statist model” via which those in and close to power robed the citizens and state property. 
Obradović forecast that such a situation would result within a year in a small number of enormously 
wealthy people in Serbia, whereas others would “belong to the world of the poor”.
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suspicious in advance. At least part of that money appearing in privatization 
was earned after 5 October. Relatively low prices of a larger number of 
companies created possibilities for the people who do not have large capital, but 
modest, to appear as buyers. This led to the “democratization” of privatization, 
i.e. shares became accessible to a larger number of people.
Second, at a formal, legal level, this money is clean until proven otherwise. 
The Agency or the Ministry for Privatization cannot and must not determine 
who is a Milošević’s tycoon and whether money someone is using for 
purchase is quite clean or not, leading to a conclusion of a contract or auction 
cancellation. 
Generally speaking, the tax on extraprofit essentially presented a method 
of legalization of money earned in the Milošević’s period. The new authorities, 
rightfully or not, made a political decision that they would not examine the 
formal correctness (legality) of the acquisition of that wealth, but to tax it and 
restore at least part of it to the people. In such a way, what remained after 
taxation is quite legal and moral, at least in the political sense. 
Essentially, why should it be morally disputable that they are buying 
companies which are being privatized and not when they are investing that 
money in new plants? From the economic and social standpoint, it is even better 
that they are investing their capital in Serbia, rather than taking it abroad. 
This entire story about extraprofit and, wider, dirty money slowed 
down privatization at the beginning, because many investors refrained from 
participating in order not to show their money at an unfavorable moment for 
them. 
Change of regulations in 2005. There are three important changes. 
First, the Agency was given a right to terminate the contract with the buyer 
independently and very easily if he fails to comply with the provisions of 
the contract. The court procedure may have been slow so far, but this desire 
for speed and efficiency brings excessive rights to one interested party, at the 
expense of the protection of rights of the other contractual party. Second, 
striving to make unattractive companies more attractive, the legislator provided 
for a conditional write-off of government receivables from the company that 
is being privatized – the goal is to ensure that it has a positive value and that 
it is sold – with the government creditors (the budget, utilities, state banks, 
etc.) collecting as much as they can from privatization proceeds. It is not a 
bad trick, but it will work only in companies with such configuration that this 
conditional write-off transfers them from a negative value to positive. Those 
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who already have positive value do not need such write-off, nor can it help 
those with a very negative value. Third, managers could no longer prevent the 
listing of their companies’ shares by simply refusing to sign the prospectus. 
This currently refers to around four hundred companies, the best known being 
C-Market.
CONCLUSION
The results of privatization in Serbia so far have disappointed many. 
However, it is difficult to expect that a privatization of a practically devastated 
economy, such as the Serbian, can quickly turn it into a prosperous one. The 
economy of Serbia was truly in a poor state, after decades of self-management, 
sanctions and, finally, bombardment. However, the result are there: privatized 
companies are now the main drivers of economic activity and productive 
employment. 
The process of privatization developed relatively successfully, without 
big affairs. The Serbian government administration demonstrated its ability to 
operate properly, so the area of privatization is probably one of the best run 
reform areas. Certain mistakes in procedures are probably a reflection of a 
game with big numbers (large number of privatizations in a short period of 
time), and not corruption, as some believe. 
Privatization still has another half of the road to cover, and the more 
difficult one at that. In the commercial sector mostly lower-quality companies 
remain. There are also the companies from the restructuring group, a certain 
number of which will end in bankruptcy proceedings. State infrastructure 
companies and utilities, whose privatization is more complex both conceptually 
and technically, are also awaiting their turn.

Boris Begović and Marko Paunović
Real Sector Restructuring 
PAST RESTRUCTURING – WHAT HAS AND 
WHAT HAS NOT BEEN DONE
Introduction – differences among companies in the real sector 
At the beginning of transition in Serbia, in late 2000, i.e. in early 2001, the 
real sector in the Serbian economy comprised, for all practical purposes, five 
groups of enterprises:
1. Completely new private companies, established through private investment 
after 1989, when private business was legally sanctioned. 
2. Companies which were partially privatized under the privatization model 
in application as of early 1997, until end-2000.
3. Socially and state owned companies whose capital is majority, or completely 
socially/state owned, which do not need pre-privatization restructuring.
4. Socially and state owned companies whose capital is majority, or completely 
socially/state owned, which need pre-privatization restructuring, i.e. 
which cannot be privatized without such restructuring.
5. Public enterprises with state and socially owned capital. 
With the exception of the companies in group 1, all other companies 
in the domestic real sector constitute the legacy of socialism in the Serbian 
economy, with all their minor or major weaknesses displayed long before a 
political crisis that broke out in 1991. All weaknesses of these companies were 
just intensified in the course of the 1990s, with changes in the region, i.e. new 
catalysts which came from the break-up of the country, international sanctions 
and isolation of the Serbian economy, extraordinary political circumstances 
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and an institutional vacuum of its own kind that was caused by the implosion of 
institutions of communism, which was not followed by the building of market 
economy institutions. Consequences of these developments for good many 
companies in the real sector were numerous: inferior and outdated technology, 
poor production programs, uncompetitive products, a lack of good incentives 
to employees, low economic efficiency. In line with the above, the situation of 
the Serbian real sector in early 2001, namely at the beginning of transition, was 
such that its large share was not competitive according to the world market 
criteria, i.e. at the international level.
For this reason, a vast majority of companies in the real sector (including 
some companies from group 1) should undergo restructuring to a smaller 
or larger extent, i.e. make adjustments to new market and institutional 
circumstances. Consequently, there is a need for restructuring, i.e. structural 
adjustment, practically of the entire real sector of the Serbian economy. Of 
course, the scope, i.e. degree and character of restructuring, differ from case 
to case, principally at the level of individual companies, but also at the level of 
branches of the economy.
A key strategic decision related to this issue was adopted in early 2001: 
in all the mentioned cases, except for the specific case of public enterprises, 
restructuring should be carried out by a private owner, i.e. owners, of those 
companies. That decision was based on the assessment that the private owner 
can do the job of restructuring far better than the state, hence a conclusion 
was drawn that post-privatization restructuring would be economically more 
efficient than pre-privatization one. In that sense, a precondition for efficient 
restructuring of the real sector is its privatization, i.e. the sale of companies in 
that sector. 
Namely, at that time such model of privatization was chosen which was 
based on the sale of the majority socially, i.e. state owned equity stake (at least 
70 percent of shares) in the real sector companies. One of the main motives 
for the application of such a privatization model was to establish concentrated 
ownership, i.e. to create a private owner of the company’s capital, who has 
efficient incentives and mechanisms to carry out its restructuring, embodied 
first and foremost in his indisputable majority stake in ownership. 
The strategic decision to leave the restructuring of the real sector to 
private owners for the most part can be assessed as justified, bearing in mind 
that there are unarguable theoretic and empiric findings which indicate that 
a private owner is much more efficient on this job and that better results of 
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restructuring can be expected by opting for such approach in comparison with 
the alternatives. However, it is much more interesting to consider political 
circumstances in which such a decision was taken. Namely, against this 
decision, that is, the restructuring strategy, were those who cannot benefit from 
restructuring as such, primarily those who will be left jobless. In early 2001 
those interest groups were not well defined and did not have mechanisms for 
projecting their interest into the decision-making process. That was the time of 
a firm reformist coalition and great political energy focused on reform. Simply, 
the political opposition of that time was deadened. In addition, financial 
and political support of the international community was very strong then, 
so an image (an illusion) was created that the said support will be enough 
to resolve by itself the problem of redundant labor in the real sector, i.e. of 
unemployment which was to be generated. Finally, the policy of the World 
Bank, that is, consultancy provided by that international financial institution 
in this field, significantly influenced the adoption of that strategy.
Before proceeding with an analysis of the restructuring of the real sector 
of the Serbian economy, it is necessary to clarify what is the best measure, i.e. 
indicator of restructuring. A methodological debate about this subject (Smith 
et al. 1999, Estrin and Rosever, 1999 and Djankov and Murell, 2002) has shown 
that there are several indicators which can be classified into quantitative (those 
derived from annual financial statements, i.e. financial reports of companies) 
and qualitative (those arising from surveys, i.e. expert evaluations of the course 
of enterprise restructuring). Without going into a methodological debate of 
this type, in the rest of the paper the restructuring indicator will be understood 
to mean its results: the ensuing economic performance of the company. This 
implies results in the field of changing the total output volume, i.e. changing 
the productivity of total engaged production factors.
Previously privatized companies
Bearing in mind the thus defined framework of the relationship between 
privatization and restructuring, the first problem, that is, the question that the 
then government was faced with, was which attitude to adopt vis-à-vis the 
companies in group 2, i.e. those companies which had been partially privatized 
under the privatization model applied as of 1997, until end-2000 inclusive. 
Namely, the result of the application of that model was great dispersion of 
ownership of shares of these companies, with high insider share-holdings, as well 
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as with part of shares still owned by the state (held by the Share Fund on behalf 
of the government). Although such ownership structure, in principle, is not 
conducive to restructuring, the question was raised whether a comprehensive 
and deep restructuring of these companies was a dire need, all the more 
so because in the said period the best companies of the Serbian real sector 
were privatized, concentrated in the food processing industry, beer industry, 
pharmaceutical industry, as well as the best companies outside the mentioned 
branches. In that context, the assessment was made that such restructuring was 
not a priority and a decision was taken not to use the government equity stake 
as a mechanism to launch, i.e. carry out the restructuring of these companies, 
but to create conditions through phased sales of government shares for 
spontaneous (through transactions on the capital market) consolidation of 
owners’ packages of shares, i.e. for increasing the concentration of ownership, 
which would enhance further restructuring of these private companies.
It turned out, however, that a creation of a concentrated ownership 
structure, i.e. the establishment of the dominant owner, was neither fast nor 
efficient, hence after four years these companies are still characterized by 
dispersed ownership – the ownership structure which is not conducive to 
restructuring. There are two reasons for such state of affairs. The first one is 
an inadequate institutional framework of the capital market, resulting in a low 
volume of trade in shares, mainly due to poor protection of property rights of 
shareholders, in particular small shareholders.1 The second is the slowness of 
the state in selling shares from its portfolio on the capital market, bearing in 
mind that the sale of these shares would encourage the establishment of the 
majority owner that has motivation for restructuring. 
Furthermore, dispersed ownership enabled the survival of the old 
management teams of these companies, so that the majority of these 
companies in the real sector are still managed by these same general managers 
who had been running those companies before privatization. This finding is 
very important, because this fact may be hiding part of the explanation of the 
phenomenon of low intensity restructuring of this group of companies. It is 
even more important in light of the fact that the current managements have 
the motivation to prevent any attempt to concentrate share holdings, with 
the legal arrangements governing company prospectuses, and thus company 
restructuring which would result from ownership, playing into their hands.
1  Moreover, it was noticed that in a number of cases the managements prevent trade in shares on the 
stock exchange by refusing to sign a prospectus, which is a necessary document for starting trade in 
shares on the stock exchange.
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Generally speaking, one could say that this group of companies in the 
Serbian real sector has been characterized by a fairly low intensity of restructuring 
over the past four years. That low intensity can in this case be explained by 
the dispersed ownership structure (with the existence of insider shares, i.e. 
shareholders) and by the fact that the managements of the companies have 
not been changed. These two findings are completely in line with the empirical 
finding (Djankov and Murrell, 2002) that dispersed ownership dominated by 
shareholders insiders (those who are employed in the companies) prevents 
thorough restructuring of a company, as well as that the survival of the old 
management of a company does not promote its restructuring. Another reason 
for such result in Serbia can be found in the inherited and widespread self-
management mentality, i.e. Weltanschauung, which only intensifies the effect 
of incentives arising from insider shareholding and dispersion of ownership.
Companies privatized under the new model 
Group 3 is comprised of companies which are relatively easy for 
privatization and in whose case privatization is just a precondition, i.e. a prelude 
to restructuring which is carried out by a new private majority owner of such a 
company. These companies were first on the list of candidates for privatization 
under a new model, which started in the latter half of 2001, with first privatized 
companies in early 2002.
Although the companies in this group had the most intensive restructuring, 
which is in line with the previously mentioned empirical evidence (that the 
establishment of a majority private owner and the arrival of a new management 
step up restructuring), it is certain that the pace of that restructuring was 
slowed down by specific requests which were put before investors, mainly in 
relation to investment in social programs and the imposition of an obligation 
not to fire workers, who are inherited redundant labor, for a specified period of 
time. These conditions constituted a consequence of political fears of the then 
government, i.e. its officials, that such retrenchments as a result of restructuring 
would have a significant negative effect on their popularity ratings, even against 
the backdrop of relatively high political stability and a strong reform coalition 
which (for a while) was providing a two-third majority in the parliament.
Pursuant to the above, the restructuring of the companies in group 3, which 
have not yet been privatized, is fully linked to its fast privatization. There are 
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no technical or institutional obstacles to such privatization. All the institutions 
which are necessary have been long built and are quite well established. The 
problem arose, however, in the first half of 2004, when the new government, 
for party-political reasons, appointed to the key posts (Privatization Minister 
and Privatization Agency Director) persons without capacities required for 
carrying out privatization, but with great capacities to create scandals, since 
the political motive for such appointments was gaining political popularity 
on account of alleged abuses in privatization committed by the previous 
government. Only when it was clear what serious damage was sustained due 
to a standstill in privatization in terms of erosion of government’s credibility, 
namely that political damage was much greater than (expected) gain, the said 
problem was solved by replacements of officials, and privatization was resumed. 
Still, precious time was lost, bearing in mind that without the said standstill, a 
far larger number of companies would have been privatized by now, thus also 
restructured.
Pre-privatization company restructuring 
The next problem has been and still is related to large socially and state 
owned companies which could not be privatized through sale, bearing in 
mind that nobody was interested in buying them on sight. The reasons for 
this lack of interest could be broadly found on two sides. Firstly, an absence 
of any business prospects of such companies, which are in a large number of 
cases conglomerates, i.e. engaged in many different activities, without being 
specialized in an area where they would have the competitive edge. Furthermore, 
these companies very often were wrong (“failed”) investments from the very 
start – they were constructed on the basis of investment decisions taken by 
those who did not have to bear the consequences of these decisions. In some 
cases of such conglomerates, there are certain plants, i.e. parts of the enterprise 
(once basic organizations of associated labor), which have some kind of 
business prospects. Consequently, fragmentation of such companies should be 
carried out and those units which have some business prospects should be 
established as separate companies. Other units without any future in business 
are candidates for bankruptcy and liquidation, in order to privatize their assets, 
primarily fixed assets, instead of their equity. Of course, in such a division it is 
necessary, in collaboration with creditors, to allocate liabilities of the company 
to the units which are formed by its partition.  
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The second problem were accumulated debts of companies, i.e. their 
obligations which in many cases were higher than assets and receivables put 
together – such companies had negative capital. Consequently, it was necessary 
to resolve the issue of their debts before launching privatization. It turned out 
that the largest part of liabilities of these companies (in some cases more than 
80 percent) was debt to the state. Direct debt, such as tax and contribution 
arrears, or indirect, such as unpaid utility bills. Still, the bulk of the liabilities of 
these companies to the government is a consequence of foreign loans for which 
creditors were issued sovereign (government) guarantees, which have not been 
repaid. The fate of this part of companies’ liabilities from the mentioned group 
deserves some more attention.
Namely these loans were taken out by domestic real sector companies, 
domestic banks acted as financial mediators, namely in most of the cases four 
large banks liquidated in early 2002, and the state issued sovereign guarantees 
to foreign creditors. Consequently, the state took over all the claims of these 
banks arising from extension of foreign loans with sovereign guarantees and 
allocated these claims to the Agency for Bank Rehabilitation, Bankruptcy and 
Liquidation. Although the liabilities of the state to foreign creditors arising from 
these loans (in arrears) were considerably reduced on the basis of agreements 
with the Paris Club creditors (51 percent of government debt was written off 
in November 2001, while the remaining 15 percent will be written off after 
successful completion of the Extended Arrangement with the IMF envisaged 
for end-2005) and the London Club creditors (a write off amounting to 60 
percent in total), the state did not write down its claims on its debtors, i.e. the 
companies which used these loans. In other words, a reduction in the state’s 
liabilities to foreign creditors did not result in a reduction of government’s 
claims on debtors in the real sector. 
Two mentioned problems created a need for pre-privatization re-
structuring of these companies, in order to make their privatization possible at 
all, that is their sale (at any selling price). The envisaged restructuring implies 
organizational changes (mostly fragmentation) and resolution of company 
liabilities. In addition, restructuring can imply also bankruptcy, i.e. liquidation, 
of parts of these companies (followed by the sale of assets) and cutting 
employment. Such pre-privatization restructuring (in the unofficial World 
Bank jargon called ”dressing-up the pig”) explicitly bans any investment, be it 
in fixed assets or working capital. It is just light pre-privatization restructuring 
which is followed by privatization through tender or auction, i.e. by the sale of 
shares of that company, i.e. its parts, to a new private owner. Therefore, as early 
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as 2001 a group was formed of 69 companies with around 155,000 employees 
(those who formally have a work place, that is, an employment booklet).2 
The above described restructuring, provided that a solution is found for 
the liabilities of the company, may be also called a substitute for bankruptcy, 
i.e. liquidation of a company through bankruptcy. One should not completely 
disregard the possibility that one of the motives for introducing such 
restructuring lies in the awareness of the shortcomings of the then legal 
arrangements related to bankruptcy, in particular extremely long duration of 
bankruptcy proceedings, weaknesses in its implementation and uncertainty 
with respect to the adoption and implementation of new bankruptcy legislation 
(which proved to be reasonable, considering that the new bankruptcy 
legislation, although passed by the Parliament, has not been implemented over 
the first half of 2005).  
However, in the first four years of transition nothing came out of the 
said restructuring and subsequent privatization of these companies. A mere 
two companies from the mentioned list had completed pre-privatization 
restructuring and were sold in early 2005. The question may be asked why 
there are such delays in the restructuring and privatization of this group of 
companies.
It is obvious that two main technical problems have arisen in relation to 
the implementation of thus designed restructuring. The first one is the problem 
of identification, separation and verification of claims by different creditors on 
the said companies, taking into account that their arrears are years and decades 
old. That problem is aggravated by the already mentioned problem of debts to 
the state, for the write-off of which, conditional or unconditional, irrespective 
of government policy, in some situations there were no legal grounds. The 
second problem is a relatively complex and pretty absurd organizational 
structure of these companies, primarily the cases of socially owned holdings 
created through the transformation of the so-called complex organizations 
of associated labor. This second problem is augmented by the engagement of 
2  The number of such companies varies. So far, since 2001 only two such companies have been 
privatized, which decreased the initial number of companies under restructuring. Contrary to that, 
companies which were not initially slated for restructuring, and whose privatization failed after 
two attempts (nobody offered the initial price), are included into the group for restructuring, as 
it has been assessed that further attempts at their privatization will not be successful. Hence, the 
total number of companies slated for restructuring was 75 in March 2005. Moreover, this number of 
companies should be increased by more than 500 smaller subsidiaries. These companies are in a way 
hostages of large companies, bearing in mind that the future of subsidiaries, whatever it may be, is 
linked to the fate of large companies which need to be restructured. The total number of employees 
in the companies slated for restructuring (including small enterprises and subsidiaries) stands at 
around 200,000.
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foreign advisors, which in certain cases was mandatory, where big multilateral 
donors provided grants. Foreign consultants, unused to such organizational 
arrangements, were wasting time searching for the sense where there is no 
sense, nor has ever been. 
However, the key reason for the absence of activity in the field of 
restructuring of this group of companies lies in the lack of political will to do 
that. Overstaffing in those companies is the main reason behind the lack of that 
will. Namely, the restructuring of these companies would inevitably lead to lay-
offs of a sizeable number of those presently employed. Whether directly, in the 
course of pre-privatization restructuring, or indirectly, after privatization, as 
part of efforts by a new owner to restructure his own company and enhance its 
economic efficiency. The total number of future retrenchments in restructured 
companies will vary from company to company, but in general terms, it could 
be said that these will be older employees, with lower levels of qualifications and 
relatively limited capacity to acquire new skills and change their work habits. 
Furthermore, one should bear in mind that a number of such companies in the 
cities, i.e. regions, where they are located, generate very significant portion of 
total employment, which is relevant in light of proverbially low labor mobility 
in Serbia.
In that respect, the restructuring of these companies, i.e. lay-offs of 
redundant workers, can have negative political consequences – significant falls 
in political popularity of those taking these decisions and those implementing 
such restructuring. Therefore, there is a direct incentive to politicians to 
maintain the inherited redundancies, namely in the case under consideration 
here, not to carry out pre-privatization restructuring. General managers, i.e. 
employees’ representatives in those companies, being aware of the mentioned 
incentives related to political popularity, are in a position to blackmail politicians, 
mostly by demanding a constant flow of, and an increase in, subsidies to such 
companies, i.e. suspension of any restructuring of such companies. 
It could be said that in this manner political equilibrium has been 
established in the form of balanced subsidies to non-restructured and non-
privatized companies, maintenance of redundancies in them and political 
support which those employees and their families lend to the politicians who 
are not carrying out restructuring. This finding is in full compliance with 
the findings of the model of relations between politicians and firms (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994). In the said equilibrium, explicit subsidies are paid to loss-
makers (budget item subsidies to non-financial organizations) and soft budget 
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constraints are made possible. Namely, in addition to direct subsidies, non-
payment of utility bills to public enterprises is tolerated, and as for other 
creditors, the efficiency of collecting claims from socially and state owned 
companies in Serbia is proverbially low.
An indirect confirmation of the thesis that political equilibrium was 
established relatively early on, which was not conducive to the real sector 
restructuring, is a relatively low level of efforts invested in institution building, 
i.e. in creating institutions and building administrative capacities necessary to 
carry out pre-privatization restructuring. Namely, in setting up the Privatization 
Agency, which is, among other things, in charge of the real sector restructuring, 
far more attention was paid to the building of the Tender and Auction Centers 
than of the Restructuring Center.
In this manner, a connection empirically verified also in other countries 
(Djankov and Murrell, 2002), was confirmed in Serbia as well, and that is 
the connection which exists between soft budget constraints and absence 
of enterprise restructuring. Moreover, on the basis of domestic experience, 
there is room for an even firmer conclusion, which reads that without the 
imposition of hard budget constraints, there are no incentives for the real 
sector restructuring. In other words, with soft budget constraints in place, the 
real sector cannot be expected to restructure.
On the example of these companies another empirical finding could be 
tested (Djankov and Murrell, 2002), which is that foreign trade liberalization 
and tougher international competition spurs the restructuring of such 
companies. Namely, it could be said that in Serbia the first year of transition 
saw liberalization of foreign trade flows, largely due to the elimination of 
quantitative import restrictions, and to a lesser extent owing to the reduction 
in customs protection. Nevertheless, such changes did not bring about the 
restructuring of this group of companies. On that basis, it can be concluded 
that the imposition of hard budget constraints is a necessary condition for 
restructuring. Without this condition in place, foreign trade liberalization can 
not by itself create incentives for restructuring.3  
3  The relation between foriegn trade liberalization and hard budget constraints is more complex than 
it might seem at first sight. Namely, protectionism increases equilibrium prices on the domestic 
market, which can enable such companies (if they still produce something) to operate without 
losses by selling their goods on the domestic market, thus also making the component of soft budget 
constraints lose its relevance. Foreign trade liberalization is cutting prices on the domestic market 
and forcing the state to (unless it wants them closed down) subsidize such companies. In that respect, 
foreing trade liberalization produces higher transparency, bearing in mind that explicit subsidies have 
to be introduced. Clearly foreign trade liberalization is not a sufficient condition for restructuring, 
but in the case of Serbia it is not clear whether it is even a necessary condition. Namely, even in the 
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It is obvious that, in principle, political equilibrium was established 
in Serbia, namely a vicious circle in which there are no incentives to any of 
the parties to begin the restructuring of the real sector, i.e. of this group of 
enterprises. However, a question is raised as to the extent to which some of the 
perceptions underlying the decision-making process are based on reality. On 
the one hand, the first transition government lasted almost three years, longer 
than in nearly any East European transition country. Still, it is questionable 
how justified it would be to link this political result primarily to the non-
implementation of the real sector restructuring. Furthermore, the fall of the 
first Serbian reformist government in 2003 certainly was not a consequence of 
the restructuring of the real sector, since no such restructuring ever happened. 
Finally, a question may be asked to which degree the real sector restructuring 
influences the popularity rating of the government, that is, of the ruling parties, 
today. Namely, employees in these companies indubitably belong to the losers 
in transition, so it can be assumed that this part of the electorate turned against 
the government, that is, against reform policies, a long time ago and that they 
have long been voting for opposition political parties, in particular those which 
for sure are not reform-oriented, i.e. whose political programs do not envisage 
orientation to market economy. 
In the long run, political equilibrium is established based on the political 
popularity (voters’ support) which is a result of increased subsidies, versus the 
political support which is a result of cuts in taxes collected for financing these 
subsidies.
In Serbia, four years after the beginning of transition, political popularity 
as a result of increases in subsidies is still far greater than political popularity 
won on the basis of cuts in the tax burden on the taxpayers. Namely, in present-
day Serbia, the number of those who are mindful of their own budget burden 
is still relatively small. The number of those who live on subsidies, that is, on 
transfers, is considerably larger. With a rise in wealth, i.e. at an increased level 
of steady income, the number will also increase of those who define their 
preferences in politics on the basis of tax burdens, among other things, which 
political competitors are offering to them. Such a change will bring about the 
establishment of a new political equilibrium in which there will be no incentives 
for keeping the redundancies in the real sector. Support to such change can 
come from a tax reform which would increase the share of direct taxes in total 
tax revenue at the expense of indirect taxes. Namely, a tax burden based on 
conditions of protectionism many of the 69 companies in this group were not able to cover expenses 
out of their own revenue, which means that the imposition of hard budget constraints would bring 
about restructuring, or bankruptcy, even in the absence of foreign trade liberalization.  
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direct taxes is much easier to notice and a larger number of people will see the 
connection between increased subsidies and their own increased tax burden.
New private investments, i.e. investments in new plants, generate 
economic growth and increase the number of voters to whom their own tax 
burdens matter much more than the subsidies the state is providing and this 
will inevitably result in the shifting of political equilibrium toward a reduction 
in subsidies. The problem is, however, in the fact that such a solution takes 
time and may be jeopardized if interest groups which demand subsidies get 
well organized. 
In the short run, however, help in terms of incentives to scale back 
subsidies and carry out restructuring of the real sector may come from those 
who represent the interests of budget balance, and in Serbia that is only the 
IMF for the time being. When the Serbian parliament adopted the 2004 annual 
budget providing for a deficit in the amount of around EUR 625 million or 
around 5 percent of GDP, only the pressure from the IMF managed to force 
the Government to submit to the Parliament a rebalanced budget with 
a dramatically decreased budget deficit. Likewise, it is only thanks to the 
IMF’s pressure that the projected deficit in the 2005 annual budget amounts 
to “a mere” EUR 250 million and allocations for subsidies to non-financial 
organizations, that is, subsidies to the real sector, are declining. Obviously, 
against the backdrop of prevailing economic populism and relatively instable 
ruling coalitions, the IMF is only relevant and credible political force which 
prevents uncontrolled growth in the budget deficit, i.e. which reduces it to a 
more or less acceptable level.
Public enterprises – restructuring and reform
Public enterprises were created in Serbia in the early 1990s, on the basis of 
a concept that these companies, irrespective of the ownership of capital, should 
be companies performing activities of public interest. However, unrelated to the 
above concept, these companies were very soon practically transformed into 
companies with state owned capital, and therefore an equal sign was effectively 
put between public and state owned companies. These companies were 
established in the fields which have elements of natural monopolies (electricity, 
communications and certain types of transport), elements of administrative 
monopolies (forests, oil industry), but also activities in the field of transport 
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which do not possess elements of a natural monopoly, and administrative 
monopoly has not been formally established (air traffic). In addition to the 
national public enterprises (at the level of Serbia as a whole), which employ 
around 135,000 people, a large number of public utility companies were 
established at the level of municipalities, i.e. local communities. 
The inherited situation in these companies at the beginning of transition 
may be assessed as very unfavorable. Firstly, in these companies core and 
non-core activities have been completely integrated. For example, within 
EPS, the core activity, such as electricity generation, was integrated with non-
core activities auxiliary to the core activity (which are directly linked to the 
performance of the core activity), such as maintenance of power plants, and 
non-core activities performed as side activities, such as catering facilities and 
vacation homes, i.e. hotels. As a result of such organizational structure, in the 
regime of public enterprises such activities are performed, which do not belong 
to activities of public interest under any criterion whatsoever. The consequence 
is that these, commercial, activities within public enterprises are fully protected 
against market competition, and they cannot be privatized, either. The next 
consequence of such an organizational structure is a very large number of 
employees in these companies, i.e. high overstaffing. 
In the period prior to transition in Serbia, in the case of a large number 
of public enterprises the policy of depressed prices was pursued (motives 
for such a policy will not be discussed). This led to a dramatic decline in the 
revenue of public enterprises, and in some cases (e.g. electricity), to a rise in 
consumption of services they provide and higher costs of public enterprises. 
All that produced sizeable financial losses of public enterprises, which were 
covered in part by subsidies from the budget, while in part they constituted a 
quasi-fiscal deficit. The beginning of the public finance reform in Serbia in the 
course of 2001 converted almost all quasi-fiscal deficits of public enterprises 
into subsidies. That is how public enterprises came to be the biggest beneficiaries 
of budget resources, within the item subsidies to the non-financial sector, with 
the Serbian Railroad Company being the biggest individual beneficiary of 
these resources. 
The absence of any incentive whatsoever for economic efficiency, mostly 
due to the absence of competition, but also due to the public ownership of 
capital, contradictory objectives of business operations of public enterprises 
and the absence of the possibility of bankruptcy (though the new Company 
Law allows for liquidation of these companies without bankruptcy), led to 
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very low economic efficiency of these companies, and one of the indicators of 
that low efficiency is redundant labor. Finally, many of these companies, like, 
for instance, JAT Airways, were not repaying loans they used to procure fixed 
assets, and ended up with huge liabilities. Although public enterprises in Serbia 
are not so ‘commercially neglected’, as are socially and state owned companies 
from the list of 69 companies, they certainly require thorough restructuring.
In analyzing the state of affairs in the public enterprise sector, it is necessary 
to separate two types of restructuring. One is relatively easy restructuring, 
which could simply imply a change in business policy of these companies. It is 
beyond doubt that significant changes have been made in that respect, which 
have first and foremost significantly reduced uncontrolled financial flows in 
these companies. This restructuring is mainly a consequence of the change of 
managements which happened with the change of government in late 2000, 
i.e. early 2001.
As for deeper, organizational, financial and management restructuring of 
public enterprises, very little has been done there. The only thing that was done 
was the spinning off of coal mines with underground exploitation, which have 
become an independent public enterprise, while two enterprises have been set 
up at the level of Vojvodina for water management and forest exploitation – a 
change motivated by the policy on Vojvodina’s autonomy, and far from any 
economic rationale, i.e. economically-driven restructuring. 
In other words, the absence of restructuring of public enterprises can be 
almost equalized with the absence of restructuring of large state and socially 
owned companies, those from the group of 69. It could be said that the reasons 
are identical. In the case of public enterprises, too, political equilibrium has 
been established in which explicit subsidies are paid to loss-making companies 
and they are allowed soft budget constraints, i.e. in which the restructuring of 
public enterprises is not initiated, all that being geared to garnering political 
support of employees in these companies. In that sense, the mechanism to 
destabilize this equilibrium, that is to break the said vicious circle, is the same. 
It is the elimination of the budget deficit, i.e. budget expenditure cuts. 
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FUTURE RESTRUCTURING – WHAT NEEDS TO 
BE DONE, AND WHAT CAN BE EXPECTED
From the standpoint of successful restructuring of the real sector, it is 
necessary to make several basic steps. 
1. Cancellation (conditional write-off) of debts to the state of heavily 
indebted companies, in order to privatize them through sales to interested 
investors. Privatization proceeds should serve as a basis for pro rata 
payments to creditors, namely to replace the bankruptcy estate which 
is formed in bankruptcies and liquidations of companies. This would 
establish an ownership structure which would create strong incentives 
to the restructuring of these companies. The first steps in this direction 
were made in the first quarter of 2005, when the Government drafted 
amendments to the Privatization Law, which will create legal grounds for 
such a procedure. Obligations related to social programs should not be 
imposed on new owners, as was the case before. Instead, social programs, 
if necessary, should be dealt with by the state.
2. Fragmentation of large companies is certainly a priority, in order to form 
units which can be privatized through sales, as well as units which are 
slated for bankruptcy and liquidation. There is a strong probability that 
in the process of liability allocation cooperation can be expected early on 
from creditors who have written off many of these claims, i.e. who have 
low expected values of these claims.
3. Following the above step is efficient implementation of new bankruptcy 
legislation, i.e. bankruptcy and liquidation of those companies which 
cannot be privatized through sales. Their bankruptcies will release 
significant resources which are currently not used and which will be 
made available through these bankruptcies to new investors interested 
in starting business. Therefore, this policy should be combined with the 
policy of eliminating barriers to the entry of new investors, both at the 
level of Serbia and at the level of local communities and their considerable 
powers in this area. 
4. It is necessary to additionally accelerate the privatization of those companies 
in the real sector which are not in need of pre-privatization restructuring. 
All the institutions necessary for carrying out such privatization have 
been built and are up-and-running, so that it would require only a strong 
political impulse from the Government, to demonstrate that privatization 
is its priority task.
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5. Thorough restructuring of public enterprises is necessary. Although 
the inherited situation, hence the obstacles to restructuring, vary from 
case to case, there are several recommendations, i.e. guidelines, which 
are common for all public enterprises. The first step is to spin off non-
core activities from public enterprises, i.e. to set up new legal entities 
for the performance of these activities, with resources they are using at 
present. Such companies should be very soon exposed to competition and 
privatized by applying the general model in force. 
6. A much more complicated part of restructuring follows, related to the 
reorganization of the performance of core activities (horizontal and 
vertical separation), aimed at exposing to competition all those activities 
which are now performed within public enterprises, and which can be 
exposed to competition, that is, which are not natural monopolies. The 
said reorganization should be followed by thorough restructuring of new 
units based on massive labor shedding. Only after the reorganization, and 
in some cases also after the restructuring of new units, privatization of 
these units, i.e. new companies, should be considered, that is, initiated. 
7. In parallel to restructuring and privatization of public enterprises 
regulatory institutions should be built, primarily independent regulatory 
agencies for regulation of natural monopolies, bearing in mind that certain 
activities performed by public enterprises belong to natural monopolies. 
The building of such institutions, in addition to the economic effect, has a 
significant political effect as well, since it mitigates political resistance to 
privatization of public enterprises.
8. Finally, the key element related to all these steps is the imposition of hard 
budget constraints on all the companies. That implies the elimination of 
explicit subsidies, as well as consistent conduct of bankruptcy proceedings, 
so that creditors can collect their claims from insolvent, i.e. illiquid, 
debtors, and consistent observance of contracts, i.e. contract enforcement, 
so that creditors can collect their claims from solvent debtors.
However, a question can be rightfully ask whether there are political 
incentives for the implementation of the said steps, i.e. whether it is realistic to 
expect any activities of the government in that field. An answer to the above 
question should be sought in the following facts.
1. There is strong pressure from the IMF to restructure the real sector in 
order to resolve the problems of the budget deficit, i.e. too large public 
spending, and trade deficit. The budget deficit, i.e. public spending, is 
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primarily related to public enterprises, and the trade deficit is related to 
non-restructured and non-privatized socially and state owned companies 
which cannot export. One should not expect the said pressure from the 
IMF to abate, it can only be heightened.
2. A change in political constellation can be expected (maybe it has already 
occurred), in which most of those employed in non-restructured 
companies (public, state and socially owned) perceive themselves as losers 
of transition. In that context, they vote in large numbers for those political 
parties which are against transition and against the establishment of market 
economy. In other words, in this political constellation, the restructuring 
of the real sector will not create new political opponents – they already 
exist, hence there is nothing to lose. Such political development can even 
lead to the stability of the government which begins the job of real sector 
restructuring. 
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Boško Živković
Banking Sector Restructuring
INHERITED SITUATION: SYSTEMIC INSOLVENCY
In the previous decade the banking sector was almost completely 
devastated: the total assets of banks from the territory of Serbia and Montenegro 
were reduced from the level of around USD 22 billion in 1989 to around 
USD 9.5 billion at the end of 1999. The income-bearing assets of the banks 
fell considerably faster than the total assets: domestic currency loans went 
down from the level of around USD 17.5 billion at the end of 1989 to USD 0.7 
billion at the end of 1999. The reduction of dinar assets is accompanied by the 
immobilization of the foreign currency components of assets. The collectibility 
of dinar placements was decreased from the level of around 40-50 in early 
90s to 20-30% at the end of 1990s. At the end of 1999 the share of income-
bearing assets (interest-bearing assets and analogous components) in the total 
assets was approximately 13%. Despite the interest rate control, the interest 
rate margin (difference between the lending and borrowing interest rates) was 
extremely high. Despite that, the banking sector operated at a loss during the 
whole decade. The sector’s liquidity was low and unstable.
The banking operated, in a political/economic sense, as a redistribution 
mechanism. It constantly transformed the quantity of money that was small in 
real terms and decreasing into a “soft loan”. Disruptions were quickly and with 
high multiplier effect transferred from the economy and government to the 
banking. The main disruption transferred from the environment to the banking 
activity are large deficits. The quasifiscal deficit, which was primarily created in 
socially- and state-owned companies (primarily in infrastructural activities), 
was partially financed by loans granted by commercial banks. The direction of 
commercial banks’ loans towards the financing of quasifiscal deficits presents 
the main cause of the low loan collectibility. According to the findings of a 
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questionnaire organized in June 1997, commercial banks regularly collected 
about 50% of the approved principal and around 60% of accrued interest. 
After that period, the collectibility rapidly deteriorated. In mid-1998 the rate 
of principal collection was 20-30%, with only 33% of the accrued interest 
being collected for the first 6 months of 1998. In the group of large commercial 
banks, the collection of principal and interest is even weaker. Because of the 
insolvency of companies-debtors a significant part of loans which was not 
serviced regularly became, in the total amount or significant percentage, 
permanently uncollectible. Therefore, the active part of the banking sector in 
Serbia entered transition with low capacity and very low level of credit interest 
rates. It was mostly useless. This situation is described by Table 1. The high 
price and low accessibility of loans inhibited the activity in the real sector.
Table 1. Average weighted interest rates (in  % at the annual level)
Description December 2000 October 2001
Average lending nominal interest rate 77.90 34.98
Average borrowing nominal interest rate 34.627 21.81
Nominal interest margin (at the monthly 
level) 2.30 0.89
Real lending interest rate 40.94 2.77
Real borrowing interest rate -0.15 -0.71
Source: NBS, Statistical Bulletin, various issues 
Under the described circumstances, rent seeking is almost an inevitable 
phenomenon. During the 1990s the banking sector was overflowing with rent 
seekers of different types. A large portion of non-performing loans arose in 
fact form related party lending.
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OVERVIEW OF MAIN MEASURES AND EVENTS
The main measure in the period after autumn 2000 was the closing 
(bankruptcy) of more than 25 insolvent banks. The total assets of these banks 
accounted for almost 2/3 of the assets of the total banking system. The main 
reason for such a radical decision was the deep banking crisis and low ability 
of the budget to increase the capital of insolvent banks. Through bankruptcy, 
mergers and acquisitions the number of banks in Serbia went down from 83 
in 2001 to 46 in 2004. 
The second key measure was the dismantling of the related party lending 
system. This phenomenon was almost legal in the previous decade: most non-
performing loans were approved to the owners of insolvent banks. In banks 
which had this imperfect connection the marginalization of the existing 
owners was conducted. This was done based on a separate law on the Paris 
and London club of creditors. From July 2002 the Government of the Republic 
of Serbia initiated the conversion of the banks’ debt to the Paris and London 
club of creditors into the capital of the group of banks which had these debts. 
The result of this process was a temporary nationalization of a large part of the 
banking system. 
A measure of this type was inevitable for two reasons: the first, debtor 
banks did not have any possibilities to meet their commitments without greater 
disruptions, and the second, the corporate structure of banks, inherited from 
the previous solutions, did not enable efficient management, since the main 
debtors were at the same time the main shareholders of the banks. 
The banking system of Serbia, after the radical structural changes 
(bankruptcy of large banks, entry of foreign banks in the market, temporary 
nationalization of some banks under the law on the Paris and London club) 
is recovering. At the end of 2004 the banking sector of the Republic of Serbia 
consisted of state-owned banks, domestic private banks and foreign banks. At 
the end of 2003 domestic banks owned approximately 80% of the total assets 
and 87% of capital. A rapid expansion of deposits and loans in foreign banks 
changed the configuration so, after a successful bank privatization in 2005, 
the banking system is to cease to be dominantly domestically-owned, i.e. state 
owned.
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MAIN RESULT: RAPID RECOVERY OF CREDIT ACTIVITY 
The most important change in the Serbian banking during the past 3-4 
years is the rapid growth of credit activity. It is clear that, after the large crisis 
during the 1990s and ensuing radical therapy, the remaining portion of the 
banking sector is recovering. Although the credit growth dynamics is slowing 
down significantly, the fact remains that such a fast recovery is rarely seen, even 
in the experiences of countries with similar history and prehistory of banking 
crises. 
Despite the fast recovery, the level of credit supply (measured by the total 
loans/GDP ratio) of the banking system of Serbia remains comparatively small 
and inefficient. The value of this coefficient is still below 0.20 in this country. For 
the sake of comparison, already in 2002 the same indicator in Croatia reached 
0.456, in Slovenia 0.384, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.216. Therefore, in 
terms of its capacity and efficiency our banking system is still closer to the 
banking systems of central Asia, than central Europe. The second important 
quality of our banking system is its fragmentation. A large number of banks 
have small capacity. That group of banks is not characterized by pronounced 
credit activity growth seen in the entire sector.
Figure 1.  Total loans of the Serbian banking system (in billions of dinars) 
and pace of its change (in %), as at the end of the period
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Source:  Lecture by R. Jelašić, IMQF Postgraduate Program, School of  
Ecnomics, Belgrade, July 2004
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The road to full normalization of this important economic activity is clearly 
long. A consequence of this finding is the following: for the banking system of 
Serbia to become comparable with the systems of the neighboring countries it 
must retain the attained pace of recovery. Is that possible? The following text 
presents an attempt to answer this question. Let us have a positive preliminary 
response to this question. The arguments supporting this assumption are as 
follows.
First: the loan structure is relatively favorable, relative to tradition and 
inherited situations. At the end of June 2005 the loan structure was traditionally 
dominated by the corporate sector (77%), and individuals (19%). Loans to 
the government and other sectors are negligible (2%). Retail loans are posting 
relatively rapid growth. Their growth causes dispute as it is primarily directed 
to financing the purchase of cars and durable consumer goods. There is still 
no cause for concern, because their level, due to low initial values, is still small. 
In the second quarter of this year the increase in loans to this sector was 7.9 
billion dinars. The largest part of that growth referred to long-term loans. A 
relatively small increase in housing loans of around 1.2 billion dinars can be 
considered an unfavorable circumstance.1
The second important argument in favor of the optimistic assessment is the 
fact that the loan offer structure is quickly changing in favor of more efficient 
banks. Unfortunately, the banks which are dominantly or exclusively in foreign 
ownership are more efficient. They are increasing the loan offer much faster 
than the banks predominantly in domestic ownership. The banks in foreign 
ownership currently account for one fifth of the national banking sector, 
measured by the total assets. Their share in the total num”ber of employees and 
the total network is probably smaller. This group of banks accounted for more 
than a half of the total loans (around 57% in 2003). This change in the loan 
structure will significantly affect the near and distant future of the national 
banking. If these trends hold out, the competitive edge of “domestic banks” 
will decrease. The advantages that the banks in foreign ownership have on the 
credit side will soon turn into a domination on the corporate banking market.
1  Other important indicators of the credit portfolio structure are also improving. It is also obvious 
that, after the “clean-up” of insolvent banks from the sector, the process of cleaning up of each 
bank’s assets continued. This was done particularly intensively by the banks in which the swap of 
government receivables for capital was very extensive. It is realistic to assume that the process of risk 
asset generation, which was institutionalized by the legalization of the so-called loans to founders 
or related parties, was placed under control. This means that risk loans will not increase in the 
future faster than the growth of the total assets. This is an important and far-reaching change in the 
manner of operation of the banking sector. The result of this process is a more favorable picture of 
the banking sector risk. Most banks adjusted the basic risk indicators (capital adequacy, large and the 
largest possible loan, permanent investment ratio) with the required levels already in 2003.
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The consequences of this finding are as follows. The first can be formulated 
as a question: why is this group of banks more efficient than the rest of the 
system, in particular the “traditional” banking. These banks manage, with 
relatively scant resources, to quickly increase their income (interest) bearing 
assets. The conditions for the loan supply expansion are equally favorable for 
both groups of banks. The main factor which affects both groups of banks is 
the fact that almost half of foreign currency retail deposits are immobilized 
by the system of specific “deposit insurance”, and their transfer to the foreign 
reserves. The credit risk is still relatively high for everyone. A possible answer: 
this group of banks has obviously found a way to manage credit risks. It seems 
realistic to assume that it is a good selection of corporate clients, absorbing 
most of credit increase and generating dinar deposit growth. Competition has 
obviously been initiated in that market. The advantages of foreign banks are 
not exclusively interest rates. The quality of services offered by these banks is 
probably higher. This group of banks also has an important status advantage 
over the national banking. The probability of related party lending (traditionally 
speaking - lending to the founders or owners) developing in these banks is 
negligible. The reason lies not only in the procedures of credit analysis and 
credit decision-making taken over from parent banks, but also in the fact that 
lending to hidden related parties is practically impossible, because it would 
be completely irrational. The ownership over capital is separated from credit 
decision-making in status terms. The efficiency of management in these banks 
is measured by a standard indicator - increase in the owner’s wealth.
The third important consequence can be defined as a question: where 
are most of the assets of the remainder of the banking system allocated? The 
possible answers are as follows: one part is in old loans that are difficult to collect. 
The following, however, remains open: what happened with the placements of 
deposit increase after the renewal of savings? Why do domestic banks slowly 
increase the supply of loans? Rarities that can be found in balance sheets are 
of interest. For example, in some banks loans account for only a tenth of their 
assets. (In this situation a question arises: is such an institution a bank in the 
strict sense of the word?) The conclusion: the most probable reason of the 
relatively slow (relative to the first group of banks) recovery of loan supply of 
this group of banks is the “traditional” form of loan decision-making. 
The fourth consequence is related to the near and distant future of the 
national banking. If these trends continue, the competitive ability of this group 
of banks will be reduced. The advantages which foreign-owned banks have 
on the loan side will soon turn into domination in the national, particularly 
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corporate banking. This process will be accelerated precisely by the open 
tender on the sale of two medium-sized banks. If the sale of large state-owned 
banks is nor accelerated, this change can, in short term, have as a consequence 
the (in)efficiency of the procedure of their privatization. (The sale price of 
those banks greatly depends on their current and potential market share.) 
In medium and long term this process can lead to the marginalization of the 
share of the national banking. Leaving aside the value disputes as to which 
banking is better and more desirable, it should be noted that this process can 
activate a risk – reopening of a banking crisis. This risk is neither small nor 
distant: the decrease in the credit activity of large domestic banks can lead to 
their insolvency. In view of the size of their total assets and their share in the 
sector structure, this could be an almost insurmountable problem and a trigger 
of much more serious disruptions. An alternative and less painful solution of 
such a crisis is the acceleration of concentration in the banking sector. 
Finally, the third argument in favor of the optimistic forecast is the high 
potential of the banking sector growth. This argument is a subject of deepest 
controversies. The starting assessment is affirmative here as well. The arguments 
can be historical and logical. From the historical point of view, the sizes of 
deposits, which essentially determine the credit potential, were in absolute 
and relative sense (relative to GDP) much larger in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
current banking system of Serbia only partially and with insufficient efficiency 
uses the existing deposit potential. In simple terms: it appears that more money 
is in mattresses than in banks.
This assessment can be proved in exact terms by analyzing the standard 
defined confidence coefficient (CC) defined by the ratio between the M3 / M1 
aggregates2). In our country this indicator is still low. (Table 4) In the observed 
period it fluctuated around 0.4. In normal banking systems this coefficient 
is higher, sometimes much higher than 1. Unfortunately, during 2003 the 
reduction of the value of this coefficient is registered. 
Table 2. Changes in the coefficient of confidence in the banking system 
December 2000 December 2001 December 2003
CC(M1/M3) 0.399 0.468 0.419
Sources: Bankers’ Association of Serbia and www.NBJ.yu
2  More details in: E. Zola, Cost and Effectiveness of Banking Sector Restructuring in Transition Economies, 
IMF WP/01/157, October 2001.
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The key changes in the value of this coefficient arise from the growth of 
savings. The maintenance of the savings growth trend is extremely important 
not only for the efficiency, quality and capacity of the banking sector, but 
also primarily for the maintenance of the trend of activity recovery in the 
real sector. For the banking sector recovery dynamics to be maintained, it is 
necessary to maintain the “heroic” dynamics of savings growth. Problems: the 
remonetization with dinar monetary aggregates was gradually slowing down 
since the end of 2002 and its potential was probably exhausted at the end of 
2003. The solution lies in the activation of the system of foreign currency 
savings protection (insurance). 
The slowdown of growth dynamics and the low level of utilization of the 
existing foreign currency savings are the probable causes of slower dynamics 
of recovery of the banks’ credit activity. For the previous growth of savings 
to be restored, apart from replacing the current system of “deposit insurance” 
with a regular one, it is also necessary to resolve the fundamental issues of 
monetary regulation strategy: the status and use of foreign currency savings 
and reserve currency in general. A precondition for that is the basic strategy of 
accession to the European Union and integration in the EMU. 
Finally, apart from these controversies, the issue of the size and dynamics 
of the future bank credit activity growth must be joined by a newly-raised 
one: could a rapid growth of loans cause inflation?3 The monetary theory and 
experience of a large number of countries give sufficient reason for an affirmative 
answer to this question. That is, in any case, the reason for the existence of 
regulatory systems restricting the supply of loans. However, the probability of 
appearance of a crisis in the banking sector, which would quickly translate into 
monetary instability does not depend only on the dynamics of changes, but 
also on the level of credit activity.4 An argument of the opposite kind is based 
on this fact: at low levels of credit supply, the risk of crisis appearance is not 
high unless the banking system is exposed to severe disruptions, such as related 
party lending. The reason: the growth of bank loans increases the supply of the 
real sector, which absorbs the demand this credit increase causes. The dynamics 
of supply increase mostly depends on the loan purpose. A working capital loan 
usually leads to a faster increase in supply than in the loan itself. In this country 
such phenomena are registered in a number of companies. This problem will 
be dealt with later in a separate section on the transition liquidity trap. 
3  The issue was opened by Piritta Sorsa, Head of the IMF Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, with regard 
to the negotiations of the IMF Mission with the Serbian Government. See: Politika, 2 October 2004.
4  Argumentation of this type can be found in: C. Cottarelli, G.Dell Ariccia, I.Vladikova-Hollar, “Bank 
Credit Growth to the Private Sector in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans”, IMF Working 
Paper, WP/03/213 
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MAIN PROBLEM: INTEREST MARGINS ARE 
DECREASING, BUT REMAIN VERY HIGH
The high costs of ownership, measured by the interest rate margin were a 
characteristic of the initial phase of transition in almost all countries. Sooner 
or later those costs were normalized, dominantly under the influence of the 
market. In the countries in which the credit market was established quickly, the 
normalization occurred relatively quickly, within 3-5 years.
In the countries in which the market is highly monopolized, the key 
problem is a low or negative deposit interest rate. It is established as a residual 
value of the lending interest rate, degree of loan collectibility and bank costs. In 
the long run this state is unstable, because it prevents the increase in the deposit 
base of the system. 
During 2003 and in particular in the first half of 2004, Serbia saw a significant 
decrease in the general level of interest rates. Although the fluctuations of 
interest rates in the first half of 2003 were primarily a reaction to the changes 
in inflation, their relatively high level was a consequence of the high credit 
risk and a high level of regulatory costs, i.e. the level of immobilization of the 
banks’ funds (required reserve). In the first half of 2004 the average weighted 
interest rates on deposits became positive in real terms. The discount rate was 
still negative in real terms in the first half of 2004. Its regulatory function was 
marginalized in this manner, if not fully annulled. The National Bank of Serbia 
conducted the policy of cheap money no one could get to. 
The monthly average weighted credit (lending) interest rate fell moderately 
during 2004, reaching 1.16% in December, or 14.59% at the annual level. The 
hidden interest rate or, in jargon, the average weighted fee rate5 collected 
when a loan is approved registered a decrease in the fourth quarter of 2004 
relative to the previous quarter; in December it was 0.37% (0.26% and 0.87% 
on long-term loans). This hidden form of interest is higher in shorter-term 
than in longer-term loans: in the first case it is 5.74% of the amount of loan 
(dominantly consumer ones), and 3.90% of the amount of long-term loans. 
The weighted deposit or borrowing interest rate (on total dinar deposits) 
stagnated in this period. In December 2004 this interest rate amounted to 
0.3% or 3.6% annually. The old problem was preserved: these interest rates 
remained deeply negative. A consequence: dinar savings were practically non-
existent. The structure of dinar deposits was dominated by approximately 70% 
5  Banks in Serbia calculated single lump sum fees. The base is the amount of the approved loan. 
Collection - immediately upon the approval. The basic reason for the claim that it is hidden interest 
lies in the fact that official interest and fee are included in the loan price. This practice is regulated by 
the NBS rules on effective interest rate from the beginning of 2005.
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of demand deposits and balances in giro and current accounts. These deposits 
generate no interest either theoretically or practically: in December 2004 the 
average weighted interest rate on these types of deposits was 0.08% on a monthly 
and 0.95% on the annual level. It is assumed that the level of dinar deposits is 
practically inelastic to the changes in interest rates. The reason: these interest 
rates are still negative. The proof: in December the average weighted interest 
rate on term dinar retail deposits was 1.03% a month and 12.86% a year.
This behavior of banks is essentially a rational response to the low level 
of confidence in the national currency. Even if interest rates on dinar deposits 
increased radically, it remains open whether that would be profitable, i.e. 
whether the growth of dinar deposits of this type would significantly increase 
the deposit potential of the banks?
The second type of behavior can be registered on the foreign currency 
deposit market. Interest rates on euro deposits do not differ significantly from 
one bank to another. There is severe competition on that market. Banks have 
different interest rates both in terms of maturity and size of deposits. The rates 
on euro savings demand deposits range from 0.7% to 3% annually, while the 
rates on term deposits maturing in a year vary in a wide range of 1.1% to 5.5%. 
One type of absurdity: the ranges of longer-term interest rates are smaller: 
savings deposited on a three-year term vary from 3% to 6%. This absurd 
situation can be explained easily: banks need short-term deposits more than 
long-term ones. The reason: loan structure is closer to short-term than to long-
term horizon. 
Table 3. Interest rates 2002- 2004 (in %, annually) 
Dec 02 Oct 03 Nov 04 Dec 04
Discount rate 9.00 8.50 8.50 8.50 
Weighted lending i.r., total 14.81 14.72 15.39 14.59 
On short-term bank loans 15.48 14.99 16.08 15.26 
On long-term bank loans 10.87 12.86 12.09 9.86
Weighted borrowing i.r., total 2.74 3.72 3.72 3.60 
On RS bills 22.71 20.59 21.15 21.25
On NBS bills 11.35 16.54  16.83 16.30 
Source: NBS, Economic Review, January 2005
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The second important implication of negative interest rates on dinar short-
term deposits is that it is practically irrelevant. The credit interest rates of banks are 
connected with interests on foreign currency deposits. Explanation: although 
loans are approved in dinars, the repayment has a foreign currency clause in 
most cases. The old problem remains: intermediation costs are still high. 
TRANSITION LIQUIDITY TRAP AND THE PROBLEM 
OF BANKING SECTOR EFFICIENCY
A question arises how, despite radical reform measures in this area, 
the banking system of Serbia still remains less developed than the banking 
systems in comparable countries? Apart from the factors located within that 
sector, another one should be registered. It is generally designated by the term 
“liquidity trap”. Macroeconomic stability is subordinated to the principle of 
efficiency and required reserves are extremely high. The effects f these measures 
on the behavior of the banking sector is not difficult to estimate. The level of 
credit activity will be lower, and (regulatory) costs of intermediation higher. 
Generalization: as long as the monetary policy is the basic pillar of stabilization 
policies in the circumstances of currency substitution (dual-currency system), 
the central bank has a restrictive effect on the recovery of the banking sector. 
It must restrict the supply of loans, regardless of whether it acts on the side of 
demand (retail loans) or supply (financing of working capital).
The experience of other countries, which faced more or less the same 
problems in the first stages of transition, shows that there are essentially two 
traps. The first trap was fiscal.6 It develops in the following manner: the initial 
production decrease, development of the gray economy, criminalization of 
the society and rent activities lead to the decrease in fiscal revenue. Revenue 
reduction cannot be followed by an efficient policy of fiscal expenditure 
restriction. The budget becomes unbalanced. The government sustains heavy 
constraints in the battle against recession. A fiscal policy that would stimulate 
economic activity is not possible. The pressure of the expenditure side of the 
budget originates from the extensive social infrastructure and the increasing 
number of unemployed that almost fully rely on the government budget. The 
fiscal trap slows down economic growth and almost completely blocks anti-
recessionary economic policy. 
6  Identification and definition of the problem was given by J. Kornai. More detail in: Kornai, Janos, 
“Transformational Recession”, Highways and Byways, MIT, 1993.
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Serbia has been in the fiscal trap for a long time. Successes in the 
normalization of public finance are mostly concentrated on the revenue 
side of the budget. The introduction and efficient implementation of the VAT 
point to a possibility of getting out of this trap. The basic issues related to such 
an exit is the reduction of budget expenditure. This is an equally painful and 
inevitable process, as well as revenue collection increase. 
The second important phenomenon following the stabilization policies in 
all the countries was a liquidity trap. It is particularly deep in Serbia due to the 
dual-currency character of its monetary system.7 Until the anchor of stability 
in medium term is taken over by other monetary policies, the banking system 
of Serbia will “produce” a relatively low level of credit supply.8 
The transmission mechanism acts in the following manner: in order to curb 
inflation, monetary policy must be restrictive.9 It involves a restriction of growth 
of the key indicators of money and credit supply.10 The recovery of credit activity 
of banks and increase in the quantity of money in circulation are, in this pattern 
of economic policy, in conflict with the preservation of monetary stability. On the 
other hand, the severe restriction reduces the level of activity in the real sector. 
This causal connection has proved to be strong in the countries in transition. 
The reason: in a situation of general liquidity crisis, without alternative (self-
financing and financial markets), companies are left without the working capital.
Companies and households respond to the liquidity crisis permanently 
generated by this pattern of economic policy in four ways: 
(1) by converting stocks into income: disinvestment, reduction of private 
foreign currency reserves;
(2) defaulting; 
7  This phenomenon was analyzed in detail by Guillermo A. Calvo and Fabrizzio Coricelli. See: “Output 
Collapse in Eastern Europe: The Role of Credit”, IMF Working Paper WP/92/64, August 1992.
8  At the end of 2003 corporate loans amounted to 18.7% of GDP. At the same time this indicator 
amounted to 42.3% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 26.6% in Bulgaria, 57.3% in Croatia and 42.7% 
in Hungary. According to the findings of the World Bank, bank loans a re still a marginal source 
of financing of the economy and account for less than 5% of funds used by companies to finance 
working capital and new investment.  
9  An example of the activity of this trap is a recent press release of the NBS, which, responding to the 
increase in prices in May 2005, issued a release stating that “for the purpose of reducing inflationary 
pressures, ...it undertook measures from its area of competence.... the required reserve rate on 
FOREIGN CURRENCY base has been increased by 5 percentage points to 26%”. Also: the obligation 
of the NBS to pay interest on allocated FOREIGN CURRENCY reserve of the banks with the 
exception of the retail FOREIGN CURRENCY savings has been abolished. The NBS will continue 
to sterilize surplus liquidity through repo operations “and in such a way influence the reduction of 
domestic demand”.See: www.nbs.yu 
10  Those levels were a subject of an analysis by the IMF in a recent press release on the occasion of the 
completion of negotiations with the Government of Serbia. 
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(3) reducing wages; and 
(4) borrowing. 
All four ways have been used in our practice. The second and the 
fourth method dominated in the period before 2000. Enormous unsettled 
commitments and uncollected loans present a proof of that. Today the first 
and the fourth type of response to insufficient liquidity are active. Foreign 
currency liquidity reserves, held both by the corporate and the retail sector, 
can create sufficiently large dinar liquidity at any time which the central bank 
cannot sterilize efficiently and on time. Monetary policy loses efficiency under 
these conditions, while the price of such policy, measured by the effects on the 
financial and real sector becomes extremely high. 
The initial liquidity crisis and low level of credit activity caused by 
restrictive monetary policy and strict fiscal discipline are partly a consequence 
of two key oversights in this economic policy model. Namely, in the developed 
economies there is an alternative to banking finance – developed capital market. 
Overseeing that key fact, in most countries (including Serbia) this economic 
policy model does not have a strategy that would enable the activation of 
healthy sources of financing the exit from transition recession. The resistance 
against this model offered spontaneously both by the retail and corporate 
sector is neutralizing the effects of monetary restriction by engaging private 
foreign currency reserves. This is a game with a negative result, in which all 
three players lose. The problem lies in the fact that the only long-term solution 
is the elimination of the dual-currency character of the monetary system by 
acceding to the European Monetary Union, or, which is less likely, designing an 
alternative economic policy model. 
CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
The basic strategic goal of additional changes in the banking sector 
is the increase in its capacity (credit supply) and efficiency (reduction of 
intermediation costs). For this goal to be achievable in medium term it is 
necessary to resolve in a consistent manner the status of the euro in the national 
monetary system and increase the level of safety of deposits by adopting a new 
deposit insurance law.
240 Boško Živković
The first basic strategic goal is to increase the capacity of the banking 
sector. This goal is not unattainable in medium term, because the banking 
sector in Serbia has high growth potential. The maintenance of savings growth 
trend is extremely important not only for the efficiency, quality and capacity 
of the banking sector, but also, primarily, for the maintenance of the trend of 
recovery of activities in the real sector. 
In order to maintain the dynamics of the banking sector recovery it is 
necessary to maintain a high dynamics of savings growth. Their growth is 
gradually slowing down. The solution lies in the activation of the system of 
protection (insurance) of foreign currency savings. The slowdown of growth 
dynamics and low level of utilization of the existing foreign currency savings are 
probable causes of slowdown of bank credit activity recovery. For the previous 
growth of savings to be restored, it is necessary, apart from the replacement 
of the current system of “deposit insurance” with a regular one, to resolve the 
fundamental issues of monetary regulation strategy: the status and use of 
foreign currency savings and reserve currency in general. A precondition for 
that is the basic strategy of accession to the European Union and EMU. 
The second basic strategic goal is banking efficiency increase and financial 
intermediation cost reduction. Costs, profit and other parameters of bank 
efficiency in Serbia have very unfavorable values. The cost ratio for the best 
banks in Serbia is approximately 2.5 times the comparable values in those 
countries. For inefficient state banks this ratio is even 10 times higher than the 
comparable ratios.
 An increase in the bank efficiency is a precondition for an increase 
in the efficiency of financial intermediation in Serbia. For this strategic 
reconfiguration of the system to be achieved in a short period of time, it is 
necessary to create conditions of full competition in which more efficient 
(domestic and foreign) banks would gradually take over the deposits and create 
loans. Therefore, this activity needs to be consolidated by small banks gradually 
merging with the large systems. Changes in the banking sector structure can 
mean either the liquidation of inefficient and small banks or their rapid capital 
increase and expansion through new strategic investment. Since a significant 
part of these banks are owed by the state a concept of resolving the issue of 
banks that cannot be privatized is needed and desirable. 
An increase in the level of security of the banking and financial system 
and a reduction of the level of their risk, should enable their easier integration 
in European processes and reduce transfer costs. Supervision over the 
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operation of banks and other financial institutions should be modernized in 
institutional and technical sense. An increase in the NBS supervisory capacity 
is possible by implementing a plan for the development of control function 
and establishment and maintenance of special supervision over state-owned 
banks. A separate task of bank supervision is to monitor the banks generating 
a rapid growth of the total assets.
In view of the degree of interconnection between banks, insurance 
companies and brokerages, experiences of some EU countries that have a single 
institution for supervision over all financial activities should be considered. 
After attaining the desired level of banking system security, it is possible 
to activate a new channel of financial intermediation – non-bank financial 
institutions, savings institutions, S&Ls and microcredit institutions. The 
activation of this system can contribute to an increase in the system’s efficiency 
and increase in the competitiveness on the credit and deposit markets. Putting 
in place the basis for the development of the non-bank financial institution 
sector is possible by establishing supervisory capacity in the insurance sector 
and adopting the strategy of medium-term development of this sector. 
Large (relative to GDP) internal debts make the normal operation of the 
financial system difficult. A part of those debts is concentrated in the relations 
between companies and banks in bankruptcy. A new law governing bank 
bankruptcy and liquidation should resole the status of those debts and the 
institution managing them. These is also need for an improvement of the legal 
and institutional framework for bank exit, including a review of the status of 
the Agency for Bank Rehabilitation and giving greater authority to this agency 
in the implementation of bank rehabilitation.

Dragor Hiber
New Economic Legislation
INTRODUCTION
The creation of a new legislative framework for economic activities is one 
of the most important initial steps in any transition period. In Serbia, as in 
other countries in transition, three processes occurred simultaneously:
•		Deregulation and liberalization, whose aim is to free economic life from 
the binds of socialist administration, in order to open up possibilities 
and realize assumptions for the establishment of a market economy; 
which meant, for example, abolishing the system of numerous permits 
and permissions, followed by the liberalization of foreign-trade relations 
and revoking various laws and sub-legislative acts which had created the 
possibility for state directives in economic life.
•	 The introduction and establishment of new institutions, characteristic of 
a market economy, for example, those which build and regulate a market 
for security papers, or which regulate markets in those sectors reserved 
up to now for the state (telecommunications and the energy sector for 
example).
•		The fundamental reform of existing institutions which existed in a certain 
form in every economic-legal system and which should be transformed 
into a form corresponding to a market economy
Deregulation and the introduction of new institutions are presented in 
the analysis of transitional moves in individual sectors. The text which follows 
presents the processes in the third domain, in the reform and transformation 
of existing institutions.
Here, a specificity of the transitional processes in Serbia, especially in this 
domain, should be pointed out. Even as far back as the socialist era, especially 
244 Dragor Hiber
before the collapse of SFRY, in the Yugoslavia of that time, based on the concept 
of social ownership and self-management and the “socialist production of 
goods” doctrine, institutions were formed which could be qualified as quasi-
market. In terms of form, they were to a considerable degree reminiscent of 
equivalent institutions in market systems. In essence and the milieu where 
they were formed, however, they were not.
Due to this, their transformation could have been either easier or 
more difficult than in other transitional countries of South-Eastern Europe. 
Easier, since the forms already existed, so resorting to the direct reception of 
models from developed market systems, or encroaching on (as for example 
in Hungarian company law) institutions which existed (and what they were 
like) more than fifty years ago was not necessary. On the other hand, reform 
could have been (and was) more difficult as the retention and reform of these 
forms allowed (and still allows) for a long term and more intensive influence 
of conservative forces and concepts than is desirable. The self-management 
conscience, i.e. the employees’ wish to decide on everything even in privatised 
companies is a good example of this.
Three segments which in a wider sense form part of company law, i.e. the 
legal organization of economic subjects: legislature on economic enterprises, 
on bankruptcy and the registration of economic subjects have been chosen as 
examples of these reforms. 
Such a selection was made not only because the management method and 
legal shaping of economic subjects facilitates and reflects the reform processes, 
but also because legal regulations in this field represent the picture of the 
influence of legal inheritance on the transition processes.
Namely, while regulations on the organization of economic subjects (the 
Law on Companies, i.e. the Law on Economic Enterprises) could somehow, 
as a legal framework, accept transitional processes, bankruptcy legislature 
(the Law on Assignment, Bankruptcy and Liquidation) and practice are an 
example of the tough resistance of old structures and old philosophies, while 
the evolution of regulations on the registration of economic enterprises shows 
the tendency to add dynamics to economic life and create a clear picture of who 
the real existing economic subjects are in order to provide interested potential 
creditors and other partners with more detailed information  through a data 
system registered by applying this law and interconnected data from other 
registers. 
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THE LAW ON ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES
The Law on Economic Enterprises, passed in the autumn of 2004, is the 
third law regulating company law in accordance with a market economy. The 
first law of this type (the Law on Companies) was passed in 1989 and was 
the first step away from the concept of a self-managing company to a market 
company. Thus, as the basic model of an economic subject, it envisaged a social 
enterprise and its sub-forms (cooperative enterprises, public enterprises), and 
only as an exception the so called mixed enterprise (a company in which social 
property is joined by private) and private enterprises, including two basic 
forms from modern company law: an enterprise with limited responsibility 
and a stock company.
 Only a few years after this law was passed, the social and economic 
environment in Serbia changed completely. Certain transitional elements, 
primarily those connected with leaving the previous system behind, showed 
the rudimentary regulative solutions of this Law to be inadequate, primarily 
in the sense of including new, more complex relations in the organization of 
economic subjects. Judicial practice had many difficulties in solving disputes 
between company founders and unclear solutions offered the opportunity for 
malpractice. Due to this, work on the preparation of a new law started very 
quickly. Its passing was postponed many times and for several years, primarily 
for ideological reasons, i.e. the lack of readiness on the part of the political 
and intellectual elite of the time to enter a political and economic transition. 
The new Law on Companies was passed in 1996 with completely new starting 
points and is to a great extent the basis on which the new Law on Economic 
Enterprises passed in 2004 was prepared. 
The Law on Companies from 1996 started from a form of organizing 
economic subjects regardless of the type of ownership of the starting capital, 
i.e. the legal nature and founding regime (the physical or legal entity in 
private, state or social ownership). The ideological base for this law was the 
idea of corporisation – all economic subjects, even social companies had to 
be organized into one form of enterprise set out by the law, i.e. in a given 
time, extended several times, they had to transform into such a form. These 
forms generally corresponded to those known in comparative company 
law. Partnerships and companies with limited partnership were planned as 
companies of individuals, while a stock company and limited joint companies 
were planned as capital enterprises, though the latter, according to the way 
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relations between the founders are envisaged was on the boundary between 
an enterprise of individuals or capital.  As well as the principles of corporate 
organization, the law also contained special rules for a social enterprise, public 
company and company which employs handicapped people, by regulating, 
first of all, specificities in the managing method. A special law was later passed 
on public companies.
The Law on Companies from 1996, based on comparative solutions 
(mostly French company law), in essence represents a modern company 
regulative. Conceptually, it could serve as a legal framework for entrance into 
economic transition. The types of economic subjects it envisaged, the founding 
systems, the relations between founders, the basic principles of corporate 
management, and also the legal framework of interconnecting companies in 
principle satisfied modern standards. 
With the acceleration of the transition process, starting from October 2000, 
and especially after privatization according to the new model began in 2001 and 
2002, legal and economic practice highlighted the shortcomings (inadequacies 
and imperfections) in the Law on Companies from 1996. On one hand, the 
adopted conception proved to suffer from being extensively normative. Many 
questions, for example, from the field of corporate management were regulated 
in too much detail and were too rigid. The lack of flexibility of the adopted 
solutions restricted economic subjects in effecting complex inter-relations, 
especially those resulting from the influx of foreign (private) capital in a way 
that best suits the founders’ goals and the character of economic relations. 
Many of these solutions are lagging behind the technical development made 
in the last decade (electronic shareholding, i.e. immaterial shares, decision-
making via telecommunications etc.). Essentially unimportant questions were 
regulated in too much detail with the obligation to transfer the solutions from 
the law into corporate acts (statute, rule book etc.) that lead to the fact that the 
internal regulations of a company were too detailed, unclear and lacking in 
transparency.  
On the other hand, numerous important issues, characteristic of a 
developed corporate system remained either unregulated or not adequately 
regulated, leading to significant controversy and disputes in judicial practice: 
regulating relations between the ownership and managing function in an 
economic enterprise and in the managing sphere, relations between the 
managing board and the director etc. Particularly difficult problems occurred 
just after insider privatization (according to the model. i.e. the law from 
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1977) which lead to the significant dispersion of ownership. The question 
of the rights and obligations of members and shareholders in relation to 
economic enterprises as well as those between members and shareholders 
lead to problems of similar intensity in a way that influenced creditor security. 
Questions of basic capital, its reduction and increase were regulated too rigidly 
and the general opinion was that the size of the minimum (basic) capital for 
founding an enterprise with limited responsibility was set too high etc.
Finally, the Law on Companies from 1996 did not adapt easily to new, 
modern solutions hitherto unknown in the legal system which regulated the 
capital market. Thus, numerous disagreements, i.e. contradictions occurred 
between the Law on Companies and those rules which regulated the security 
paper market, their issue and circulation, taking companies over etc. The 
solutions set out in the Law on Companies from 1996 were contradictory 
to other systematic regulations envisaging ownership relations: for example, 
in relation to the Law on Obligatory Relations the situation where a legal 
representative (director) of a company signs a contract outside the limits of 
the authority given to him by internal regulations, for example the Managing 
Board, is regulated differently and not quite clearly. The question of the validity 
of such a contract caused many serious disputes which, of course, increased 
the business risk of all economic subjects and foreign investors in particular.
Due to this, in 2002 the Ministry for Privatisation and Economy decided to 
set up a working group for the preparation of a new law on economic enterprises. 
The World Bank supported their work in an expert sense. The new law retained 
basic conceptual solutions, and to a great extent the systematization of the Law 
on Companies from 1996 in an attempt to remove all noted deficiencies. Some 
of these solutions are the result of the desire to harmonize the new law on 
economic enterprises with European directives relating to the organization of 
economic enterprises.
As regards the types of economic enterprises, the law omitted the 
theoretical classification into enterprises of individuals and capital and stood by 
the standard four-part classification into partnerships, companies with limited 
partnership, limited joint companies and stock companies. What is new is that 
the law tried to include and regulate entrepreneurs. For the first time after 
World War II a difference was made between an open and closed stock company 
with special, strict rules valid for open stock companies (financial revision, 
publishing business reports etc.). In the case of an open stock company, the 
role of the Commission on Security Papers in the procedure of founding an 
248 Dragor Hiber
economic enterprise was emphasized in the function of protecting the interests 
of both the public and the investor. 
The legislator paid special attention to regulations on founding economic 
enterprises. A contract dominated the founding process, i.e. a founding act 
for one-member companies, though the principle that internal company acts 
are regulated in more detail by the Statute is accepted. For relations between 
founders, especially in the case of a limited joint company a special contract 
can be made between the founders. For all forms of economic enterprises 
foundation is significantly easier compared to the previous system. The 
minimum basic capital is significantly reduced (for limited joint companies); 
except in the case of an open stock company, the basic capital can be paid 
in goods and rights, and not money and the value of non-cash deposits can 
be evaluated by the founders. Furthermore, the law defines and limits the 
deadlines in which state organs can act in the processes of founding and 
registering economic enterprises, and passing a deadline is taken as if it has 
been approved, i.e. registration is then possible.
Significant new items were introduced into the system of corporate 
management. Firstly, a greater number of regulations are of a dispositional 
nature, i.e. founders and enterprise members can modify the management 
system to suit their own needs, i.e. goals. Secondly, the system of corporate 
management is simplified in all forms of economic enterprises except an open 
stock company. Thus, in the case of a limited joint company, unless the members 
defined this differently in the contract, in addition to the member assembly, a 
director or managing board also run the enterprise and supervision is handed 
over to an internal reviser or board of revisers instead of the supervisory board. 
In the case of a stock company, management is divided between the assembly 
and the management and executive board. Regulations on convoking and 
the decision making methods of the management bodies (the assembly and 
managing board) are clearly defined, which was a significant weakness in the 
existing regulations. Regulations on management responsibility and conflicts 
of interest are also strictly defined and the system of shareholder protection 
is significantly improved (possibility to reverse the decisions made by the 
assembly and managing board, lawsuits by minority shareholders, derivative 
lawsuits etc.). The goal of all of these regulations is the establishment of a more 
rational balance between the ownership and management function, a more 
complete ownership control of economic enterprises and a legally defined 
management responsibility. Many of these solutions are, to a great extent, 
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new not only to the old law but also to the legal tradition of Serbia and future 
practice will show how efficient their application is.
The strengthening of the controlling function of the founder (members, 
shareholders) through intensifying the authority of the Enterprise Assembly 
is especially significant in the management system. When dealing with 
relations between members, in accordance with trends in modern company 
law, special attention was paid to the protection of minority shareholders 
with the imperative method of regulation prevailing. This, of course prevents 
the regulation of this protection with internal company acts at a level below 
minimum standards, but at the same time risks reduced decision efficiency 
(“terror of the minority over the majority”).
From the viewpoint of management functions, this law abandoned the 
idea of defining the methods for the obligatory participation of the employees 
in the management and co-decision making process of a company. The 
question of participation is left to be regulated by the Law on Work or other 
separate regulations.
A significant improvement brought by the Law on Economic Enterprises 
in relation to the previous law is a detailed and precise regulation of the statutory 
changes of the enterprise and the interconnection of economic enterprises 
with capital. Regulating these questions, in the case of statutory changes, the 
law brings the protection of the creditor’s interests to the forefront. The legal 
solutions in this domain are almost completely harmonised with EU directives. 
On the other hand, when dealing with the interconnection of enterprises with 
capital, restrictions were made in relation to potential misuse, especially on 
account of minority shareholders or creditors – for example, by forbidding 
mutual participation in the capital. However, the law did not regulate the 
contractual interconnection of economic enterprises as the legislator deemed 
this matter part of trade-contract law, rather than company law. Theoretically 
observed, this viewpoint can be defended, but one should not forget that in 
obligation law, Serbia accepted the so-called system of unique regulation, i.e. 
the regulation of all obligatory relations with a unique Law on Obligatory 
Relations, so more specifically detailed, even dispositive regulations on 
contractual connection do not exist in the legal system. Firstly, this solution 
can de-stimulate the desired interconnection. Secondly, the non-existence of 
separate regulations makes contractual connection non-transparent which can 
endanger the interests of third-party economic subjects, minority shareholders 
and creditors. Thirdly, Serbia does not have an efficient antimonopoly 
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legislature and the proposed solutions (autumn 2005) are not convincing, so 
the absence of general legal regulations on contractual connection additionally 
opens up a space for the creation of damaging integration from the viewpoint 
of unsettling competitors.
In contrast to the previous law, the Law on Economic Enterprises does not 
have special regulations referring to social and public companies. Transitional 
and final regulations envisage the application of previous regulations valid for 
public and social enterprises and the idea that privatisation is obligatory makes 
new special regulations superfluous.
At the time when the Law on Economic Enterprises was passed (autumn 
2004) the first transition phase was almost over. The legal framework of 
the modern business market was at least formally in place to a significant 
degree, i.e. as regards the number of laws. Thus, one of the central questions 
for the application of the newly passed Law on Economic Enterprises is the 
harmonization of this law with numerous laws regulating the status and 
management of economic subjects. It is not only an illustration to name the 
most important ones: the Law on the Registration of Economic Subjects, 
the Law on Marketing Securities and other Financial Instruments, the Law 
on Privatization, the Law on Bankruptcy Proceedings, the Law on Foreign 
Investments, the Law on Banks, the Law on Insurance Companies, the Law 
on Investment Funds, the Law on the Protection of Competitors (should be 
passed), laws on accounting, some process laws (extrajudicial and executive 
procedures) etc.
Although some of these laws were passed or changed just before passing 
the Law on Economic Enterprises, it is difficult to talk of the harmonization 
of this law with other regulations. The impression gained is that the proposal 
had the idea that the Law on Economic Enterprises is a basic system law, that 
the choice of key solutions lie in this law and that other connected regulations 
should be harmonized with those solutions adopted by the Law on Economic 
Enterprises. Theoretically, this is true, but from the viewpoint of normal and 
continual business practice and the normal functioning of the legal system this 
is a textbook example of bad legislative politics. On one hand, serious legal 
gaps exist until individual regulations are passed or changed – for example, 
Serbia today has no regulations in the domain of founding and connecting 
companies or in the field of foreign investments or in the privatization domain, 
or in the specific field of the protection of competitors which will be a barrier 
to creation, i.e. abuse of a dominant position, i.e. monopoly. This, besides other 
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things, leads to sending the wrong signal to investors. On the other hand, the 
harmonization of laws passed with the Law on Economic Enterprises has started 
before they have practically been applied, like the Law on the Registration of 
Economic Subjects. Finally, in some fields the legal framework has continued 
to be built independently of the newly passed Law on Economic Enterprises, 
so the creation of special subsystems has continued, even though the concept 
of the Law on Economic Subjects was that these subsystems, such as banks and 
insurance companies would be, in principle, regulated by general company 
laws.
The Law on Economic Enterprises is a complex and detailed law (457 
articles) and many of its solutions are new in some significant details. It is 
understandable that work on such a key legislative act is long and complex. 
Even though the law was prepared for two years, the impression that can be 
confirmed by serious arguments is that its preparation was unnecessarily 
accelerated in the last phase. Thus, in the parliamentary procedure the Cabinet 
that proposed the Bill accepted and the parliament voted for an unusually 
large number of amendments a law of this type and of such significance. This 
could be the consequence of the bill being legally-technically incomplete and 
interventions by the Cabinet that proposed the Bill were carried out at the last 
moment through parliamentary procedure. This allows for the possibility of 
numerous other legal-technical weaknesses and discrepancies when the law is 
applied which cannot be noted at this moment.
In any case, the preparation and adoption of the new Law on Economic 
Enterprises represents a significant reform step. In the first place a significantly 
more modern codex of statutory organization is obtained – the law offers answers 
to questions and problems which arose in practice in the previous period. 
Secondly, this law is to a great degree harmonized with the European statutory 
law and also new trends and solutions adopted by modern national legislatures. 
Finally, it represents a complete legal framework for the establishment of a new 
market economy, both in the finalization of the privatization process and its 
complete end.
However, more than for other systemic laws, one must expect that the 
application of this law will require not only the adaptation of economic 
subjects and state institutions, but also the opening of new questions which 
will have to be answered by changing and adding to the law itself. Experiences 
of other transitional countries in which regulations on organizing economic 
subjects were changed several times, show that it is dangerous to take a strict 
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and inflexible attitude to the adopted codification, but the legislator should 
be open to the adaptation process and the need to fine tune the legal text. All 
the more, the application quality and real range of this law will depend on 
the speed and quality of its harmonization with other connected regulations. 
Existing experience with delays, confusion and polemics in the preparation of 
changing rules regulating the market of capital shows all the dangers which 
can occur in this process. 
THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
The law valid until now regulating bankruptcy was the Law on 
Assignment, Bankruptcy and Liquidation passed at the same time as the first 
law on business, in 1989. The environment for which this law was prepared 
was dominant government ownership and self-management. The rules of 
bankruptcy and liquidation were in accordance with the legal-economic 
ambience in which many questions in legal and economic life were regulated 
using illegal methods and legal regulations, even those on bankruptcy only had 
an instrumental function in implementing political decisions. Thus, the Law 
on Assignment, Bankruptcy and Liquidation was, with justification, evaluated 
as being non-applicable to a market economy and was perceived to be a barrier 
for the establishment of clean and transparent economic-legal relations. The 
inherited practice in the application of this law, especially total voluntarism 
in making decisions on starting, leading and completing bankruptcy or 
liquidation proceedings probably represented this barrier to an even greater 
degree. Thus, this law primarily served to eliminate those subjects for which 
the permanent inability to settle their debts (insolvency) was established, from 
legal life. 
As an option in exceptional circumstances (in the assignment procedure) 
the law predicted that the interests of a creditor of a business heavily in debt 
could be realized without final debtor elimination. The main legal-regulation 
weaknesses of the Bankruptcy Law prior to reform are as follows:
•		Before the bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings began, a long primary 
procedure took place. By undertaking such a procedure the courts rarely 
decided to start bankruptcy proceedings. Bearing in mind the serious 
consequences of starting bankruptcy proceedings (the loss of the legal 
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subjectivity of the debtor, the loss of work on the part of all employees, 
etc.), the courts called on the “general interest” for postponing the 
decision on starting bankruptcy proceedings, thus enabling the existence 
of businesses which, objectively speaking, did not have any chance of 
survival, while the creditors helplessly waited for a change in the court’s 
stance.
•		If the court ruled in favour of starting bankruptcy proceedings, the 
implementation of the bankruptcy proceedings was entirely in the hands 
of the court and the bankruptcy manager.  The bankruptcy manager did 
not have any motivation to complete the bankruptcy proceedings quickly 
or any particular reason to protect the creditor’s interests. The creditor’s 
role in the bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings was minimized. The 
rules on converting the debtor’s property into cash did not facilitate an 
efficient procedure. As a rule, the property lost value or was confiscated 
and the position of the creditor did not improve after the bankruptcy was 
set in motion.
•		The possibility of assignment depended on the debtor’s good will. 
The debtor or creditor could start the assignment proceedings only in 
agreement with the debtor. If the expert report on the material-financial 
state of the debtor was in favour of an assignment, then an assignment 
ruling was made if more than half of the creditors eligible to vote voted for 
it. The law envisaged a very rigid framework, i.e. the assignment method 
with a postponement of the payment for a year or a 50% reduction in 
claims. No other assignment modalities were allowed, for example, the 
postponement of all claims until the reconstruction of the debtor company, 
and what is of particular importance, those creditors who agreed to an 
assignment or who were forcibly included in the assignment did not have 
any legal influence on any restructuring, i.e. on managing the company.
•		Liquidation proceedings were envisaged for a company which was not 
insolvent, but whose work should be brought to a halt by the will of the 
founders, by missing the deadline, if the company was founded with a 
deadline, by canceling registration, forbidding work and if “the subject 
is not organized in accordance with the law” (the law does not contain a 
definition of a situation where “a subject is not organized in accordance 
with the law”, where at the same time that is not also the reason for 
the cancellation of the registration). The regulation in question gave 
the liquidation court almost unlimited discretion. This possibility had 
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“interesting” applications, just after the onset of transition, by starting 
pre-liquidation proceedings referring to “illegal organization” in order 
to resolve very different relations: from significantly disrupted relations 
between shareholders, with the unresolved question of the size of the 
shareholding in the background, to the possibility that the government 
as the minority shareholder would gain control of the company. Opening 
pre-liquidation proceedings facilitated receivership, which was used in 
the case of large companies such as “Mobtel” and “ICN Galenika”. 
Based on all of the aforementioned issues, the conclusion can be 
drawn that neither the legal framework nor the bankruptcy, liquidation and 
assignment practices satisfied any of the interests which should be met in a 
market economy. The fact that the new bankruptcy procedure law was passed 
as late as mid 2004 shows the acuity of the conflict of interests (often wrongly 
recognized) and also the strength of the remains of self-management logics 
and the resistance to transition.
Syndicates played a pronounced role in discussions on the future law on 
bankruptcy proceedings. The syndicate demands were not only an expression of 
tendencies to obtain the best possible position for the employees of a bankruptcy 
debtor in a bankruptcy procedure. This was, to a significant degree, achieved 
by the plan whereby the employees were placed in the second payment order 
in the creditor payment order immediately after the costs of the bankruptcy 
proceedings are met and before any government claims based on public income 
are met. Furthermore, government claims in relation to pension and invalid 
funds are in the second payment order as they are indirectly to the benefit of 
the employees. However, the syndicates considered that the employees should 
be consulted even about controlling the course of the bankruptcy proceedings 
and especially in the case of carrying out the bankruptcy proceedings by 
selling off part of the company or selling the company in debt as an entirety, 
when they should approve the attained price. For the syndicates this was a 
form of privatisation and not the payment of creditors, and according to this 
notion the employees as “representatives” of government ownership should be 
consulted in its “transformation”.
The postponement of passing the Law on Bankruptcy Proceedings was 
aided by the “transformation” of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. According 
to the Constitution of the FRY, a federal regulation needed to be passed, but in 
the meantime Montenegro passed its own law and at the time when the draft 
of the law was prepared, the adoption of the State Constitution of Serbia and 
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Montenegro was also expected, based on which the bankruptcy issue would fall 
into the jurisdiction of the member states, i.e. the Republic of Serbia. Finally, 
the law on bankruptcy was place on the agenda of the People’s Assembly of 
the Republic of Serbia for the session which ended in the disbanding of the 
Assembly and the parliamentary elections which were held in December 2003. 
The government which began its mandate after these elections brought a draft 
bill before the People’s Assembly at one of the following sessions which had not 
undergone any significant changes from the previous government. 
The name itself (the Law on Bankruptcy Proceedings) denotes a new 
bankruptcy philosophy – this is a law on bankruptcy proceedings which is 
applied when the debtor is incapable of paying.
Bankruptcy can end in one of two ways: in the bankruptcy of the debtor 
or his reorganization. Bankruptcy means the payment of creditors by selling 
off the property of the company in debt which therefore ceases to exist. 
Reorganization is intended to be the payment of the creditor according to the 
conditions adopted by the reorganization plan of the company in debt.
From these simple definitions cited in the first article of the law the 
philosophy of the new bankruptcy proceedings can be seen clearly:
•		The reason for starting bankruptcy proceedings is the fact that the debtor 
is unable to pay
•		The goal of the bankruptcy proceedings is the payment of the creditor’s 
claims to the highest possible degree
•		The rules of the bankruptcy proceedings are defined in order to attain this 
goal.
Thus, inevitability can be emphasized as the key innovation in the new 
bankruptcy system, i.e. the reliability of the criteria based on which the decision 
to open, i.e. to start bankruptcy proceedings is made. There should be no place 
for discretionary decisions by the court or any other institution. The creditor 
brings about the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings by asking the 
debtor to pay his debt with the result that it cannot be paid (as an exception the 
debtor himself can declare bankruptcy by ensuring that when the payments 
should be made he is not able to do so; potentially his goal is to secure timely 
reorganization, i.e. restructuring which will enable him to become solvent 
again). It is highly likely that this new item, the inevitability of the bankruptcy 
proceedings if the conditions set out by law are met, and especially in cases for 
which pre-bankruptcy proceedings are planned is the reason for the resistance 
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to adopting the Law on Bankruptcy Proceedings. (It remains to be seen whether 
the Commercial Courts will faithfully implement this by evaluating whether 
or not the conditions have been met). In the public, wagers have been laid on 
the number of government and state companies which will cease to exist after 
the strict application of the inevitability of bankruptcy rule, which would bring 
about the formal cessation of employment to a great number of those who are 
not officially employed.
Another significant innovation is the changed role and status of creditors 
in the bankruptcy proceedings. They cease to be passive observers of the 
actions of a bankruptcy judge, bankruptcy council and bankruptcy manager, 
and instead are active participants on whose decisions the implementation 
model of the bankruptcy proceedings, its dynamics and finally goal realization, 
i.e. creditor payment, depend.
Depending on the type of creditor, whether it is a bankruptcy, third-party 
or security creditor (a bankruptcy creditor is one who in the end receives 
payment from the debtor’s property, a security one has claims which are secured 
by some real security means entered into the public register and a third-party 
creditor is one whose assets at the moment the bankruptcy proceedings begin 
form part of the debtor’s property), the law enables him a special role in the 
process. Bankruptcy creditors play the most significant role, which is realized 
through special bodies, an assembly and board of creditors (the board is a 
body elected by the assembly and represents a type of executive organ). The 
Assembly of Creditors decides on whether bankruptcy will be conducted by 
means of a procedure leading to bankruptcy or by the reorganisation and 
continuation of the work of the bankruptcy manager. Creditors, through the 
Board of Creditors, by giving opinions to the Bankruptcy Manager, participate 
in decisions on how the property is converted into cash and also in other 
questions relating to the management of the property until bankruptcy has 
been completed. The board has a controlling role in relation to the bankruptcy 
manager with the right to object to his decisions to the Bankruptcy Judge or 
Council, to propose his dismissal and a replacement and to determine the level 
of compensation costs and reward for the bankruptcy manager. The board 
submits any complaints regarding the decisions of the Bankruptcy Judge and 
Council on behalf of all creditors.
The third new item is the significantly changed status of the bankruptcy 
manager. A special law (on the Agency for Licensing Bankruptcy Managers) 
proposed that licensing could only be performed based on a special expert 
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exam and also supervision of the work of the bankruptcy managers carried 
out by the agency. A bankruptcy manager has the right to compensation 
costs and a reward, so he is stimulated to perform his task well and quickly. 
At the same time he is held responsible for any damages under strict liability 
rule. A manager can be replaced (changed) during bankruptcy proceedings 
on the initiative of the creditors. If bankruptcy proceedings are performed 
on a debtor with majority government or state ownership, a “specialized 
organization formed according to a special regulation” will perform the role 
of the bankruptcy manager according to the regulations set out by the Agency 
for Privatization.
When bankruptcy is commenced, a bankruptcy manager has the authority 
of the managing organ or the owner in debt. As in the previous system, the 
bankruptcy manager is under the supervision of the Bankruptcy Judge and 
Bankruptcy Council, but control by the creditors is also included now, which 
represents an additional guarantee for his legitimate, conscientious and 
efficient work. 
What is new is the attempt to determine deadlines for individual tasks 
in the bankruptcy proceedings. In total, according to the given deadlines, 
bankruptcy proceedings should last between six months and a year.
When converting the debtor’s property into cash, in addition to the sale of 
assets and property rights, the sale of the debtor as a legal entity or the debtor’s 
work is also envisaged. The law foresees the application of one of two types 
of public sale, auction or tender. Only in special cases, under strictly defined 
conditions and in a limited number of cases is free sale possible (by direct 
agreement).
As far as reorganization as a form of bankruptcy is concerned, it can 
be achieved at the proposal of the debtor, the creditors (at least 30%) and 
the bankruptcy manager and also the owner of 30% of the debtor’s capital. 
Reorganization means the adoption of a reorganization plan. The procedure 
involved in the preparation and adoption of the plan can last a maximum of 90 
days from the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings. The elements of 
the plan are set out by law. The law contains a detailed list of measures which 
can be adopted and applied with the aim of realizing the plan. In order for a 
plan to be adopted it is required that most creditors vote for it according to 
classes (bankruptcy, third-party and security) and payment orders.
The adoption of a regulation plan has the character of a settlement 
between the creditor and the debtor, the conversion of the claim to cash and 
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has the strength of an executive document. Bankruptcy is thus formally over, 
the denotation that the debtor is a bankrupt company is deleted from the 
register and it continues to function normally (though the plan may predict 
limited independence, i.e. the participation of bankruptcy subjects and organs 
in the management of the company). In essence, the end of the bankruptcy 
proceedings is conditional: if the plan is not realized, bankruptcy proceedings 
leading to bankruptcy will be reopened.
As a whole, the legislator strived to predict precise rules for every situation 
and phase of the procedure.
The scope of the new Law on Bankruptcy is still difficult to evaluate. 
Preparations for its application took a long time, so it can be said to be 
somewhat late. In principle it represents a serious advance in this transition 
phase, especially as a pre-condition for a thorough restructuring of the existing 
real sector in Serbia.
THE LAW ON THE REGISTRATION OF ECONOMIC SUBJECTS
How the introduction of new subjects into economic (and legal) life is 
organized is especially important in the initial phases of transition. Not only 
can Company Law regulations set too high obstacles and barriers for the 
organization of new economic subjects, but these barriers can also be set on 
the formal side in the registration procedures.1
This does not exhaust the potential importance of this legislation. Public 
registers on companies and entrepreneurs provide information on the other 
participants in economic life. Their comprehensiveness, correctness and 
accuracy are also significant.
Furthermore, obstacles and unnecessary delays can also occur regarding 
changes in legal subjectivity (mergers, the division and connection of economic 
companies with capital).
In keeping with the economic and legal philosophy, socialist law was 
restrictive regarding the introduction of new subjects except for those founded 
by the state (in the Serbian variant, however, this also included those under 
government ownership,).
1 Traditionally in comparative law and in Serbia/Yugoslavia legal subjectivity is gained by registration
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Thus, it is perfectly understandable that registration regulations, in a 
certain way, follow the systematic laws in the field of company law (the Law on 
Companies, i.e. the Law on Economic Enterprises).
Hence, until recently the procedure of registering a company in Serbia 
was regulated by regulations drawn up in the pre-transition period (amended 
and added to later) in the last version of the Law on Registration Procedures in 
a court register from 1994, the Decree on Registration in a court register from 
1997 and the Law on Private Entrepreneurs from 1989.
According to these regulations, the Commercial Court managed the 
company register according to regulations on extrajudicial procedures, while 
the municipal government body managed the register of entrepreneurs. 
The court ruled on the application of a company to register by evaluating 
from the application and enclosed documents whether all conditions 
prescribed for registration had been fulfilled. The legal question asked here, 
especially after an inspection of commercial court practices, was, what was 
the role of the court and what was its authority in relation to the content of the 
submitted founding acts (in the application procedure, according to the Law on 
Companies from 1996, it was necessary to enclose the company’s foundation 
contract, i.e. a founding act and statute), especially when predicted rules on 
corporative rule were in question.
In practice the court refused registration if it noticed faults in the 
composition, authority and relations of company organs which broke the 
rules of the Law on Companies, though not with a negative decision, but most 
often with a conclusion, thus a type of decision used for procedure control, de 
facto asking the founders to remove the noted deficiencies before an eventual 
decision refused registration.
In some cases, following the logic and principle rules of corporate control, 
the court would evaluate the suitability of autonomous solutions and not only 
formal law.
This all concerns the previous control of corporate rules, which albeit 
formal and sometimes rigid, was undoubtedly useful in the early phase of the 
development of corporate law in the transitional legal and economic system.
The practice of registration changes is also interesting. A characteristic 
phenomenon was that individual stockholders, i.e. shareholders in a society 
with unlimited responsibility, would contest the registration of changes stating 
that the law, i.e. the statute in the decision-making procedure containing the 
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change, had been broken. This concerned the content or legal questions for 
which suites could be filed for contesting the illegal decisions of company 
organs. Instead of filing these charges, the possibility for raising these questions 
in the registration procedure was provided and the registration court could 
decide on these issues, as in the previous question, so that even during the 
registration of changes procedure de facto disputes on property (stocks, shares) 
disputes, i.e. the ownership structure of an economic society, were conducted. 
It is better when these charges are brought autonomously and not 
camouflaged by registration, not only because of the unjustified delays in the 
registration procedures.
Despite the ruling the registration procedure in a court register was 
considered urgent, the general opinion is that it took too long, too many 
documents were requested with the application, the signature notarization 
and other formalities were required and the courts acted too formally and 
rigidly. Any delay in the simplest registration can lead to significant damages. 
In addition, engagement on registration procedures utilized legal resources 
required for such long (too long) procedures.
Furthermore, the personnel and technical equipment of commercial 
courts was (and still is) such that difficulties arose when data on registration 
needed to be accessed (the register has the character of a public book and every 
interested party can inspect it, i.e. an extract).
This is why radical regulation changes were made in this field (these 
regulations were also prepared by the old government and did not come onto 
the agenda until the People’s Assembly was disbanded and they were passed 
by the new session). Simplicity and speed are the main characteristics, i.e. the 
goals of the new system.
The new Law on the Registration of Economic Subjects removed the 
registration tasks out of judicial jurisdiction, transferring them to a special 
Agency for Economic Registers. This united the organs and regulations for the 
registration of economic companies and entrepreneurs.
This means that the procedure is not judicial, but a special case of 
comparative procedures. In this procedure an appeal (decided on by the 
authorized ministry) is allowed only against those decisions where registration 
is refused and not against those which accept it.
Registration is performed at the request (application) of the subject who is 
required to provide all of the necessary documentation required for registration. 
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The party who considers that the registration violates some interest (for example 
a stockholder or shareholder who considers that a registered change is against 
the law or internal acts of the company) can realize this interest only in court, 
by proving that the decision based on which the registration was completed 
(for example a decision made by the company’s managing body) is illegal. The 
law then predicts a correction, i.e. the deletion of the registration.
Other, very significant new items brought in by the new system are:
•		The urgency of the procedure, by law, is not just an instructive rule. If the 
registrar (the authorized individual named by the Managing Board of the 
Agency who performs all registration work, the issuing of excerpts and 
certificates etc.) does not complete the registration within the regulated 
time, the registration will be considered complete and the registrar forced 
to acknowledge it.2 
•		The uniqueness of the register for the whole of Serbia; registers which 
were kept in commercial courts did not represent an entirety. Now there is 
one register – independent of the office where the registration was carried 
out.
•		The maintenance of the register in an electronic form facilitating rapid 
data manipulation. 
•	Links with other registers containing data on the economic subject.
•		The obligation to submit annual reports on business affairs, meaning not 
only publicity, i.e. the accessibility of this data, but a corresponding legal 
reaction in the case when reports are not made; it is assumed that this is 
a result of the fact that the company or entrepreneur had no economic 
activity so their status will be defined as inactive in the line of duty if a 
report is not made in two years.
Inactive company status is a special category in the law which illustrates 
the transitional nature of the law itself and the economy it is regulating. This is 
the status into which all companies previously registered in commercial courts 
which do not request transfer into the new register are transferred. Namely, 
an evaluation was made that (proved right at the start of the application of 
the law) there are a significant number of companies in Serbia founded by 
law, which never really started to operate or have de facto stopped and their 
founders have not commenced a liquidation procedure and deletion from the 
register.
2  This formulation is not the best, for example, when the deadline for an application is met for an 
application that does not satisfy the conditions
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INSTEAD OF A REFORM BALANCE
Laws organizing the status, foundation and cessation procedures of 
economic subjects which prove unsuccessful were passed in the fourth year 
of transition; it was expected, based on the experiences of other countries in 
transition and due to the nature of the issues they deal with, that this would 
occur at the start of transition.
It was shown that this “delay” was in part caused by the fact that formal-
legal, structures envisaged by pre-transition regulations could serve as the 
framework for new conditions, i.e. new processes. This primarily refers to 
the Law on Companies, i.e. Economic Enterprises. Any additions and fine 
tuning of regulations could wait (necessary interventions concerning public 
companies were performed earlier).
Thus viewed, the new Law on Economic Enterprises represents a good 
step forward. However, it must not be forgotten that the system, in a legal 
sense, is not complete by far. The public debate on some aspects of the legal 
regulation of the capital market and also the public scandals which occurred 
when the existing regulations were applied, clearly indicate which questions 
should urgently be regulated or reformed: the securities market and the role of 
investment funds. Not only is this market incompletely regulated according to 
the standards of a market economy, but the influx of a significant participation 
of private (shareholder) capital in market mechanisms is very slow.
The reform direction is clear. Public scandals which have emerged are 
linked to the unclear role and position of the state (as the capital owner, 
regulator, subject of economic politics ready to adjust the interpretation of 
laws to concrete cases, not respecting owners’ rights etc.). In short, the role of 
the state should be examined again, particularly the increase in that role in the 
last years of transition.
In the second part, the “delay” is to a great extent the consequence of 
resistance to the formation of legal opportunities for the action of market laws. 
Bankruptcy regulations are a good example. Illusory social and political calm, 
i.e. its preservation, are the motivation for the postponement of adopting and 
applying regulations leading to the elimination of the obviously unsuccessful 
from economic life and the transference of the economic burden resulting 
from this failure from creditor to debtor.
Thus observed, the passing of the analyzed laws can be evaluated as a 
transitional step ahead. A real evaluation will, however, ensue when their 
solutions are put into practice. It is too early for that now.
Dragor Hiber
The Reform of the Judiciary 
and Judicial Legislation
THE INHERITED STATE
The analysis of the inherited state shows that, under the 1990 Constitution, 
the Serbian law proclaimed the principle of the division of power. The system 
of the division of power generated the constitutional principle that courts were 
independent and autonomous in their work. This independence and autonomy 
were guaranteed by the rule under which judges held a permanent post, as 
prescribed both by the Constitution and law. The Constitution laid down that 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office was “an independent state authority prosecuting 
the perpetrators of criminal offences and other deeds punishable by law and 
applying legal remedies in order to protect constitutionality and legality”. 
However, the principle of the division of power was not fully applied in 
the judicial legislation in force at the time, which led to numerous derogations 
compromising the principle of the independence of judges and courts from 
other branches of power. However, even that system was gravely breached. 
The above was manifested in:
(a) the manner of the election of judges and court officials, public prosecutors 
and their deputies, where the legislative branch, namely the parliament 
and its working bodies, played a decisive role in formal and legal terms, 
while, in fact, the executive branch (ministries) had the upper hand. 
(b) the manner in which judges were relieved of duty, where the legislative 
branch had the final word, but with the prior control of the judicial 
branch, which established reasons for dismissing a judge; in practice, the 
right of the judicial branch (the Supreme Court General Session) to be 
the only proposer of the dismissal of judges against their will, was severely 
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violated, so that politically unsuitable judges were relieved of duty directly 
by the parliament at the proposal of a parliamentary committee and at the 
initiative of a ministry. 
(c) the manner of financing, given that courts and judges are financed from 
the budget, adopted by the parliament at the proposal of the executive 
branch, and that the financial means are managed by the minister. The 
material position of courts as institutions and of judges depends on the 
budget and its distribution.
This dependence was all the bigger in that it also meant, at the time of 
strained circumstances, privileged financing and rewarding, for example by 
assigning public flats and granting favourable housing loans to particular 
judges and prosecutors. This material dependence, including the dependence 
of the judiciary and judges, had many even subtler forms, a situation in which 
new financial and political elite played an important role, acting as mediators in 
allocating resources between the executive branch and judges and the judicial 
administration, e.g. through organizing (quasi)specialist judicial training 
seminars, purchasing equipment and decorating premises, etc.
As a logical consequence, judges were influenced by the executive branch 
of power, i.e. the political elements constituting it, to an extent that can be seen 
as corruption. This assessment was supported by numerous studies.1
The dependence of the judiciary on political power and its bad economic 
position led to the resignation of many experienced and competent judges. 
Between 1992 and 1994 some 800 judges (almost 1/3 of all judges) resigned. 
New judges were recruited as dictated by the political parties, while the 
establishment of political coalitions forming the executive power meant, among 
other things, deals on “quotas” in the election and promotion of presiding 
judges, judges and prosecutors. 
The outdated judicial network was yet another factor that contributed to 
the bad circumstances in the judiciary, the inefficiency of courts and corruption. 
Special courts existed only in the economic field, while the obsolete system 
of procedural law and the abuse of that law in ordinary courts, resulted in 
numerous bottlenecks in the judiciary, which virtually turned the Supreme 
Court of Serbia into an ordinary court, although its task was to ensure the 
uniform implementation of the law.
1  For more detail see: Begovic, B. et al.: (2001), Korupcija u Srbiji (The Corruption in Serbia), Belgrade: 
Centar za liberalno-demokratske studije (Centre for Liberal-Democratic Studies).
265The Reform of the Judiciary and Judicial Legislation
For this reason, even before the transition (October 2000) the judicial 
system had been assessed as one of the segments of state authority which 
needed a radical transformation and the most comprehensive changes.
Immediately before the transition new directions of the judicial reform 
were formulated:
-  “cleansing” the judiciary by legally and constitutionally dismissing those 
who abused their judicial post or whose professional competence and 
experience did not guarantee successful discharging of their duties;
-  strengthening the independence of the judiciary from other branches of 
power by implementing various institutional measures, including those 
aimed at financial independence;
-  altering the legal system of electing and dismissing presiding judges, 
judges and prosecutors, again to strengthen their independence, to reduce 
the influence of the executive power and follow professional and ethical 
criteria in their election and promotion instead of political and other 
criteria;
-  ensuring the more efficient and transparent organization of court systems 
and the technical modernization of courts;
-  promoting professional standards and responsibility of other experts 
participating in court proceedings (clerks and expert associates, lawyers, 
expert witnesses, etc.).
THE LEGAL REFORM OF THE JUDICIARY IN 2001
In 2001, immediately upon the change of government and the beginning 
of the transition, the first steps were made to restore and reform the judiciary 
by consistently implementing the old regulations. Firstly, the national 
parliament abolished the unlawful decisions under which, in the last several 
years of Milosevic’s rule, judges were relieved of their posts in contravention 
of the prescribed procedure, (due to their public opposition to electoral frauds 
and the manipulation of the judiciary); secondly, a great number of presiding 
judges (who had seriously compromised themselves) were replaced, as they 
did not hold permanent posts, but had limited mandates.
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The legal framework for a more thorough reform of the judiciary was to 
be established by a set of judicial-organizational laws adopted in the second 
half of 2001: the Law on Judges, the Law on Public Prosecution, the Law on 
the High Judicial Council, the Law on Court Systems and the Law on Seats and 
Districts of Courts and Public Prosecutor’s Offices (all published in the “Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 63/2001).
The very circumstances in which those laws were adopted showed that 
there was no consensus and, perhaps, no clear strategy of judicial reforms in 
the pro-reform political block. In other words, the laws were not proposed by 
the Government or prepared by the competent ministry. Instead, they were 
proposed by a parliamentary group which, at that moment, although still part 
of the ruling majority, was about to become the opposition (the Democratic 
Party of Serbia). The Ministry of Justice, which itself set up a working group 
to prepare draft laws on the organization of the judiciary, was opposed to the 
mentioned laws, but they were adopted after all with some minor changes. It was 
said that they were endorsed by the parties which supported the Government 
and, in return, the party which proposed the laws, was to vote for the Labour 
Law, a claim which can be considered truthful. 
The basic difference between the draft laws prepared by the Democratic 
Party of Serbia and those prepared by the working group of the ministry, lied 
in the continuity issue. While the adopted laws sought to reform the existing 
judicial system by maintaining the continuity of the institutions and the same 
personnel, the draft laws of the ministry, i.e. the Government, revealed the 
intention to achieve discontinuity and to build completely new institutions. 
Thus, for example, the adopted laws insisted on the permanent post of judges, 
including the judges holding posts at that time, meaning that judges could 
not lose their status even if the courts to which they had been elected were 
abolished, nor could they be transferred to another court against their will. 
The laws elaborated by the ministry, on the other hand, laid down that upon 
entering into force of new laws, the old courts were to be abolished and 
new ones established; hidden behind this was the idea of the discontinuity 
of judicial posts and reelection of all judges, in order to achieve lustration 
through a professional and ethical review to be conducted by an independent 
body, as had been done in some other transitional countries. This concept was, 
admittedly, never fully developed and there was also a dilemma as to whether 
it was necessary to link the discontinuity of judicial posts with the change 
of the constitution. Interestingly enough, this idea can be heard again in the 
context of discussions on constitutional changes in Serbia, based on the draft 
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constitution drawn up by the present Government, i.e. the party which opted 
for continuity2 at the moment of the adoption of the judicial laws. 
Nevertheless, it is quite certain that the new laws introduced a number of 
novelties that are undoubtedly reform-oriented, the most important of which are:
The system of the election and dismissal of 
judges and public prosecutors
The mentioned laws (the Law on Judges, the Law on Public Prosecution, the 
Law on the High Judicial Council) envisaged a system based on the model of a 
High Judicial Council, i.e. a concept of an independent and professional body 
with the exclusive right to propose judges, presiding judges and prosecutors, 
at the same time keeping the system of the parliamentary election of judges as 
prescribed by the constitution. 
The composition of the Council differs depending on whether it proposes 
judges or prosecutors. The majority of Council members in the procedure 
of proposing judges are precisely judges themselves. Thus, the Council has 
permanent members (the President of the Supreme Court, the Republican 
Public Prosecutor, the minister of justice, a representative of the Bar Association, 
a prominent expert elected by the national parliament among three candidates 
proposed by the Supreme Court), who are always on the Council, and members 
at invitation (six members are elected by the Supreme Court and two by the 
Republican Public Prosecutor) depending on whether the Council decides on 
the election of judges or prosecutors.
This potentially decisive role in proposing judges and prosecutors 
considerably strengthens their independence from the executive and legislative 
branch of power. Putting an end to the domination of political power was to 
ensure that professional criteria prevailed in the election and promotion of 
judges and prosecutors. 
The legal arrangement regarding the dismissal of judges against their 
will reflects even more clearly the decisive role of the representatives of the 
judiciary. According to the law, a judge may be dismissed against his will if 
he has performed his duties unprofessionally and unconscientiously, if he is 
2  As regards the continuity/discontinuity dilemma see Ivosevic, Z. (2002): “Reforma sudstva u Srbiji” 
(The Reform of the Judiciary in Serbia” in “Zakon o uredjenju sudova” (the Law on Court Systems), 
Savremena administracija, Beograd, pages 6-8. See the draft constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 
D. Hiber, “Dugo putovanje do ustava” (A Long Journey to the Constitution), Prizma, June 2004, 
pages 16-17.
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sentenced to prison for a period exceeding six months or if he committed 
a criminal offence rendering him unsuitable for discharging judicial duties, 
and if the conditions exist for his retirement. The decision on whether there 
are reasons for the dismissal of a judge or whether the conditions exist for 
such dismissal, is made by the Grand Personnel Council, a body consisting of 
nine judges of the Supreme Court of Serbia. The national parliament is only to 
confirm that decision.  
The dismissal procedure, initiated, as a rule, by presiding judges, guarantees 
the rights of the person against whom the procedure was initiated, i.e. his 
right to present counter-arguments challenging the reasons for his dismissal, a 
practice which turned out to be successful.
The material position of judges
The material position of judges and prosecutors has been institutionally 
improved; the law guarantees a minimum salary, which, in the original version 
of the law, was relatively high, so that the salary of a judge of the Supreme 
Court was brought into line with the salary of a cabinet minister, the salary of 
the president of the Supreme Court with the salary of the Prime Minister, while 
the salaries of judges and prosecutors, depending on the level of the court, 
were 6-10% lower. At one point, a career in the judiciary was even desirable in 
financial terms.
Special courts and new subject matter (instance-related) jurisdiction
The Law on Court Systems envisages the establishment of a new special 
court: the administrative tribunal. (Under the regulations which were in force 
at that time, administrative procedures were in the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court of Serbia, and, exceptionally, of the District Court in Belgrade). This was 
to contribute to relieving the Supreme Court of a great number of frequently 
banal administrative procedures, but also to increase the efficiency of the 
judicial protection of citizens against the unlawful acts of the administrative 
(executive) branch. 
Corporate crime courts, specialized for corporate disputes, corporate 
criminal liability, the execution of decisions in these matters, bankruptcy 
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procedures and the registration of enterprises3, continue to work under the 
new name of commercial courts.
Additionally, a new kind of second instance court as well as new subject 
matter jurisdiction or instance-related jurisdiction, were envisaged in order 
to increase efficiency, shorten the procedure, establish uniform jurisprudence 
and restore the original role of the Supreme Court – the role of a supreme court 
of appeal. District courts ceased to be courts of appeal vis-à-vis communal 
courts, keeping the first instance jurisdiction only for aggravated criminal 
offences and some kinds of law suits. The second instance jurisdiction (vis-
à-vis both communal and district courts) was granted to a newly established 
court, the Appellate Court, which was seated in Belgrade and had departments 
in Novi Sad, Nis and Kragujevac. Thus, the Supreme Court acts only under 
extraordinary legal remedies.
Institutional guarantees of impartiality and efficiency
The laws included the adoption of additional institutional guarantees of 
the judiciary’s impartiality and efficiency. The supervisory role of the court 
administration (presiding judges) was established more clearly, it’s right 
and duty to carry out the regular supervision of prompt and fair judicial 
proceedings (but, certainly not the right to influence specific cases) as well 
as supervision over court departments (offices, executive clerks, etc.) The 
supervisory role of higher courts over lower ones was envisaged in the same 
way. The judge’s responsibility for conscientious and efficient work is increased 
with his obligation to report to the presiding judge in cases where the case has 
not been completed within 6 months. 
In the case of the prosecutor’s office, an attempt was made to clearly 
define, on one side, the relationship between prosecutors and their deputies, 
and on the other, the relationship between lower and higher prosecutors. 
Of special importance here is the manner in which the system of obligatory 
instructions is defined, which higher prosecutors can, in written form, issue to 
lower prosecutors in specific cases; written form is here the basis of the clearly 
located responsibility.
The principle of the incongruousness of the judiciary post with carrying 
out any other professional work, public services, membership in political 
3 Insofar as the judicial branch is involved in the registration of enterprises.
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parties or any other proceedings which bring the judge’s independence, 
dignity or impartiality into question is also envisaged. A special act regarding 
this issue was to be adopted by the Supreme Court – even though this act 
was formally passed, its contents do not correspond to the idea that it should 
precisely define the cases of the incongruousness of the judiciary post with 
other posts, because of which its adoption was initially envisaged.
It was considered as of exceptional importance to guarantee the system 
of the “accidental judge”, i.e. the scheduling of a judge’s cases based on criteria 
which is independent of cases or sides, or anybody’s will, and which was 
established by the court’s operating procedure (the operating procedure has 
adopted the scheduling system according to the time when the case arrives 
in court). Truly, the law already provided the possibility to deviate from this 
principle, in the case of the court’s overburdening, as well as the possibility of 
taking a case from a judge who is unjustifiably behind with his caseload. The 
decision to abandon the accidental schedule is in the hands of the presiding 
judge, but the additional barrier and controlling mechanism in the use of 
this possibility was supposed to be presented by the obligation to inform the 
immediate higher court presiding judge about every exception.    
The application of and amendments to the law: 
defective and incomplete reform. 
The judiciary-organisational laws adopted at the end of 2001 were not, 
from one side, consistently applied – certain institutions envisaged by those 
laws had not yet been introduced into the legal system. 
The most important example of the non application of those laws is the 
fact that the new organisational scheme of courts had not been established; 
the deadline for their implementation, which was already rather long, was 
constantly extended. “The seriousness” with which the establishment of the 
appellate and administrative tribunal was approached and the preparations 
for the transfer of cases to those courts could be best seen from the scandal 
which occurred when the national parliament failed to adopt the law which 
would extend this deadline on time, thus Serbia entered the year 2004 literally 
without second instance courts. District courts lost this jurisdiction and 
appellate ones were not established. The problem was resolved with the help of 
the Constitutional Court by the further postponement of the implementation 
of this part of the law. 
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Even the establishment of the High Judicial Council was delayed because 
the Supreme Court’s proposal for the Council member who is elected by the 
national parliament was also delayed. 
On the other side, and more importantly, many of the newly adopted 
decisions were essentially disputed by the various participants, in the very name 
of the (fundamental) reform of the judiciary. The central issue, at least on the 
surface, was the appointment and dismissal of judges and prosecutors; many 
dilemmas were refracted through this issue. The solution according to which 
the High Judicial Council proposes the appointment and the Great Personnel 
Council the dismissal of judges was not questioned in principle. The adopted 
decision was one of the variations of comparative-legal known models, often 
accepted in countries in transition.4
Namely, soon after the beginning of the implementation of this system 
(and the implementation, as it was mentioned, was delayed because the 
appointment of the permanent Council members was also delayed according 
to legal regulations), clashes of interests between the judicial on the one side, 
and the legislative and executive branches on the other, emerged. After a 
series of proposals from the High Judicial Council failed to be accepted by 
the national parliament, the amendments to the law provided the national 
parliament with the right, in the case of the non acceptance of the Council’s 
proposal, to appoint one of the candidates who fulfilled the conditions and 
had applied for the position, but had not been proposed by the Council. This 
meant, of course, that not only was the Council’s role of exclusive proposer 
stopped, but in fact the nucleus of authorisation for the appointment of judges 
was returned to other administrative branches. This amendment was later 
declared unconstitutional. 
Furthermore, the right to propose the presiding judges from the High 
Council’s jurisdiction was also excluded and was passed firstly to the national 
parliament’s competent committee, and then following the declaration of this 
regulation as non-constitutional, to the special body where representatives 
from the legislative and executive branch of power dominated so that this 
decision was also abolished on the grounds of being unconstitutional.    
On evaluating the constitutionality of the reduction in the High Judicial 
Council’s jurisdiction, the Constitutional Court assumed the position that this 
represented a violation of the independence of the judiciary as guaranteed by 
the Constitution. (Truly, this court, which forms part of the same personnel 
4  See V. Rakić-Vodinelić and others, Pravosudni savet (Judiciary Council), Institut za uporedno pravo 
(the Institute for Comparative Law), Belgrade, 2003, page 7
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structure, did not consider that the same independence guaranteed by 
the unchanged constitutional decree, was violated during the former legal 
regime in which the authorised parliamentary committee had the exclusive 
right to propose the holders of judiciary posts.) However, regardless of the 
Constitutional Court’s legally controversial rationale, because the Constitution 
itself envisages that the national parliament elect and dismiss judges, the return 
of the nucleus of authorisation to the controlled legislative branch, carried out 
by the executive branch, undoubtedly presented a step backwards and the 
return to the previous model which was rightly criticised and discarded. 
On the other side, the supporters of restricting the jurisdiction of the High 
Judicial Council, in which the holders of judiciary posts predominate, cited 
the fact that the personnel structure of the judiciary had not changed in regard 
to the pre-transitional period, and that the communis opinion was that this 
structure was very bad. Since the structure of the High Judicial Council reflects 
the structure of the judiciary itself, it is understandable, they emphasised, that 
the structure of proposals for the appointment of judges, all the more for 
proposals for judge posts in higher courts and for presiding judges was in fact 
the continuation of the status quo, the confirmation and reproduction of the 
judiciary from the previous, pre-transitional period, and hence a barrier to 
reform. Those judges elected by political criteria, insufficiently skilled party 
obedients, judges discredited in election scandals and political trials, cannot 
be participants in the process of creating a new, democratic professional 
judiciary. 
No matter what the basis for those arguments and even without their 
comparative evaluation, it can easily be concluded that in addition to facing 
two concepts of reform, the scene was also pervaded with the struggle for 
dominance in the process of making judicial appointments, which implicates 
the preponderance of other criteria, both political and pragmatic over purely 
professional criteria.  Even more, this meant the negation of the independence 
of the judiciary: this kind of control over making judicial appointments meant 
the opening of possibilities for extended control over those appointed, i.e. 
those aspiring to be appointed, i.e. institutional corruption. In short, those 
who make decisions about appointments, in other words about promotions, 
hold the lever of influence over those who have been appointed and all other 
contenders. This proves, among other things, the lack of sufficient potential 
for reform, i.e. the real readiness for the reform of both the representatives of 
executive and judicial branches of power.    
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A similar situation, facing two opposing “concepts” of judiciary reform, 
also emerged in the implementation of regulations regarding the dismissal of 
judges. 
According to regulations drawn up in October 2000, proposals for the 
dismissal of the holders of judicial posts were determined by the Supreme 
Court General Session. This regulation was evaded in the case of the dismissal 
of those judges who opposed the electoral theft in 1996, who later went on 
to become activists in the Judges Association, the professional association of 
judges whose work was put out of action by the regime before 2000 through their 
refusal to register the Association. Entrusting the establishment of proposals 
(reasons) for dismissal to the , the body which is made up of Supreme Court 
judges, instead of to the General Session, the collegiums of all Supreme Court 
judges, does not essentially change the concept. It was most likely that the idea 
was that it would be hardly feasible to achieve a majority who would vote for 
the dismissal of those judges who had been discredited the most, since the 
Supreme Court, as the top of the pyramid, pronouncedly suffers from those 
flaws which are characteristic of the judiciary in general. Reaching this level 
in the judiciary hierarchy was only possible by using those means which were 
most criticised. If the intention was the conservation of the inherited state, it 
seems that this was achieved: by the end of the year 2003 the  proposed the 
dismissal of only three judges for performing their duties unconscientiously 
and unprofessionally, which fully contradicts existing data regarding the 
quality and efficiency of the courts’ work, the trust which citizens place in the 
judiciary and the evaluation of the level of corruption etc. 
If not formally, the system was essentially brought into question by the 
amendment which transferred the appointment of the Council’s members 
from the ranks of all judges to the national parliament. This meant that 
the parliament directly took over the decisive role in the control of the 
conditions (reasons) for dismissal. This amendment was also disputed by the 
Constitutional Court, thus the original system was reinstated. However, legal 
confusion ensued since for some time there was no legal body to implement 
the appropriate procedure. Among other things, this confusion resulted in 
dismissal proceedings practically not being brought at all (until the end of 2003, 
apart from cases of retirement and release from duties on personal demands, 
there were only three dismissals).     
At the same time, the executive branch, and also part of the public, 
continuously brought up the issue of the lustration of the existing judicial cadre, 
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allowing for, at one moment, the possibility of making amendments to the Law 
on Judges, primarily linking such a move with the so called electoral thefts and 
rigging of political trials. (This amendment was also declared unconstitutional). 
It thus came about that, on the whole, despite prevailing appraisals about in-
sufficient expertise, poor work and disorganisation, inefficiency and even 
corruption, the judge and prosecutor cadre inherited from the pre-transitional 
period has not essentially changed. Moreover, amidst the confusion of 
amendments, constitutional control, suspensions from the Constitutional 
Court and the repeal of regulations, the Supreme Court Collegiums brought 
the decision not to apply the unconditional decree of obligatory retirement of 
judges after the fulfilment of legal conditions, citing the position that, before 
the passing of this law, the retirement age was extended in accordance with 
the (general) Law of Employment based on the ruling of the presiding judge, 
contrary to special regulations.  
As regards the prosecutor’s office, the situation was somewhat specific. 
In the legal system and the Serbian Constitution, the Prosecutor’s Office is 
characterised by independence but not autonomy. The most important 
dilemmas (or conflicts) during the passing of a law or later during its 
subsequent application and amendments, related to the position, mandate and 
type of appointment, i.e. the selection of deputy prosecutors. Firstly, in the 
first version of the law, the permanence of their post was reduced in that their 
mandate was limited to eight years, and their appointment was transferred from 
parliament to the High Judicial Council. At one point, with the amendments to 
the Law on Public Prosecution, the jurisdiction for the appointment of deputy 
prosecutors was transferred to the Government, which probably destroyed the 
balance between the development of the institution of the prosecutor’s office 
as a judicial body and the fact that this institution is not fully autonomous to 
lead specific prosecuting policy.    
The appraisal of the existing confrontation between the judicial and 
political branches in the establishment of a certain kind of control over the 
judiciary, can be confirmed by another fact: in four years, each of the four top 
posts at the head of the judiciary were held by four different people (the Serbian 
Supreme Court presiding judge or acting presiding judge and the Republican 
Public Prosecutor or acting public prosecutor). 
In the three years since it was adopted, there were other novelties too, 
introduced through amendments and appendixes to the initially adopted 
judicial-organisational laws or through special laws. 
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One particularly significant innovation was the introduction of special 
departments (including the Belgrade District Court and the Serbian Supreme 
Court) for organised crimes and war crimes. Special prosecutors were 
introduced and appointed in the same fields. This solution was also the subject 
of dispute, with the argument that this is a disturbance of the regular judiciary 
system, which is unnecessary, unacceptable and inappropriate for a legal 
state.  
Public debate about the status and justification of the existence of the 
special department for organised crime, in which the senior representatives of 
the executive and judicial branches participated, is characterised by excessively 
direct political argumentation with regard to the judiciary problematic, at times 
relying too much on specific trials which were conducted in this department, 
which has certainly not contributed to strengthening the judiciary’s position, 
especially in this segment. 
The Supervisory Board was also introduced, the body with jurisdiction to 
investigate complaints about illegal and delayed court proceedings.   
The institutionalisation of the centre for the professional training of 
judges, which was originally established as part of the Judges Association 
can be counted as one of the fundamentally useful innovations. The fact that 
transition means numerous, rapid and detailed changes in legislature makes 
the issue of professional training one of the central issues in the reform of the 
judiciary. The further development of the training system within the judiciary 
is expected and along with the reform of the qualifying examination for judges 
and, of course, university law education, this could be very useful. 
It could be concluded that the frequent and numerous changes to adopted 
judiciary laws, including the return to the original versions and the non appliance 
of some adopted solutions as well as the sharp public polemics between judicial 
and executive branch officials, are a clear indicator of the relative failure of the 
reform of the judiciary, the lack of clear strategic determination and even the 
existence of an insufficiently strong resolve for reform.  
At the same time, the appraisal of the situation within the judiciary from 
senior officials within both the executive and judicial branches, remains very 
unsatisfactory, regardless of how sincere they were or whether they were 
attempting to avoid their own responsibility for the current state. They are 
confirmed by the empirical data of excessively long proceedings, corruption 
and other scandals and legal insecurity stands out as the factor which influences 
the unsatisfactory efficiency of economic reforms. 
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COURT PROCEEDING LEGISLATURE
For a modern, fair and independent judiciary, based on the principles of 
the rule of law and the respect for human rights, not only are changes to the 
judicial-organisational system of importance, but also proceedings regulations 
too.
The first phase of the reform of court legislature, and also some of the 
classical institutions of substantive law, can be linked to the preparation 
and accession of Serbia (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, … Serbia and 
Montenegro) to the European Council system and the European Human 
Rights Charter.  
Criminal proceedings were the first to be reformed. The most significant 
innovation in the new Law on Criminal Proceedings was the reduction in the 
so called police temporary custody and the right of the arrested individual 
to have access in that phase to an expert defence lawyer as well as the stricter 
establishment of regulations regarding temporary custody. 
The law also attempted to adapt to the times and to modern technological 
challenges, for instance the controlled introduction of new sources of evidence 
including evidence gathered by, approved in advance, wiretapping.   
Even though in general this was a modern law, its implementation brought 
some of its solutions into question. Therefore, the efforts to insure the right 
of the defendant to an efficient trial (prompt justice), in accordance with the 
European Human Rights Charter and the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence, 
among other things, was achieved through the absolute limitation of the 
temporary arrest period. If the verdict is not reached and sentencing passed 
before the end of the legally regulated maximum period, the defendant has to 
be released to defend himself while on bail. It was not just that, because of the 
lack of corresponding transitional regulations, but also because of its incorrect 
interpretation (this issue was the subject of scandal and polemics between 
judicial and executive branches), the adoption of this law lead to the release of 
a number of criminals accused of the most serious criminal acts against whom 
the proceedings went on long after the time limit had expired in the previous 
period, but it was also shown that the inefficient Serbian judiciary is rarely 
able to keep to the predicted time limits. Therefore, the maximum time for 
temporary confinement was extended, especially for cases of organised crime. 
The litigation proceedings, whose solutions were also criticised for being 
archaic and not relevant to modern needs, were changed in the last years of the 
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period in question. The aim of the largest number of newly adopted solutions 
was, almost certainly, to prevent the abuse of the power of attorney which 
led to the dragging out of lawsuits; the general opinion was that on average 
trails lasted for unjustifiably long periods, which makes the legal protection of 
property rights extremely inefficient. The repercussions of such a situation on 
the economy, i.e. economic growth, are obvious. 
It is not possible to evaluate the scope of the adopted changes because of the 
short period since their implementation. It seems that they will largely depend 
on the court’s readiness to place efficiency at the forefront, and proceedings 
regulations are not the only condition for that.  
From the most significant innovations the first efforts to ensure the 
concentration of the litigation materials could be set aside, which included 
the obligation of all parties to present all facts and evidence during the 
initial proceedings operations, the charges and the response to charges. The 
possibility for the later presentation of new facts is strictly limited; the opinion 
is that this will discipline all parties and prevent the unnecessary dragging 
out of court proceedings. It should be said that this means that a new higher 
level of expertise will be required to lead the litigation, i.e. it will increase 
the importance of engaging an expert proxy (this was, however, obligatory 
only in exceptional circumstances). The possibility for requesting the judge’s 
disqualification was also restricted, which was used and abused a great deal 
in the function of dragging out litigation. Finally and potentially the most 
important as regards efficiency, was restricting the possibility for the appellate 
courts to repeal the original ruling and to return the case to the court of original 
jurisdiction for a repeat ruling. If a complaint is also submitted against the 
ruling of the new court of original jurisdiction, the appellate court is obliged 
to solve the case in an appropriate way.  However, the question remains as to 
what extent this is harmonised with the expected position and organisation of 
the future appellate court.   
For the same reasons (inefficiency), (civil) enforcement proceedings 
have also been reformed. Characteristic new institutions, aimed at the more 
efficient protection of contracts and properties, are, for instance, for economic 
issues, shortened enforcement proceedings: if the claim is documented with 
the appropriate written documentation, the possibility of direct enforcement 
proceedings is envisaged without any prior litigation, and the debtor in those 
proceedings can dispute the implementation of enforcement only with evidence 
which literally contests the documentation. 
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New enforcement means and subjects, relevant to the market economy 
(enforcement on shares of stocks, shares in limited liability companies, 
securities etc.) have been introduced and the enforcement procedure on bank 
accounts has been amended. 
Of particular importance is the fact that time limits during which the court 
is obliged to carry out certain enforcement operations (with the possibility of 
sanctions for any violations) is determined and shortened by law. 
It is also still too early to evaluate the scope of the new items in the 
new Law on Enforcement Proceedings because, among other things, the 
implementation of some of the previously adopted regulations on which some 
forms of enforcement depend has not yet been secured (for instance, the 
register of securities on movable property, the completed register of securities, 
the functioning of the Agency for Enforcement Claims etc.).   
Some other measures have also been introduced in the “unburdening” 
of the courts in the attempt to improve the courts’ efficiency. Therefore, some 
records which were traditionally under the courts’ jurisdiction in our law have 
been removed from their jurisdiction. 
In first place was the continuation of the project according to which, 
through the replacement of the land-registry system with the so called system 
of uniformed registry, i.e. real estate registry, the land registry was to be 
transferred from courts and entrusted to certain administrative (geodesist) 
bodies.     
The registry of economic subjects (companies) is no longer within the 
jurisdiction of commercial courts either, but of a separate specialised agency. 
Such a reduction in jurisdiction and along with that the scope of work, 
will certainly exert a positive influence on the courts’ work, but what remains 
is the question as to whether the jurisdictions (tasks) themselves will suffer 
after being taken over by less qualified bodies. 
The same function – the unburdening of the judiciary – is shared by 
the institutionalisation of peaceful, out of court settlements envisaged by the 
Law on Mediation for litigation proceedings and the Law on Out of Court 
Settlements for labour disputes.    
Dragor Hiber
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THE BALANCE OF REFORMS
In the decade which preceded transition the judiciary, which by definition 
could hardly manage to respond to the new demands and needs since it was 
basically established as a socialistic one, was completely devastated. Personnel 
ruined by poor cadre selection and an impoverished and frightened judiciary 
became nothing but the appendage of the executive branch. Judges were the 
executors of the first confirmed election theft in 1996, which even Milosevic 
had to admit by annulling it with the special law for election results which 
was “established” by the judges. Such a judiciary was susceptible to general 
and institutional corruption and was ready to execute the political elite’s direct 
orders. It was used for the legal cover and protection of the grey privatisation 
and the squander of public and state property, smuggling, crime and some of 
the most serious politically motivated crimes. However, such as it was, it did 
express a certain resistance and vitality, especially when a number of judges, at 
the cost of being crudely expelled from the judiciary, opposed the abuse of the 
judiciary in election theft.   
The necessity for reforms was clear, the same as the final goal: an 
independent, expert, fair and efficient judiciary. The legal principles, which 
should be transformed into laws thus offering the most direct route to the 
desired target, were mostly known. 
The objective difficulty in projecting reforms was presented by the fact that 
the contradiction between the principles on which a good judiciary is founded 
and the existing state was obvious. Therefore, for instance, a certain legal 
security for judges, some of the models where judges hold permanent posts, is 
not only the constitutional principle of the current constitutional system, but 
also an important guarantee of independence; the same model (permanent 
post) was protecting (and protected) also those who not only seriously violated 
professional and ethical standards, but did not inspire confidence that they 
would be able to respond to new demands. 
Furthermore, the reforms should have been multilateral, with the aim of 
resolving both trivial and serious issues, such as elementary financial issues, 
the fulfilment of elementary needs for the modern functioning of courts or 
prosecutor’s offices, such as computers (and people trained to use them), 
premises etc. Two disastrous figures show the importance of providing at least 
the bare minimum of resources. Trails are being postponed because jurors fail 
to turn up because they have not received the minimum compensation for 
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their work, and investigations are not completed because the courts do not 
have the finances to make the down payments for essential, more expensive 
expertise.   
The reforms should have started with the adoption of the new judicial 
laws. It is obvious that their proposals are characteristic not only of a lack of 
coordination, but also the lack of any previously adopted strategy. 
Although any basic criticism cannot be formally directed at the adopted 
laws, the very lack of a strategy is probably the reason why it was impossible 
to gather efficient reform forces around the reforms themselves (through the 
implementation of the laws). 
There was also resistance from both the judiciary, apart from other things, 
because many people were worried about their positions, and the executive 
branch, not only because they thought that the laws and the tempo of reforms 
had been forced on them, but also because they considered that the domination 
of the concept of preserving continuity imposed a reform project which 
did not offer sufficiently profound changes. Through the implementation 
of the new laws, the political branch, in relation to the judiciary, had to be 
practically unconditionally stripped of its power and was unwilling to accept 
that, considering themselves as a more reliable guarantee for reforms than the 
judiciary itself. Therefore, the resistance to reforms came from all sides; the 
status quo was de facto maintained in many judicial systems and often changes 
to judicial laws only introduced additional insecurity. In such a milieu even 
those steps forward which were made remained without effect after some time. 
In the last years and months, the executive branch have often violated 
explicit legal regulations, as was the case with the earnings policy; for a long 
time the salaries in the judiciary were not brought in line with those in the 
executive branch as was predicted by law, and the reaction to that problem 
was a change of law, by which judges are made equal to clerks in the state 
administration. 
On the other side, the results, quality and efficiency of the judiciary have 
not essentially changed – in other words, the reforms have not brought about 
any real results. Some indicators, some scandals which have emerged lead us 
to draw the conclusion that the reform of the judiciary is without any results 
at all. 
Hence we come to the most important evaluation regarding the balance 
of reforms: the processes are (again) at the beginning. That implicates the 
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preparation of a new strategy and standing behind it and the creation of a pro-
reform majority both within the judiciary and outside it. 
As part of any future constitutional changes, a new, balanced response to 
the issue of discontinuity should be found.  

Boško Živković
Financial Market Reform
MaRket FoRMation and opeRation: Basic contRoveRsy
although the Belgrade stock exchange is the first stock exchange re-
established in eastern europe after the second World War (1989), the question 
whether serbia has a proper financial market still remains open. From 1990 to 
the beginning of 2002 the stock exchange lingered as an organization without 
institutions or proper rules of conduct. at one moment, in order to survive, the 
stock exchange itself engaged in trading in short-term securities. This form of 
deformity is probably rarely seen anywhere.
during 2002 a significant change occurred: the capital market began to 
operate. The main assets (instruments) are shares issued in the privatization 
process under the 1997 Law. already during 2002 the volume increased several 
times over the previous period. a smaller part of volume is the frozen foreign 
currency deposit bonds of the Republic of serbia. at the end of 2002 the total 
market capitalization reached around 40 billion dinars or 634 million euros. 
in March 2004 the market capitalization reached 203 billion dinars. This level 
is relatively (compared to the comparable countries) high and amounts to 28 
percent of Gdp.
However, already from october 2003 and throughout 2004 the volume 
on the stock exchange went down. This development was expected, but not 
in such a short period of time and with such intensity. The main reason for 
the emptying of the market is its basic imperfections. The serbian financial 
market practically does not know the primary issues of corporate instruments. 
(The market of short-term commercial paper was mostly in the grey area and 
could not survive for long.) The consequence: the financial market is at this 
moment the mechanism of concentration of ownership over shares distributed 
in the process of mass privatization during 2000 and 2001. This fundamental 
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market deformity, which is basically determined by the imperfections of the 
mass privatization model can be seen in other countries as well. it, however, 
causes two types of consequences.
The first type of consequences is related to the functioning of the market 
itself. it is becoming empty. after share ownership concentration is achieved, 
the volume is reduced and shares are practically withdrawn from the stock 
exchange. in the elementary definition the financial market in serbia is used 
for purposes quite contrary from the standard ones. instead of being used for 
companies going public it is used for going private. Moreover, this process is 
continued in the conditions involving low information and price efficiency. it 
is estimated that in such circumstances the market undervalues shares, which 
additionally accelerates the process of its emptying, increasing the risk of full 
retardation.
The second group of consequences refers to the market regulation. in 
the circumstances when it becomes a redistribution mechanism, there is an 
increased risk of “regulator capturing”, i.e. its discriminatory behavior in favor 
of one and against another group of players. The reason for the formulation 
of this estimate is the fact that the trade in the highest quality securities has 
mostly been transferred to otc methods of trading. The main cause: emptying 
of the market is caused not only by the market concentration, but also by 
the regulator’s behavior. The volume of share trading went down because of 
intensive otc trading due to the takeover market activation in the conditions 
of drastic underregulation under the Law on Market of securities and other 
Financial instruments from november 2002, which came into effect in october 
2003. The second important fact: with different regulatory norms government 
bonds have practically been withdrawn from the stock exchange. Foreign 
currency deposits bonds are directly traded between the banks.
MaRket seGMents
Market evolution during the last four years has been unsteady. the 
evidence of such unsteadiness is the brief description of operation of its basic 
segments.
The corporate bond market is of low liquidity and non-transparent. in 
the period until 2003 this market operated mostly with short-term corporate 
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commercial paper. The primary market of long-term corporate bonds has not 
been established yet. the stock exchange still has no such securities at the 
official listing.
The basic corporate securities traded are privatization shares. dominant 
sellers are individuals who received these shares free of charge in the procedure 
of mass privatization. The dominant buyers are de facto taking over these 
companies. For that reason the financial market is predominantly a corporate 
market, rather than a share market. There are no new issues of shares that would 
be used for the financing of companies. Thus, the capital market in serbia is 
still not an important mechanism of financing of the corporate sector. the 
lack of transparency of this market (problems of going public and prospectus 
quality) is a consequence of the attempts of the current management to 
maintain unofficial control in such companies or to establish official control of 
the majority owner.
in october 2004 the stock exchange activated a special segment of the so-
called continuous share trading. This measure should affect the evolution of 
the national market by reversing the process of its emptying. The reserves 
towards the early activation of this market are based on the argument that 
liquidity can be created by speculative demand. the second type of reserve 
refers to the ability of the market to discover the fair price. (There is a series of 
evidence demonstrating that the markets in transition are generally speaking 
not price efficient. This primarily refers to the existence of possibility of price 
manipulation.) The permitted daily price fluctuations are relatively high. The 
liquidity of this market is exhibiting an upward trend.
Foreign currency deposit bonds are liquid and have attractive yields. 
although they are not directly convertible, they can be used for the purchase of 
corporate shares in privatization. Their introduction in stock exchange trading 
(september 2002) significantly affected the level of market capitalization and its 
liquidity. This security will be an important part of the total volume of trading 
in a relatively long period in the future, because the issue value is relatively 
high (4.2 billion euros), with satisfactory liquidity. (this security is traded 
continuously.) The yields of these bonds were relatively high at the beginning 
of the operation of the market. in time they were gradually normalized at the 
7-10% range at the annual level. The bond market is segmented. There are three 
basic markets. The first market is within the banks. The banks convert deposits 
into bonds. at conversion the owners have a right of choice: conversion or 
payment in cash. at this market, the discount applied when paying frozen 
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foreign currency deposits in cash, is very deep in real terms. information 
asymmetry, which partly originates from the complicated procedure of 
registration and trade, results in the owners of FX savings passbooks often 
accepting the offer of banks for the purchase of bonds at a relatively low price. 
The second market is formed between the banks. The prices on this market 
are not public. it seems realistic to assume that most of trading is conducted 
on this market. The main players on the supply side are banks which have 
the largest number of depositors. on this market capital gains from the first 
market are realized. The third and probably the smallest in terms of volume is 
the stock exchange.
The money market in serbia is still shallow and undeveloped. The basic 
problems in its operation are relatively high interest rates and high level of 
required reserves of the national Bank of serbia. The level of interest rates on 
short-term borrowing is very high. attempting to normalize the structure of 
interest rates, in January 2005 the nBs organized the first repo auctions. Their 
volume is still not so large as to substitute more significantly the system of 
required reserves. in the given conditions, until repo operations become a mass 
instrument of monetary regulation, the required reserves will remain the basic 
instrument of system liquidity control. The expected result of activation of these 
operations is the normalization of interest rates. The attempt to discover the 
lowest (non-risk) interest rate by the auctions of treasury bills of the Republic 
of serbia was not successful. The interest rate at which the government bills 
were sold was above the interest rates on the nBs bills, in the range between 
3 and 6 percentage points. The yield rates in this market varied regardless of 
the basic fundamental factors and, generally speaking, remained at a very high 
level. in some situations these rates were higher than the commercial ones. The 
demand for these securities is concentrated on a few highly liquid banks, and 
the price of money which the government obtained in this way is very high. 
the nBs repo operations have a chance of engaging much greater demand 
and discovering the base interest rate in the system in the conditions involving 
greater competition. This would lead to a revival of the money market and its 
gradual normalization.
during december 2004 the Belgrade Stock Exchange Index was established 
under the official name of BELEXfm. the basic characteristics of this index 
are determined by the qualities of the market itself. There is no official listing 
on the Belgrade stock exchange, with a relatively small number of shares being 
continuously traded. For that reason, the composite index concept was selected, 
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measuring changes in the prices of all shares on the so-called free stock exchange 
market. The index is, in the statistical sense, descriptive, not an investment 
index. This characteristic of the index is a consequence  of a relatively small 
depth and low liquidity of the share market. The index weighting is based on 
market capitalization, with the weight of each index component being limited 
to maximum 10%. The index is not adjusted for dividend payout or number of 
free float shares, which means that it is not protected from price disruptions 
regularly arising due to dividend payout. price weighting is performed based 
on capitalization or the number of shares of each issuer which are included in the 
free stock exchange market. preference shares or ordinary non-voting shares are 
not included in the number of shares included in the index basket. in order to 
prevent any single share from having a dominant share in the index basket, the 
number of shares with which it can participate in the index basket is limited. 
The weight is limited in the following manner: first the market capitalization of 
each issuer whose shares are included in the index basket is calculated, followed 
by the calculation of the weight of each share in the index basket.
iMpeRFections oF tHe coRpoRate contRoL MaRket
The corporate control market (takeover market) was activated in october 
2003 amidst low protection of minority shareholders, codified in the company 
Law. The second important circumstance: the regulation of the company 
takeover process in the Law on security Market was vague and particularly 
discriminatory in favor of the takeover bidder. This is what led to the expected 
deformities of this market. public scandals, discreditation of regulatory bodies, 
powerful vested interests which were latent on the market appeared in more 
drastic forms. The key deformities of this market are the following.
The best companies privatized under the 1997 privatization Law with the 
low level of protection of minority owners are exposed to the greatest takeover 
risk. There are practically no takeovers of other types of companies. takeover 
subjects were mostly from the so-called horizontal line: companies engaged 
in the same or similar activity. a stronger presence of investment funds and 
conglomerates has been detected lately.
an inversion of this market’s function is registered here: instead of the 
sanitary role (predators, takeover bidders eliminate from the corporate structure 
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inefficient companies and managers), here the basic function is the formation 
of rents (obtaining monopoly) or high capital gains. For that reason the process 
of company takeover in serbia bears all the characteristics of early transition: 
inefficient institutions, accelerated concentration of ownership and low level of 
minority owner protection.
takeover is realized amidst low price efficiency of the market. The basic 
causes of low price efficiency of this market are systemic: the general level of 
share price is lower than in the comparable countries. The low price efficiency 
results in a low value of the price/book value ratio. The consequence: the risk 
of hostile takeover, in the circumstances of combined activity of these factors, 
increases. This deformity allows the national corporate control market to be 
described as discriminatory in favor of the takeover bidder. The current market 
configuration allows the activation of this procedure even in the case when the 
share price is unknown.
The basic cause of the accelerated takeover market expansion is the instability 
of ownership structure created by the 1997 privatization Law. This quality of 
dispersed ownership is registered in all the cases in which the countries in 
transition applied it. typical examples of this type are Russia and the czech 
Republic.
the undervaluation of companies on this market is a consequence of 
fundamental imbalance between the supply of and demand for privatization 
shares. The supply on the takeover market underwent an upward deformation. 
The deformation of supply is a consequence of the low level of income and 
weak protection of minority shareholders. The share yield is usually not in any 
way dependent on the amount of net corporate profit. For that reason, a large 
number of shareholders of this type strive to sell their assets. on the demand 
side is the takeover bidder or bidders. other potential owners (individual and 
institutional investors) do not buy shares of the target company because the 
level of investor protection is low. The reason: the owner who took over the 
company may legally hide the profit or transfer it into his other company (firm 
“tunneling”).
The second group of factors are legal and regulatory inconsistencies. The 
takeover bidder is not obligated to buy out all the shareholders. it is enough 
for him to take over 51% of voting shares. since there is no legal obligation 
of public unconditional offer for the purchase of the remaining shares at the 
price of the controlling package takeover, the remaining shares usually become 
worthless very soon. neither is the other basic laws governing this issue 
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complete, coherent or consistent. These regulatory imperfections practically 
give the management unlimited power: it can “tunnel” the firm, reduce the 
value of its assets and adopt most of the decisions against the classic rules of 
property protection. on the other hand, the Law on securities Market treats 
all joint-stock companies as public, in such a way unnecessarily increasing the 
takeover risk.
takeover often occurs as the market’s punishment against the management 
expropriating the property of its own owners. in most dramatic takeover cases 
non-standard behaviors of managers can be registered, practically abolishing 
or significantly restricting the owners’ rights. The Law on securities Market 
did not regulate the normal takeover defense procedure. For that reason the 
mass moral hazard arises: the management, if it cannot take over the company 
itself, works for the benefit of the takeover bidder, rather than its own principal. 
This situation results in the worst possible outcome. share prices fail to reach 
their real value even during the takeover. everyone loses: the owners, the 
management and the state alike.
on the serbian corporate control market almost all forms of takeover are 
present. From the purchase of initial packages on the secondary market to the 
purchase of the companies in bankruptcy. Recently, the takeover through a 
public offer has become particularly topical. The second important phenomenon 
in the past few months since the Law on securities Market came into effect 
has been the strong presence of investment funds from the countries of the 
so-called tax haven. in the near future the mechanism of mass takeover of 
companies in bankruptcy is likely to be activated.
The phenomenon of takeover itself is not disputed. it is today a world trend 
and presents one of the basic channels of restructuring of modern economies. 
What is problematic in this phenomenon in this country? 
experiences with joint-stock company takeover in serbia so far show that 
this procedure is usually followed by a massive threatening of property rights 
of the existing owners. This practice can compromise the financial market in 
the long run.
after the takeover, the new owner frequently conducts the mass operation 
of expropriation against the remaining shareholders through the capital 
increase operation. this is done particularly frequently by domestic owners. 
The issue price of new issue shares is much lower than the real and last realized 
market price, or the share price at which the takeover was conducted. The 
preemption right to new issue shares is usually first eliminated. These decisions 
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are adopted by the shareholders’ meeting without particular resistance because 
they (employees and pensioners) do not have a possibility to purchase new 
issue shares. since our legislation does not regulate the secondary trade in this 
right, it is, under such circumstances, practically worthless. The result of this 
operation is a drastic reduction of the share price. (cases have been registered 
where, due to these operations, the price of shares went down to barely 10% of 
the price at which the joint-stock company was taken over.) 
if the new owner is a financial or institutional investor it is not possible 
to expect additional investment in companies taken over as is the case in 
takeovers by strategic investors. The basic strategy of a financial investor is to 
acquire capital gains. He takes over a company which is evidently undervalued 
and achieves appropriate result with relatively small cost restructuring and 
management change. The presence of these investors, in particular funds from 
“tax havens” has lately increased. domestic investors of this type are in a less 
favorable position, because the adoption of the law on investment funds has 
been delayed for already a few years.
Finally, in the present form the takeover market  is discriminatory. takeover 
transactions as they are conducted currently in this country negatively affect 
everyone involved except the takeover bidder. small owners who do not accept 
the takeover bid, cannot, under the existing conditions, protect the property 
rights. they were also previously affected by the management’s failure to 
observe property rights.
The government and its share Fund are particularly affected. since the 
moment when the Law on securities Market came into effect, no significant 
sale of the minority packages has taken place. if it fails to join the takeover 
bid, the government mostly shares the fate of the remaining small shareholders 
and suffers losses. The legislative reaction to this phenomenon was wrong. The 
share Fund is given the rights of ordinary share holders. The solution lies in the 
adoption of a standard law on takeover.
strategy of market development and existing regulations 
The key issue of strategy of capital market development is the issue of its 
survival. other countries with mass privatization programs faced this problem 
as well. after “the high tide” of sale, which is essentially a normal reaction of the 
owner to the level of risk and yield of these shares, low tide sets in. The number 
of listed shares is decreased, the trade volume goes down and there are no new 
emissions.
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For the market to survive and make sense it is necessary to develop 
those of its basic functions. The basic (strategic) goal of the financial market’s 
development is to make it capable of performing its basic function – financing 
of the corporate sector. For the financial market to evolve gradually from 
the currently dominant mechanism of property rights redistribution, the 
mechanism of financing the corporate sector should be fundamentally 
rearranged.
the Law on the Market of securities and other Financial instruments 
was adopted at the federal level in november 2002. This law jeopardizes the 
basic principles of shareholders’ property protection. a new law or radical 
amendments to the existing law must eliminate the conflict with elementary 
standards of market regulation.
as long as this Law is in force it is not possible to establish the basic 
function of the market, because it did not successfully solve the problem of a 
company going public through a public share offer. Furthermore, the Law 
does not enable the protection of the market’s integrity, because it does not 
recognize the concept of related parties. This shortcoming led in some cases 
to the discreditation of the regulatory bodies and a collapse of the market. 
namely, pairs or groups of related parties (issuers, banks, financial auditors, 
brokers, etc.) can cause a series of disruptions on the market from the 
deformation of the price of a stock exchange transaction to the manipulations 
in public placements of securities.
the second important area of necessary and desirable changes is the 
area of takeovers. in this area the laws do not precisely define the procedure, 
supervision over and obligation of the takeover bidder. The need for regulating 
this area is undisputed, regardless of whether this will be done by a separate 
takeover law or amendment to the Law on securities Market. The desirable 
solution is the adoption of a new takeover law.
at the end of 2004 the Law on economic entities was adopted. The Law 
dedicates particular attention to public corporations or publicly-held joint-
stock companies. The expected result of the implementation of these solutions 
is a reduction of the risk of investment in the real sector and, in medium 
term, enabling the real sector to acquire additional capital not only through 
the banking system but also through the financial market. The achievement of 
this strategic goal does not depend only on the solutions in this law. equally 
important are the laws governing the financial markets. The development of 
the capital market requires an improvement of management of joint-stock 
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companies, in particular the improvement of the protection of minority 
shareholders. The basis for the evolution of regulations according to the eU 
standards and oecd principles of corporate governance is provided by the 
Law on economic entities. national corporate governance principles based on 
these standards should be defined.
parallel with risk reduction, which would result from amending the basic 
laws, it is also possible to activate new sources of demand on the financial 
market. the simultaneous development of these processes enables the 
deepening of the market and increase in its liquidity. Without institutional and 
portfolio investors the capital market cannot be expected to grow quickly. For 
that reason, the law on investment funds and investment companies should be 
adopted.
apart from the basic laws, there is also need for a separate law on mortgage-
backed securities. That law would enable the issuing of low-risk securities 
backed by mortgages 
a strategically important goal could also be the reinforcement of the 
supervisory function on the financial markets. it is necessary to redefine the 
competences of the securities commission and increase its actual regulatory 
and supervisory capacity by defining its status as an indisputably independent 
regulatory body. the commission must have actual ability to exercise its 
authority in particular in the area of efficient supervision of participants and 
processes on the market. The second important area in which the supervisory 
capacity of the commission should be increased is the introduction of adequate 
reporting based on the iFRs and iosco principles. namely, the procedure 
of company going public by issuing securities on the primary market and 
protection of minority shareholders can be raised to a significantly higher 
level.
These goals can be achieved either by reinforcing the existing institution 
(securities commission), or forming a new institution for supervision of all 
financial activities (banking, insurance, financial market). in view of the 
experiences of other countries, a possibility of establishing a new institution 
for integrated supervision over all financial activities which would be de facto 
and institutionally independent both from the executive power and from the 
market participants, should also be considered.
in the area of international and regional cooperation it is possible to 
reinforce the national financial market by continuing and intensifying 
cooperation within the iosco. serbia is a full member of this international 
293Financial Market Reform
association of regulatory bodies for securities. This cooperation can improve 
the quality of national regulations and raise the supervision capacity of the 
national regulatory body.
The next important goal is the reinforcement of self-regulatory bodies 
and professional associations enabling an increase in market discipline 
and improvement of ethic standards of professions, increase in the level of 
professional knowledge and skills and creation of trust of the investment and 
general public in institutions.

Boško Mijatović
Reform of the Labor Market 
and Labor Relations
THE SITUATION UNTIL 2001
Situation on the labor market 
The 1990s were the years of crisis in every respect – not only economic but 
also political. The break-up of Yugoslavia brought with it wars in which Serbia 
did not formally participate, but its material and financial engagement was 
clearly visible. UN trade and economic sanctions were an additional burden. 
If one adds to it the negative effects of the administrative socialist economic 
system, the result is a very unfavorable picture of economic and social trends 
during this decade. 
During the 1990s, economic trends were exceptionally unfavorable – 
from the sharp decline of the domestic product, real value of wages, pensions 
and all personal income, through plummeting employment and growing 
unemployment, to the flourishing grey economy, criminalization of economic 
life and the society as a whole, etc. 
The total employment fell by 200,000 from 1991 to 2000, i.e. from 2.2 to 2.0 
million. The basic contribution to the adverse employment trends came from 
the sector of state and socially owned companies (including mixed), where 
employment dropped by more than half a million, from 2.1 to 1.6 million. 
This constant downward trend was a proof of the failure of the formal sector 
not only to increase employment and engage the available labor force, but 
also to maintain the current employment level. The private sector increased 
employment by more than 300,000, but did not manage to make up for the fall 
in the state/socially owned sector. 
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The reasons for such dynamics of employment lie in the economic 
activity trends. The decrease in the domestic product of the formal sector 
was accompanied by a decrease in employment, although at a slower pace. 
This difference in the speed of decline caused a large rise in the number of 
surplus employees (hidden unemployment), i.e. those employees who did not 
contribute to the production of goods or services. The exact assessment of 
the employee surplus for 2000 did not exist, but it is certain that the surplus 
exceeded one third of the total number of employees in socially and state 
owned sector. Such processes are the result of the government policy of 
preventing employee layoffs, i.e. transferring the social policy from the state 
to companies. The reduction in the number of employees during this decade 
is the result of the natural outflow due to retirement, employment in the private 
sector or emigration. 
The private sector had a positive employment dynamics, but the 
opportunities for a faster development of this sector and greater employment 
by the same were not utilized. Economic policy usually favored „large scale“ 
economy at the expense of the autochthonous private sector, which slowed 
down its development. On the other hand, the private sector avoided high 
taxes and contributions hiring employees without registering them, which 
reduced the growth of formal employment. 
At the same time, registered unemployment was on the rise, to increase 
between 1991 and 2000 from 522,000 to 723,000. These figures hardly reflected 
true employment trends, since the registering with the labor market completely 
lost the character it should have: namely, many of the unemployed who were 
actually looking for a job stopped registering with employment bureaus since 
there was no hope that they would find a job that way; on the other hand, those 
who were not really looking for a job registered to obtain benefits the status 
of the formally unemployed entailed (health insurance, child allowance, etc.). 
The duration of unemployment was very long. According to the labor force 
survey, in 1996 the average duration of waiting for a job was 47.2 months, 
and about 4/5 of the unemployed waited for employment for more than 
one year.1 Thus, unemployment in Serbia was a long-term and permanent 
category: few people left the category of the unemployed. Unemployment in 
Serbia was definitely exacerbated by the inflow of refugees from Croatia and 
B&H, and then from Kosovo and Metohia. According to the 1996 census they 
1.  G. Krstić and B. Stojanović – Osnove reforme tržišta rada u Srbiji, (Basic Reforms of the Labor Market 
in Serbia), CLDS and EI, 2001, p. 30
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numbered, not including the refugees from Kosovo and Metohia, six hundred 
thousand.2
The movements in registered employment during the nineties are shown 
in the following graph:
Figure 1. Formal employment
During the 1990s Serbia experienced a strong upswing of grey economy. 
Many people who did not formally earn enough to provide an adequate living 
– the unemployed, employed, pensioners, housewives, etc. – took up jobs in 
the grey economy sector to provide themselves and their families at least 
mere subsistence. The causes of the above were numerous: overly restrictive 
government regulations, excessive taxes, wars, sanctions, blocked transition, 
weaknesses of government bodies, etc. Generally speaking, grey economy is 
certainly inferior in terms of economic efficiency compared to the formal 
sector, but in the given circumstances it proved to be a more vital part of the 
overall economy.
The empirical studies of the grey economy of Yugoslavia from 19973, 
confirmed the assessment on its size and significance in the life of the 
population. On the basis of the survey (3,000 respondents) it was concluded 
2  Census of Refugees and other War Affected Persons in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, UNHCR, 
Commissioner for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia, Commissioner for Displaced Persons of the 
Republic of Montenegro, Belgrade, 1996.
3  Analiza sive ekonomije u SR Jugoslaviji sa procenama za 1997. godinu i preporukama za nje-nu 
legalizaciju (The Analysis of the Grey Economy in FR Yugoslavia with Estimates for 1997 and 
Recommendations for is Legalization), Ekonomski Institut, Beograd, 1998.
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that as many as 2.3 million people were involved in the grey economic activities 
and that slightly over a half of this number was made up of the individuals 
who had jobs in the formal sector, which is the evidence of their low income. 
The earnings of the grey economy participants per hour were higher than the 
earnings in the formal sector by half. 
The normative labor relations system 2000
During the 1990s, certain labor legislation reforms were introduced 
(labor relations laws were passed in 1991 and 1996), but they mostly involved 
formal adjustment to market economy in little or least important domains. 
For instance, collective bargaining was introduced, but it was controlled by the 
state to such an extent that it was reduced to mere form and was a continuation 
of legal regulation, very much like government decrees.
These changes of the labor legislation were a part of a very slow transition 
from the socialist towards the market system. The foundations of transition 
were laid in 1990, but, later on, there occurred some retrograde processes, so 
that the economic life proceeded in the institutional interspace between these 
two forms. Privatization began, but by the end of the decade less than five 
percent of capital was privatized; prices were still under government control; 
legal labor, capital, money or foreign currency markets were stifled or did not 
exist; companies were more like welfare centers than profit centers, etc.
Towards the end of 2000, and until the adoption of the new Labor Law in 
2001, the labor relations system was based on the 1996 Labor Relations Law. 
The foundation of the labor legislation was the federal labor relations law, while 
the republic one supplemented it with more detail. However, the federal law 
was detailed enough, so some provisions repeated in both laws. An important 
addition to this law was the Law on Labor Relations within Government 
Bodies, which protected this category of the employed and practically made 
dismissing them impossible, except in the case of clearly proved disciplinary 
offences. The novelty in the new system was greater reliance on collective 
bargaining agreements, and also the elimination of many previous detailed 
provisions from the text of the law and their transfer to collective bargaining 
agreements.
From the economic point of view, the most important provisions of a labor 
law are those related to the hiring and firing of employees, types of employment, 
manner of determining wages, collective barging, employee benefits, etc.
299Reform of the Labor Market and Labor Relations
The hiring of employees faced considerable procedural and formal 
requirements. First, as a rule, the vacancy had to be filled by means of public 
announcement, with all the accompanying procedures (selection committee, 
supervisory body, etc.), which complicated and lengthened the procedure. 
Secondly, for each position there was, in accordance with the legal requirements, 
a job plan with the necessary qualifications, which significantly and frequently 
narrowed unnecessarily the scope of candidates for hiring. Such an approach 
to hiring is justified in the system in which the private ownership of companies 
does not dominate or exist, but social or state ownership dominates, and the 
legislator rightfully believes the only way of curbing nepotism and corruption 
is the setting of a wide scope of the most objective selection criteria and 
procedures possible. However, in the system which is becoming a market 
system, the obstacles to free recruitment of employees by owners or managers 
selected by them become counterproductive and impedes a normal and 
inexpensive flow of staff expansion or renewal.
Firing for economic reasons was almost a mission impossible. First, 
although the law provided for the possibility of dismissing employees due to 
organizational, economic or technological reasons, during the most part of 
the nineties, a decree was in force banning employee layoffs during the UN 
sanctions against Serbia, with the so-called forced leaves to which were sent 
employees for whom there was no work; besides, there was a direct legal ban 
on dismissing certain categories of employees (veterans etc.) Secondly, the 
political atmosphere during this decade was completely against the layoffs, 
which, due to the domination of party state over economy, automatically meant 
that company directors completely avoided layoffs. In other words, even when 
it was possible, there were no layoffs for fear of government reaction. And, 
thirdly, the costs of possible layoff, stipulated in the Law on Labor Relations, 
were exceptionally high, and amounted to 24-36 employee wages, in the form 
of a single redundancy pay. What was even more unfavorable, those high costs 
of the adjusting of the labor force to the necessary level were supposed to be 
borne by the companies which, as a rule, were in a bad situation and which were 
supposed to be saved by restructuring, including the reduction of employee 
number, from the impending bankruptcy.
In such combined conditions, there were no layoffs for the purposes of 
adjustment of labor force to the changed circumstances. The only way of labor 
force reduction was the natural outflow due to retirement or the employee’s 
leaving his/her job willingly, which for most of the companies was too slow a 
process.
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This lack of possibility to lay off the labor force affected the companies’ 
behavior: instead of legal employment there was mass grey employment or 
employment through youth employment cooperatives, by means of service 
contracts, temporary work and similar legal and illegal techniques of avoiding 
full employment. That is how restrictive legislation produced its opposite – the 
shift of employment from formal to grey and quasi-formal arrangements.
While new employment managed somehow to avoid restrictive rules and 
reach companies, it was not possible to reduce the existing employment to 
the right measure. Therefore, in many companies there was a large employee 
surplus, i.e. a great number of employees did not contribute to the production 
and the financial result of the company. Estimates (although unreliable) of the 
surplus ranged between a third and more than a half, and that is supported by 
the fact that lately, new owners of privatized companies have very often offered 
incentives to a considerable part of the labor force (usually 30-40% of the total 
employees, even more) to leave the company voluntarily.
Collective bargaining was contemplated as an unavoidable and centralized 
system. Unavoidable, because the obligation of collective bargaining is stipulated, 
although it goes against the logic of collective bargaining and against the rules of 
the International Labor Organization on the freedom of collective bargaining. 
Centralized, because there was an applicable rule that everybody had to comply 
with the provisions of the “higher” collective bargaining agreement, even if 
they did not conclude “their own” collective bargaining agreement. In other 
words, it was sufficient that the all-powerful Government of Serbia conclude 
the republic collective bargaining agreement with its faithful political allies, the 
Independent Trade Union and the Chamber of Trade and Industry of Serbia 
and that all companies were obliged to apply it, regardless of whether it suited 
them or what they thought of it. 
The main victim of the system of collective bargaining designed in such a 
manner was the setting of wages, which was, thus, transferred from companies 
to collective agreements. “The basic price of labor”, as the minimum price for 
the simplest work, as well as the prices of labor for other employee categories 
were most often set at a level much higher than the market one, and most often 
could not be paid out, since companies could not bear such high labor costs. 
The party state tolerated such company behavior since in this manner it got 
propaganda points as a declared protector of employee interests, but since it 
also laid down high taxes and contributions on the minimum base of such 
unrealistically determined wages. By doing so the state additionally encouraged 
employers to satisfy their demand for labor force on the informal market. 
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Flexible employment forms were hardly provided for in the law, and 
only as specificity and an exception to the rule. And the rule was permanent 
full-time employment, which certainly does not suit the market economy, but 
which strengthens employees’ social security. 
Various benefits were stipulated by the law: paid leave (minimum 18 
days, not including Saturdays), holiday and meal allowances and the cost of 
transport to the place of work, part of the sick leave costs, etc, were considerable 
additional cost for the companies, and a significant part of employee income, 
especially for those with lower wages.
Social aspects of labor legislation and policy
Socially and state owned companies in Serbia in the 1990s were increasingly 
turning into welfare centers for employees, and were less and less production 
and profit centers. The economic crisis uncovered this change of character of 
Serbian companies, but, although less visible, it had itself contributed to the 
crisis. Namely, when one considers more closely the normative character of 
labor relations at the time as well as the state policy in this and other areas, 
one can easily notice that the welfare function of the state was to a great extent 
transferred to companies, with mostly adverse effects. Let us take a closer 
look:
1. job security, i.e. the impossibility for a company to lay-off an employee 
and thus try to reduce costs;
2. collective “bargaining” in favor of employees;
3. wage egalitarianism;
4. different financial and material benefits from company funds (the above 
mentioned ones stipulated by the law and those received through the 
trade union);
5. prescribing of low selling prices, by which the state protected the 
employees’ standard of living, without compensation to companies for 
losses sustained;
6. lack of implementation of bankruptcy legislation,
7. melting away of capital in favor of wages and due to low prices of the basic 
foodstuffs and utility services, etc.
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In this manner, the state tried to make the survival of (a part of) the 
citizens at the time of economic crisis easier, but at a considerable economic 
and social cost. The economic cost was reflected in the ruin of many companies 
which could not sustain the burden of the social policy imposed on them, and 
the social cost was reflected in a considerable neglect of a large part of the 
population in Serbia – all those who were not employed. The bad situation 
of the neglected citizens was further exacerbated by the bad management of 
the state’s social programs, intended for all citizens: therefore, the payments 
out of a small welfare program for the poor (both in terms of the number of 
people and the amount of welfare) were more than 24 months late towards the 
end of 2000; on the other hand, only the employed citizens had the right to a 
somewhat better child allowance program. 
The care for the employees was also reflected in a very favorable system 
of compensations and insurance in the case they were to lose their jobs due to 
objective reasons (bankruptcy or the like). These unemployed persons had the 
right to a cash compensation and pension and disability and health insurance 
in the period of receiving the compensation. The cash compensation amounted 
to 70% of their net wages in the last month of employment, and the period in 
which they received payments lasted up to 24 months, while those with over 
30 years of service had the right to compensation until they found another 
job or become entitled under the law to old-age pension. Of course, the other 
unemployed persons (i.e. those who were looking for their first job and those 
who voluntarily terminated employment) did not have such favorable rights. 
The basic division was into the employed and the unemployed: the employed 
had jobs and the accompanying benefits, while the unemployed were pushed 
to the margins, with very bleak prospects. Among the latter prevailed the 
young and educated, who responded to the deterioration of living conditions 
by emigrating.
The welfare approach to employment and hiring during the 1990s 
produced the expected results during the worsening of the economic crisis: 
the wages plunged in real terms (by more than a half) and, thus, took on the 
burden of adjustment to the lower domestic product. On the other hand, in 
capitalist economies the adjustment to the crisis is made by the reduction of 
the level of employment, leaving the companies in a healthier state, and the 
crisis is, therefore, less deep. 
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LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 2001-2005
Introduction
The process of the true transition of Serbian economy, which commenced 
the beginning of 2001, inevitably affected labor legislation. True capitalist 
economy is definitely not possible with the labor relations law containing strong 
socialist elements of employee protection. For the foreign investments to arrive 
in Serbia, especially in the form of privatization investments which the Serbian 
Government seriously counted on, it was necessary to radically change labor 
legislation at the very beginning of this wave of transition. Because it is hard 
to believe that the investment in the Serbian economy not only by foreign but 
also by local investors would be of a larger scope if numerous impediments 
from the applicable Law on Labor Relations were to remain.
The new Labor Law was passed in December 2001. It was an important 
step on the reform path and was passed after an exciting political struggle. 
It was followed by the Employment Law from 2003, which was supposed to 
provide a necessary level of protection from unemployment and to ensure 
that the active employment measures are implemented through the National 
Employment Service. 
At a more general level, the strategy of the DOS’s Government of Serbia 
was a combination of the following elements:
1. a relatively liberal labor law which increased the flexibility of the labor 
market, which, in turn, was supposed to increase the attractiveness of 
doing business in Serbia;
2. alleviating the tax and contribution burden on the wages, which was 
supposed to increase the attractiveness of new employment and to 
encourage the legalization of employees in the grey economy;
3. active employment measures which, with government support, were 
meant to encourage new employment; and
4. relatively generous social programs for those who lose their jobs or 
agree to willingly leave their companies (under the Employment Law, 
from the Transition Fund and from the funds of the buyers of privatized 
companies) 
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The idea was to enable through 1, 2 and 3 a long-term rise in employment, 
and to absorb some of the short-term problems. Increased fiscal costs for 
the implementation of this strategy could be covered from donations and 
privatization proceeds.
Labor Law from 2001
Introduction
The whole of 2001 was spent in the preparation and passing of the Labor 
Law. Since the Ministry of Labor and Employment did not have sufficient 
expert capacities for the drafting of the law, foreign experts were engaged, too, 
under the leadership of the World Bank. The Minister, Dragan Milovanovic, 
was a staunch advocate of the reform.
In the autumn of 2001 political obstacles to the draft law built up. The 
Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia (SSSS) led a strong 
action against the draft, demanded to participate as a partner in the drafting 
of the law, proposed anti-reform amendments to the proposal, and at the time 
the law was being passed in the Parliament, organized an unsuccessful general 
strike. The Association of Free and Independent Trade Unions (ASNS) of 
Minister Milovanovic supported the draft while the Nezavisnost Trade Union 
Confederation (UGS Nezavisnost) was somewhat indecisive, not willing to join 
either the Government or the SSSS. The SSSS had three goals: first, to secure 
mandatory collective bargaining at all levels, from the state to the company 
level; second, to make layoffs as hard as possible; and third, to ensure through 
the law the largest possible role for the trade unions in the relations between 
employers and employees. If these demands had been accepted there would 
hardly have been anything left of the free negotiations between employers and 
workers, and thus of the labor market. 
Another important difficulty appeared in the party field. The break-up 
of DOS coalition was so far advanced that he passing of the Labor Law was 
threatened. Since DSS indicated that it was not happy with the proposal, a 
political deal was struck in which DSS was promised the passing of the 
(corrected) judiciary laws proposed by them if they voted for the Labor Law. 
And that is what happened.
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Basic solutions
One of the important questions the proponent was faced with, which 
to a great extent predetermined other solutions, was the following: how to 
encompass in one labor law to such different sectors as the state/socially owned 
and private? That is, whether to opt for equal solutions for all employees or to 
differentiate them according to sector? For example, is it good to also give the 
right to lay off workers to the directors of socially owned companies, who are 
not accountable to an unbiased owner, but are either accountable to no one 
or to the biased political parties? Whether and where to make compromises? 
The Government opted for one law with equal rules, considering the fact that 
the privatization process was beginning and that all socially-owned and many 
state-owned companies would be privately owned in the foreseeable future. This 
solution certainly makes sense, but it brought – as could be seen after a time 
– many difficulties, since its basic assumption (the one about fast privatization) 
did not materialize, since, as we can see, privatization is not over, not even half 
of it, four years from its commencement. Perhaps it would have been better 
to provide in the law somewhat different solutions for the two sectors, with 
the socially owned companies or those with mixed ownership shifting to the 
regime stipulated for the private sector after privatization. That is because 
the path taken resulted in a lot of compromises, solutions that were adopted 
primarily for the purposes of protecting employees in the socially owned sector 
prior to and during privatization, but which do not suit the private sector and 
the market economy.
Generally, the basic dilemma in designing the Labor Law was : freedom of 
negotiation or state regulation, that is, the labor market flexibility or employee 
protection. In essence it is the choice between economic and social motives 
in designing the law: the economic ones speak in favor of the freedom of 
negotiation, based on the respect for the labor market, while the social ones 
aim at the highest possible protection of the employees from the risks (and 
gains) the labor market brings to the workers.
Employers, on the one hand, most often favor market regulation of their 
employee relations, i.e., the freest possible negotiation of all the relevant 
factors (nature of employment, wages and other conditions) with employees, 
as well as the least possible costs the state imposes or may impose (taxes and 
contributions, legal obligations of the company towards its employees, the 
simplest possible procedures, efficient adjudication, etc.). Such relatively liberal 
labor relations systems truly foster the development of economic activity, and 
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even, usually, provide for a higher level of employment than alternative, more 
tightly regulated ones aimed at the maintenance of employment.
Employees, on the other hand, often prefer job security and wage stability, 
especially during the times of high unemployment and transition changes. 
Trade unions always support them and the state usually shows understanding 
for such demands and regulates labor relations favoring security, wages and 
other employee benefits. In the countries where labor relations are more 
broadly regulated (like in many EU members) unemployment is usually high. 
It is similar in many countries in transition, but the question here is whether it 
is primarily the consequence of labor legislation (similar to the one in the EU) 
or the difficulties of building and functioning of a new economic system.
In the area of labor relations, not only in Serbia but also in other countries, 
social and political considerations are opposed to economic ones and the result 
is a trade-off between job security and level of employment, i.e. the higher the 
security the lower the employment, and vice versa. Individual countries have 
resolved this dilemma differently: liberally in the USA, for instance, with the 
domination of contract over legislation; by broad legislative protection of jobs 
in Germany and Italy, for example. However, the European Union realized that 
the restrictive solutions in labor legislation in many member countries make 
the European economy less competitive and dynamic than others (e.g. USA), 
and adopted, through the 2000 Lisbon Agenda, proclaiming the goal of making 
the EU the most competitive economy in the world by 2010, a program of 
labor legislation reform in a more liberal direction, which has been gradually 
implemented, but not fast enough (the Koch’s report, end of 2004).
The most important issues reflecting the character of a labor law are: the 
hiring and firing procedures, employee benefits, collective bargaining and 
prescription of wages, etc. If the hiring and firing procedure is simple and 
inexpensive for the company, if the wages and other benefits are not precisely 
regulated by the law but left to collective bargaining, which, in turn, is not 
mandatory, we can speak of a liberal labor relations regime. If, however, hiring 
is complex and firing even more so, if many employee rights are defined by 
the law, and collective bargaining thus emptied of any content and then made 
practically mandatory, obviously, social and protection motivation dominate 
the legislation. procedure.
Let us look at the basic solutions in the 2001 Labor Law.
Hiring was simplified compared to previous solutions. there is no longer a 
legal obligation to recruit employees by means of public announcement, which 
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made the process long and costly. Now, there is a reasonable basic assumption 
that an (private) employer knows best how to obtain the best workers and that 
he does not need a tutor in the form of government legislation. The Labor 
Law provides only for the basic employment conditions (minimum 15 years 
of age and that such labor does not threaten the employee’s health, morality 
and education), but all other conditions for a particular job are defined by the 
employer (qualifications, years of experience, etc.).
The Law, apart from the classic form of permanent full-time employment, 
also provided for flexible forms of work, such as temporary and part-time 
employment. These solutions widened the choice of both the individual and 
the employer, and the wrong interventionist idea of strict limitation of flexible 
forms of work in order to force the employers to hire full time permanent 
employees, was discarded. A reasonable opinion prevailed that the unemployed 
will benefit more from flexible employment forms, although this may mean 
less work and earnings per person, but for more people, than not so effective 
pressure on the employers to do something that does not suit them (full-time 
employment). 
Termination of employment by the employer. This part of the law 
underwent the greatest changes. It is true that the principle that the employer 
can dismiss an employee only for a justified cause was still retained, which 
limits the freedom of contract, and involves the court as the place where it 
is finally determined whether the cause was justified or not. However, such 
justified causes are formulated in the Law quite broadly, and they, too, are 
basically interpreted by the employer (at least in the first instance), so that they 
do not pose a serious functional obstacle to the dismissal of employees.
There are three basic groups of causes for possible dismissal:
1. if the employee violates the rules;
2. if it is established that the employee does not perform adequately, that 
is, that he does not possess the necessary knowledge and skills to do the 
job;
3. if due to technological, economic or organizational changes, the need for 
a particular job no longer exists.
#1 – The novelty here is that the law does not impose the procedure of 
determining the violation, as was the case in the previous law with the 
disciplinary committee, but it leaves to the employer the right to establish the 
facts, based on a reasonable assumption that it is not in the employer’s interest 
to rid himself a good employee this way. 
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#2 – The right to dismiss an employee who does not perform satisfactorily 
must also be an inalienable right of the employer. That is because such an 
employee is a hindrance to the efficient functioning of the firm and it is only 
natural that the direct way of dismissing him be defined.
The labor law, however, stipulates the obligation of the employer to pay 
severance pay to such an employee, the amount of which depends on the 
years of service and the amount of the wages up to that moment. Namely, 
the severance pay ranges from one to 2 ½ employee’s wages for each year of 
service with the present employer. This severance pay was drastically reduced 
compared to the previous law, under which it amounted from 24 to 36 monthly 
wages, but it is not clear why it was retained in the first place. Namely, it is 
unclear why an employer should have any obligation to pay anything to a 
bad or insufficiently good worker; if the basic prerequisite of the employment 
contract – the one about the good performance of work by the employee – was 
not met, it is natural that the contract should be terminated by the employer 
but without any compensation for the employee. If the state wants to assist 
such an individual, it should pay the severance pay itself, from the budget. 
Of course, it is clear why such solution was included in the law: to discourage 
layoffs and thus reduce social tensions during transition. Such socio-political 
reason is hard to support from the economic, and event the moral point of 
view, considering that it grants the right to financial compensation to the 
person who does perform his job properly.
#3 – The employer may also terminate the contract of the employee if, 
due to technological, economic and organizational changes, the need for his 
services no longer exists. This is, therefore, the way in which the employer can 
reduce the labor force in the company, i.e. adjust it to the real needs. However, 
the law sets two limits to the employer who has more than fifty employees.
Firstly, he must attempt to solve the problem of redundant employees 
before laying them off. If he intends to lay off less than 10% of the labor force, 
it is sufficient that he attempts to provide the employee with another position. 
Since this obligation was broadly defined, it did not pose a true obstacle for less 
than 10% of the labor force.
A somewhat more complex procedure was stipulated for the layoff of 
more than 10% of all employees. In such a case a redundancy program must 
be prepared, which may contain the change of position, assignment to another 
employer, retraining, etc, which is carried out in cooperation with the National 
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Employment Service. If such measures are unsuccessful, which happens as a 
rule, the particular employees are laid off and the problem remains with the 
National Employment Service.
Secondly, and more seriously, the law stipulates the employer’s obligation 
to pay to the employee who is losing his job the redundancy pay ranging from 
the amount of two to five monthly wages of the said employee, depending 
on the total years of service. This provisions, too, is neither economically 
sensible (since it makes the so much needed restructuring of the company 
harder) nor morally justified (since one cannot see why the employer/company 
owner should finance social policy). There is still that old socio-political 
consideration.
Privatization and the reduction of the labor force4. One of the important 
components of the privatization program in Serbia is the care for the destiny 
of redundant employees in privatized companies. Namely, in the process of the 
decision-making on to whom a company will be sold ( in tender privatization) 
the social program criterion was one of the basic three criteria (apart from 
the selling price and the amount of the investment program). This criterion 
usually meant the commitment not to lay off employees in the following 
few years, and/or the obligation to pay the agreed (and defined in the social 
program) redundancy payments for those employees who agree to voluntarily 
leave the company during this period. Similarly, in the companies sold through 
auction, the privatization program and the draft agreement include the ban 
on lay-offs in the following few years, as well as the amount of redundancy 
payment (usually 200 € per year of service) for those who will willingly leave 
the company. This was the way to attempt, as was declared, to reduce the so-
called social cost of transition, or indirectly, (some) employees were bribed 
into accepting privatization.
What were the effects of such an approach? It led to the direct reduction 
of the price of the company being privatized. Because it makes no difference to 
the buyer what form the payment takes:
1. the full amount he is ready to pay for the company to the state budget 
(through the selling price of he firm), but with no cost for the layoff of the 
redundant workers, or
2. a part of the amount he is ready to pay to the budget, and the other to the 
excess employees, so that they leave the company.
4.  The points related to privatization and the Transition Fund are not related to the Labor Law, but, 
since they are linked to layoffs, they certainly belong here.
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The buyer, of course, is only interested in the total acquisition and 
restructuring costs, and not their structure. An the state decided to give up 
one part of its revenue, in the form of compensation, to the employees who 
are going to lose their jobs. the idea is that these employees either find a way 
to initiate a private business, or, at least for a while, to have some means of 
livelihoods.
Frame 1
Philip Morris, the buyer of the Duvanska Industrija Nis - DIN (Nis 
Tobacco Industry), offered redundancy payments to the DIN employees in 
the autumn of 2004, according to the social program from the privatization 
time. The management estimated that it is less expensive than to have a 
large surplus of employees on the payroll for another four years and pay 
them wages. Of 2,400 employees, 1,650 accepted the offer and left DIN. 
The total Philip Morris’s cost was a US$ 100 million, and the employees 
who left the company received US$ 65 thousand on average, i.e. between 
US$ 10 and 100 thousand. In this way the state lost US$ 100 million, since 
that is the difference in the price Philip Morris was prepared o pay in the 
privatization DIN in the situation when it was left to it to resolve the issue 
of redundant employees and the alternative situation in which the rules of 
privatization would not oblige it to retain the present level of employment 
for the following five years. The question remains whether it is good for the 
state to give up US$ 100 million in order to improve the situation of only 
1,650 workers, and whether it is fair that at the expense of the state certain 
individuals gain up to US$ 100 thousand for the loss of job5.
BAT, the buyer of the Duvanska Industrija Vranje – DIN (Vranje 
Tobacco Industry) did not opt for the reduction of the number of employees 
and payment of redundancy pays, but intends to increase production and 
thus employ the whole workforce. Many DIV employees are probably sorry 
that they are not employed with the neighboring DIN.
The so-called Transition Fund is a special social protection program, 
intended for larger companies being restructured or placed under bankruptcy.6 
The Government of Serbia usually pays from it lump sums to employees who 
5.  The year before almost all DIN employees, in their capacity of minority shareholders, sold their 
shares to Philip Morris for about US$ 90 million.
6.  This program was created as the result of political pressure exerted by large companies, and its 
legality is disputable even though in 2002 the Government adopted the so-called Social Program, 
which was supposed to formalize the spending of these budget funds
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are willingly or forcedly left jobless, most often 100 € for each year of service. 
In 2002, 57,000 employees ere paid off in this manner, for which CSD 7 billion 
were spent. This is, in fact, the option which those people whose employment 
is terminated may choose instead of the regular unemployment benefit, and 
the idea is to provide, even with a modest sum, some initial investment into a 
small private business. The experience shows that this does not happen very 
often, but that the money is spent for self-support for several months. Informal 
at the beginning, this program was formalized in 2002 through the so-called 
Social Program. In 2005, CSD 5 billion from the budget were earmarked for 
these purposes.
Collective bargaining between employees and employers should to a great 
extent regulate employee wages and other more important employment 
conditions.
Under the 2001 Labor Law, collective bargaining between employers and 
trade unions is mandatory “… the participants … shall be obligated to negotiate”. 
If the negotiations do not go well, the arbitration body must be formed by 
mutual agreement, but its decisions need not be binding. Such a solution is 
not in full harmony with the principle of free collective bargaining, since it, at 
least partly, loses the character of free negotiations if it is, firstly, mandatory, 
and, secondly, if the arbitration is mandatory. The only thing missing is that the 
arbitration body’s decision is binding, to have the collective bargaining system, 
at least in terms of effects, similar to that from the times past. However, what is 
important is that the situation when the collective bargaining agreement is not 
reached, remains a possibility: collective bargaining – in order to truly be free 
– must be given a chance to fail and not to produce the collective bargaining 
agreement, at least for a while.
The improvement in comparison to the previous solutions is also the fact 
that the general collective bargaining agreement (for the whole of Serbia) and 
the social collective bargaining agreement (for a smaller territory or a group) 
bind only those employers who are the members of the association which signed 
these agreements, and not everybody else as well. Up to 2001, both general 
and special agreements directly bound all employers.
The provision from the Law stipulating that the Labor Minister may 
decide, if he assesses that there is a justified interest, that the general or 
individual collective agreements or individual provisions thereof apply also 
to those employers who did not participate in the conclusion of the collective 
bargaining agreement, is not a good solution. This possibility exists in practice 
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in some European countries, but one cannot see the need for this system to be 
applied in Serbia. Quite the opposite would be good: that it is made possible 
through free contracts for the companies and employee representatives to 
adapt employment contracts to their own preferences and specific conditions 
in individual companies.
The provision of the Labor Law reading that until new collective bargaining 
agreements are concluded the old ones, from Milosevic’s time will apply, is a 
very conservative one. These collective bargaining agreements can hardly be 
considered legitimate, since they were concluded between the representatives 
of the party state and party trade unions, and as such, should not be in force at 
all in the new environment. it would be better if upon the passing of the Labor 
Law all collective bargaining agreements had become invalid, and had to be 
concluded again, after new collective bargaining. However, in the majority of 
Serbian companies these old collective bargaining agreements are still in force, 
regardless of whether they are applied or not. It would be better if the Labor 
Law had stipulated that upon the enactment thereof all current collective 
bargaining agreements were to become invalid and that the new ones could be 
adopted in accordance with the new labor relations system.
Generally, the normative system of collective bargaining did not function 
as contemplated in the Labor Law. And in the part it was functioning it would 
hardly get a passing mark. The major trends are as follows:
  in some companies the old collective bargaining agreements were not 
complied with, either because there wee not sufficient funds for 
compliance, or because they do not fit with the new conditions, or because 
the management, feeling stronger than the employees or the trade unions, 
did not honor them.
  in some companies the trade union was strong and managed, after strikes, 
to achieve not only the compliance with the provisions of the old collective 
bargaining agreements favorable for the employees, but also additional 
benefits,
  there is a relatively small number of new collective bargaining agreements, 
which is not the evidence of the satisfaction with the current ones, but 
of the unstable and/or unclear situations in these companies, problems 
in communication between the two sides, as well ash immaturity of 
industrial relations in Serbia,
 in Serbia, there is a clear problem of the representativeness of the 
collective bargaining actors at a higher level: two trade unions are formally 
•
•
•
•
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representative (SSSS and Nezavisnost), the third currently is not (ASNS), 
while, really, no employer association is representative, and therefore the 
collective bargaining at the level of Serbia or large regions is not possible; 
in many companies, especially the smaller ones, there is a problem of 
trade union representativeness, since the trade union organization is 
either non-existent or weak and inactive. 
In summary, in Serbia, the compliance with the inadequate collective 
bargaining rules was weak on the part of the stakeholders who consciously 
relied on the fact that neither their partners in the company nor the state would 
stand in their way.
Since the determination of wages, in normative terms, is the basic task 
of the collective bargaining effort, it is obvious that, in Serbia, they are not 
determined through collective bargaining agreements. according to anecdotal 
evidence, since proper research has not been conducted, one could cautiously 
conclude that the wages are determined:
  in the sector of socially-owned and mixed (not fully privatized) companies 
as well as in the previous times: according to the available resources of the 
company with marked solidarity,
  in the autochthonous private sector, which mostly comprises small 
companies: by owner’s decision, i.e. in accordance with the local labor 
market, and
  in large privatized companies: often according to collective bargaining 
agreement, after tough negotiations (and with strikes) between the 
company trade unions and management.
Minimum wages – The Labor law stipulated the minimum wage, as a social 
measure which should protect the worst paid workers. it is determined semi-
annually by the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the representative 
trade unions and employer associations.7
While the 1996 Labor Relations Law set the minimum wage in a simple 
way – at 35% of the average wage – the 2001 Labor Law stipulated that it be 
determined according to the cost of living, needs, labor market situations and 
development of Serbia. Such flexible criteria turned the system of setting the 
minimum wage into constant haggling, where the trade unions demand as much 
7.  The question is whether the Employers’ Associations of Serbia is a representative employer association, 
because since the summer of 2004 it is practically unknown which management group represents 
the organization. It was not certain even in the previous period whether this Association represented 
a relevant number of employers. It seems as of the governments and trade unions need an employer 
organisation for procedural reasons, so they condone it.
•
•
•
314 Boško Mijatović
as possible, the government offers less, and the final outcome is somewhere in 
between. A witness to the above is the ratio of minimum to average wage in 
Serbia: from 35% towards the end of 2001, through 43% in January 2002, to 
47% in January 2005.
Despite all the understanding for the care of the social position of the 
poorest, even when it is exclusively motivated by political reasons, it is not 
good that the minimum wage practically equals a half of the average wage 
in Serbia. too high a minimum wage must!) either lead to non-compliance 
with the regulations, which has been a custom in Serbia all these years, 2) or, 
if the regulation is complied with, to lead to the increase of wages of a part 
of unqualified workers, but also to the rise in labor costs and the reduction 
of the job positions for unqualified workers, and thus rise in the overall 
unemployment.
General assessment of the Labor Law
The 2001 Labor Law was a large improvement in comparison to the previous 
Law on Labor Relations from 1996. the improvement of labor legislations is 
visible in all areas – from the simplification of hiring and firing, through more 
flexible relations within the company to a more liberal collective bargaining 
system. the basic philosophy of the law – to regulate the basics and toe leave 
the rest to the companies and collective bargaining – was good. There is no 
doubt that the Labor Law from 2001 was great step forward from the previous 
solutions. But this was neither hard to achieve, since previous legislation was so 
restrictive that it was easy to bring positive novelties, nor does it mean in itself 
that this law is exceptionally good, at least from the economic point of view. 
The 2001 Law, nevertheless, belongs to the category of laws common in market 
and transitional economies.
The main weakness of this law stems from its striving towards political 
compromise. That is, although liberal to some extent, this Labor Law gives 
concessions, for the purposes of political compromise, at the level of principle: 
it does not promote the idea of free contractual relations between employers 
and employees, but accepts the philosophy of the state regulation of industrial 
relations for the purposes of employee protection, and then attempts to mitigate 
the regulation in detail. For example, it prescribes mandatory collective 
bargaining, although not the obligation to reach agreement. Or, it stipulates 
that the employer may dismiss the employee only for a justified cause, and then 
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attempts with flexible formulations to expand the freedom it has just restricted. 
this apparently pragmatic approach – in which you accept wrong philosophy 
for the sake of compromise, and than derogate the compromise by allegedly 
clever tactics – can hardly produce good results over a long term. Because, 
wrong philosophy sooner or later comes to the forefront, for instance, by the 
parliament correcting technical weaknesses of the law and ensuring that the 
ruling philosophy is respected.
This law was rated somewhat more favorably by the World Bank saying 
that this law “provided more flexibility in both the hiring and firing of workers 
… These changes are the basis for the efficient reallocation of labor so as to 
increase productivity of existing and new enterprises.”8 Or, the law “creates 
the scope for enhanced labor mobility and job creation by simplifying the 
process of hiring and terminating employees and by reducing labor costs”9. 
The Foreign Investors Council in Serbia (FIC) goes even further, and almost 
fervently claims that “ the new law is very free-market oriented and comes as a 
response to the major economic and social changes that call for more flexibility 
in the labor market” 10. A more balanced and accurate evaluation of this Labor 
Law was given by the consulting firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers which says 
that “the Law does not privilege either employer or employees and it enhances 
functioning of the labor market”11
In sum, the 2001 Labor Law had both strengths and weaknesses. Its basic 
weakness was that it was too European and the basic strength was that it was 
not fully European.
Employment Law
The Employment Law was changed in 2001, and in July 2003 a new one 
was enacted, under the name of the Law on Employment and Unemployment 
Insurance, riding on the last wave of the reform laws of Zoran Zivkovic’s 
Government. They basically regulate two important things: first, unemployment 
8.  Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of Serbia, An Agenda for Economic growth and Employment, World 
Bank, December 6, 2004, p. 114
9.  Serbia and Montenegro, Recent Progress on Structural Reforms, World Bank, November 16, 2003, 
p. 5
10.  Proposal for Improvement of the Investment Climate in Serbia, Foreign Investment Council, Belgrade, 
2005, p. 24
11. Doing Business and Investing in Serbia, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2004, p. 43
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insurance, with employee rights and manner of financing, and, second, the 
system of active policy of employment by the state.
Unemployment insurance aims at assisting an individual who has lost his 
job without his fault, through the payment of unemployment benefits during 
a certain period of time, to look for and find an appropriate job, without a 
significant loss f income.
Towards the end of 1990s the minimum unemployment benefit was 50% 
of the average monthly wage in the Republic and there was no upper limit. 
Those who received the benefit were entitled to 70% of their last wage plus 2% 
for each year of work experience. This was really a generous formula, especially 
for those with high wages and many years of service: they could obtain a benefit 
that was higher than their last wage! Such a generous system was possible 
because the number of beneficiaries was exceptionally low, since the job security 
was high and the number of those who lost their jobs was very modest.
At the beginning of 2001 the system changes: the computation formula 
is corrected and now the benefit amounts to 60% of own wage plus 2% for 
each year of work experience. There is also a corrective, so that the benefit 
cannot be less than 40% and more than 80% of the average wage in Serbia. the 
period during which the benefit is to be received ranges from 3 and 24 months, 
depending on the years of service of a particular person. A single payment of 
the whole benefit is allowed if the individual commits to start a private business 
with these funds.
As from July 2003, the cash unemployment benefit amounts to 60% of the 
employee’s last wage in the first three months, and then 50%. The benefit may 
not be lower than minimum wage, nor higher than the average wage in Serbia. 
the length of the period of 3 to 24 months is retained, as well as the right to a 
single benefit payment in the case of self-employment.
Less generous unemployment benefits were inevitable and the result of 
two concerns:
1. the expectation of a significant rise in the beneficiaries during transition 
and layoffs of redundant employees during the restructuring of the 
economy, with the corresponding adverse financial consequences
2. fear that the policy of generous benefits over a long period of time would 
discourage beneficiaries from seeking employment.
However, even at this level the benefits in Serbia are above average for a 
country in transition, and there are considerable difficulties in financing them. 
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Namely, at the beginning of 2005, the delay in the payment of unemployment 
benefits is six months and rising, which does not speak favorably of the care of 
the state for the unemployed or of the respect of their legal rights.
The number of the unemployment benefit recipients increased from 
46 thousand in December 2000, to 79 thousand in December 2002, and 
to 85 thousand in December 2003. it is still low, considering that the total 
unemployment stands at least at 500 thousand (according to the labor force 
survey) or about 900 thousand at most (according to the National Employment 
Service records). This number is not much higher only because many people 
who lose jobs in large companies in restructuring or bankruptcy do not apply 
for the benefit, but opt for another program aimed at the unemployed, as more 
favorable – single payment from the Social Program, or the Transition Fund.
Active employment policy is treated well and in a modern manner by the 
Law. The problems arise in its operationalization: neither are there funds for 
active employment measures, nor does the National Employment Service 
operate at a sufficiently high level.
The obligation of financing a rising number of unemployment benefits 
very efficiently empties the National Employment Service’s budget, so that very 
little is left for other programs. That is why in the last several years only 1 ‰ of 
the Serbian BDP is allocated for these purposes, which is insufficient for more 
serious results. Therefore, the measures implemented are mainly the cheapest 
ones, such as the mediation in employment and education for employment, 
and to a lesser extent to adult education. Such low amounts allocated for active 
measures begs a question as to whether the state has any serious intention of 
pursuing the active employment policy or is skeptical as to its efficiency. 
Such possible skepticism on the part of the state would be well founded, 
since active employment measures usually yield poor results, both in Serbia 
and other countries. They are mostly a political response of the Government 
to a significant problem of unemployment, undertaken without much hope 
in the positive outcome. International empirical research indicate inefficiency 
of most active employment policy measures in terms of costs and benefits. It 
seems that only a small number of measures may yield positive effects on the 
rise in employment in accordance with the cost-benefit principle, such as the 
mediation in employment and education of the unemployed.12 Therefore the 
policy of active employment programs which is, reluctantly pursued in Serbia, 
may be positively evaluated: the National Employment Service practices 
12.  See: Impact of Active Labor Market Programs: New Evidence of Evaluations with Particular 
Attention to Developing and Transition Countries, World Bank, 2004
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only those measures that are considered to be the only effective ones – adult 
education and mediation in employment.
Moreover, the weaknesses of the National Employment Service are 
considerable. Its institutional capacity building in accordance with the 
Employment Law is not complete. Its staff is not numerous enough. There 
is also a problem of skills of a part of its employees for doing their jobs. A 
particular problem is the lack of the modern IT equipment, which slows down 
the work and results in lower efficiency- then monitoring and evaluation of the 
undertaken active employment policy measures does not exist, which results in 
the lack of knowledge on the effects of such measures, and renders impossible 
the fine tuning of the active policy instruments according to the efficiency 
level of each of them. A special problem poses the lack of any vaguely reliable 
estimates of the future needs of the economy in terms of workers by profile/
trade, which restricts the educational component of the National Employment 
Service activities13.
Social dialogue
The idea of the social dialogue of important actors in a society as a method 
of making important social decisions has constantly been around in the last 
few years. All the time it has been advocated by the trade union representatives 
and shied away by the members of the Serbian Government. Employer 
representatives are reserved but passive.
The fundamental idea lying behind the advocacy of social dialogue in our 
country is the idea of the possibility to achieve social harmony if major players 
are reasonable and act in good faith. Then, the representatives of employees and 
employers could find the best solution in agreement with the executive branch 
of the government, starting from their own interests, needs and capacities.
In a standard liberal democratic system, and Serbia inevitably strives for 
such a system, decisions are basically made in two ways. Firstly, on the market, 
by free contract entered into by free citizens on the basis of supply and demand, 
on their private affairs in the economic field. Secondly, in parliament, on the 
affairs that must be dealt with collectively. 
13.  For more detail see: Forum o najvažnijim merama i preprekama za povećanje zapošljavanja, Finalni 
izveštaj, (Forum on the Most Important Measures of and Obstacles to the Employment Growth, 
Final Report) CLDS, 9 March 2005
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The idea of a social dialogue as the decision-making form is opposed to 
both the market and the democracy. To the market, since the social dialogue, 
dealing with affairs that belong to the individual, tries to replace the market 
and change the outcomes of its operation. To democracy, since the stakeholder 
groups discuss the affairs that belong in the Parliament (laws, etc.), trying to 
reduce it to an auxiliary body which would implement the previously reached 
agreements. And that would in turn be totally opposite to the idea of citizen/
people sovereignty and the concept of parliamentary democracy.
Social dialogue lacks democratic legitimacy of the participants, since 
they (apart from the Government) are mostly self-proclaimed, i.e. no one gave 
them, through proper elections, the right to decide on behalf of the real or 
imaginary members. It lacks the precisely determined scope and decision-
making procedure. On the other hand, both the market and the parliament are 
based on the clear and full powers to decide on detailed regulation of both the 
contract and property (the market) and parliamentary work, and to ensure that 
the decisions are enforced (courts, executive bodies, etc.). from this standpoint, 
the social dialogue which should produce important decisions turn out to 
be a very controversial idea, since no one knows who and with what rights 
participates, what is the subject matter of the decision-making process, how 
the decisions are made and who ensures decision s enforcement. If some effort 
were invested and the above questions regulated in detail, the result would be 
somewhat unexpected – we would get a class defined, corporate state, which is 
a well known and long ago discarded idea of the foundation of the state on the 
agreement between classes.
A nicely devised dialogue of interest groups, on the other hand, very 
easily turns into fighting between lobbies for immediate material and status 
gains for the participants through the abuse of state. Moreover, it is very hard 
to distinguish between the “true” social dialogue and the lobbying for own 
interests. And lobbying is the simple struggle for redistribution of profits and 
fixed income, which, when it is in full swing, ruins the productive sphere of the 
society.
Another type of the social dialogue – informative and consultative – may 
be useful, but it requires that all participants agree on the type of the dialogue 
held and on the unacceptability of imposing own ideas and interests on the 
others, and especially on the Serbian Assembly. I believe that the purpose of the 
social dialogue should not be the making of binding decisions, since it would 
mean not only the marginalization of market freedoms and parliamentary 
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democracy, but also of economic development. And that would be to high a 
price for a controversial institution.
The first Socio-Economic Council was established by the agreement 
between the government, trade Unions and the Employers’ Association in 
August 2001, but the Council soon, due to the differences which emerged 
over the proposed Labor Law and the withdrawal of the UGS Nezavisnot, ceased 
its activities. It was restored in April 2002, but it died down due to the lack of 
agreement between participants on the role and scope of activity of the Council. 
Prime Minister Djindjic used the idea of the social dialogue for propaganda 
purposes, and nothing serious was (being) done.
The Government of the Prime Minister Kostunica proposed and the 
Assembly accepted the Law on the Socio-Economic Council, but that did 
not produce any more serious work either. The Law itself does not indicate 
specifically the scope of activity of the Socio-Economic Council, so one cannot 
tell what kind of the social dialogue the legislator had in mind. The practice 
will tell, then.
2005 Labor Law 
Two leading trade unions in Serbia were displeased with the 2001 Labor 
Law and in the following period led a tough propaganda campaign against 
it, claiming that the pendulum swung too much to the employer’s side to the 
detriment of employees, and that it needs balancing out. When, in forming 
the government of Vojislav Kostunica, Slobodan Lalovic, a trade union activist 
became the Minister of Labor, the time came for this law to be changed in the 
direction advocated by the trade unions.
The first draft appeared in the summer of 2004, and expressed a trade 
unions’ candid opinion as to what a labor law should be like. According to 
other views (the World Bank, four employer associations, some economic 
ministers, economic experts) it was absolutely unacceptable. In further 
dialogue many weaknesses have been mitigated, but the marked social-trade 
unionist orientation was preserved, at the expense of the employer’s rights 
and freedoms. The Law was adopted, after the disallowed text corrections and 
repeated vote in the Parliament in March 2005.
Let us see what are the novelties in this law compared to the one from 
2001. The novelty in this law is the chapter on additional employee rights 
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during he bankruptcy procedure. The employees who have claims against the 
company in which they worked, and which is under bankruptcy, under the 
provisions of the Labor Law gained the opportunity to collect part of their 
claims outside and prior to the bankruptcy proceedings itself, regardless of the 
fate of the bankrupt’s estate. Their claims are taken over by the newly established 
Solidarity Fund, who pays them in advance. Who finances it? The Republic 
of Serbia budget. Considering that the Bankruptcy Law itself stipulates the 
priority payment of a part of the employee’s claims, these provisions of the 
Labor Law must be understood as providing for additional and faster exercised 
employee rights.
Is this a good solution? On the one hand, arguments in its favor may be 
found: unlike the classic capitalist economy, in which employee claims against 
the company in which they are employed cannot be more than a monthly gross 
wages, in Serbia in transition, such claims could be multi-annual, and there is 
sense, from the social reasons, to enhance and speed up the payment of a part 
of these claims. On the other hand, the above problem is temporary and there 
is no sense in adopting a solution which will be in force in future, when the 
situation has stabilized, to address a temporary problem. Moreover, it is not clear 
why the taxpayers, which definitely include some poor people, should finance 
the payment of private claims of private persons against private companies. 
Because, budget financing of debts in bankruptcy is just that: interfering with 
government coffers with private financial relations.
There is also a new chapter on status changes, which prescribes that the 
new employer is obliged to apply for one more year the collective agreement 
or operating rules of the former employer for the employees taken over by him. 
It is obvious that the idea was to protect the employees from the risk of wage 
reduction upon the status change, but the question is why disregard the 
possibility that the collective agreement of the new employer may be more 
favorable than the old one. Secondly, it hardly make sense to impose on 
employer the internal document (collective bargaining agreement) of another 
company and another employer. If nothing else, this provision will to some 
extent and in some circumstances discourage status changes, which cannot be 
good news for the employed either.
Wishing to improve he position of the employed at the expense of the 
employer as much as possible, in many provisions old figures were replaced 
by more favorable ones or the provisions of the general socialist collective 
agreement from 1997 were introduced in the law. That is how the minimum 
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annual holiday increased from 218 to 20 days, paid leaves (for birth or death 
in the family, etc.) from 5 to 7 days, the provisions on the increased wages 
(for working on public holidays, at night or overtime) were taken from the 
collective agreement, the redundancy/severance pay was also raised to one 
third of the wages per year of employment (for redundant employees) and 
1 to 4 wages (for individual dismissals), the threshold for the obligation of 
preparing the program to address redundancies was lowered, the limit for 
temporary employment was reduced from 3 to one year, etc. Under the new 
law, the employer must, and in the old law he “could”, pay the retirement 
allowance of minimum three average wages and cover the costs of his or his 
family member’s funeral! There is no doubt that these changes increase labor 
costs, and that they will reflect adversely both on employment or on other 
employee income.
There were no significant changes regarding the termination of employment: 
the philosophy of justified cause for dismissal was retained (dissatisfactory 
performance, breach of rules, the need for the employee no longer exists), as 
well as the special treatment of redundant employees. The procedures are now 
very complicated, allegedly to protect he employees, but perhaps, to give the 
chance of weaker jurists and non-jurists in small and medium enterprises to 
make a procedural mistake and to have the termination reversed by the court, 
with damages for the employee.
There are no big changes in collective bargaining. All participants are 
still obligated to negotiate, but they do not have to form an arbitration body, 
so there is no obligation to have a collective agreement and the whole deal 
may fail. The provisions of the general and special collective bargaining 
agreements still directly apply on all the employers who are members of the 
signatory associations. The novelty is that the minister my, for justified reasons, 
exempt some employers or associations from the application of the collective 
agreements in the part related to wages.
The wages chapter looks a lot like those dating twenty years back: it is filled 
with criteria, value of work, equality, rulebooks, different wage components, 
past work, cost compensation, etc.
All in all, this law did not essentially change the character of industrial 
relations in Serbia, but the labor market regulation is more inflexible, and labor 
costs for employers have significantly increased. The idea that during transition 
employees need as much potation as possible prevailed in this government 
and in this Assembly, which is not only unfavorable for the future course of 
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transition and investment, but also leaves the uncertainty as to whether the 
restriction introduced because of transition are there to stay. Because, rules 
once introduced, especially when they particularly favor one important group, 
are hard to change even when the real reasons are very strong.
The role of IFI’s and donors
The donors’ role in the creation of labor legislation and institutional 
building was considerable. Of special importance has been and still is the 
engagement of the World Bank, which dominates among donors in terms of 
experts and strategy. Namely, the World Bank is given the lead by the donor 
community in the areas which have key impact on poverty, and labor relations 
and employment definitely do.
The most important role of the World Bank is its influence on the design 
and implementation of structural reforms. It does so by means of its own 
expertise, which is obviously very precious for the countries in transition and 
developing countries, and by attaching formal conditions of conducting certain 
reforms as the prerequisite for the loan approval. 
In designing, and also drafting, the 2001 Labor Law and 2003 Employment 
Law, foreign experts had a significant role since the expert capacities of the 
Ministry of Labor and Employment were relatively limited. In drafting the 
2005 Labor Law, expert assistance to the Ministry was given by local trade 
unions, and the World Bank tried and partly succeeded in removing from the 
draft he exaggerations which abounded in the first drafts. The main arguments 
it tacitly used was the (future) SOSAC, i.e. the structural adjustment loan.
LABOR MARKET TRENDS
Introduction
Globally speaking, the situation on the labor market in Serbia is not 
favorable. Its basic characteristics are high unemployment, long-term reduction 
of employment and considerable number of surplus employees in the formal 
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sector, inflexible formal labor market, large grey economy, relatively low wages, 
which are all manifestations of serious deviations both on the labor market 
and the overall economic system.
Four basic categories on the labor market in Serbia are the formally 
employed, the redundant, those active in the grey economy and the (formally) 
unemployed. There are overlaps between these categories: part of the employed 
in the formal economy is also active in the grey one, and part of them are 
redundant; part of the formally unemployed is also active in the grey sector. 
The causes of such overlaps are numerous, but we will mention only the basic 
ones. Firstly, many of those employed in the formal economy have an interest 
to work in the grey economy as well to increase their otherwise modest income, 
and there are opportunities for it because many companies do not yet operate 
at full capacity or no at all. Secondly, a part of the formally employed are 
redundant in their companies, and remained there from the previous times. 
Thirdly, many of those who work exclusively in the grey sector, or under short-
term agreements in the formal sector, remain registered with the National 
Employment Service, for the benefits the status of the unemployed brings 
(health care, child allowances, etc.) due to these overlaps, and the weaknesses 
of official statistics, there are dilemmas related to the basic labor market figures 
– employment and unemployment, average wage, and they depend on the 
definitions used and the methodology of calculation.
Employment 
At the time of transition it is usual for the employment to be one of the 
first victims of structural changes during the first years, and, therefore, the 
subject of the greatest concerns of the Government and the Parliament. The fall 
in employment in the first stages is probably natural, since the process of the 
destruction of the old, uneconomical jobs is usually faster than the creation of 
new jobs, especially if the opening position is far away from the economically 
rational (balanced market). Thus the unemployment levels in the East European 
countries in transition rose fast in the first few years of transition, although 
more slowly than the drop in the GDP, to gradually fall in later phases, together 
with the restoration of the economic activity on the reformed bases. However, 
even today, fifteen years from the beginning of transition, the labor market 
situation there is not satisfactory: in the East European countries and the 
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ex-USSR countries the number of redundant employees is high, due to 
insufficient company restructuring.14
In Serbia, as shown on graph 2, formal employment during the period 
2000-200415 did not plummet, like in other countries, but was mostly stagnant, 
with slight decline in the last few years. 
Figure 2. Employment
Sources:  Labor Force Survey, Republic Statistics Office (RZS), various years; Statistical 
Yearbook of Serbia, RZS, various years
There are three main causes for it:
 first, Serbia did not witness a (considerable) fall in the GDP in these years, 
so the fall in employment was not necessary; moreover, Serbia witnessed 
a significant GDP growth during these years, as a result of the economic 
recovery in the period after the 1999 air raids, lifting the strict confining 
measures from the time of Milosevic, and inflow of aid and other foreign 
capital; Serbia entered the second wave of transition, the one we are 
following, with (deformed) market economy, and not with the centrally 
planned one, as was the case with most countries in transition, so the 
structural breakdown was not very big,
  secondly, privatization was not particularly fast during the first years 
of this period, so the relieving of companies from the burden of excess 
14.  Labor Markets in Europe and Central Asia: Towards Creating More and Better Jobs, World Bank, 
November 2004.
15.  Employment trends are displayed on the basis of two sources of data: Labor Force Survey and 
regular statistics. The differences between them are not great, neither in level nor in trend.
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employees, which is the most direct and most important method of 
reducing formal employment in Serbia, was not considerable; the 
obligation of the company buyer to provide hefty redundancy payments 
to the employees who agree to leave the company, being expensive, 
dissuaded a part of owners from trying to reduce the workforce and, thus, 
certainly contributed to it;
  thirdly, the implementation of the new bankruptcy legislation, which 
could reduce formal employment, did not start yet (until spring 2005).
One may notice that the increase of employment in the autochthonous 
private sector was not m entioned among the important factors, which does 
not mean that it does not exist – it is just not particularly high. Therefore, 
the following very beneficial mechanism is not work in Serbia: many jobs are 
lost in the privatized companies which were overburdened with redundant 
employees, but the loss is compensated by a fast growth of employment in 
the new private sector; that means that, unless the growth in the new private 
sector accelerates, we may witness, in future, a considerable drop in formal 
employment – when he restructuring is in full swing and when the companies 
start shedding excessive workforce. Slow growth of new companies is the 
consequence of insufficiently favorable investment climate, i.e. not only slow 
transition and regulatory and economic and political weaknesses, but also 
political causes (the issues of the state’s borders, Hague Tribunal, etc.).
In Serbia, basically, the following trends in overall employment are 
present:
  companies from the previous socially owned sector are slowly shedding 
redundant employees, so the employment in this sector is falling;
  the GDP growth increases the demand for the workforce, which leads to 
the rise in employment in the new private sector, and which is reducing 
the redundancies in the former socially-owned sector;
  grey economy is gradually shrinking (the activity shifts to the formal 
sector) although it is still considerable.
The results of such trends are slight fall in formal employment in the last 
few years. Job loss in Serbia is, as in many other countries in transition, still 
faster than the job creation. Employment is growing.
However, apart from those who are formally employed, there are many 
other individuals who work and earn money, such as farmers, participants in 
the grey economy, temporarily active, etc. They number about 1 million, which 
•
•
•
•
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means that those who work and are “employed” according to the definition of 
the International Labor Organization number about 3 million (2 million of the 
formally employed and 1 million of others).16
Figure 3. Rates
During the years under observation, all relevant rates were edging down: 
the rate of participation (share of the employed and the unemployed in the 
working age population), rate of activity (share of the employed and the 
unemployed in the population aged 15 or above) and rate of employment (share 
of the employed in the population aged 15 or above). The reasons are multiple. 
First: gradual reduction of employment and increase of unemployment. Second: 
gradual passivization of the unemployed, i.e. the abandoning of the status of the 
unemployed on the part of those who lost hope that they would ever find a 
job.17 These trends match the processes in other countries in transition too, but 
in Serbia, the values are (were) higher in the previous years owing to the delay 
in transition and/or company restructuring.
The movements in the rate of employment in five-year age cohorts is 
shown in Figure 4.
16. See Labor Force Survey, Republic Statistics Office (RZS), various years
17. Third: In 2004, the methodology of Labor Force Surveys was changed. 
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Figure 4. Employment rates (in %)
It is noticeable that the employment rate between the ages of 30 and 49, 
when it is maximal, reaches only about three quarters, which means that every 
fourth inhabitant of Serbia from these most productive cohorts does not work, 
which is certainly too many. There is a considerable difference between men 
and women: while the rate of employment of men in the above cohorts exceeds 
80%, in women it barely exceeds 60%. Similarly, the overall rate of employment 
for men for the ages 15-64 is 63.2% wand for women it is 44.1%.
There are no good estimates of the level of redundancies in Serbia, but it 
is certain that it is a large figure. It is supported by the fact that new owners of 
privatized companies often give an offer to a large number of the workforce 
(20-40%) to leave the company voluntarily accompanied by a stimulating 
financial offer. In the companies which have not yet begun the privatization 
process, including companies with huge losses and state owned companies, it 
is certain that the surplus workforce is even larger. This will only deepen the 
problem of unemployment. As was the case with many countries in transition, 
the shrinking of economic activity in Serbia in the 1990s18 was now followed 
by an appropriate reduction of employment, but a steep decline of real wages, 
which left the addressing of the redundancy problems to the future.
The share of self-employed in the total number of employees is very low 
– about 5% and much lower than in the advanced countries in transition 
(over 10%) and the developed countries (OECD about 15%). The causes 
of the above are a relatively low level of SME development and high level of 
grey (informal) employment in them. Similarly, Serbia has a very low share of 
flexible employment forms (part-time, temporary employment), which makes 
up about 1% of total employment. And flexible forms could bean important 
18. Due to other, and not transition related reasons.
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channel for the employment of women and youth. Who are particularly 
threatened by unemployment19.
The employment in the grey economy is very high: in 2002, the ratio 
between employment in formal and grey economy was 70 to 30% according 
to the Standard of Living Survey20. Such a high percentage of those active in 
the grey economy speaks of the failure of the state to reduce grey economy 
through milder fiscal policy, liberalization of economic regulations, and control 
mechanisms (repression).
There formal employment structure underwent the changes usual for a 
country in transition: reduced share of employment in agriculture, mining 
and industry, from 39.0% in 2000 to 36.3% in 2003, in favor of the services 
sector21. The smaller share of these sectors, in particular the industry, was 
not caused by fast increase in productivity and efficiency of the industry and 
Serbia’s shift towards the post-industrial society, but by the failure of many 
companies to maintain their market share in the presence of competition. 
This deindustrialization process was followed by a surge in the share of those 
services that are market oriented.
In the first half of 2005, the process of employment reduction began at 
last in the public administration and public enterprises. The International 
Monetary Fund gave its strong contribution to this process. In many institutions 
and companies – from the Army and health care to EPS and the Railways 
– employees were offered severance packages in return for their leaving their 
jobs. The Army offered 12 gross wages, Belgrade Airport 15 average gross 
wages, Zastava Arms 300 EUR per year of service, Yugoslav Airlines 250 EUR 
per year of service, the railways and the PTT 200 EUR per year of service, etc.
There are a few problems with this system. First, the offer applies to all 
employees, so in some companies and institutions it may be noticed that the 
needed employees (qualified and good workers) leave, while those who are 
not necessary (administrative staff, and poor performers) stay. Secondly, these 
offers are often directed at older employees, those who are near retirement, 
which means that the gain in the reduction of employment will be short-term 
– several years – since they would, even without the program, retire in the near 
future. Thus, the financial gain from the reduction of the labor force is temporary 
and modest. And, thirdly, the offered redundancy payments are often not well 
19  Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of Serbia, An Agenda for Economic growth and Employment, World 
Bank, December 6, 2004
20 See: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Republic of Serbia Government, 2003
21  Labor Force Survey (LFS), various years, share of the total number of employees in these sectors is 
higher, owing to agriculture 
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balanced, or well suited, meaning that they do not meet employee expectations 
and do not result in the number of those who want to leave the company being 
more or less equal to the estimated number of surplus employees: thus, in 
Yugoslav Airlines too few, while in PTT too many employees applied.
Unemployment
The first years of this transition wave in Serbia were characterized by a 
noticeable growth of unemployment, whether it be measured according to the 
Labor Force Survey (LFS), or the National Employment Service (NSZ).
Figure 5. Unemployment
Sources: LFS and NES, various years
Note:  in July 2004 the NSZ methodology was changed, so the number of the jobless in 
December 2004 fell from 969.9 to 830.6 thousand; this change is not shown in this 
graph for consistency purposes
As may be seen, two relevant source of data on the level of unemployment 
in Serbia give materially different results. It is usually considered that the NSZ 
data overestimate the actual unemployment, since there exist strong incentives 
for the individuals who work in the informal sector, i.e. who are not jobless, 
to register with the National Employment Service: health care, right to various 
welfare benefits, etc. on the other hand, one may say that the Labor Force 
Survey data underestimate unemployment, since even those people who work 
only one hour per week are considered employed. It would probably be the 
most accurate to consider these two measures of unemployment the bottom 
and top limit of actual unemployment in Serbia.
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The corresponding unemployment rates are shown in Table 1
Table 1. Unemployment rates
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
NES* 25.6 26.8 29.0 31.7 31.7
LFS** 12.1 12.2 13.3 14.6 18.5
*  The rate was calculated as the ratio between the number of the unemployed and the sum 
of employed and the unemployed.
** The rate was calculated as the ratio of the unemployed and the active population
It is obvious that the unemployment problem in Serbia has been worsening 
in the last few years, together with the increase in the number of the unemployed 
and the decrease in the number of the employed. In terms of the unemployment 
level, Serbia belongs to the most unfavorable group of countries in transition 
(with Macedonia, Poland and Slovakia), while it exceeds by far OECD and EU 
countries. What is the worst of all, Serbia has not finished its economic 
restructuring phase and has not entered the phase of accelerated growth so 
that it can expect that there will be no further increases in unemployment, but 
the worsening of the situation is not only possible but highly likely.
The duration of unemployment is very long: in 2002 it reached 47 months 
on average
Table 2. Unemployed by length of unemployment (in %)
years 2000 2001 2002 2003
under 1 18.2 26.6 25.7 24.7
1-3 32.2 27.5 31.9 33.6
3-8 31.6 27.1 25.5 25.0
over 8 18.0 18.7 16.9 16.8
Source: LFS, various years
Compared to previous years, the share of the jobless who have not had a 
job for less than a year has increased (to about a quarter), but unemployment 
is still a long-term situation: three quarters of the jobless have not had a job for 
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over a year, and 1 in 6 has been unemployed for more than 8 years. In OECD 
countries, this ratios are quite the opposite: about three quarters of the jobless 
have not had a job for less than a year, which means that the flexibility of the 
labor market there is much stronger, as are the chances of the unemployed to 
find a new job fast.
According to the LFS, in 2002 women experienced a somewhat higher 
than average rate of employment (14% compared to men 9%), and the 
people with secondary education, including technical (14%). The lowest 
unemployment rates are among those who have no education (3%) and those 
with a university degree (6%). The young (up to the age of 24) are particularly 
affected by unemployment, and the unemployment rate among them is three 
times as high as the average rate22.
Skills
There is a prevailing opinion in Serbia that our labor force is educated 
and very well qualified, and that it is a comparative advantage of Serbia. 
However, a large part of it is not true. There are many problems: the skill of the 
employed and the unemployed are often obsolete since they refer to obsolete 
technologies, which is the consequence of the technological stagnation of the 
Serbian economy; the education system is obsolete and produces workers 
with the occupations that are very often unnecessary (a half of the secondary 
vocational schools’ capacities produce unnecessary occupational profiles; 
adult education is at a low level and does no provide the necessary knowledge 
innovation to either the employed or the unemployed, etc.
The reform of the secondary education is ready, but it is just not 
implemented due to the conceptual differences, resistance by many teachers 
who would possible lose their jobs, insufficient cooperation between the 
Ministry of Education and the National Employment Service, etc. Recently, an 
inter-ministerial group for the reform of the secondary education was formed 
(including the National Employment Service), and the outcome of its work 
remains to be seen.
The state of the adult training system is quite bad. The old training system 
through the so-called People’s Universities is long, not to be replaced with a 
better one. A small number of companies (only one third) participates in such 
22.  Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of Serbia, An Agenda for Economic growth and Employment, World 
Bank, December 6, 2004
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programs; the National Employment Service has limited resources available 
and organizes programs of limited reach (computer literacy, foreign languages); 
the Ministry of Education can train adults and with what curricula, what 
certificate do they obtained, etc. Part of the gap is filled by the private sector, 
but the problem of the lack of the certificates recognized by the state limits its 
reach.
Wages
During the transition period, average nominal wage in Serbia grew very 
fast. When the nominal growth is adjusted for the cost of living index it can 
bee seen that even the real growth of wages was high between 2001 and 2004 
(Figure 6) with the explosion in 2002.
Figure 6. Wage trends – real growth
The accelerated pace of the wages in 2001 and 2002 by 16.4 and 
exceptionally high 47.2 percent respectively is the consequence of certain 
production activation, but, even more so, a significant inflow from the funds 
from abroad in the form of aid, loans and privatization proceeds.
Such fast growth of wages corresponded to the optimistic expectations of 
the population about the fast resolution of socio-economic problems with the 
change of Government. Such expectations were encouraged by DOS before 
elections, and afterwards tried to meet. What is even more important is that 
international financiers, led by the World Bank and the EU, agreed with the rise 
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of the individual income for two reasons: first, to pull the production by the 
increase in domestic demand, and, secondly, so that the general public better 
accepts the transition. That is why they were ready to provide the appropriate 
financial support to Serbia.
In 2003 and 2004 the real wage growth considerably slowed down, although 
it was still in the high regions between 10% and 15% of annual growth. This 
slowdown was mostly the consequence of the lower inflow of foreign capital 
and the impossibility to provide faster growth from domestic sources. 
The wage growth contributed to the growth of personal spending of the 
general public, although they make up only one third of the total population 
income23. However, the wage growth did not manage to boost domestic 
production to the desired extent, since the increased purchasing power of the 
population was for the most part materialized in the purchases of imported 
goods, which led to the worsening of the trade balance.
Lately salaries in he public sector and their accelerated growth pose a special 
problem. It threatens not only the budget balance, i.e. increases the budget 
deficit, but also the internal and external macroeconomic balance.24 Namely, 
the monopolistic character of many public sector activities is obvious, not only 
in infrastructure, utilities and related activities, but also in education or health 
care, as well as the use of such monopolistic position by the employee trade 
unions. Strikes, from educational workers to Yugoslav Airlines employees, as 
well as threatened strikes, are a common phenomenon and a political problem 
which is hard for any government to solve. The government of Zoran Djindjic 
tried to regulate the wages in the public sector in the uniform manner and 
under the uniform criteria, but it proved to be impossible due to the existing 
wage differences and strong resistance for them to be done away with.
GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANGES SO FAR AND THE 
PROPOSALS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LABOR LEGISLATION
The labor market in Serbia experienced considerable changes in the last 
four years, i.e. in the second wave of transition. The changes are material, 
23.  Other major items are pensions, natural consumption, income from agriculture, etc. See: Siromaštvo 
i reforma institucija podrške siromašnima (Poverty and the Reform of the Institutions Supporting the 
Poor), Ministry for Social Affairs and CLDS, 2003, p. 69.
24.  See: Serbia and Montenegro, Fourth Review Under Extended Arrangement (EA), International 
Monetary Fund, November 30, 2004.
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both in institutions that make up the framework for this market, and in the 
fundamental characteristics and trends on the market itself. 
The labor and employment legislation reform was thorough in the period 
2001-2003. the 2001 Labor Law, despite the compromises made, was a good 
basis for the transition of the Serbian economy and the creation and efficient 
operation of new companies. It brought a considerable dose of the labor market 
flexibility, which is so badly needed by a country in transition in which both 
the economy and the companies should be restructured towards a significantly 
different environment and set of incentives. 
The Employment Law from 2003 enabled the modernization of the state 
employment policy. However the results are not great, or satisfactory, due to 
the lack of funds for larger scale programs of active employment policy and a 
longer process of the improvement of the National Employment Service.
Labor market trends are not favorable. Employment is slowly declining, 
or stagnating at best, while the unemployment is growing. What is unfavorable 
is the fact that the corporate restructuring, including the reduction of the 
workforce, is still ongoing, so that the current trends will continue in the years 
to follow. It is equally unfavorable that the investment environment in Serbia 
mostly unattractive, and the expansion of the new companies sector is modest, 
with adverse effects on employment.
The basic challenge with regard to the labor market has been and still 
is the creation of an efficient market which should reallocate the workers 
from the grey economy to the formal sector, and from the companies with 
redundancies to others, enhance the incentives for the employees to look for 
a job, retain labor costs within the moderate range, and bring to individuals 
(especially from the vulnerable groups) social security, as much as possible.
The improvement of labor legislation is one of the elements of the policy of 
the labor market performance upgrading. To make this market more flexible, 
facilitate corporate restructuring and meeting the labor demand with supply, 
it is necessary to correct or change several solutions in the labor legislation of 
Serbia:
  significantly reduce the regulation of the labor market and enhance the 
role of contractual relations between the employer and the employee; 
increased flexibility can only result in increased employment,
  transfer from the Labor Law to Collective bargaining agreements many 
employee benefits (holidays, leaves, increased wages, compensation of 
•
•
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costs, etc.), since in that manner the specificities of individual companies 
are better catered for,
  eliminate the rule calling for a justified cause for the termination of 
employment, i.e. leave it both the employer and the employee the full 
freedom to terminate the employment contract, in accordance with the 
contract itself,
  eliminate the legal obligation of the employer to pay severance/redundancy 
pay upon termination of employment; the social policy should not be 
financed by employers but by the state,
 eliminate the special system of employee claim settlement in bankruptcy,
  eliminate the validity of old documents with the new employer in the case 
of status changes,
 simplify many procedures prescribed by the 2005 law, etc.
The reformed labor legislation would contribute to the improvement 
of the business and investment environment, and, finally, to the rise in the 
number of jobs, which should be the basic orientation of the state policy.
Moreover, the issue of how and to what extent the state can boost and 
enable the increase in investments in human capital, i.e. the skills of both the 
employed and unemployed is an important one.
•
•
•
•
•
Gordana Matković
Reform of Pension and Disability System
LEGACY OF THE PAST - THE MOST IMPORTANT 
CHARACTERISTICS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE SYSTEM
As in most other countries, the pension and disability system in Serbia 
is partially based on the pay-as-you-go financing of pensions. Compulsory 
insurance in Serbia encompasses employees, employers, the self-employed and 
farmers, and their insurance is organized within three separate funds. 
At the end of 2000 in Serbia there were 1.5 million pensioners, over 1.2 
million in the employee fund, with the average pension of 2000 dinars (around 
EUR 30). Two thirds of pensioners received below-average pensions. At the 
same time, the average pension amounted to over 90% of the average wage,1 
with the share of pension expenditure in GDP reaching almost 15%. 
At the same time large debts were inherited in the system. In the employee 
fund the so-called “large debt” was inherited in the amount of 2.5 monthly 
expenses for pensions and  pension payment lag of almost two months, while 
the payment lag in the farmers fund was 23 months.  
Difficulties in financing pensions in Serbia arose already in mid-80s and 
culminated at the time of economic decline during the 90s. A reduction of 
the number of employees, evasion of contribution payment and widespread 
gray economy led to a reduction of the number of insured persons. On the 
other hand, due to the population ageing, as well as very liberal retirement 
requirements, the number of pensioners rose continually. Over the years 
pension financing required increasingly “creative” measures, since pensioners 
presented an important electorate, leaning towards the then regime.
The adjustment of the pension-disability system was conducted in several 
manners. First of all, by changing the indexation system and increasing the 
1 For pensions paid for the corresponding month 
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contribution rate, which was as much as 32% at the end of 2000. However, 
pension expenditure “reduction” was achieved by not paying all 12 pensions a 
year, illegal reduction of pensions during 1994-1995 (when the “large” debt to 
pensioners was created), paying pensions in the form of electricity vouchers, 
depreciation of all receipts through inflation, in particular hyperinflation in 
1993, etc. 
The 1990s crisis led to a clear demonstration of both positive and negative 
characteristics of the pay-as-you-go method of pension financing. 
The basic advantage of the pay-as-you-go financing system is that it 
prevents the “savings for old age” from losing its value in the market and in 
extraordinary circumstances, which can happen to capitalized pension funds. 
It is quite certain that war years, hyperinflation and “unreliable investment” 
would have left capitalized funds completely without assets and disappeared, 
like foreign currency savings, for example. 
On the other hand, the main shortcoming of the pay-as-you-go financing 
system is its increasingly difficult operation in the conditions when the number 
of insured persons is decreasing relative to the number of pensioners. Since in 
2000 this ratio in the Serbian employee fund came down to only 1.26, (1.26 
employees per 1 pensioner), this weakness of the pay-as-you-go financing 
system is clearly demonstrated. 
The inherited situation, however, was not the only reason for the 
preparation of the Serbian pension and disability system reforms. 
From a long-term perspective, Serbia is facing a process of pronounced 
population ageing. In these circumstances the unfavorable ratio between the 
potential contributors and pensions cannot be a short-term phenomenon 
and will not be eliminated by economic development and progress. Similar 
demographic movements present the main driver of pension system reforms 
in developed countries as well. 
Apart from that, the rapid growth of the pensioners’ number was not only 
a result of population ageing, but also of very liberal retirement requirements 
and exercising different rights. The once established retirement age was never 
changed, despite the longer life expectancy, reduction of the importance of 
physical labor and change in the economic structure. The right to disability 
pension was often exercised without meeting the basic requirements that 
would point to actual disability, with a significant presence of corruption in 
the last decade. Liberal retirement requirements were partially a result of a 
policy aimed at resolving the issue of unemployment and redundancies (the 
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so-called administrative pensions). Apart from that, there were institutes in the 
system that enabled early retirement, such as early pension and purchase of the 
remaining years of service, or were too liberal, such as the right to work with 
shorter working hours, disability occurrence risk and others, which implied the 
supplementing of employees’ wages from the resources of the pension fund.  
Furthermore, certain other solutions and illogicalities in the system, as well 
as numerous irregularities during the 90s, resulted in a very high replacement 
rate (ratio between the last wage and the first pension). For the employees who 
retired during 2001 with full pensionable service, pensions were on average 
higher than wages.2 
REFORM STEPS
The first moves after the October 5 changes were directed towards the 
stabilization of the system and establishment of regular pension payments. 
Pension payment was among the government’s priorities and remained as such 
throughout all four years of transition. Since October 2000 to date pensioners 
have been paid 12 pensions every years. Payment regularity was not achieved 
only in the farmer fund.  
At the same time, soon after the establishment of the new Republic 
government at the beginning of 2001, the preparation of reforms began. An 
important part of the reforms was also communication with the public, in 
particular the trade unions and pensioner associations, on the unsustainability 
of the system and necessity of change of the legal framework. 
Strategic commitments were defined and decisions adopted on reform 
steps and pace. It was decided that changes of the existing pension and 
disability insurance system would be swiftly introduced and legal amendments 
proposed which would ensure the sustainability of the financing system. Like 
in other countries in transition, the government explored possibilities for the 
system reform to be designed in such a way as not to rely only on the pay-as-
you-go pension financing as the only pillar of the system, but also to introduce 
the second and the third pillar. The second pillar entails the introduction of the 
compulsory additional insurance for younger insured persons, while the third 
2  In view of the fact that the average pension was 90% of the average wage, where the average pension 
includes disability and survivor’s pension, as well as pensions of those who did not have full years 
of service. 
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pillar provides for voluntary pension insurance. The idea of rapid introduction 
of the second pillar was rejected, primarily due to high transition costs, 
underdevelopment of the financial markets in Serbia, as well as insufficiently 
persuasive advantages of its introduction in other countries. It was accepted 
that instead of the second, after the reform of the first pillar, regulations 
would be prepared for the definition of the voluntary third pillar of pension 
and disability insurance.3 A working group for legal amendments was soon 
established. 
Parallel with the work on reforms, other activities were initiated for the 
purpose of contributing to savings in the system. First the previous practice 
of borrowing the missing funds in the pension fund from the banks was 
discontinued, which signified annual savings of over 500 million dinars related 
to interest. Order was introduced in the procurement system, exchange of data 
with relevant municipal registry departments in order to interrupt payments 
to deceased pensioners,4 and during 2002 fight against corruption was initiated 
in the disability pension system (change of the retirement procedure, cutting 
the ring of perpetrators and fund employees, doctors and intermediaries with 
the assistance of the police). 
With the amendments to the tax laws already in mid-2001 different 
receipts of employees on which taxes and contributions had not been paid 
(”hot” meal allowance, vacation allowance) were included in the wage. In such 
a way, one of the channels for contribution payment avoidance was cut and 
payment base extended. On the other hand, by the decision of the government 
and management boards of the pension funds in mid-2001 the contribution 
rates were reduced from 32 to 19.6%.5 At the same time the contribution rates 
for health insurance and unemployment insurance were also reduced. The 
total contribution and tax burden on net wages went down from 110 to less 
than 70%. This reduction was to provide an incentive for an exit from the gray 
economy and employment and reduce the wage burden to the level in other 
countries in transition. The pension fund deficit increased in such a way to 
over 30% of total assets, with the missing funds being paid from the budget. 
3 G. Matković – Social Sector Reforms, in “Reform Strategy”, CLDS, Belgrade, 2001
4  Comparison of data with the relatively outdated base of the Ministry of the Interior showed that 500 
pensions are paid after the beneficiary’s death, in some case for more than 10 years, or they were paid 
without a reduction to the deceased’s survivors - it is estimated that in such a way annual savings 
amounted to 5-10 million.
5  Although the effects of these measures were never evaluated, it is a fact that in the conditions of 
predominantly socially- and state-owned economy contribution reduction primarily led to wage 
increase (which rose by over 40% in real terms in 2002), which resulted in a significant increase in 
real pensions.  
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After 2001 the level of contribution rate was changed another two times, and 
legally fixed at 22% by the recently adopted law on contributions.
At the end of 2002 the return of the so-called large debt to pensioners was 
initiated. This debt is to be fully repaid by June 2006. 
LEGAL AMENDMENTS
Reforms of the first pillar of the pension and disability system in Serbia 
were conducted in two steps. Since until the adoption of the Constitutional 
Charter in early 2003 the pension issue was regulated at the federal level, first 
the federal law was amended in December 2001. The Government of Serbia 
formulated and officially submitted the proposed amendments to this law 
to the federal level, insisting on legal amendments despite the opposition of 
Montenegrin representatives in the federal government. 
From the aspect of the financial consolidation of the system, two most 
important changes from 2001 were the extension of the retirement age and 
change in pension indexation. 
The retirement age was increased by 3 years, from 55 to 58 years for 
women and 60 to 63 for men. At the same time the minimum retirement age 
was changed from 50 to 53. In such a way Serbia caught up with other countries 
in transition which initiated these changes earlier, but mostly opted for gradual 
change of the retirement age.  
The second important change implied a transition from pension indexation 
to wages to pension indexation to the combination of wage and cost-of-living 
increase. In this way pensions were prevented from growing too fast, which 
was unsustainable due to the deficit in the pension fund.     
Furthermore, during these legal amendments the uniform amount of 
the minimum pension was guaranteed (20% of the average wage) instead of 
multiple minimum pensions, varying depending on the length of pensionable 
service. Some entitlements were abolished, as for example the disability 
occurrence risk and employment and retraining under special terms.
Further changes were introduced in the first pillar when the competence 
for the pension system was brought down to the Republic level with the adoption 
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of the Constitutional Charter. The new pension and disability insurance law 
was adopted in April 2003. 
The goal of the changes were as follows: establishment of firmer bonds 
between the level of pension and paid contributions, more just, stimulating 
and simpler manner of calculating pensions, more even distribution of burden 
between contributors (expansion of insured persons’ coverage), reduction of 
overly liberal and redistributive elements in the system, creation of incentives 
for longer participation of older workers and opening of possibilities for 
voluntary insurance.
One of the most important changes in the law refers to the introduction 
of the new formula for pension calculation, based on points6 and extending the 
calculation period to all years of service. This kind of calculation system enables 
a firmer connection between the level of pension and contributions paid in, 
because it takes into account all the years during which contributions were 
paid in, eliminating the favoring of those with significant career advancement 
or significantly higher wage only in one part of their work history. This method 
also increases and determines more precisely the difference in the amount of 
pension depending on the number of years of service, and for over 40 years of 
service it increases the amount of pension. One of the important characteristics 
of the new system of calculation is the reduction of difference in pensions 
between pensioners with the same work history, regardless of the moment they 
retire. 
The new method of calculation of pensions provides incentives and is 
important in curbing the gray economy, because it increases the importance 
of the amount of contributions paid in, regardless of whether the contributor 
is at the beginning of his working years or about to retire. Because of these 
characteristics the method of “personal points” is also particularly important 
in the conditions of self-employment expansion. 
Legal amendments also extended the coverage of compulsory pension 
insurance. The obligatory payment of contributions for author’s and short-term 
service contracts was introduced, as well as for the work via youth and student 
employment agencies, except for those below the age of 27 attending regular 
schooling. In the previous period work through contracts and youth and student 
employment agencies was also a widespread method of avoiding the payment 
of contributions. The law also introduced a possibility for everyone who wishes 
to pay in contributions to be able to do so, regardless of their employment/
6  Personal points, the average value of points calculated for each year of service presenting the ratio 
between the individual’s average wage and average wage of all employees.
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ownership status. The method of calculation of pensions for special categories, 
with rights to beneficiary years of services was also reformed, becoming more 
explicit and less privileged.
Important changes were also introduced in the area of disability pensions. 
The concept of determining disability according to general disability was 
introduced instead of the disability to perform their own job, and a regular 
review of disability pensions was envisaged. The right to benefit due to reduced 
work ability was abolished and benefits for the existing beneficiaries of II and 
III category of disability were restricted.
Changes in farmers’ insurance were supposed to resolve, at least partially, 
the vicious circle of non-payment of contributions and deficit in the farmer 
fund. Instead of the previous solution whereby all members of farming 
household were mandatorily insured, which presented a significant burden for 
multi-member farming households, obligatory insurance of only one household 
member was introduced. It was prescribed that those who accumulated debts 
did not have to meet their debts from the previous period, but that period 
would not be included in the pensionable service. Apart from that, the base 
and contribution rate were equalized with the lowest base and rate in other 
funds.
Legal amendments were accompanied by intensive communication, 
primarily with employees’ trade unions, with numerous presentations of new 
solutions and discussions with competent committees. The amendments were 
officially adopted by the Economic-Social Council by all three largest trade 
unions.
According to the assessment of the World Bank “bold changes in the 
pension system in Serbia, implemented on two occasions, during 2001 and 2003 
are among the most important achievements in the overall reform program”.7 
In the second half of 2003 work began on the preparation of the law on 
voluntary insurance, for which it is expected that it would soon go before the 
Republic parliament.
The World Bank team participated in designing the reform strategy. 
Within the concrete work on reforms, its experts were mostly involved in the 
preparation of voluntary insurance. On the whole, this cooperation can be 
assessed as positive, with respect for arguments on both sides and attempts of 
the Bank to open possible options, and not to impose them.
7 Serbia and Montenegro, Recent Progress on Structural Reforms, World Bank, November 2003, p. 22
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OMISSIONS AND/OR FURTHER NECESSARY REFORM STEPS
As can be seen from the example of developed countries, the pension 
and disability system based on the pay-as-you-go financing principle, passes 
through constant reforms. One of the methods in which the system, in the 
conditions involving ageing population and deterioration of relations between 
those who potentially contribute and those who receive pensions could operate, 
is its constant changing, adjustment of the amount of pensions and raising of 
retirement requirements. This, however, is not simple due to political reasons, 
in view of the fact that the increasingly numerous elderly population presents 
a large electorate.   
Some effects of the pension and disability system reforms in Serbia can 
be illustrated by the data according to which in 2004 the reduction of the 
number of disability pensioners was initiated, the total number of pensioners 
in the employee fund went down by 54 thousands, the replacement rate went 
down to 66%, in 2004 over 3 billion dinars were collected from contributions 
on work conducted through youth and student employment agencies and 
contracts, and payments were initiated for voluntary insurance (for the so-
called extended and additional insurance over billion dinars were paid in). In 
2004 the average pension reached around EUR 130, and relative to 2000 the 
real growth of pensions is over 85%. 
Because of large inertia characterizing the pension and disability system, 
low employment and widespread gray economy, the effects of reforms are 
relatively slow and insufficient for a more complete financial stabilization of the 
system. The share of pension expenditure8 has in the past few years stabilized 
at approximately 11.6% of GDP, while the deficit for pension payments9 went 
down from 3.2% in 2002 to 2.4% in 2004.10 
Optimistically speaking, in medium term, the pension financing problem 
will be alleviated by employment increase and gray economy reduction. In 
longer term, however, the problems related to population ageing remain. For 
that reason in the future there is likely to be a further increase in the retirement 
age, in particular for women, change in pension indexation, further entitlement 
 8  t s necessary to differentiate between the expenditure for pensions and expenditure of the pension 
fund, which, apart from pensions, include care and assistance to elderly and disabled persons, health 
care of pensioners, administrative costs, foreign exchange differences and interest on the loan from 
the Fund for Development, etc.
 9  It is also necessary to differentiate between the transfers from the budget and the deficit. The transfers from 
the budget include the legal obligations of the budget to pay higher contributions for the contributors 
with accelerated calculation of years of service, payment of the old debt to pensioners, etc.
10 J. Bajec and K. Stanić – The Serbian Pension System Assessment, draft, 2005
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review.11 In longer term, the pressure can also be reduced by the introduction 
of additional insurance pillars. Any new consideration of the introduction of 
the second pillar should be based on a careful evaluation of experiences of 
other countries in transition, but only after Serbia is able to bear the transition 
costs of its introduction.
One of the important changes in short term can be expected in the area 
of fund consolidation. Namely, Serbia is the only country in the region which 
continues to have three separate pension and disability funds. In mid-2004 
the Government of Serbia adopted a decision on consolidation, which is to be 
conducted first at the administrative, and then at the financial level. There is no 
dilemma that the employee fund and the self-employed fund should become 
a single fund. A barrier to their integration are debts in the employee fund, 
which still pays pensions with an almost two-month delay. A barrier for this 
part of consolidation is also the resistance among the insured from the self-
employed fund and their desire to use “surplus” assets of this fund, which are a 
result of its favorable age structure (5:1) for business loans.  
A dilemma, however, remains related to the integration of the farmer fund 
to the integrated pension fund and general review of the compulsory nature 
of pension and disability insurance of farmers. Namely, with the adoption of 
the 2003 law, there was hope that the incentives provided by the law would 
stimulate regular payment of contributions and reduce the deficit in this fund. 
This did not happen, inter alia because the control of contribution payments 
was not strengthened simultaneously. On the other hand, there is widespread 
belief among some farmers that voluntary insurance is a better solution. In 
the event of accepting that option, the government budget would have to take 
over the complete financing of over 214 thousand pensioners from this fund 
and define separate/different solutions in the area of social assistance to old 
farmers.
The planned improvement of the IT system and reorganization of the 
registry records of the insured, with the technical assistance of the World Bank, 
should contribute to the improvement of the system as a whole, but also enable 
easier control of contributions.
11  More in B. Mijatović et al. - Improvement of the Socio-Economic Position of the Elderly in Serbia, 
Economics Institute, Belgrade, 2004
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SOCIAL WELFARE REFORM
Inherited situation
Poverty in Yugoslavia dramatically increased during the 1990s, the middle 
class was disappearing, the number of poor doubled with an increasingly 
rising number of people just above the poverty line. According to the national 
criteria, measured in relation to the income per consumer unit, over one third 
or nearly 2.8 million inhabitants of Serbia were below the poverty line in 2000.1 
The collapse of the economy and dramatic decrease of the GDP, which was 
halved during the 1990s, certainly had its decisive impact on the increase of 
poverty. Due to irregular payments or non-payment of salaries, collapse of 
the “socialist giants”, delays or non-payment of social assistance and pensions, 
poor functioning of health care and the necessity to pay for previously “free of 
charge” services, pushed many households below the poverty line.
Under such conditions, the social policy was pursued primarily through 
direct subsidizing of unsuccessful enterprises, on the one hand, and prescribing 
low prices of basic products and services (bread, milk, cooking oil, sugar, 
electricity, rent), on the other. At the same time, the minimum safety nets were 
practically destroyed. Social welfare (cash) benefits, such as child allowances, 
were more than two years delayed, and other allowances (social assistance – MOP 
and carers’ allowances) between 26 and 32 months. Debts were also incurred 
in the system of pension and disability insurance, veteran disability insurance, 
and the accommodation in the social welfare (residential) institutions was paid 
irregularly … Huge delays in payments, as well as devalued and low amounts 
of social assistance also caused a great fall in the number of beneficiaries of 
1  G. Krstic -The Profile of Poverty in Serbia, in “Poverty and Reform of Financial Support to the Poor”, 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and CLDS, Belgrade 2003, p. 23
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certain entitlements.2 Additionally, the lack of funds caused the permanent 
deterioration of living conditions in homes for the children without parental 
care, in homes for the elderly and other residential institutions. Underpaid, 
left on their own and most often not in a position to render the elementary 
assistance, the social welfare employees lost their motivation for work, and the 
level and quality of the services considerably worsened.
The the dis-functional social welfare system caused the poorest groups 
to become highly dependent on international humanitarian aid. Numerous 
non-governmental organizations, supported by international funding in the 
field of social protection, started to operate introducing new methods of work 
and new forms of social welfare services. The lack of cooperation between the 
NGO sector and the social welfare system made it impossible to introduce the 
innovations into the system and impeded the development and sustainability 
of social protection. 
Pace of the reforms 
Immediately after the changes of October 5, the activities in the field of 
the social protection followed the double-track course.
The first activities were practically crises management, directed towards 
stabilizing the system. These activities consisted of: repayment of the debts 
accrued over a number years, establishment of regular payments of social 
welfare benefits, improvement of the conditions in residential institutions, 
etc. By the end of 2003, all debts for social assistance were settled: for child 
allowances, social (cash) assistance (MOP), carer’s allowance, as well as the 
debts for veteran disability allowances. Donor funds were used for paying 
debts previously accumulated in the system, while the government committed 
to reinstate a regular payment of entitlements. That regularity in payment of 
current liabilities was established, as early as during 2001. Simultaneously the 
so-called One off Fund was established at the republic level, through which, 
during the first two years, additional donors’ and budgetary funds were 
channelled towards the poorest and the most vulnerable.3 
The coordination of donors’ humanitarian aid was established, especially 
in the area of interventions related to the improvement of living conditions 
2  In 2000, in far more unfavourable situation, the number of beneficiaries was cut by half compared 
to the beginning of 1990s
3  Several times additional payments (double amounts) of social assistance have been paid in order to 
improve the conditions of the most vulnerable entitled persons, as fast as possible.
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in residential (social welfare) institutions. During the first year, considerable 
donors` funds were used for the procurement of food and medications for 
these institutions, as well as durable consumer goods, indispensable accessories 
and equipment, PCs, etc. The most affected residential institutions were 
reconstructed completely. A number of collective centres (CCs) for refugees 
and IDPs (internally displaced persons) was also reconstructed and, since 
mainly elderly people stayed in them, they were converted into the homes for 
the elderly and formally introduced as a part of the social welfare system.
The other part of the activity was aimed at the formulation of reforms 
within the system. First, strategic goals in social protection were defined4, 
(expert) working groups to deal with reforms were established and many 
national and regional conferences were held in order to reach professional 
consensus on reforms.5 
The principles of social protection development were formulated, based on 
the transformed role of the state, on sound financing and greater responsibility 
of the individual to provide security for him/herself and his/her family.6
The transformed role of the state implies the decrease/discontinuation 
of subsidies to enterprises and therefore the withrawal of social policy from 
enterprises. This transformation also implies not only decreasing subsidies for 
basic products and services, but also decentralization, meaning that the state 
should not be the sole financier, organizer and service provider in the social 
sphere.
An important principle was also the rationalization of the funds and 
sustainability of social protection implying that the rights must be adjusted to 
the financial capacities of the society and state aid must be available to everyone 
in the same way and aimed at those really vulnerable.
The principle of greater responsibility of an individual to provide security 
for him/herself and his/her family attaches greater importance to the active 
measures of social policy and those measures in the field of the social protection 
which would not encourage long-term or even multi-generational dependence 
on the state’s social welfare.
From these basic postulates it follows that the changes in the area of 
social welfare benefits should be directed to the establishment of the unique 
absolute poverty line for the entire territory of Serbia, the real value of which 
4 G. Matkovic - The Reforms of the Social Sector, in “The Strategy of Reforms”, CLDS, 2001
5  In 2001, 5 regional conferences were held which were followed by published bulletins about the 
reforms in the social protection.
6 B.Mijatovic - The Principles of a New Social Policy, in “The Strategy of Reforms”, CLDS, 2001, p. 63
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will be maintained by indexing with the costs of living, together with the 
permanent access to entitlements and improved targeting of the beneficiaries. 
In order to analyse the weaknesses of the current system and prepare the 
changes and get the best possible picture of the standard of living and poverty, 
a Living Standard Measurement Survey - LSMS was initiated and carried out 
in mid-2002 on the sample of more than 6300 households and on another 500 
households depending on social welfare assistance.
On the other hand, for the purposes of budget planning, the changes of 
the welfare criteria were piloted with the aid of donors` funds. On the basis 
of the adjusted criteria, a new beneficiary list was established. These “new” 
beneficiaries received social welfare assistance from the donor funds (DFID 
and the World Bank). 
In the area of social welfare services the changes should have moved 
towards decentralization, deinstitutionalization (transformation of institutions) 
and development of alternative forms of social care, incorporation of the non-
governmental (NGO) sector in the service provision through cooperation/
partnership of all participants that may offer both active and passive social 
protection measures at the central and local levels. Thus, the changes were 
supposed to ensure the availability of services, their designing according to the 
needs of the beneficiaries and the opportunity to choose.
The implementation of the reforms in the area of services was carried out 
through two mechanisms: reform projects and special funds to finance the 
projects at local level.
In 2002, the work on many reform oriented projects began: the strategy 
of foster care development (the instructions for programme implementation, 
regional employee training, preparation of training curriculum for foster care 
families, establishing of regional networks, launching national, regional and 
local campaigns, adjustment of foster care allowances, preliminary changes 
of the relevant legislation), the transformation of institutions (analysing the 
possibilities of institutions beginning to render alternative social services 
- opening of day-care centres for persons with disabilities, creating regional 
centres for foster care, shelters, “half way houses” in the process of decreasing 
the number of institutionalised beneficiaries), the development of integrated 
social protection at local level (the analysis of the situation and capacity 
  Half-way homes are intended for the young who at the age of 18, upon finishing their schools, under 
compulsion of law, leave the homes for children without parental care or foster families. Quite 
often without any job or with a low pay, they suddenly appear with no institutional or any other 
support. Half-way homes are in fact a transitional solution between the home/foster home and fully 
independent life.
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building, along with launching pilot programmes in five municipalities for 
the joint action of protection from violence, abuse, juvenile delinquency, care 
of children without parental care and children in conflict with law) and the 
development of standards of professional work, procedures and protocols 
in social care centres and certain areas, too (the protocols on protection of 
violence, the change of operation of the commissions for the categorization of 
children with special needs, human trafficking, etc.). 
The mechanisms for the development of alternative social protection 
services and changes at the local level, as well as for the incorporation of non-
governmental sector in providing services include the Fund for Financing 
Associations of Disabled Persons (2002), and the Social Innovation Fund – SIF 
(2003). Both funds represent mechanisms for the decentralization and reform 
of the system, since they finance the projects at local level and new alternative 
services which are not part of the system or are not sufficiently developed. 
Also, both mechanisms encourage the partnership of governmental and non-
governmental sectors giving priority to joint projects and encouraging transfer 
of good practice. The standard projects, financed through these two projects, 
are: day care centres for children with disabilities, half-way houses, home care, 
development of local protocols and action plans to fight violence, inclusion 
projects for disabled persons, day care centres for Roma children… Over 300 
local projects were financed in the course of two or three years of these two 
funds’ operation.
The statutory changes and strategic documents
At the beginning of 2002, the Law on Financial Support to Families 
with Children was enacted. One of the basic features of this law is clear 
differentiation between the social policy and population policy measures. 
According to former solutions,8 the amount of the child allowance differed 
depending on the order of the child’s birth, and children of higher order of 
birth exercised a universal right in the areas with a low birth rate. The new 
law defines the child allowance as the social policy measure, the universal 
right to the child allowance is abolished, the amount of the allowance is equal 
for all children, and better targeting of the poor is provided by more precise 
8  The Law about Social Care on Children, Official Gazette, No. 42/92, 29/93, 53/93, 6/93, 28/94, 
4/94, 48/94, 25/96 i 29/01)
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definition of income and property, while considering eligibility.9 The families 
with children with disabilities and single parents, foster parents and guardians, 
are put in a favourable position by the new law in order to encourage protection 
of children without parental care outside institutions.
The law also eliminated regional differences in criteria, establishing a 
uniform threshold for the entire territory of Serbia, provided maintenance of 
real value of allowances (through indexing of welfare and thresholds with the 
costs of living) and as much as possible provided the continued access to this 
benefit.10 Parents` allowance – one-off allowance at the time of the child’s birth 
- was introduced as a special measure to encourage more childbearing. The new 
law stipulated a stricter penal policy towards employers and responsible persons 
if they issue false certificates of income to the applicant for child allowance, 
and towards responsible persons in municipal and/or city administration in 
the case of their misapplication of the funds for benefits payments. 
The Amendments to the Law on Social Protection and Social Security 
of the Citizens were prepared as early as the end of 2002, but they were 
adopted only in mid-2004. As the former one, this law, too, eliminated the 
differences between municipalities in the eligibility criteria for social welfare 
assistance and introduced a uniform absolute poverty line at the republic 
level, ensuring maintenance of the real value of benefits by way of indexing 
with the costs of living and continued access to entitlements. The legislative 
changes established new, a somewhat more realistic equivalency scale, and the 
use of the benefits for employable beneficiaries was limited to 6 months in a 
calendar year. Also, the amount for the carer’s allowance for old and disabled 
persons was considerably increased, thus decreasing the difference in the 
amount paid through the pension and disability plan. Certain legal criteria for 
foster families were defined, and the concept of professional foster care was 
introduced, too, although limited only to the employees who may lose their 
jobs in the process of deinstitutionalization. As an initial step for a different 
treatment of the beneficiaries, their representatives were incorporated into the 
governing bodies of the social protection institutions.
In 2003, the Family Code was also prepared, which was recently adopted 
(February 2005). In terms of the social protection system, particularly 
important innovations in this law are reflected, primarily, in the changed role 
9 According to the new legal solutions while establishing he financial situation of a family, all incomes, 
savings and property will be taken into consideration, not only wages and pensions.
10  At the same time, the change of the procedure in payment enabled budget savings of over 200 
million CSD per year.
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of the centres for social work (CSR) in the area of the family legal protection, 
introduction of pluralism of services and in the definition and formulation of 
protection measures against domestic violence.
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)11 was adopted towards 
the end of 2003 as a document that analysed the role of some priority sectors 
(employment, education, health care, social protection, environment, etc.) and 
the position of certain affected groups (refugees and displaced persons, the 
Roma, women, children, etc.) through perspective of transition and economic 
development effects to poverty. The implementation of the strategy in these 
areas is underway, together with monitoring and evaluation and efforts to 
achieve the coordination of the measures and activities envisaged by the 
strategy with the European integration processes.
The shortcomings and/or further required reform steps
During the first four years of transition poverty in Serbia was considerably 
reduced. According to the criterion of income per consumer unit the share of 
the poor fell to 14.5%, and according to the criterion of consumption, more 
appropriate for countries in transition, to about 10.6%.12 The real growth of 
salaries, pensions and other income in real terms put many households above 
the poverty line, reducing poverty in urban areas in the first place. However, 
the density of households just above the poverty line remained significant, 
indicating that even relatively minor aggravation of the standard of living 
may jeopardize a relatively large part of the population. If the poverty line 
were raised by 25%, the number of the poor would double.13 The unemployed 
and undereducated make up the most vulnerable group, and, at the level of 
households, the households with a large number of members and elderly 
households with only one bread winner are particularly threatened. The poorest 
live in villages and in less developed regions. Besides, the Roma, refugees and 
displaced persons, and disabled persons are exceptionally vulnerable groups 
that cannot even be covered by general surveys.
Reestablishment of the minimum safety nets almost certainly alleviated 
the position of the poorest. As the researches in 2002 on the basis of LSMS 
indicates, the social welfare in Serbia is well targeted, even better than in 
11 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2003
12  G. Krstic - The Profile of Poverty in Serbia, in “The Poverty and Reform of Financial Support to the 
Poor”, Ministry of Social Affairs and CLDS, 2003, p. 23
13 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2003, p. 9
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other countries of the region and represents comparatively important part 
of consumption of the poor, much higher than other transfers.14 The analysis 
of the previous results of the survey carried out in 2003, indicates the 
improvement of targeting children’s allowances after the enactment of the 
new law.15 The following can be indicated as the basic shortcomings in the 
area of benefits: very low coverage by social assistance,16 low cash benefits 
amounts and inadequate equivalency scale favouring small households. The 
Amendments to the Law on Social Protection and Social Security of Citizens 
made some positive steps in ensuring social security of citizens in relation to 
all the above weaknesses. It is necessary to further extend this most efficient 
social transfer after the analysis of the effects of these changes and providing 
for the adequate budget funds in the next period.1 However, the degree of its 
extension depends on the administrative capacity of local CSRs, too. In this 
field, it is also necessary to consider proposals for relocation of the part of the 
work concerning collection of documents to municipalities which administrate 
child allowances. Also, while considering possibilities to extend the coverage 
of the social welfare assistance, it is necessary to have in mind that the same 
may cause considerable “leakage” of budgetary funds, unless grey economy is 
reduced at the same time
Moreover, since the research studies reveal that more than the half of the 
poor, who do not receive social assistance, are in fact not informed about their 
rights and entitlements or do not know how to apply to exercise the rights,18 a 
more active role of all the participants in the social protection is necessary in 
this area, as well as the cooperation with other participants at central and local 
level. Many problems in the area of the social protection are inter-ministerial 
by nature and require establishing connections with the education, health care 
and employment sectors. This is even more important if the emphasis in social 
policy should be laid on active measures. 
14  B.Milanovic - The Social Transfers; Inequality, in “The Poverty and Reform of Financial Support to 
the Poor”, Ministry of Social Affairs and CLDS, 2003, p. 51
15  G. Krstic - The Poverty in Serbia in 2003 and Analysis of Children’s Allowances, internal document of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs, 2004
16  According to the study of the World Bank on the poverty in Serbia, the basic problem with welfare 
benefits is not targeting but the error of “exclusion”, i.e. insufficient coverage of the poor. World Bank 
“Serbia and Montenegro Poverty Assessment”, Vol II, p. 13
1  For some proposals for further changes see B.Mijatovic - “The Proposal of Reforms of Financial 
support to the Poor” in “The Poverty and Reform of Financial Support to the Poor”, Ministry of 
Social Affairs and CLDS, 2003, pp 111-128
18  B.Milanovic - The Social Transfers; Inequality, in “The Poverty and Reform of Financial Support to 
the Poor”, Ministry of Social Affairs and CLDS, 2003, p. 61
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In the previous four years, the system of support to persons with disability 
was not sufficiently analysed and changed, especially in the area of benefits, 
same being comparatively low and different in various parts of the system 
(social welfare, pension and disability insurance and protection of veterans). 
Nevertheless, certain improvements were made in changing attitudes and 
raising awareness about human rights of persons with disabilities, need for 
tolerance, the right to inclusion and participation, and especially in terms of 
quality and fostering of certain services at local level. The national strategy for 
persons with disability, currently underway, should also answer these questions, 
among other things.
In the area of reforming the system of social services, more decisive 
actions towards deinstitutionalization and transformation of institutions. At 
the same time, re-categorization of the social welfare (residential) institutions 
and re-categorization of beneficiaries have not begun yet, because, among 
other things, a professional consensus on overcoming classical “categorization” 
and establishment of categories based on needs has not been established yet. 
As for the further reform of the social services, it is of particular importance 
to analyse the results of the reform projects and pilot programmes through the 
Social Innovation Fund (SIF) in order to further improve the social protection 
legislation on the basis of such knowledge. In this context, it is also necessary 
to analyse the restrictions and possibilities of further decentralization with the 
utmost care.
The insufficiently developed control mechanisms at central level make 
further advancement of the social protection impossible, and also represent an 
obstacle to continuing the process of decentralization. Its establishment and 
strengthening will also cut down the problem of corruption and misuse in the 
system, which were not the focus of engagement in the previous period.
Finally, as well as in the other sections of the social sector, one of the 
challenges in social protection will also be “placing the beneficiary in the 
centre of the system” and, in this context, the change of views of the actors 
rendering services in this area. It seems that placing a student in the centre 
of the education reform, or, for example, a patient in the centre of the health 
care system will be far simpler. In other words, in principle, the beneficiaries 
of the social protection are not the interest group, they are often excluded 
from participation processes, they have no access to the power centres and 
cannot articulate their demands. This is certainly one of the reasons why in 
2000, speaking in relative terms, the largest state debts inherited were to the 
beneficiaries of the social protection were. Different attitude of the state towards 
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those who need assistance, and the change of attitudes and behaviours of the 
employees in social protection departments, is a long-term process which can 
hardly be achieved through changes in legislation,19 and will require a great 
number of different instruments and incentives, as well as the education of 
professionals and the general public.20
The role of international institutions and donations
As may have been expected, in the first two years of the transition, the 
donations in the social welafre sector were considerable21 to decrease with 
the withdrawal humanitarian aid and greater orientation to development 
projects and programmes. Most of the donors tried to follow the activities 
of the Government and respond to the requirements defined at the donor’s 
conferences.
Of international organizations, the World Bank played the most prominent 
role. The cooperation with the World Bank was positive as a whole. The expert 
team of the bank rendered support to the Government, placing its expert 
capacities at its disposal, acknowledging professional arguments, specificities 
of Serbia, without imposing solutions prepared in advance.
On the whole, the basic shortcoming was insufficient mutual coordination 
of donors who presented far too great demands to the state that, objectively, 
does not have sufficient capacities for international cooperation. 
19  V.Bosnjak - “Social Services / the Heart of Social Protection Reform”, internal document of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, p. 
20  Due to these reasons, all reform projects also cover educational packages for professionals, and 
enactment and beginning of the implementation of new solutions provided for by laws and bylaws 
are also followed by training process.
21  In the past period, the biggest donors in the area of social protection were the Government of Norway, 
the Government of Italy, the Government of the Great Britain, the Government of Switzerland, the 
World Food Programme, ECHO, UNICEF, UNHCR. UNDP also assisted in capacity buildingof the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. 
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Snezana Simic
THE REFORM OF THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
The inherited health care system
In the last decade of the 20th century in the Republic of Serbia, there was a 
policy of maintaining all the capacities and employees in the health care system, 
as well as all the rights to health regulated by law in the hope of economic 
recovery and possible preservation of all the resources without greater social 
perturbations. Since in the meantime the socio-economic situation in the 
country dramatically worsened, the health care system adjusted to the newly 
appeared changes in a disorganized manner, together with the falling of fixed 
assets (buildings and equipment) into disrepair, the lack of medicines and 
medical supplies, drastic decrease of the quality of health services and their use, 
informal payments and corruption, transfer of patients and part of equipment 
from the state to the private health care sector and resulting deteriorating 
health of the population.
The characteristic features of the health care system used to be and still are 
to a great extent: a well developed network of health institutions, the population 
extremely favourably covered with health care personnel and hospital beds, 
fragmentation of health services with the introduction of a series of clinical 
specialities, formalized approach to the health promotion and prevention of 
illness, lack of motivation to work and low professional satisfaction of medical 
staff. Low productivity, inefficiency and uneven quality of health services 
rendered to the population are the consequence of such conditions.
Despite considerable funds allocated to health care from the gross 
domestic product from the government sector, and the total costs evaluated at 
up to 10% of GDP, this system is faced with constant financing problems. The 
proceeds of the Republic Health Insurance Fund are not sufficient for servicing 
all the rights due to the low GDP level, developed informal sector, inherited 
debts, inadequate collection of contributions as a consequence of financial 
indiscipline, undeveloped insurance information system and administrative 
weaknesses. The funds from the Republic budget financing the health care of 
refugees, internally displaced and unemployed persons, although increased 
during the past years, are still insufficient. 
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The discrepancy between a wide scope of rights and their affordability, 
jeopardize the basic principles of the system operation. Access to health care 
services is limited by considerable payments out of the beneficiaries’ pockets, 
especially for the poor and other vulnerable groups (the elderly, the disabled, 
the Roma, refugees and internally displaced persons). In the study on the 
evaluation of poverty in Serbia, conducted in 2003, more than 3% of the 
population stated high costs of health care services and lack of insurance as 
basic reasons of the decreased access to health services.
While analysing the state of health of the population, the high share of 
cardiovascular and malignant diseases in the death structure is indicative of 
wide presence of behavioural risk factors (smoking, alcohol, obesity, improper 
nutrition, physical inactivity) and the environment (polluted air, water and 
soil). High-risk behaviour is most common in adults, especially men and 
vulnerable population groups. These causes of death are known as preventable, 
i.e. premature mortality since they can be successfully prevented by health 
promotion and preventive measures and activities. 
The legislative framework of the reform
The basic documents, representing the basis for the implementation of 
the reform in the health care system, have been adopted. The Health Policy 
in Serbia document was created out of the need to define the basic goals 
and directions of health care development. The Government adopted it in 
February 2002 and it has seven goals referring to the following: protection and 
improvement of the state of health of the population, fair and equal approach 
to health care, placing beneficiaries (patients) in the centre of the health care 
system, achieving financial and institutional sustainability of the system, 
improvement of efficiency and quality of work together with the definition of 
special national programmes concerning employees, network of institutions, 
evaluation of health technologies and improvement of medical supplies, 
defining the role of the private sector and advancement of staff base in the 
health care system.
The appearance of international partners imposed a need to define a 
clear vision of the system development. The Vision of the Health Care System 
in Serbia has been formulated with the participation of all key stakeholders 
in the health care system - the team from the Ministry of Health, including 
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the minister, the representative of the Republic Health Insurance Fund and 
the Health Care Institute of the Republic of Serbia and contains nine leading 
principles. The general vision of the health sector takes several assumptions as 
a starting point:
•		The future health care system in Serbia will be developed from the existing 
capacities and inherited tradition;
•		In future, the principle of solidarity will be the most important decision-
making and finding solutions, to always be respected at all levels. The 
health care beneficiary must always be in the centre of attention of those 
who make decisions at the political, administrative and professional level, 
and of health care providers;
•		Although the goal must be the directing of all necessary resources to 
the provision of the best possible health care, in the following years the 
development has to consider financial restrictions conditioned by the 
economic potential of the country. Open discussions must be held about 
this fact, both in political institutions and in the public;
•		During the next decade, the controlled change from the present system 
should lead to such a system in which the joint activity of public and private 
sectors in rendering health care services, will provide the population with 
the health care system which will, within the effective organization and 
actual resources, ensure equal access to the basic package of health services. 
Such services will be based on modern technology and modern scientific 
methods, backed by effective prevention and promotional activities. 
The working version of the Strategy of the Health Care System Reform in 
the Republic of Serbia until 2015 with the action plan is based on the previous 
documents and, together with them, it is presented in the publication of the 
Ministry of Health “Better Health for Everyone in the Third Millennium”. 
This strategy set the platform for the activities in the health sector with the 
priorities defined on the basis of the evaluation and analysis of the state of 
health of the population. The set priorities in the reform of the health care 
system are: the reduction of preventable illnesses and premature mortality of 
the population, the coordination of health insurance rights with the financial 
capabilities of the population and creation of modern, sustainable, decentralized 
and transparent health care system.
In the meantime, drafts of several specific strategies in the health care 
system have been prepared - the Strategy of Providing Sufficient Quantities of 
Safe Blood, the Tobacco Control Strategy, the Safe Food Strategy and the Public 
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Health Strategy, while the National AIDS Combating Strategy had already been 
adopted by the Government.
One of the systemic laws - the Law on Medicines and Medical Devices, 
drafted in cooperation with the European experts and harmonized with the 
requirements of EU, has been adopted (Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia, 
number 84/2004), while the proposals of the other two systemic laws (the Law 
on Health Care and the Law on Chambers of Health Care Workers) are in the 
parliamentary procedure. The Law on Health Insurance underwent the public 
hearing procedure and, in September, it will be proposed to the Government 
of the Republic of Serbia. Apart from the above, the Law on Protection of the 
Population against Contagious Diseases and the Law on Sanitary Inspection 
have been adopted, too.
The past reform changes
The reform of the health care system was delayed after the events in 
October 2000 in comparison to the other social sub-systems and practically 
started in 2002. During these three years, decent conditions of work in the 
health care system with sufficient most important equipment and consumables 
were achieved. However, medical workers themselves, their motivation and 
professional satisfaction have not changed a great deal and a longer period of 
time will be needed for these changes. 
The health care institutions were equipped with modern equipment, 
reconstruction and refurbishment of premises in some twenty general hospitals 
and many out-patient clinics have started, 150 ambulance cars have been 
bought, and clinical centres have been equipped with diagnostic equipment of 
the state of the art technology. There is a better supply of medicines and medical 
supplies and, at the same time, measures for rationalization of consumption 
were applied, especially medicines by establishing a “positive list of medicines” 
and introduction of the information system for the monitoring of their. 
About twenty guidebooks of good clinical practice for the most common 
diseases and conditions, appearing at the level of primary and secondary health 
care, were developed. They serve as protocols for physicians in their work and 
enable a considerable rationalization of resources.
The mechanisms of respecting the rights of patients have been advanced 
by introducing a representative for the protection of patients’ rights of (the so-
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called “patient’s lawyer”) at the level of health care institutions and at the level 
of the Ministry of Health and by defining a procedure to be undertaken in case 
of infringement of these rights. 
In the draft Law on Health Care there is a separate section with precisely 
defined rights to health and rights of patients based on the European Charter 
of Patients’ Rights.
The explanation on the improvement of quality of the health services 
work defined the quality performance indicators at the level of health care 
institutions, making appointments for diagnostic procedures has been 
introduced and the waiting lists for expensive interventions, by which the 
access of the population to these services has been improved. The investigation 
of the level of satisfaction of beneficiaries with the work of health centres was 
conducted and the results of these efforts are available the public and they 
will be used while concluding contracts on services and programmes with the 
Republic Health Insurance Fund.
A restrictive granting of approvals for specializations has been introduced 
in order to reduce the fragmented structure and narrow specialization in the 
health care system. New standards of population coverage with medical staff 
and hospital beds have been defined, as well as new performance standards. 
The assessment of the surplus number of employees in the health care system 
is underway, as well as looking for the most suitable models to decrease their 
number.
Numerous national programmes and campaigns are underway and their 
aim is the promotion of health and prevention of diseases and disorders 
- the National Anti-Smoking Campaign and the National Campaign for the 
Prevention of Cardiovascular Diseases. The guidebooks for preventive health 
services are being prepared and programmes and projects for early discovery 
of diseases - especially malignant diseases, have been strengthened.
The international partners in the reform of the health care system
During this period, the most important partner in the reform of the health 
care system has been the EU through the European Agency for Reconstruction. 
It financially supported about ten major projects in the amount of about 90 
million Euros. The Project of Medication Management, the Project of Preparing 
Good Clinical Practice Guidebooks, the Support to the Public Health in the 
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Republic of Serbia, including the foundation of the School of Public Health, 
the Strengthening of Preventive Health Care Services, the Development of 
the Health Care Information System, the Project of the Supply of Sufficient 
Quantities of Safe Blood, the Project of Reconstruction of 20 General Hospitals 
in Serbia and several smaller ones - the Burden of Diseases and Injuries in 
Serbia and the Assessment of the Health Care Service.
The World Bank is financing the “Health Care” project which covers the 
reconstruction of health care centres in four pilot regions: Vranje, Kraljevo, 
Valjevo and Zrenjanin. This year the International Committee of Red Cross 
will finalize a successful pilot project of the basic health services in the 
municipality of Kraljevo, and the Canadian Agency for Development started 
the second round of aid in the Balkans aimed at the reform of the primary 
health care and improvement of the reproductive health of the young. The 
funds for combating HIV/AIDS and introduction of the Directly Observed 
Therapies (DOTs) for tuberculosis have been obtained from the UN Global 
Fund. Bilateral aid from many countries is important, too, especially from 
the Norwegian Government in education in emergency medicine and 
development of the information system for monitoring the consumption of 
medicines, donations of the Japanese Government in the equipment of high 
technological value to the clinical centres, as well as the aid from China, also 
in the equipment of high technological value. It is important to mention that 
there is coordination at the level of ministries of health between the partners, 
so the projects are not duplicated and the results are jointly evaluated.
Future activities in the reform of the health care system
Considering that the most significant aspects of the reforms of all social 
sub-systems, and the health care system, too, is the reform of financing, it 
is important to emphasise that this aspect of the reform of the health care 
system is considerably delayed, mainly due to the initial inertia and lack of 
readiness of the Republic Health Insurance Fund to undertake the reforms. 
The change in the method of financing of service providers from the financing 
of the structure (institutions and personnel) to the financing of outcomes and 
performance is the process still awaiting us. It was envisaged that the results 
of the pilot project of the basic health care services in Kraljevo, introducing 
capitation (paying physicians in primary health care according to the list of the 
patients who selected him/her), will be extended to the entire system in 2006. 
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The best way of financing hospitals has not been chosen yet, and the consultant 
of the World Bank, currently engaged, has a task to propose a model appropriate 
for our country. The solutions range from the so-called prospective budgeting 
of hospitals to the introduction of the diagnostically related groups (DRGs) as 
isoresource categories with the costs defined for each group of diseases. 
One of the problems in the implementation of the health care system 
reforms is the capacity and the staff which did not increase greatly, but not 
decreased either, during 2001, and they are not in harmony with the financial 
capabilities of the country. Apart from considerable investments in the health 
care system during the past several years, the productivity, efficiency and 
quality of work of the health service were not increased as a result. At the 
request of the MMF, the Action Plan for the Rationalization of Capacities and 
Staff is underway and it will define new standards for population coverage with 
hospital beds and medical care staff, and new standards of performance. On the 
basis of same, in the period until 2010, the number of beds in hospitals for acute 
hospitalisation will be decreased (15%) and in the hospitals for the treatment 
of chronic diseases and conditions (10%), the number of medical doctors in 
specialized consultative departments in health care clinics and hospitals will 
be decreased (6%), as well as the number of administrative and technical staff 
(1%). Some departments, such as occupational medicine and dentistry will be 
considerably reduced. Rehabilitation centres and pharmaceutical activity are 
considered for privatisation.
The position of the private health sector is not properly solved and it has 
been developing in an unorganised manner without proper legislation and 
control, and currently, it presents (financially) a powerful lobby that requires 
an equal status in the health care system, which is impossible to establish due 
to limited financial capabilities of the Insurance Fund and surplus of capacities 
and staff in the public sector. One of the solutions, already accepted, is to 
incorporate certain service providers from the private sector which will have 
to conclude contracts with the Insurance Fund (so-called public/private mix).
And, finally, it is necessary to emphasise that the important aspects of 
the health care system reform of, such as financing reform (insurance), 
constant improvement of quality of work, accreditation of health institutions 
and programmes, licensing of medical workers and assessment of health 
technologies, depend on the adoption of new systemic laws for which there has 
been no consensus so far. Although a part of preparations to introduce these, 
for our situation, new concepts, has already been carried out, the preparation 
itself requires proper legal solutions not existing in the current laws.

Boris Begović and Milica Đilas
International Relations
INTRODUCTION
The 990s were quite certainly a decade in which Serbia’s, i.e. FR Yugoslavia’s 
relations with the world were at their all-time low, with the country’s position 
being the most unfavorable in its recent history. This was a period of wars for 
the heritage of the SFRY, foreign political isolation and the United Nations 
sanctions against FR Yugoslavia, NATO air strikes, an economic and social 
crisis, political authoritarianism etc.  
After the democratic changes in October 2000, prospects opened up 
for a radical improvement of Serbia’s relations with the world and its inclusion 
in international institutions and structures of integration. The population’s 
expectations in this regard were exceptionally high, especially concerning the 
positive effects of such integration on the standard of living. The new authorities 
were doing very little to manage these expectations. It soon transpired that 
a considerable part of the obstacles to full integration in the international 
community had not been eliminated. For example, the issue of relations with 
the Hague Tribunal, i.e. the fulfillment of its requests made Serbia’s foreign 
political position increasingly difficult and represented the crucial obstacle to 
the process of successful integration in international trends.  
DRAWING CLOSER TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
There is no doubt that Serbia’s first partner on the road to full integration 
in the international community is the European Union, so that any review of 
  Even though this is a joint paper of the two mentioned authors, the veritable division of 
work which existed in the writing of this chapter should be mentioned. Boris Begović 
covered sections Integration into International Financial and Economic Institutions and 
Evaluation of Integration into the International Community and Milica Đilas the rest of it. 
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Serbia’s international relations should start with a review of how close Serbia 
has drawn to the European Union, i.e. to the stabilization and association 
process. Before October 2000, the relations of Serbia, or better to say of FR 
Yugoslavia with the European Union boiled down to accepting assistance for 
democratization, independent media and humanitarian assistance, since any 
other forms of economic cooperation were banned by the sanctions. Following 
the democratic changes in Serbia, however, the isolation was lifted and, at 
the Zagreb summit in November 2000, the FRY became a full member of the 
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), this representing the framework 
for association which the EU had offered to countries of the western Balkan 
region – Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania and FRY/Serbia 
and Montenegro (SCG). The promotion of relations with the EU, with 
membership being the final goal, became the new authorities’ foreign policy 
priority. In view of the fact that drawing closer to the EU found itself at the 
top of the list of political priorities, but also that, following a ten-year period 
of isolation, integration into the EU enjoyed a high degree of support among 
the citizens, one was to expect faster progress towards the establishment of 
contractual relations with this international organization than was really 
the case. It was only in April 2005 that Serbia and Montenegro’s Feasibility 
Study was approved, meaning that the start of talks on the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement can be expected in the autumn of 2005, and the actual 
signing of the Agreement in spring at the earliest, or more likely in the autumn 
of the following year. The following analysis will endeavor to review the reasons 
for the slow realization of the process of integration into Europe.
Serbia and SCG in the stabilization and association process
The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) was conceived as an 
approach to countries of South-Eastern Europe (Western Balkans) offering 
the entire region the prospect of membership in EU, but also enabling each 
individual country to advance faster if it meets the envisaged conditions. The 
conditions are defined in a similar manner – as a set of conditions applying to all 
countries, with the addition of specific conditions for countries that had been 
conflict. The most important common conditions are, essentially, the criteria 
defined at the European Council in Copenhagen in 993, which also applied 
to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that had already joined the EU, 
including: the stability of institutions guaranteeing the respect of human and 
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minority rights and democratic principles and the rule of law, a functional 
market economy, as well as the ability to assume obligations stemming from 
membership. The attention of all SEE countries was additionally drawn to 
the necessity of regional cooperation, as well as the need for devotedness to 
the resolution of open question in a peaceful and constructive manner. For 
those countries that had experienced conflicts which ended with the signing 
of peace agreements, envisaged is the respect of all obligations stemming from 
them. In the case of SCG, this means the Erdut, Dayton-Paris can Kumanovo 
agreements, but also the obligation to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal 
set out in them. Such an approach by the EU demonstrates the desire for the 
region to improve as a whole and for all the states in it to become stable and 
democratically-oriented, economically prosperous, directed towards regional 
cooperation and dialogue and without the desire to resolve open questions 
through armed conflicts.
Serbia, i.e. FR Yugoslavia/SCG, has made large steps towards the 
fulfillment of the conditions set by the SAP. Political life in the country has 
normalized, even though it soon became clear that the elimination of certain 
repressive laws adopted in the previous period (Law on the University, Media 
Law) would require the building of new, strong and legitimate, legal and other 
institutions, which required time.   
In the sphere of economic reforms, a whole series of resolute moves 
were made and were positively assessed in European and world economic 
and financial circles. Macroeconomic stabilization was achieved surprisingly 
fast, as well as the liberalization of prices and foreign trade, comprehensive 
economic reforms were launched with the goal of improving the technical, 
legal and institutional presuppositions for attracting foreign investments and 
achieving sound economic growth.
As regards regional cooperation, the FRY became a factor of stability 
in the region and an active participant in the search for solutions for the 
existing problems, instead of being, like before, someone who “produces” new 
problems. The relations with former Yugoslav republics have been established 
and/or upgraded to a higher diplomatic level, the process of resolving open 
issues has been launched (like, for instance, the issue of the succession of SFR 
Yugoslavia), as was the process of active participation in regional initiatives 
and organizations.
The progress achieved in economic and political reforms led to the 
establishment of a Consultative Working Group, a working body characteristic 
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of the first phase of SAP and consisting of representatives of the FRY government 
(as well as the governments of Serbia and Montenegro) and representatives of 
the European Commission. The first meeting was held on July 23, 200 and, 
in the following year, another four meetings took place at which the progress 
achieved in certain fields was discussed. After each meeting, the Commission 
published its recommendations, stating what else needed to be done in the 
observed field in order for the reform process to succeed. After the fifth 
meeting of the Consultative Working Group, held in July 2002, the mechanism 
was interrupted due to our side’s expectation that a positive assessment of the 
Feasibility Study would follow soon and would open the door for talks on the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement. Since events did not take such a 
course, technical talks were reinitiated in July 2003 in the form of an Advanced 
Permanent Dialogue and, before the final approval of the Feasibility Study in 
March 2005, as many as six meetings of this working body were held.
Despite the fact that significant steps were made, the process of drawing 
closer to the EU soon encountered a deadlock. There are two reasons for such a 
course of developments – the obligation to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal 
and the relations between Serbia and Montenegro in the joint state – first in the 
FRY, and then, after the redefinition of relations, the signing of the Belgrade 
Agreement and then also the adoption of the Constitutional Charter, in the 
state union of SCG as well. Unlike the US, which laid emphasis primarily on 
cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, the EU insisted equally, if not more, 
on an agreement between Serbia and Montenegro on the manner in which 
the joint state would function. The reason for this was simple – the goal of 
the improvement of relations with the EU is to regulate contractual relations 
through the signing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement, whose 
provisions largely deal with the establishment of a free trade zone between 
FRY/SCG and the EU. In order to enter such a relationship, the EU, simply 
speaking, wants to know on which terrain the game will be played – on the 
terrain of the joint state, which implies a clear agreement on the division of 
competencies between the level of the joint state and its members, or, if there 
is a customs border between Serbia and Montenegro, on the separate terrains 
of the republics. Furthermore, the redefinition of the relations between Serbia 
and Montenegro, achieved through the Belgrade Agreement, was a political 
project supported by the EU, so it is understandable that the consistent 
implementation of the agreement would be important for this organization’s 
credibility, primarily for those actors, like the high representative for the 
foreign and security policy, Javier Solana, who mediated in the conclusion of 
the Agreement.
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At the beginning of the transition process, the ruling coalition in 
Montenegro did not participate in the federal government, nor did it consider 
binding the decisions which would be taken by such a government, in which 
Montenegro was represented by the opposition political bloc. Such a situation 
very soon became an obstacle to the promotion of relations with the EU, and the 
agreement on the redefinition of mutual relations was expected to contribute to 
the overcoming of the problem. It transpired, however, that the Constitutional 
Charter also failed to provide a satisfactory answer to Brussels’ question as to 
who on the other side is responsible for doing the work within the SAP and 
on which territory will a possible Agreement be applied. True, the problem of 
the non-recognition of the government was overcome – official Podgorica is 
participating in institutions established by the Constitutional Charter, but this 
was not the case with the problem of different economic systems, i.e. policies, 
and the attitude to their harmonization. While official Belgrade, with the support 
of Brussels, insisted on the Charter containing provisions on the free flow of 
goods, services, people and capital on the territory of SCG, official Podgorica 
claimed that the market was not, i.e. that it should not be unified, but rather 
joint, and that there was no cause for the European Union to exert pressure for 
the full harmonization of the economic systems, i.e. the policies to be carried 
out. Nevertheless, efforts were made to resolve the created situation through 
the adoption of an Action Plan for the harmonization of the economic systems 
of Serbia and Montenegro which harmonized the customs rates for 93% of 
the products, with the exception of a certain number of agricultural products. 
These problems proved to be an insurmountable problem – while there is no 
political need in Montenegro to apply high customs duties in order to protect 
farmers, as there are none, Serbia has around 500,000 farmers’ households, 
i.e. around two million people, due to which the Serbian government, for the 
purpose of acquiring the political support of that part of the population, has a 
completely different attitude to the issue of lowering customs barriers.2
The Action Plan is adopted by the parliaments of Serbia and Montenegro 
and, it is only in the third attempt, due to the inability to form a quorum, that 
2  In this regard, the partial interests linked to the foreign trade regime are much better articulated in 
Montenegro. Namely, non-tariff barriers (based on quantitative restrictions) suit the realization of 
such interests to a far greater extent. Since such restrictions lead to the growth of the equilibrium 
price on the domestic market, the possession of an import permit which is, of course, issued in a non-
transparent and non-competitive manner, makes it possible to keep considerable rent for oneself. 
Such a system of non-tariff barriers and the allocation of permits also prevents any new entry, this 
enabling the maintenance of such rent. The relatively small number of those who collect such rent 
makes it possible for them to organize well and articulate their interests well, so as to master the 
process of formulating the relevant economic policies, i.e. to bear influence on those taking decisions 
on these policies. It is for this reason that the „harmonization“ did not succeed. 
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the parliament of the state union of SCG adopted it. This was sufficient for the 
European Commission to start, in September 2003, work on the Feasibility 
Study, presuming that an agreement on the harmonization of customs barriers 
for the remaining products would soon be reached. It soon became clear that a 
final agreement would be difficult to achieve, not only because of the different 
economic and political interests of Serbia and Montenegro in regard to the 
issue of the harmonization of agricultural products, but also because of the 
fact that early parliamentary elections were called in Serbia  in December 
2003, and that the government was not formed before March 2004. This 
meant that, until that time, the Montenegrin government had no partner for 
talks on resolving this problem – such a constellation perfectly suited official 
Podgorica which did not wish to resolve this problem in the first place. Since 
the new government could not (or did not want to) offer a solution that would 
be accepted by both the Montenegrin side and the EU and, thus, unblock the 
process of European integration, the EU took upon itself to resolve the problem 
and in October 2004, allowed SCG the “twin track” approach for association 
with the EU. This, essentially, implies the possibility for Serbia and Montenegro 
separately to negotiate on economic issues and no further conditions for the 
full harmonization of the two republics’ economic systems. As an indicator 
of the fact that it remains devoted to the idea of a joint state, the EU will sign 
with SCG one Stabilization and Association Agreement, with two protocols 
that will contain economic issues, while the political issues would be reviewed 
in the joint part. Such an approach enabled the continuation of the process of 
integration to the extent to which it was halted by the lack of harmonization 
between the Serbian and Montenegrin economic policies, and it produced 
the first positive results already in March 2005, when the Textile Agreement 
between the EU and Serbia was signed. 
Nevertheless, prior to the approval of the Feasibility Study it was 
necessary to resolve yet another problem – the problem of direct elections for 
the parliament of the state union of SCG, which were to take place in February 
2005 under the Law on the Implementation of the Constitutional Charter. 
Much before the deadline for the holding of the elections, it became clear that 
there was no political will in Montenegro to have them organized, while there 
was no united answer to this problem in Serbia. The attempt to resolve the 
problem through the postponement of the elections for a year, during which 
period a referendum on independence would be held in Montenegro, failed 
in December 2004. The deadline for the holding of elections passed without 
any agreement on how to overcome this obstacle, which created a situation 
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in which deputies whose mandate had, essentially, expired found themselves 
in the SCG parliament in March. As the approval of the Feasibility Study was 
becoming certain, there was a growing need to find a solution to this problem, 
which was preventing the EU Commission from concluding in the Study that 
the rule of law existed in SCG. Finally, on April 7 an agreement was reached on 
a change of the Constitutional Charter which linked the holding of elections 
for the parliament of the state union to the holding of elections in Serbia and 
Montenegro, respectively, and which the public learned about only two days 
before it was signed. Less than a week later, on April 2, the Feasibility Study 
was approved.  
The standstill in the process of promoting relations with the European 
Union did not, however, occur only because of the non-harmonized relations 
between Serbia and Montenegro in the joint state, but also because of 
unsatisfactory cooperation with the Tribunal in The Hague (International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia – ICTY). From the start of 
SAP, the obligation of cooperating with the Hague Tribunal was clearly set 
out among the criteria whose fulfillment was important for drawing closer to 
the EU.  Even though cooperation proceeded sporadically and without a legal 
framework until the spring of 2002, the European Union did not suspend, or 
threaten to suspend either the macro-financial assistance forwarded to FRY, or 
the funds from the CARDS program, nor did it stop the technical dialogue being 
conducted within the Consultative Working Group. The only “threat” the EU 
addressed to the FRY in regard to the fulfillment of its obligations towards the 
Hague Tribunal concerned the holding of the donors conference in Brussels in 
June 200 – while the US made its participation in the conference conditional 
on the extradition of Slobodan Milosevic to the Tribunal, the EU did not call 
into question is participation, but made it clear that it would promise funds 
at the conference itself, but that they would be given to the FRY only when 
the former Yugoslav president is extradited to the Tribunal. Such a stand of 
the EU regarding cooperation with the Hague Tribunal essentially did not 
differ from the US stand – the difference could more or less be described as a 
difference between a “good cop” and a “bad cop” – while the US constantly kept 
exerting pressure for this cooperation to be established, threatening with the 
suspension of assistance, the EU made it clear, without threatening to suspend 
current cooperation, that the fulfillment of obligations towards the Tribunal 
would be the key condition for further steps on the road to the establishment 
of contractual relations with the EU.
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The extent to which cooperation with the Hague Tribunal is a crucial 
precondition for the EU became clear the moment when the EU Commission 
started working on the Feasibility Study for the first time, i.e. in the autumn 
of 2003. After the parliament of the state union adopted the Action Plan for 
the harmonization of the economic systems of  Serbia and Montenegro, the 
European Commission started working on the Study, in the belief (which 
was insufficiently based on facts) that, while the Study was being drawn up, 
the economic systems, i.e. the policies of Serbia and Montenegro would be 
fully harmonized. Not only did this expectation prove to be wrong, but even 
at the moment when the Study was to be published – in March 2004 – the 
issue of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal was raised once again. Namely, 
in December 2003, indictments were issued against four generals of the SCG 
Army and the police, and until the moment when the Study was to be published 
their appearance in The Hague did not look very probable. For this reason, and 
because of the inability to carry out economic harmonization between Serbia 
and Montenegro, the drawing up of the Study was postponed, in expectation 
of the resolution of these two problems. While the problem of harmonization 
was resolved with the adoption of the twin-track approach in October 2004, 
cooperation with the Hague Tribunal was established only later. Until the 
publishing of the Study in April 2005, 2 indictees voluntarily surrendered to 
the Tribunal, the funds of ICTY fugitives were frozen and good cooperation 
was established between the Tribunal’s Office of the Prosecutor and the Special 
War Crimes Court. With the Serbian government’s guarantees being accepted, 
a number of indictees have been released pending trial.3 However, until the 
moment the Study was published, it was not known whether this would be 
sufficient for it to be approved, because General Pavkovic, one of the four 
generals indicted in December 2003, had not been extradited to the Tribunal, 
nor were, allegedly, his whereabouts known at the time when the Study was 
published.4 The confirmation of the approval by the EU Council of Ministers 
came after General Pavkovic’s arrival in Scheveningen, and the start of the 
talks has been scheduled for October 2005, although the Study itself explicitly 
says that the talks could be suspended if the non-fulfillment of conditions 
continues.
3  First of all, in December 2004, Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, then in April 2005 Vladimir 
Lazarević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović and Dragoljub Ojdanić.
4  It is certain that high-ranking officials of the European Commission, i.e. of the EU had received 
credible assurances that this problem would be resolved in a satisfactory manner, i.e. within a 
satisfactory deadline. The assurance truly proved to be credible. 
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Foreign trade cooperation with the EU
This part of the text will restrict itself to an analysis of foreign trade with 
the EU after October 2000, primarily because of the fact that the essence of 
the Stabilization and Association Agreement lies in the establishment of a free 
trade zone between SCG and the EU, after the transitional period agreed on 
in the talks. This means that a vast majority of the Agreement’s provisions, 
around 80%, will be devoted precisely to foreign trade. 
The inclusion of FRY in SAP in November 2000 also meant our country’s 
inclusion in a liberalized regime of preferentials for the entire region, which 
came into force on December , 2000. These, so called exceptional trade 
measures were granted for a period of five years and they imply the right to 
export to the EU without customs duties and quantitative restrictions on all our 
products, with the exception of certain categories of textile and food products 
which can be exported to the EU without customs duties or reduced customs 
duties only within a quantity quota. After May 2004, the preferential treatment 
of our exports was expanded to include the 0 new EU member countries.
The renewal of trade cooperation and the use of EU preferentials produced 
their first results already in 200, when the growth rate of exports to the EU 
was 25.0%, in 2002 it was 3.3% and in 2003 it was around 20%, while the 
growth rate of imports in 200 was 27.9%, in 2002 it was 43%, and in 2003 it 
was 3%. Between 200 and 2003, exports and imports to and from the EU 
registered very high growth rates which were, true, partly the result of the non-
existence of trade with the EU in the period of the sanctions and isolation. 
True, noticeable was a faster growth of imports than exports, this leading to 
the increase in the existing trade deficit. 
This situation was contributed to by the fact that, in the period between May 
2003 and August 2004, the preferential treatment of exports of our sugar to the 
EU was suspended, primarily because of the excessive exports of sugar whose 
origin could not be determined with certainty, and then also because of the lack 
of adequate legal and institutional procedures for the issuing of certificates on 
the origin of goods, which the “sugar affair” clearly pointed to. For this reason, 
in January 2004, the European Commission issued a warning to its importers 
to pay additional attention to the origin of goods being imported from SCG, 
which quite certainly had a discouraging effect on cooperation. After a detailed 
investigation into the routes of the sugar that had been exported from Serbia 
in the preceding period, as well as the establishment of a supervision system 
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and the issuing of certificates on the origin of the goods, harmonized with the 
requests of the European Commission, the preferentials were reinstated. The 
direct consequence of the re-approval of sugar preferentials was the growth of 
exports of this product, and consequently of overall commodity exports to the 
EU in 2004, by 40% compared to the preceding year. Imports of goods from 
the EU in 2004 grew by 46% compared to the preceding year. The trade deficit 
with the EU in 2004 was as much as 4.7 billion USD and it was larger than 
the deficit in 200 by as much as 246%.   
Obstacles to a major growth of exports are primarily the low quality of 
domestic products, the production inefficiency of domestic plants and the 
non-diversified production structure, the lack of effective mechanisms for 
the favorable insuring of export credits, but also the long procedures for the 
establishment of administrative and technical cooperation for exports of 
agricultural and food products by the EU, as well as high quality standards and 
high standards of consumer protection and health protection on the EU market. 
The development of institutions that are to contribute to the fulfillment of these 
requests was, for a long time, the subject of internal institutional problems 
and conflicts of competencies between the state union and the member states. 
The “twin track” model made the situation clearer by determining that the 
economic sphere fell within the competency of Serbia, i.e. Montenegro, this also 
enabling the establishment, i.e. the faster reform of all institutions necessary 
for the promotion of economic cooperation with the EU. The result of such an 
approach is also the signing of and Agreement on trading with textile products 
between Serbia and the EU, which lifted all quantity restrictions on exports of 
our textile to the EU. By signing the Agreement with Serbia, the EU abandoned 
its three-year long attempt to sign such an agreement at the level of the state 
union, which was prevented by the inability to establish institutions that would 
assume international obligations for the entire territory of SCG.
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INTEGRATION INTO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
Previous activities and results 
Even though the largest part of the activities towards integration into 
international institutions proceeded simultaneously and although there 
existed important links among these institutions, it is more suitable at the 
analytical level to analyze each of these institutions and Serbia’s relations with 
it individually.5 In this sense, only the most important international financial 
and economic institutions will be reviewed. 
International Monetary Fund 
The renewal of membership in the IMF in the autumn of 2000 was the first 
step towards Serbia’s integration into international financial institutions. The 
renewal of membership and the preparation of the first Stand by arrangement 
with the IMF was made conditional by this institution on certain elements of 
the economic policy, primarily the abolition of the dual exchange rate, i.e. the 
establishment of a single exchange rate, more or less determined by the market, 
and endeavors to eliminate the quasi-fiscal deficit, as well as the settlement of 
Serbia’s outstanding financial obligations towards the Fund.
In June 200, the first Stand by arrangement with the IMF worth 36 million 
USD was approved. Part of these obligations which Serbia accepted within the 
arrangement concerned the maintenance of the envisaged macroeconomic 
proportions, but the IMF strongly stimulated structural reforms, primarily 
in the financial (banking) sector. During the realization of the arrangement, 
the IMF insisted on the need to liquidate four large banks which accounted 
for 80% of the assets of the then domestic banking sector, but whose total 
placements were contaminated. The liquidation of these banks, carried out in 
January 2002, apart from having a beneficial effect on the development of the 
domestic financial sector, also enabled the successful execution of the Stand by 
arrangement. 
5  Further in the text it is exclusively the position of Serbia in these structures of integration that is 
observed, regardless of the fact that membership itself is linked to the state union of Serbia and 
Montenegro, i.e. FR Yugoslavia that preceded it. 
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In 200, i.e. during the Stand by arrangement, the IMF was a kind 
of representative of Serbia’s at international conferences, i.e. at financial 
negotiations. This included the presentation of credible assessments of the 
Serbian economy’s macroeconomic stability, which had a large effect on 
decisions at donors’ conferences, to the extent to which the donors’ decisions 
were economically, i.e. non-politically motivated. Furthermore, the IMF made 
the basic projection of the country’s foreign indebtedness and an analysis of 
the possibilities for servicing the foreign debt which represented the basis for 
the decisions of the Paris Club of creditors. With the results of this projection, 
the IMF strongly supported a considerable write-off of our foreign debt.  
In May 2002, an extended (EFF) arrangement with the IMF was concluded. 
Two elements of the IMF’s policy are of the greatest importance for transition 
in Serbia. The fist one is the refusal to accept the Serbian budget for 2004 with 
a deficit of 625 million EUR. Even though Serbian officials insisted that it was 
impossible to reduce the deficit, the IMF’s relentless policy and the stipulation 
of the execution of the arrangement with the reduction of the budget deficit 
led to a revision of the budget for 2004 and the forming of a budget for 2005 
with a moderate budget deficit. The second element is the IMF’s policy in the 
first half of 2005: the IMF’s conditions in this period are directed towards 
the restructuring of the real sector in Serbia which is viewed as the source 
of the budgetary and foreign trade deficit. It is obvious that, in recent time, 
the IMF turned to the microeconomic causes of the chronic macroeconomic 
disproportions in Serbia.
World Bank 
The restoration of Serbia’s membership in the World Bank was linked to 
two main issues. First was the issue of settling the outstanding obligations, 
since the due, i.e. outstanding obligations of FR Yugoslavia on the whole 
were around .760 million USD in 200. The World Bank Statute does not 
allow a write-off of claims, i.e. the forgiving of debts, so that the question of 
an arrangement that would regulate outstanding obligations was raised. This 
was all the more so since there is no possibility of the World Bank granting 
new loans to a member country if it has outstanding obligations towards the 
Bank from previous loans. This problem was resolved with the World Bank 
granting FR Yugoslavia a consolidation loan, which consolidated all the due 
obligations, and the deadlines for their execution were moved into the future. 
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The consolidation loan has a 30-year repayment period and interest rates at the 
level of the standard loans of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). This financial operation was the third operation of the 
kind in the World Bank’s history (after the consolidation of the obligations of 
Bangladesh and Bosnia-Herzegovina).
The second important issue was the issue of the status: whether to acquire 
membership of the International Development Association (IDA) or of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Membership 
of IDA ensures loans under concession terms, meaning terms more favorable 
than those on the market: practically interest-free loans with a very favorable 
repayment period for the debtor. However, the scope of the funds that can 
be received under these conditions is extremely limited, since the funds are 
obtained from the budgets of the World Bank’s most developed member 
countries (the G7 group of countries). Membership in IBRD can ensure a 
larger amount of funds, but which are borrowed under higher interest rates, 
i.e. rates based on the interest rates which the World Bank pays on the capital 
market when obtaining them. The decision of the authorities at the time was to 
request, i.e. to obtain an IDA status and this decision was taken on the basis of 
the assessment that the state’s priority was a generous write-off of the foreign 
debt to the Paris Club of creditors. Namely, there were credible assurances 
that without the IDA status (reserved for the most under-developed countries 
of the world) it is not possible to receive a write-off of the debt to the state’s 
creditors that would be close to the so-called Naples terms (67% write-off).6 
The first problem with such a decision and its realization was the small 
amount of funds that were at the disposal for borrowing. Thus, in the first 
three-year arrangement with the World Bank (which was completed in 2004) 
envisaged was the borrowing of a total of 540 million USD under IDA terms. In 
the current arrangement with the World Bank, which represents the borrowing 
of funds under mixed terms (part of the funds are being borrowed under 
IDA, and part under IBRD terms), only 225 million USD will be borrowed 
under IDA conditions. This inflow of capital from the World Bank should be 
compared to the outflow of capital for the payment of interests to the World 
Bank for the consolidation loan. The total amount of the obligations based 
on this interest is up to 00 million USD annually (depending on the LIBOR 
trends). This means that, in the first three years, the net inflow of capital from 
6  The acquisition of an IDA status, i.e. membership, is linked to certain conditions concerning the 
level of development measured by the GDP per capita. Namely 895 USD per capita was the ceiling, 
so that a country above that GDP level could not become an IDA member. A creative calculation of 
our country’s GDP at that moment produced satisfactory results. 
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the World Bank was only around 80 million USD annually. In the following 
period, the inflow of funds under IDA terms will not be sufficient even for the 
repayment of interests on the consolidation loan.7   
Furthermore, part of the outflow of capital for the payment of interests 
on the consolidation loan (somewhere over 20 million USD annually) is for 
the servicing of the portion of that loan that concerns the unpaid credits for 
investments in Kosovo.8 In other words, the Kosovo debt is included in our 
debt to the World Bank, so that interest on this part of the debt is also being 
paid. These obligations are being serviced from the budget. However, Kosovo 
is not participating at all in the servicing of these obligations. This has created 
an economically and politically illogical situation in which the one who is 
servicing the obligations from his own budget (at this moment this boils down 
to the payment of interests, but the repayment of the principal is to ensue as of 
2007) cannot collect taxes in the region that had generated those obligations. 
UNMIK and its patrons objected to any kind of alternative solution, so that in 
the political game that followed, their political weight, regardless of the lack of 
arguments, proved to be much larger than that of Serbia.
As far as the World Bank’s engagement is concerned, in the first years of 
new membership it focused on advisory and technical assistance to the new 
authorities in the transition. This assistance was valuable, since the World Bank, 
as an institution, had accumulated and systematized the ten-year experiences 
of countries in transition. This especially refers to the process of specific 
institutional building like, for example the one concerning the realization of 
privatization.  
The start of the World Bank’s financial engagement in Serbia was very 
ambitious in the sphere of financing projects, i.e. primarily projects for the 
promotion of the state policy, such as the financing of the establishment of 
an agency for insuring export credits, the modernization of the customs 
service, so as to accelerate the flow of goods across the border etc. However, 
the realization of such projects proved to proceed very slowly, and in certain 
cases the realization of projects was totally halted, so that by the beginning of 
2005 only one such project was implemented. This points to our country’s very 
7  Even though there were attempts to increase the amount of funds for our country, this was strongly 
opposed by France. Namely, IDA funds also come from the French budget, and the French 
government wants to use these funds to increase the benevolent attitude of African countries which 
fall under the French sphere of interest. France has no such ambitions in the Balkans. For this reason, 
quite clear was the motivation of France (which was even against the awarding of the IDA status to 
our country) to limit the granting of IDA funds to Serbia, so that there would be more for its clients 
in Africa. 
8 Kosovo’s total debt within the consolidation loan is 404 million USD (around 23% of the principal). 
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small administrative capacity, i.e. the small ability of the state administration to 
accept specific-purpose (project) funds and to realize projects financed in such 
a manner. This is the result of the fact that there is a very small number of people 
in the state administration who are capable of managing the implementation 
of such projects, as well as the inadequate organization and lack of stimuli for 
the state administration to work on such an implementation.  
In view of the above mentioned, the World Bank very soon moved to 
the financing of budgetary support to our country, through the granting of 
loans for structural adjustment. This method of work can be implemented 
much easier since the state, i.e. the government, is expected to make certain 
reform moves, these expectations are presented to officials, and when the 
reform moves are realized, financial assistance is also realized, i.e. the funds 
are paid into the budget. The World Bank’s increasing orientation towards 
such a method of work points to the already mentioned small administrative 
capacity of Serbia to receive other forms of financial support, but also a lack 
of confidence in the authorities’ commitment to reform policies, since loans 
for structural adjustment are disbursed exclusively after the state makes the 
envisaged reform moves, like, for instance, the adoption of a law with certain 
reform solutions.
Quite interesting is an unexpected effect of the World Bank’s engagement, 
together with the engagement of the IMF. Namely, both financial institutions 
are paying attention to the supervision and reduction of the subsidies which 
companies in the real sector receive from the budget, this prompting these 
companies to use, instead of transparent subsidies, other, non-transparent 
funds to enlarge their overall income, i.e. to cover the wage bill and (at least 
partially) their financial losses.   
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
Membership in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) was realized very quickly, since there were no outstanding obligations 
(arrears) towards this financial institution. The financial problem that appeared 
was the payment of capital, but this was quickly resolved with a Swiss state 
interest-free bridging loan.   
The start of activities by the EBRD, as a dynamic financial institution, 
far closer to commercial banks than other international financial institutions, 
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which considers itself to be a bank of the private sector, was marked by various 
results. Very soon a new bank (Micro Finance, later ProCredit) was formed 
for the financing of small private business undertakings, and it is operating 
very successfully. Contrary to this, the idea about a facility for the financing of 
the working capital of large (non-privatized or partially privatized) companies 
was not successful and a very small part of the envisaged funds were disbursed 
(only 2 million out of the envisaged 60 million EUR). This idea represented 
an innovation in the EBRD’s business operations, since it had previously not 
been applied, i.e. tested anywhere. The creative thinking of bankers, as well 
as the creativity of business people in general, sometimes leads to business 
failures. It seems that one of the reasons for such an outcome was also the 
overestimated potentials of the existing large companies in Serbia to generate 
rich and constant money flows based on exports.  
Due to this failure (and not only for this reason), in the first phase of its 
engagement in Serbia the EBRD turned to loans for financing the rehabilitation 
of the infrastructure (railways, the electric power industry, the road sector, 
the municipal infrastructure sector etc.), with the obtainment of sovereign 
guarantees, which can only very indirectly be characterized as support to 
the private sector. It is important to mention that loans of this type were also 
granted to local communities, and in the case of some of them (like Belgrade, 
for instance), no sovereign guarantees were requested.  
In time, the EBRD kept getting into the swing, so that this bank’s present 
operations are mostly directed towards the financing of more or less private 
companies, both directly (in the case of large companies), and indirectly, 
through local banks (mostly foreign owned ones), in the case of smaller 
companies. In that sense, the share of loans for financing the infrastructure 
considerably dropped, although programs of support to the local, i.e. utilities 
infrastructure have been retained.
European Investment Bank
In the case of relations between Serbia and the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) the issue of membership in this bank was not raised (EIB members are 
exclusively EU member states), but rather of the renewal of its operations on 
the territory of Serbia. In this sense, the EIB set as a condition the immediate 
settlement of all arrears, i.e. the payment of all the installments of previously 
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received loans which had fallen due, together with the entire incurred interest, 
before requests for new credits are even taken into consideration. In this 
regard, the EIB offered no mechanism for resolving this problem, but adopted 
a defensive and relentless attitude – first pay your obligations, then we will 
cooperate.   
The offer to resolve this problem came from the European Commission, 
i.e. an EU body. Within the arrangement for macro-financial assistance, the 
European Commission granted a loan with which the outstanding obligations 
to the EIB were paid. In other words, the due obligations towards the EIB were 
transformed into obligations towards the EU. After the resolution of the problem 
of outstanding obligations, the EIB started its activities in its traditional fields 
such as the financing of the energy and transport infrastructure, primarily the 
rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure, with some construction of new 
facilities, at both the national level and the level of individual (larger) local 
communities. All the loans granted by the EIB are loans for which sovereign 
guarantees are requested. 
Bilateral donors 
Even though it represents a multilateral organization, the EU can be 
described in this context as the most important bilateral donor, i.e. the 
donor from whose sources the largest support had arrived. EU donations 
can be classified into two groups: macro-financial assistance and the CARDS 
program.  
Macro-financial assistance consists of a combination of grants (non-
returnable payments) and loans intended as budgetary support, i.e. these funds 
pour into the budget without any directing (earmarking) of the supervision of 
their purposeful spending. In other words, there are no restrictive conditions 
for the use of these funds. The provision of macro-financial assistance is made 
conditional on certain macroeconomic policies and their implementation.  
The CARDS program is envisaged by the Stabilization and Association 
Process as a program of support to the reforms and economic development 
of South-East European countries (the Western Balkans) and it consists of a 
whole series of projects which imply the financing of investment programs and 
of technical assistance. Each year, a list of such projects is harmonized with 
the government of the country receiving the funds, although the donor, i.e. 
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the European Commission on behalf of the EU, has the final say in this. The 
donor formulates the initial list, true in direct contacts with representatives of 
the authorities, but also according to his own priorities and an assessment of 
the situation in the field, and the final version of the list of these projects differs 
relatively little from its initial version.
Namely, in the case of the CARDS program the donor has quite firm ideas 
about the priorities that should be financed. Furthermore, the donor has quite 
certain concepts regarding the manner in which part of these funds should 
be spent. For example, in the case of projects of institutional building, clearly 
defined are the concepts of the institutions whose building, i.e. development 
is advocated by the donor. For this reason, one can say that along with the 
funds, certain concepts are also introduced. This can be explained by the fact 
that CARDS is essentially defined as strategic support to the Stabilization and 
Association Process, which is why assistance from this program is intended for 
the realization of the goals and mechanisms defined by the Process, meaning 
by the EU. As the country advances on its road towards stabilization and 
association, assistance is increasingly directed precisely towards those reforms 
and the building of institutions necessary to fulfill the obligations that would 
originate from the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement. The 
problem is, however, that, due to the lack of a political agreement within Serbia, 
there is no domestic «ownership» over the processes of European integration, 
but rather the process mostly boils down to the fulfillment of conditions set from 
the outside. Another restriction is also the unclear division of competencies in 
regard to the coordination of the CARDS program, which largely reflects the 
general picture of the lack of a clear division of competencies in regard to the 
process of European integration. At the level of Serbia, the CARDS program 
is being coordinated by the Unit for developmental assistance within the 
Serbian ministry of internal economic relations, which requires exceptionally 
good cooperation with the Serbian government’s office for association with 
the EU, as the coordinator of the entire process of integration and thus also 
an actor acquainted with the priorities of the Association Process, but also 
all the responsible ministries, as actors that use assistance and implement the 
reforms which are crucial for the success of the integration process. At the level 
of the state union, the CARDS program is coordinated by the SCG ministry 
of international economic relations, while appearing as the coordinator in the 
sphere of European integration is the SCG Office for association with the EU. 
It is clear that there are so many actors and levels that coordination is crucial 
in order to present clearly defined priorities to the donor. The problem is, 
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however, that on the side of the Serbian authorities, i.e. the side of the demand 
for donations and projects there was no clear concept as to what it is that Serbia 
wants, i.e. what are the institutions and policies that suit our conditions and 
this period of reforms. Therefore, the authorities were not prepared to try to be 
an equal partner of the EU, i.e. to engage in a serious debate on the priorities. 
Due to this imbalance of forces the assistance offered by the EU (and many 
other large donors) was defined by the donor himself (supply driven), i.e. the 
financing of many projects was based on the supply, much more than on the 
demand.
The CARDS programs, since it is conceived as financial support to 
the Stabilization and Association Process, is used not only by Serbia and 
Montenegro, but also by the other participants in the Process – Macedonia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania. While this program in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is managed by delegations of the European Commission 
in those countries (with the tendency, especially in Croatia, of increasing 
management by the beneficiaries themselves), the funds from the CARDS 
program in Serbia and Montenegro, in Kosovo and Macedonia are managed by 
the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), which was primarily founded 
for the purpose of assisting reconstruction in Kosovo, after which its activities 
were extended to Serbia and Montenegro and Macedonia. It was decided to set 
up a very complex procedure for the selection of the beneficiaries of the funds, 
i.e. the one who will implement the project, in order to prevent possible fraud. 
Such a complex procedure inevitably slowed down the inflow of the already 
approved donations, i.e. the implementation of the corresponding programs. 
Such delays can have very unfavorable effects. Furthermore, when competing 
for the provision of consultative services the participation of companies 
from the EU territory was necessary, whereby a certain service became free 
of charge from the standpoint of its user, while the funds «returned» to the 
EU. The separation of the user and the payer, especially if the user is not 
vitally interested in that service (which is the case with projects based on the 
supply, and not on the demand), can have negative effects on the quality of the 
rendered service. Appearing as an additional restriction is also the fact that the 
European Agency for Reconstruction does not manage the funds that arrive in 
the country on the basis of regional CARDS projects such as, for instance, the 
regional CARDS project in the spheres of visas, asylums and migration. Such 
projects are managed by the European Commission, so that the “surplus” of 
protagonists on the SCG side is also coupled by a multiplication of actors and 
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the need for their good coordination and cooperation also on the side of the 
donor, i.e. the European Union.
It is quite certain that the amount of the donations and the method of 
their implementation are fully in accordance with the conditions set by the 
Stabilization and Association Process, this implying conditions of a political, 
economic and administrative nature which were discussed in greater detail in 
the part of the text devoted to relations between the SCG and the European 
Union. The question remains open as to whether the effects of such an 
engagement could have been larger. This is all the more so since there was 
no strong setting of political conditions in the implementation of the CARDS 
program , as is the case with the Stabilization and Association Process with the 
EU.
US assistance is implemented by the responsible American state aid agency, 
USAID, which has developed a very rich and diversified program of support 
to the reform in Serbia. In this regard, political conditions have been very 
strongly set (primarily concerning cooperation with the Hague Tribunal) for 
the implementation of that program, whereby the set conditions have nothing 
to do with the program itself, i.e. with the course of the reforms in Serbia. 
The setting of conditions for the provision of assistance is linked to American 
internal political reasons, which concern the relations between the legislative 
and executive authorities. In this regard, the US legislative authorities have 
precedence in the creation of political pressures on Serbia.
Such an example of the setting of political conditions is also the donors’ 
conference held in Brussels in June 200 and the strong pressure for Slobodan 
Milosevic to be extradited to the Hague Tribunal. It is only after the American 
administration received credible assurances that Mr. Milosevic would be 
extradited to the Tribunal, that it took the decision for the American delegation 
to participate in the Conference, to undertake to offer assistance in the amount 
of 75 million USD and, which was of special importance, to stimulate other 
countries to assist Serbia.
There exist very important small donors, whose support is not linked 
to any kind of political, or even economic (reform) conditions. Among these 
donors, one should quite certainly mention Switzerland, with which very good 
relations have been developed since the very start of the return to international 
financial institutions, in the field of financial diplomacy. Namely, FR Yugoslavia 
chose to be a member of the Swiss constituency in all international financial 
institutions, which prompted the Swiss government to offer significant support 
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in international financial institutions, as well as financial support to the reform 
policies, especially in the field of international finances.
Paris Club
The settlement of the foreign debt to the state’s creditors, i.e. creditors 
rallied within the Paris Club, was one of the main priorities of the state policy 
in the first year of transition (the total amount of the long-term debt to these 
creditors was around 4.5 billion USD, while the short-term debt was around 
500 million USD). It was estimated that the level of the encountered state debt 
(which was not serviced during the 990s at all, so it has been considerably 
enlarged by capitalized interests) represented the kind of burden that could 
not lead to a drastic drop in economic growth and to a moratorium on the 
servicing of the foreign debt, with all the negative consequences of such a 
moratorium. In accordance with this, one of the state policy’s main goals in 
the sphere of international finances was to obtain the so-called Naples terms 
for settling the debt to the Paris Club credits (which imply a write-off of 67% 
of the debt) and a comparable treatment by the London Club credits (club of 
commercial creditors).  
In that sense, chosen was also the strategy of joining the World Bank 
as IDA member, so as to create conditions for a generous debt write-off, 
i.e. for obtaining the so-called Naples terms. The financial diplomacy that 
was conducted in the preparatory phase was based on the strong support 
offered to our request by the US, whose financial authorities agreed to be our 
representative, i.e. the representative of our request to the Paris Club. Such 
a decision by the American authorities should be viewed in the context of 
the very good relations between the two countries in the second half of 200, 
following the extradition of Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague Tribunal at the 
end of June that year. Furthermore, very good financial and legal advisors 
were chosen, and engaged were also certain lobbyists, close to the American 
financial authorities, as well as the financial authorities of the world’s most 
developed countries (the biggest creditors).
The final phase of the talks took place in November 200 in Paris and 
they produced a non-standard solution, i.e. non-standard terms for the write-
off and rescheduling of the remainder of the debt, very close to the so-called 
Naples terms. Namely, the terms were such that 5% of the debt was written off 
386 Boris Begović and Milica Đilas
immediately upon the conclusion of the agreement, the next 5% was frozen 
and is supposed to be written off following the completion of the extended 
arrangement with the IMF, i.e. its successful execution (in 2005), while the 
remained of the debt would be repaid over of period of 22 years, with a six-
year grace period.9 Such terms for a write-off, i.e. for settling the debt to non-
commercial creditors are usual only for highly indebted and poor African 
countries, while among European countries comparable terms for the write-
off and restructuring of the debt was received only by Bosnia-Herzegovina.
On the one hand, such an outcome of the talks with creditors of the 
Paris Club can be assessed as successful, in view of the relative reduction of 
the debt, i.e. the reduction of the country’s overall burden and the moving 
of this burden into the future. Such a success was the result of the country’s 
relatively high reputation in the world in 200 and the convincing actions by 
the US as a powerful representative, but probably also the good preparations 
for these talks. On the other hand, there remains the fact that a large part 
of the written off debt represented incurred interests resulting from the non-
servicing of this debt in the 990s, when Serbia, even if it had wanted to, could 
not have serviced these obligations due to the international financial sanctions 
that were imposed in 992. Moreover, there is also the problem of the Kosovo 
debt, since the rescheduled part of the debt which will start being repaid, i.e. 
the interests that are already being paid, also include the state debt allocated to 
Kosovo. Like in the case of the consolidated loan from the World Bank, here 
too Serbia will be repaying these obligations from its own budget, but without 
collecting any kind of tax revenues in Kosovo.
The agreement with the Paris Club was followed by a relatively long-
lasting and technically complex signing of bilateral agreements with the Club’s 
creditor countries. This created the conditions for obtaining new credits, i.e. 
primarily for the engagement of these countries’ state agencies in insuring 
export credits, which stimulates trade with those states.
London Club
The final talks with the London Club started, without thorough 
preparations, only two weeks after the successful completion of the talks with 
the Paris Club, in an atmosphere of large domestic support and popularity 
9  With these minimal, but still formal deviations from the Naples conditions, the Paris Club probably 
wanted to protect itself from the case of Serbia (FR Yugoslavia) being proclaimed a precedent which 
some other, larger debtors, could use as the basis for requesting the same treatment. 
387International Relations
generated by the reached agreement. This largely indicates that the decision to 
start final talks with the London Club was motivated by the winning of cheap 
political points, and not by the completion of an important state job.0   
All this was accompanied by quite poor preparations for the talks, 
since the issue of connected persons had not been resolved, nor were stands 
coordinated with the creditors on the total amount of the debt (the so-called 
reconciliation), i.e. on the amount which Serbia really owes, especially after the 
arrangements concluded with the London Club of creditors by certain former 
Yugoslav republics. Furthermore, not much attention was paid to the fact that 
the country’s political rating was not of too great an importance for commercial 
creditors, who are exclusively interested in the yield they will achieve on the 
remainder of their claims.  
Unsuccessful moves, the use of tactics, procrastination and the like 
continued over a period of more than two years, which showed that the London 
Club of creditors was ready to wait and that they believed that time was on 
their side. When this became clear, and also when the new governor of the 
National Bank of Serbia (NBS) arrived, serious talks started only in 2004 and 
were conducted this time in a completely different manner, this also meaning 
far from the public eye and without statements to the press. The public was 
informed about the talks only when they were completed, in June 2004, with 
an agreement that brought a write-off of 62% of the total debt (the total debt 
was 2,700 million USD), while the remained would be repaid within a period 
of twenty years.
Such an outcome can be described as a success, since the terms can be 
compared to the terms of the write-off obtained from the Paris Club. Even more 
important is the fact that, with this agreement, Serbia acquired an international 
credit rating, which practically opened the road for borrowing the necessary 
capital on the world market under reasonable interest rates (premiums on the 
risk).
World Trade Organization 
A request for admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) was 
submitted in January 200 along with the submission of requests for admission 
0  Just before leaving for the first round of the final talks, the negotiators competed in their statements 
to the press about how much of a debt write-off they would request and obtain, i.e. how much money 
they will “leave the creditors short of”, so that these figures even went up to over 70%, which is a larger 
write-off than in the case of the non-commercial creditors of the Paris Club. No one likes to be publicly 
humiliated, and powerful private creditors are no different than other people in this respect. 
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or for the renewal of membership in almost all the international financial and 
economic institutions. Accession to the WTO started with the submission of 
the Memorandum on the present situation, i.e. a memorandum describing the 
candidate country’s foreign trade regime.
The problem with the admission that occurred was of a political and 
technical nature. Namely, the memorandum is submitted by an internationally 
recognized state, and that state (FR Yugoslavia at the time) consisted of two 
states with completely different foreign trade regimes: Serbia, which abolished 
in 200 non-tariff barriers (quantitative restrictions) and based protection on 
relatively high customs duties, and Montenegro, which was doing the exact 
opposite. Not even after the redefinition of relations between Serbia and 
Montenegro and the adoption of the Constitutional Charter did the situation 
improve in the sense of establishing a single market. After spending more than a 
year on attempts to harmonize the economic systems of Serbia and Montenegro, 
primarily for the purpose of achieving progress on the road to European 
structures of integration, in October 2004 the European Union adopted the 
„twin track“ approach, essentially enabling Serbia and Montenegro separately 
to negotiate on economic issues.  Such a stand by the European Union also led 
to a changed way of thinking in the World Trade Organization, whose General 
Council adopted on February 5, 2005 (after SCG withdrew, in December 
2004, its earlier request for membership, and Serbia and Montenegro at the 
same time submitted separate requests for membership) the decision to initiate 
the procedure for admitting the Republic of Serbia to this organization and it 
formed a special working group for the talks. In line with such a decision, at 
the beginning of March 2005, the Serbian government adopted and addressed 
to the WTO a Memorandum on the trade regime of the Republic of Serbia, 
which opened up political problems, but technical problems as well. All 
this was coupled with dilemmas and uncertainty regarding the survival of 
the joint state of Serbia and Montenegro. That uncertainty and dilemmas are 
still present, with increasingly strong centrifugal forces in action. In line with 
this, international institutions kept increasingly adopting the „twin track“ 
principle, providing Serbia with the possibility of having independent access 
to these institutions. According to this, Serbia independently presented a new 
memorandum on the present situation in January 2005. It is assessed that, now, 
when the major problem is resolved, Serbia would became a WTO member in 
2008. 
  One of the discussed solutions was for Montenegro’s foreign trade regime to be described in the 
annex to that memorandum on the present situation. The implementation of this solution was 
obstructed by the total lack of cooperation on the part of the Montenegrin authorities. 
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It is quite certain that there had so far been no strong political stimuli 
for joining the WTO, i.e. that the authorities so far viewed this accession 
as something that can hardly bring political points. Quite the contrary, this 
accession means the obligation of the further liberalization of foreign trade 
and of increasing competition on the domestic market, and this does not bring 
political points, especially not in connection with the restructuring of the real 
rector. In view of the fact that accession to the WTO also leads to a reduction of 
barriers for our exports to the member countries (practically all the important 
countries of the world), it is obvious that exporters in Serbia are not organized 
as well as are producers whose goal is to sell goods on the domestic market.
Analysis of the integration into international financial 
and economic institutions achieved so far
Generally speaking, with the start of the transition in Serbia, the new 
authorities had strong political motives to work towards integration in 
international financial and economic institutions. These political factors should 
be sought in several facts. First of all, the country had been isolated over a 
period of ten years and it had practically been  excluded from world economic 
and financial trends. Emergence from this isolation and re-integration into the 
world were quite certainly the desire of a majority of the population in Serbia 
at the start of the transition. Secondly, initial steps in integration meant a large 
inflow of funds, mostly donations, which also had a major political value and 
it directly reflected on the growth of the standard of living. In view of this, 
there were significant political motives in favor of such integration. Finally, in 
the first year of transition, due to the mentioned reasons, it was very difficult 
to conceive any kind of political attack on integration into the world, i.e. into 
international institutions, or any rhetoric of the kind, so that, initially, there 
were no political parties that were publicly against such integration.
International financial and economic institutions themselves, for their 
part, are mostly facilitating this job, since it was in their interest to resolve the 
problem of membership for Serbia which had been isolated for so long and 
without any possibility of being internationally supervised. The acquisition 
or renewal of membership enables, albeit indirect, supervision of the policies 
being applied in Serbia and it reduces the uncertainty which the international 
factor faces. In line with this, sometimes truly creative solutions were found for 
overcoming technical problems on the road to membership.
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In time, especially after the first year of international integration and 
the declining of the obvious political value of this integration as a contrast to 
isolation (which is slowly being forgotten more and more), political opponents 
to the country’s international integration started appearing. This change 
was not the result of a change in the constellation of direct partial, i.e. group 
interests and their articulation in the process of public choice, but it was more 
of an ideological struggle, between mondialists and patriots, i.e. those who, 
for ideological reasons are advocates, or opponents of Serbia’s integration 
into the world. The constant requests of the Hague Tribunal, the immoderate 
rhetoric of the Tribunal’s officials and its legal inefficiency have strengthened 
the political forces in Serbia against international integration.   
Some politics of interest groups, i.e. some decision-making within the 
framework public choice, can be encountered in jobs directly linked to the 
foreign trade regime, i.e. the protection of domestic producers, which mostly 
refers to accession to the WTO, the harmonization of the economic policies 
with Montenegro and the Stabilization and Association Process.   
Finally, relations with international financial and economic institutions 
were sometimes used as a means for a party and pre-election battle. For 
example, during the 2003 election campaign, sovereign guarantees for the 
EIB loan for financing the utilities infrastructure in Belgrade were not issued 
(adopted), because this was the way certain political parties fought against the 
party that was in power in Belgrade at the time, with the explanation that the 
issuing of sovereign guarantees increased the state’s indebtedness.
Integration into other international organizations
At the moment when economic and political transition was launched, 
FRY was not a member of the major international universal or regional 
organizations, primarily because of insistence on the stand that it was the legal 
successor of SFRY, which was contrary to the generally accepted stand that 
the SFRY disintegrated into five successor states, and also because of the non-
democratic internal circumstances and the restoring to the policy of the use of 
force in the region. After the presidential elections in FRY in September 2000, 
and then also the parliamentary elections in Serbia in December of the same 
year, power was taken by a heterogeneous, but essentially democratic and 
pro-European coalition, rallied within the Democratic Opposition of Serbia 
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which accepted the position of the FRY as one of the five equal successors of 
the FRY, this having created the conditions for the renewal of membership 
in international organizations, i.e. for applying for membership in those 
organizations which the SFRY had never been a member of. 
Renewal of United Nations membership
In response to the submission of an application for membership, 
forwarded on October 27 by the FRY president, in Resolution 326 of October 
2 2000, the United Nations Security Council recommended to the General 
Assembly to accept the FRY as a member of this organization. Only a day later, 
at a session of the UN General Assembly session, the FRY was the last out of 
the five legal successors of the FRY to become a member of the United Nations. 
This resolved the FRY’s eight-year long unclear status in the UN which started 
with the disintegration of the FRY and the creation of independent states. 
Namely, the FRY was called on to request admission to the UN, but Belgrade 
kept refusing to do so, referring to its legal continuity with the SFRY, which 
Croatia and BiH contested. The situation was partially resolved with the 
decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council to enable the FRY 
to be present at the UN, but without the right to vote in this organization’s 
bodies and commissions.
At the time of the acquisition of membership in this universal international 
organization, under way before the International Court of Justice, as a UN 
body, were proceedings instituted by Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina against 
the FRY on the basis of a lawsuit for genocide, as well as the proceedings which 
the FRY was conducting against eight NATO countries based on a lawsuit 
for the unlawful use of force during the NATO air strikes in 999. All these 
proceedings take as a point of departure the fact that, in the previous period, 
the FRY was a UN member, and, therefore, a signatory of the Statute of the 
International Court and the Convention on Genocide. The admission of FRY 
as a new UN member country on November , 2000, shed new light on the 
disputes before the International Court of Justice. In accordance with this, 
on April 24, 200, the FRY submitted a request for a revision of the Court’s 
decision to proclaim itself authorized in the case of the lawsuit filed by BiH 
against FRY, emphasizing precisely the FRY’s admission to the UN as a new 
fact. The request was rejected in February 2003 as unacceptable. In December 
2004, the Court decided that it had no authority over the proceedings based 
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on the lawsuit of FRY/SCG against eight NATO member countries, since the 
FRY was not a UN member in the mentioned period, so that based on these 
grounds, or any other grounds, it could not appear as a side in the dispute 
before the highest UN legal institution. It remains to be seen how this decision 
will reflect on other proceedings being conducted before the Court, primarily 
on the lawsuit filed by BiH, since it was precisely the expectation that the Court 
would proclaim itself unauthorized for the reasons set out by FRY/SCG in the 
suits filed against our country by BiH and Croatia, that was the basis for the 
perseverance in the charges against eight NATO member states, despite the 
fact that the withdrawal of the charges was, as we will later see, one of the 
conditions for the country’s admission to Partnership for Peace.
Renewal of membership in the Organization for 
Security  and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
The FRY was admitted to the OSCE on November 0, 2000, when 
FRY President Vojislav Kostunica signed the basic OSCE documents and 
ceremonially swore to accepts all its provisions and obligations. The extent 
to which the FRY’s international position deteriorated in the period between 
992 and 2000 is perhaps best illustrated precisely by the fact that the FRY was 
the only country ever to be excluded from the OSCE. Therefore, admission in 
this organization best marks the end of the FRY’s political degradation, since 
membership in the OSCE is, as a rule, open to all non-problematic European 
states, so one can freely say that the absence of membership is a much 
stronger negative status symbol than admission is of a politically prestigious 
significance.
With the FRY’s consent and encouragement, an OSCE Mission was formed 
in Belgrade in March 200, which is when the previously established long-
standing missions in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina were formally closed 
down (the OSCE Mission in Kosovo was established in July 999). The Mission’s 
mandate and structure are such that is offers assistance and cooperation in all 
the main OSCE areas, such as the establishment and functioning of democracy, 
the rule of law, the promotion of human rights, including the rights of 
minorities, the transformation of the media, the promotion of the application 
of confidence and security military measures, including the democratization 
of the army, adjustment to the economic standards of a market economy and so on.
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Even though there is no direct formal connection between membership in 
the OSCE and accession to certain other European organizations, participation 
and acting within this organization can have a certain impact, primarily a 
positive one, on the possibility of joining other European organizations such as 
the Council of Europe or Partnership for Peace. The closest is the link between 
the essence and nature of the obligations in the Council of Europe and the 
OSCE, primarily because of the fact that the main goal of both organizations 
is the promotion and protection of human rights and the realization of 
democratic principles. In that sense, the OSCE secretary general and the 
Council of Europe secretary general exchanged letters in February 200 on the 
importance of cooperation between these two organizations in the FRY/SCG.
Admission to the Council of Europe
The FRY applied for membership in the Council of Europe (CoE) soon 
after the democratic changes in Serbia, on November 9, 2000, and on November 
22, the CoE Committee of Ministers initiated the procedure for admission, 
requesting the opinion of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly. This was the second 
time that the FRY applied for membership in this organization – back in 998, 
the then government submitted a request for admission the debate on which 
was postponed, based on the decision of the CoE Committee of Ministers. 
Membership in this oldest and, according to its system for the protection 
and promotion of human rights, most prestigious European organization is 
conditional on the acceptance of the principles of the rule of law and the basic 
freedoms of all persons falling within the jurisdiction of the member state, 
but also the ability to fulfill all the obligations stemming from membership. 
Two requests which the FRY filed at different periods of time, show the extent 
to which both elements are important – and they also show that the state is 
willing to accept the obligations, and capable of doing so. Namely, the request 
filed during the Milosevic regime was rejected due to the „lack of seriousness 
and credibility“ in regard to the will of the then authorities to fulfill their 
obligations, while the request submitted after the democratic changes waited 
long for a positive answer, mostly because of suspicion regarding the ability to 
meet the obligations which membership implies.
The general conditions for membership of the CoE in the case of FRY 
implied, primarily, the holding of elections that would be assessed as free and 
fair, expressed readiness to accept the European Convention on the Basic Rights 
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and Freedoms, cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, the opening of dialogue 
with other CoE member countries and candidate states, including the states 
created on the territory of the former SFRY, as well as the necessity of respecting 
the standards for the protection of minorities and national groups with the 
acceptance of the Framework Convention on the Protection of Minorities. The 
FRY made huge steps towards the fulfillment of these conditions. The effects 
leading towards the establishment and strengthening of the democratic practice 
in the country were positively assessed, as was the conducting of a peaceful and 
constructive foreign policy. Of special importance was the peaceful resolution 
of the crisis in southern Serbia at the end of 2000 and the beginning of 200, 
then the establishment and development of relations with neighboring states 
created on the territory of the former SFRY, and the launching of cooperation 
with the Hague Tribunal.
On the basis of a positive assessment of the invested efforts, at the beginning 
of 200, the FRY acquired the status of a special guest in the CoE Parliamentary 
Assembly, as well as the special guest status within the Congress of Local 
and Regional Authorities in Europe. The FRY also acquired the status of an 
associate member in the expert CoE Commission for Law-based Democracy 
(the Venice Commission). Adopted was the mandate and established was 
the CoE Mission for FRY, with CoE offices in Belgrade and Podgorica, while 
constant and intensive cooperation was established between the CoE and FRY, 
which was especially intensive in the sphere of achieving compatibility with 
conditions for membership in the CoE and its human rights standards.
Despite the approval of the made reform steps, it transpired that the CoE 
considered them insufficient, because the decision on admission, announced 
for April 2002, when BiH was admitted, was postponed for September the 
same year, but was not taken because April the following year. As the most 
important reason that prompted the decision to postpone the FRY’s admission 
mentioned was the unstable political and legal position of the federal state, 
which was to assume the obligations stemming from membership. In that 
sense, the adoption of the Constitutional Charter of the joint state of Serbia 
and Montenegro became a precondition for a positive decision of the CoE 
Committee of Ministers on FRY’s admission to this organization. The 
responsible committees of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly (the Committee 
on legal affairs and human rights and the Committee on political affairs) in 
June 2002 adopted the reports of their rapporteurs on the FRY and set the 
conditions that it needed to fulfill following admission. In September, the 
Parliamentary Assembly adopted a positive Opinion on the admission of FRY 
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to the CoE. Apart from the adoption of the Constitutional Charter and the 
establishment of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, there is no doubt 
that the assassination of Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic on March 2 
also had an effect on the Committee of Ministers’ decision of March 26. Fear that 
this event could jeopardize the reform course which Serbia had been following 
since October 2000, eliminated even the last obstacle to SCG’s membership 
in the CoE and considerably accelerated the decision of the Committee of 
Ministers in the procedural sense. This created a paradoxical situation in which 
SCG became a member of the CoE, an organization known primarily for its 
system of the protection and promotion of human rights, on April 3, 2003, 
at a moment when certain rights were restricted by the state of emergency 
imposed in Serbia after the assassination of prime minister Djindjic.
By joining the Council of Europe SCG also assumed a whole series of 
obligations which it had to fulfill, and which primarily concerned the respect 
of human rights and they can, actually, be observed as obligations not towards 
the international community, but towards the citizens of SCG. Some of these 
obligations have already been met (the ratification of the European Convention 
on the Protection of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, the signing and 
ratification of the European Convention to Prevent Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, etc), but work continued 
on the full realization of the assumed obligations. For the purpose of ensuring 
the full implementation of the obligations, a supervision procedure is carried 
out towards SCG, by both the CoE Parliamentary Assembly and the Council 
of Ministers. The full realization of obligations stemming from membership in 
the CoE also became a condition set by the European Union in the context of 
meeting the criteria requiring the stability of the institutions guaranteeing the 
realization of human and minority rights and democratic principles, as well as 
the rule of law.
Application for membership in Partnership for Peace
The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program is NATO’s most important 
initiative directed towards the strengthening of trust and cooperation among 
the NATO member countries and other countries in the Euroatlantic region 
for the purpose developing and strengthening stability and security in Europe. 
Even though the main task of PfP is cooperation in the sphere of defense, the 
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program is primarily of a political nature and represents a very important 
factor in Europe’s security environment.
The Partnership for Peace program is individual and specific for each 
state. In accordance with its sovereign rights and national interests and needs, 
each country determines the essence of partnership cooperation. Practically 
all the states in the Euroatlantic area have today accepted membership in PfP. 
All the states in the immediate vicinity of SCG, except BiH, are either members 
of NATO or of PfP, with the desire of being admitted to NATO. In order to join 
to program it is necessary to obtain the consent of NATO, which assesses the 
readiness of the candidate states on the basis of its own standards and criteria 
and only then does it invite a candidate country to join it.
The process of the FRY’s inclusion in PfP was initiated by a decision of 
the Supreme Defense Council in April 2002, to recommend to the federal 
government to launch the process. On the basis of the federal government’s 
authorization, the then foreign minister, Goran Svilanovic, forwarded a letter 
of intent to the NATO secretary general and informed the responsible federal 
parliament committee about the decision to initiate the procedure for the 
FRY to join PfP. In his response, the NATO secretary general applauded the 
efforts being made by the FRY in regard to issues of importance for inclusion 
in PfP, but he also emphasized the conditions that needed to be fulfilled for 
the acquisition of membership. They primarily include cooperation with 
the Hague Tribunal, support to the implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 244 and the Dayton/Paris agreement, as well as the withdrawal of 
the FRY’s lawsuit against eight NATO members before the International Court 
of Justice. All these conditions are still valid today, with the exception of the last 
one – with the decision of the International Court of Justice to proclaim itself 
unauthorized for the lawsuit filed by the FRY against eight NATO member 
countries for the unlawful use of force during the air strikes in 999 (see the 
part of the text devoted to the UN), the need for the lawsuit to be withdrawn 
ceased. Mentioned as the most important condition is full cooperation with 
the Hague Tribunal, which also implies the extradition of General Mladic, for 
whose presence in the SCG the governments of Serbia and Montenegro claim 
that there is no proof, but also the respect of the signed peace agreements, with 
the increasingly frequent emphasis of the promotion of relations between the 
authorities in Belgrade and Pristina in the context of possible future talks on 
the final status of Kosovo.
The adoption of the Defense Strategy of the state union of Serbia and 
Montenegro in November 2004 once again confirmed the country’s orientation 
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in favor of joining the PfP program, while the decision on membership in 
NATO is left to the democratic will of the citizens, i.e. to a referendum. Even 
though the holding of a referendum prior to admission to NATO is a practice in 
all countries, there is an additional need for this in our country because of the 
NATO air campaign in 999, due to which current support among the public 
for membership in NATO is much smaller than support for membership in 
PfP.
The international community’s policy of setting conditions
When reviewing the policy of setting conditions which has been applied 
by the international community so far in the previous course of the transition, 
one should observe separately the political conditions and the conditions 
linked to economic policies and institutional reforms.
When speaking of the setting of political conditions after the launching 
of the process of political and economic transition, one must bear in mind 
the fact that, until October 5, 2000, there was a regime of sanctions imposed 
against Serbia, one that was regulated by the law, by both UN Security Council 
resolutions (ban on arms trading in March 998) and on a bilateral basis by 
certain countries or groups of countries – the economic sanctions which the 
Contact Group countries (except Russia) introduced against Serbia, the US 
president’s executive order blocking all the property of the FRY government 
in the US and banning new investments in the FRY, expanded by a new one, 
banning all imports and exports between the US and FRY, then the ban imposed 
by the US Congress on granting any kind of financial assistance to Serbia, 
except assistance for democratization, the freezing of the funds of the FRY and 
Serbian government in the EU countries, as well as the ban on new investments 
(later expanded to include a ban on exports of goods, services and technologies 
that can be used for the repair of the infrastructure or equipment damaged in 
the NATO air strikes). The ban on the sale of oil was also in force, while the 
blocking of funds was expanded to include approximately 800 individuals on 
the visa-ban list, as persons connected with the Milosevic regime. Ten years of 
the setting of political conditions which was applied in the course of the990s 
obviously left a trade on the policy which the international community applied 
towards Serbia after the democratic changes – both because of the established 
picture about Serbia and its citizens, for the change of which it will take time 
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and perseverance on the reform course, and because of inertia, which can very 
often be a powerful factor in the definition of policies.  
After the October change of the regime, most economic restrictions 
were immediately abolished – the European Union lifted without delay all the 
sanctions against the FRY except those against former president Milosevic and 
persons close to him (the embargo on oil imports and the flight ban in the FRY 
were immediately abolished, but it took some time for the other sanctions to be 
lifted), while the US lifted the ban on oil imports and on flights to and from the 
FRY, it allowed financial transactions and the opening of new accounts in the 
US, as well as American investments in the FRY, but without fully withdrawing 
the previously introduced executive decrees. Nevertheless, the restrictions on 
granting economic assistance by the US remained in force, since they became 
and integral part of the law on the awarding of assistance, and as such, they 
became a permanent instrument of the setting of political conditions for 
economic assistance. The economic, as well as political relations with the EU 
which, in the long run, represent a major source for setting conditions to the 
SCG, since the promotion of relations with this organization is Serbia’s priority 
orientation, are defined by the Stabilization and Association Process, so they 
will be reviewed within the analysis of the position of FRY/SCG in this regional 
instrument of the European Union.
The first concrete opportunity for changing the US policy of setting 
conditions was on March 3, 200, as the date envisaged by the Law on awarding 
assistance to foreign states for the fiscal year of 200 for the US administration 
to certify that Serbia had met the conditions set by this Law. They include: 
cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, improvement in the sphere of human 
rights and a reform of the judiciary, as well as the termination of financial, 
political, security and every other support to Republika Srpska. By the deadline 
envisaged by the law, any process that could be verified was totally lacking in 
the sphere of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal (ICTY).2 Faced with the 
US intransigent stand regarding the ICTY, in the night between March 3 and 
April , the authorities in Belgrade arrested Slobodan Milosevic and took him 
to the Central Prison in Belgrade where, two days later, he was charged with 
corruption and abuse of office. This was sufficient for the US administration 
to certify that Serbia had fulfilled all the conditions envisaged by the Law on 
awarding economic assistance and for Serbia to qualify for another 00 million 
dollars worth of assistance. The next three months were characterized by 
pressure on Belgrade to extradite Milosevic to the Hague Tribunal. The issue 
2  Only Blagoje Simić, former officer of the Republika Srpska police, charged with ethnic cleansing in 
Bosanski Šamac, left for The Hague, following his voluntary surrender.
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of extradition and cooperation with the Tribunal in general awoke the already 
existing differences between President Kostunica and Serbian Prime Minister 
Djindjic, this complicating the creation of political support for cooperation, 
but also for the successful proceeding of economic and political reforms in 
general. As the donors’ conference scheduled for June 29 was approaching, 
it became clear that the US would not participate in it unless Milosevic was 
in The Hague by then, and that the EU would participate, but would not give 
the promised funds if cooperation with the ICTY was lacking. In the light 
of these facts, the Serbian government assumed responsibility and extradited 
Milosevic to the Tribunal in the evening of June 8, thus ensuring the success 
of the donors’ conference which was held the next day in Brussels.
However, similar conditions were envisaged for economic assistance in 
2002 as was the case with the preceding year, which meant the need for a new 
certification by the administration on March 3, 2002. As progress failed to be 
made again, the certification was postponed, and American representatives, in 
both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank voted against the 
credits granted to Serbia in this period. Their objection, however, was passive 
– they did not actively lobby against the granting of funds to Serbia and it was 
clear that at issue were political reasons, i.e. that the US law obliged them to 
act in such a manner. The situation, however, changed in regard to acceptance 
of cooperation with the Tribunal as an obligation that must be carried out 
– the Law on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal was adopted on April , 
2002 and indictees started voluntarily surrendering, which made it possible 
for the US administration to certify that Serbia was fulfilling its obligations 
and that it, thus, qualified for a new tranche of economic assistance and active 
support in international financial organizations. At the same time, however, 
with the renewal of the certification, it was stressed that American pressure 
would continue until the Tribunal’s Office of the Prosecutor is provided with 
full access to SCG archives and until General Mladic is  brought to justice.
Less than two months without American certification in 2002 were 
actually the only period of the formal denial of support until March 3, 2004. 
Meanwhile, in May 2003, the US president’s executive decrees imposing 
emergency measures against the SFRY were abolished and all similar decrees 
were withdrawn, as a result of the progress achieved in the political and 
economic transition and due to the strong resoluteness in persevering on the 
road of reforms demonstrated by the country’s leaders. In November 2003, 
the status of normal trade relations with SCG, abolished back in 992, was 
renewed. This additionally emphasized US support for the reform processes 
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in the country3 On March 3, 2004, US Secretary of State Powell said that 
Serbia did not meet the criteria envisaged by the Law on granting assistance to 
foreign states in 2004, i.e. that it was not cooperating with the Hague Tribunal, 
which meant that the unused portion of assistance for that year (6 million US 
dollars) would not be able to arrive in Serbia. The Law on granting assistance for 
the fiscal year of 2004 mentioned for the first time, along with full cooperation 
with the Hague Tribunal, also the arrest of General Mladic. In January 2005, 
the continuation of non-cooperation led to even more dramatic measures: 0 
million dollars worth of assistance for the fiscal year of 2005 were frozen, even 
before certification, which, due to the belatedness of the legislation regulating 
the granting of assistance to foreign countries, is not accepted before May 
3 this year. Apart from the freezing of these funds, an additional 73 million 
US dollars were redirected from assistance envisaged for the government 
to organizations and programs which are not managed by the government. 
Soon after the US introduced partial sanctions, the Serbian government’s 
intention to fulfill its obligation towards the Hague Tribunal became clear. 
A large number of indictees (2 from Serbia and 2 from Republika Srpska) 
voluntarily surrendered to the Tribunal, thus qualifying for receiving the 
Serbian government’s guarantees for being released pending trial. The number 
of remaining fugitives is nine, and they include General Mladic. The funds of 
ICTY fugitives were frozen and good cooperation was established between the 
ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor and the Special Court for War Crimes, this 
opening up the possibility for this court to take over certain cases.
As regards the direct conditions set by international financial institutions 
during the first four years of transition, these conditions were always of an 
economic, i.e. reform nature, and never of a political nature. In other words, 
the conditions were linked to the nature of relations with the corresponding 
institution. In accordance with this, they were the subject of talks between 
representatives of both sides, like, for instance, the IMF’s conditions concerning 
concrete macroeconomic policies to which the domestic authorities agreed 
and they demonstrated this by signing memorandums on understanding.
Even though the political conditions set by the US also included the 
threat that they would vote against arrangements with international financial 
institutions (primarily with the IMF and World Bank), these threats never 
came true, and even when they did, as could be seen in the previous text, they 
were very clearly motivated by political reasons, but not by the desire not to 
offer economic assistance to SCG. Although US representatives voted against 
3  In view of the modest scope of trade between Serbia and the US, and especially the modest scope of 
Serbian exports, this move was primarily of a symbolical, i.e. political significance. 
40International Relations
the arrangements, they did not lobby among representatives of other countries 
to vote against as well, but rather made it clear that they voting was determined 
by internal political reasons, this being a clear signal to other countries that 
they should not vote against the arrangements.
The policy of setting conditions, which the international community 
carried out after the democratic changes in Serbia in October 2000, mostly 
focused on two issues – the issue of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, 
which was dominant, and the issue of relations between Serbia and Montenegro 
in the joint state. The condition to define the relations between Serbia and 
Montenegro in the joint state was largely prompted by the desire to receive 
a correct answer to the question of who is responsible for the fulfillment 
of obligations that would result from contractual relations with a certain 
international organization, be at issue membership (Council of Europe) or the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (European Union). However, despite 
this practical motive, part of this setting of conditions was prompted by the 
desire to preserve the credibility of the EU, i.e. to avoid the „humiliation“ of 
the high representative for the foreign and security policy, who mediated in 
finding a solution for the relations between Belgrade and Podgorica.
The situation is somewhat different regarding the conditions that concern 
unhindered cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, and which can be viewed at 
least on two levels. The first one, just like the issue of Serbia and Montenegro, 
is functional and it concerns the question of how other contractual obligations 
would be fulfilled if the legal obligation of cooperation with the Tribunal is 
not respected. Nevertheless, the this motive is not excessively convincing, 
especially when one sees how big a political attention is devoted to this issue. 
Such heavy „political artillery“ is not used for achieving something that is 
only of an instrumental value. The second concerns the promotion of certain 
values that are considered crucial for the cohesion and identity of the present-
day international community, and which would be disrupted by agreement to 
the non-punishment of serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the war conflict over the previous decade. Of course, one should 
not exclude the existence of certain other political motives, but the further 
review of these motives would exceed the needs of this paper.
When observing the policy of setting conditions applied by the inter-
national community, one can say that, in the case of Serbia, if was largely 
efficient, i.e. that it prompted the authorities in Belgrade to fulfill certain 
obligations towards the Tribunal. Of course, very important for this fact is 
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also the condition-setting applied by the European Union, regardless of the 
differences in the manner in which the conditions are set, since this creates 
unity among all the factors of importance for the success of transition in SCG. 
Another thing that must be noticed in regard to the setting of conditions 
by the US is the absence of a general legal framework, which would offer 
predictability to the setting of these conditions and would make it possible 
for this policy to be understood in Serbia as the promotion of certain values, 
instead of the simple implementation of certain conditions towards Serbia and 
Montenegro. The conditions that are defined at the annual level (through US 
legislative bodies regulating the granting of assistance to foreign states) and 
the addition of new ones often seems like the placing of a „mobile target“, 
and does not originate, as is the case with the conditions set by the European 
Union, from a clearly defined approach to a certain group of countries with 
similar political security and economic problems. Apart from the fact that a 
legal framework is lacking, one should also emphasize the role of Congress 
- since the conditions are incorporated into the legislation regulating the 
granting of assistance to foreign states, and which is adopted by Congress, of 
great importance is the possible influence that could be borne on Congress by 
members of the media, international non-governmental organizations and the 
public opinion in general, as well as groups for exerting pressure, which aspire 
towards the realization of certain political goals. In the case of the condition-
setting applied by the European Union, it is the European Commission that 
decides whether or not the conditions have been fulfilled, and it does this 
on the basis of a report of its mission in that country, regular annual reports, 
technical talks with the government and representatives of the civil society in 
a certain country. And finally, even though, among bilateral donors, the US 
is the motor of the policy of condition-setting, much more important on a 
long term basis is, nevertheless, the setting of conditions by the EU. More than 
an understanding that the EU offers Serbia much larger funds than the US, 
such a stand is primarily the result of the fact that drawing closer to the EU is 
not only the SCG’s foreign policy priority, but it is also, precisely through the 
implementation of the policy of setting conditions, the „inciter“ of perseverance 
on the road to political and economic reforms. In view of this fact and the 
previous progress achieved in cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, the US 
setting of conditions would probably not be sufficient if the EU pressure had 
not gone in the same direction as well.
Regardless of the nature of the condition-setting, it is necessary to point 
out that the answer to the question as to whether it was effective in the case of 
403International Relations
FRY/SCG, as least from the standpoint of operative goals, could be positive. 
Without the international community’s pressure concerning cooperation with 
the Hague Tribunal, it is unlikely that indictees would have been extradited, 
especially in this number. Somewhat less successful was the pressure directed 
towards the redefinition of relations between Serbia and Montenegro – under 
the pressure of the EU, the Belgrade Agreement was reached, i.e. imposed, 
but further pressure by the EU and the Council of Europe did not result in 
a functional state, but rather the European Union gave in and, speaking in 
the language of SCG politicians, „accepted the specificities of the state union“, 
having offered the twin-track approach, i.e. separate talks on economic issues 
for Serbia and Montenegro.
No matter how successful condition-setting may seem, the question being 
asked is to what extent did it essentially manage to prompt the promotion of 
certain values, and to contribute to the establishment of equal partnership 
relations with the international community to which we are aspiring. For 
example, there are opinions that the pressure that was applied did lead to 
extraditions, but not to a comprehensive reexamination of the events from the 
previous period and the role of Serbia in them. Simply speaking, the perception 
has been created that it is necessary to fulfill certain conditions, without an 
essential understanding of why this is being done, except for the need to 
continue with integration into international organizations. The truthfulness of 
the previous conclusion is best illustrated by the change of the Constitutional 
Charter for the purpose of having the Feasibility Study approved: as of the end 
of February deputies with no mandate sat in the SCG parliament, without this 
provoking a debate on the non-existence of the rule of law and the illegitimacy 
of the decisions being taken by this body. The decision to change the Charter 
was made public two days before it was signed, without any public debate, 
without much thought being given to the fate of the state union and with the 
understanding that this is being done in order to create the conditions for the 
Study to be approved.
The responsibility for such a situation lies with the actors in the SCG, 
but in the international community as well. The actors in SCG missed the 
opportunity to work on the resolution of problems of crucial importance for 
the future of our society without pressures from the international community. 
International organizations, for their part, missed the chance to react in a more 
positive manner to the first steps from this side, so as gradually to turn the 
SCG into a responsible, equal partner. Instead, the naked policy of exerting 
pressure continued, which did not allow the authorities in SCG to show the 
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citizens that a cooperative attitude led to a change in the international factors’ 
stands, and not only to new conditions. Perhaps the best example is admission 
to the Council of Europe which, if it had taken place earlier, would have quite 
certainly been a positive sign for both the authorities and the citizens in SCG. 
One could not say that essential progress had been achieved in the economic 
and political reforms in the period between autumn 2002 and spring 2003, 
when we were finally admitted to this organization, but the death of prime 
minister Djindjic, which gave rise to fear that the situation in Serbia would 
deteriorate, resulted in the awareness that it was better to include SCG into the 
CoE and thus to show that the previous results were appreciated and supported, 
and also to acquire, through the obligations that needed to be fulfilled 
following admission, the possibility of overseeing the further development of 
the situation in the country.
It was precisely fear of a possibility deterioration of the situation that led 
to an understanding in international organizations that it was necessary to 
support the reform steps that were being taken in SCG, even when there is 
awareness that a lot more needed to be done. This could explain the more 
flexible attitude of international organizations towards the government of 
Prime Minister Kostunica – the guarantees of this government were accepted 
and six ICTY indictees were released pending trial, even though the obligations 
towards the Hague Tribunal had not been met. Something similar applies to 
the European Union which, after long insistence on the full harmonization of 
the economic systems of Serbia and Montenegro, which was an obstacle to the 
approval of the Study at the time when cooperation with the Hague Tribunal 
was not specified as a problem, enabled separate talks on economic issues 
through the twin-track approach. These positive signals lent support to the 
position of the government in the country and opened up space for it to make 
new moves which will accelerate the country’s international integration.
Evaluation of integration into the international 
community achieved so far
The previous course of Serbia’s integration into the international 
community can be evaluated from a number of aspects. The simplest and, in a 
way, the most superficial approach is quite certainly the viewing of the flow of 
money, i.e. the total net inflow as a result of the process of integration into the 
international community.
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Table . Realized grants and credits (in millions of €) 
Year Grant Concession credits Total
2000 87 0 87
200 593 270 863
2002 554 263 88
2003 430 288 77
2004 44 43 575
Total ,907 ,252 3,60
Table 2.  Structure of the inflow of funds 
(grants and credits, in millions of €)
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
International financial 
institutions 0 33 244 253 407 937
European Union 43 472 35 222 22 ,074
Bilateral arrangements 44 357 259 242 46 ,49
Total 87 863 88 77 575 3,60
The large inflow of funds from abroad in the period after the autumn 
of 2000 made it possible for our standard of living immediately to be above 
anything which exclusively domestic productivity would enable. It is for this 
reason that the average net wages in Serbia are still somewhat above the average 
net wages in countries that are to enter the EU in less than two years (Romania 
and Bulgaria). Such a standard of living can, in principle, be encouraging 
for a radical economic reform, primarily the restructuring of the real sector. 
However, in conditions of the population’s enormous expectations, inadequate 
management of these expectations and the absence of a radical break with 
the philosophy of workers’ self-management, in which the worker-managers 
constantly keep requesting higher salaries believing that they were entitled to 
them, this advantage has simply not been made use of until now.
Serbia’s crucial problem lies in the fact that there is no national consensus 
in regard to international relations, i.e. the strategic national goal in this area. 
Even though accession to the EU is, nominally, sometimes stated as such a goal, 
there are obviously very significant differences among the leading political 
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forces over this issue. This is all the more so since an understanding of what it 
is that admission to the EU actually means is still not wide-spread in Serbia. It 
is precisely on the basis of this lack of information that party-political games 
are being played. Namely, public opinion polls show that a large part of the 
population (almost ¾) support the idea of joining the EU. However, it has 
transpired that a large portion of this population which supports accession 
to the EU sees this accession primarily as benefits that will come from it, 
predominantly in the sense of a higher standard of living. Very little thought 
is given to all the changes that need to be made in order to achieve a higher 
standard of living in a market economy.
It is precisely on the lack of this link that many political party see the 
possibility of increasing their popularity by referring to the idea of European 
integration, on the one hand, but without doing anything to change these 
ideas, on the other, especially not in regard to the economic reform which is 
to introduce a market economy, a firm budget restriction, limited and strictly 
controlled subsidies and an effective protection of private ownership rights.
Nevertheless, the large popularity of the idea of European integration 
and the still expressed desire of the EU to be actively included in the reform 
processes in Serbia which are to lead to full membership in the Union offers 
certain advantages. In conditions in which there is no strong, consistent and 
sustainable driving force for the economic and political reforms in the country, 
integration into the EU can become precisely such a force. Namely, if accession 
to the EU is made conditional on well and precisely specified requests in 
regard tot the economic and institutional reform, such reforms can obtain 
their driving force, which Serbia obviously lacks at this moment. Therefore, 
the reform moves which inevitably lead to a drop in the political rating of the 
government, i.e. the ruling parties, can be politically justified by the need to 
integrate into the EU, which is still a dominant political value, and the non-
flexibility of the foreign partners.
Furthermore, the authorities’ devotion to the project of integration into 
the EU, due to its large political value, can also serve as a mechanism which will 
be used to demonstrate to all the sides and to domestic partners devotedness 
to certain policies, i.e. constancy in their implementation, which is especially 
important from the aspect of the confidence of private (foreign and domestic) 
investors. In the case of the EU, two preconditions are necessary for this. The 
first one is the precise definition of  policies expected of Serbia, which can 
partly be expected in the future Stabilization and Association Agreement, 
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although this agreement encompasses only a smaller part of reform economic 
policies, i.e. elements of an institutional reform. The second is the resoluteness 
of the EU itself to continue along the road of supporting Serbia’s integration 
into the EU. This second precondition could come under a question mark after 
the latest debate on the future of the EU, following the admission of 0 new 
members in 2004, the failure of the referendum in France and the Netherlands, 
and the mood of the public in the EU countries opposing the admission of new 
members.4 
A similar mechanism is also the political will to maintain good relations 
with the IMF and, as part of this, successfully to complete the existing 
arrangement, whose completion is to lead to the write-off of the remaining 
5% of the debt to the creditors of the Paris Club. In this sense, certain reform 
moves represent the government’s obligation towards this international 
financial institution, so that certain difficult decisions can be presented to the 
domestic electorate in this manner.
In this sense, devotion to further integration into the international 
community (political and financial) represents a signal of the government’s 
resolve to implement certain macroeconomic policies, i.e. to carry out the 
necessary reform moves, which is very important when foreign investors are 
deciding to invest in our country, i.e. when domestic private investors are 
thinking about embarking upon investments. This offers  credibility to certain 
economic policies, i.e. to the authorities’ devotion to these economic policies 
and their consistent implementation, i.e. it increases the likelihood of a change 
of power not leading to a change of the economic policy.
A certain problem regarding international relations, especially in the 
sphere of integration in international economic and financial structures, is 
also the insufficient domestic capacity to follow this integration, primarily 
the lack of administrative capacities. This is the result of the insufficient 
number of competent people, insufficient level of training for jobs of this 
type and insufficient stimulation for training and for attracting new, adequate 
personnel for jobs in the state administration. An indicator of the insufficient 
administrative capacities of this type are the unexpectedly poor results of the 
financing of World Bank projects, such as those focusing on the modernization 
of the customs service.  
The result of this lack of administrative capacities, i.e. human capital 
allocated in state services, is also the fact that international institutions, i.e. 
4  According to the results of public opinion polls in the EU5 countries, only 40% support the 
membership of Serbia and Montenegro in the EU.
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foreign partners are in the position to impose an agenda, since the domestic 
side is simply not an equal interlocutor. For this reason, imposed have been 
not only certain solutions, but also reform topics, especially in the sense of 
defining the priorities.
Finally, one can say that the domestic consensus on the need for integration 
into the world, which existed at the beginning of the transition process, has 
disappeared in time and that a division of society is appearing and, apart from 
the component of interests, it also has an important ideological component. 
This is the result of the fact that the political forces which was are, out of their 
own interests and for ideological reasons, against integration, had calmed down 
for a certain period of time, only subsequently to return to the political scene, 
with more or less modified interest-related i.e. pure ideological xenophobia.
In all this, so far there has been no high degree of the articulation of private 
interests as public ones in the process of our integration into the international 
community, except in those cases in which such integration was linked to the 
foreign trade regime, primarily the regime of imports, i.e. the regime of the 
protection of domestic production.
As regards the guidelines for the future of Serbia’s integration into the 
international community and the impact of this integration on the transition 
process in the country, one could take as a point of departure the fact that, 
at this moment (and in some foreseeable future as well), association with 
the EU is the main driving force of our reform. The harmonization of laws 
and the adequate regulation of the institutional framework represents the 
main elements of this reform. This concept leads to the resolution of several 
problems since the reform then presents itself as both a political need and 
as a value, even an instrumental one in the sense of realizing the basic value 
called European integration. Of course, at issue here is not the notion that 
the EU institutional framework is an ideal one and that the policies being 
implemented are optimal. There is no doubt that there is too much state 
interventionism in the EU, too much regulation and discretionary decisions 
of supra-national authorities which are practically answerable to no one. The 
separation of authoritiesand responsibilities never produced good results. The 
space for a free market, unhindered individuals and entrepreneurial initiative 
is narrowing down. However, drawing closer and finally integration into the 
EU makes it possible to obtain a clear and consistent regulatory framework 
with (in many solutions) decades-long experience in implementation, so that 
there is no need to invent hot water. Moreover, in conditions in which there 
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is still a strong political majority in favor of European integration, it is within 
the framework of this integration that it is possible politically to push through 
many changes under the motto „We must do this if we want to enter Europe“. 
Nevertheless, space for domestic creativity does exist, primarily in the manner 
of implementing such reforms, its dynamics and priorities.
A priority on the domestic plane is quite certainly the creation of a 
competent state administration, a nucleus which will be able to communicate 
on a more or less equal footing with representatives of international political, 
financial and economic institutions. Without such an administration Serbia 
will simply not be able to impose its own interest in the field of international 
relations.
This leads probably to Serbia’s biggest problem, not only from the stand-
point of international relations and further integration into the international 
community, but also from the aspect of the success of transition on the 
whole. At issue are the limited human resources which Serbia disposes of: a 
small number of competent people. Even if good and promising people are 
successfully attracted to the state administration by adequate benefits, this 
means that the private sector will be left without such people. Nevertheless, 
it seems that the biggest problem of present-day Serbia is the equilibrium 
allocation of the very limited resources called smart people.

Slobodan Samardžić
Basic Issues of the State
CONSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SERBIA
Serbia stands as a unique example of transitional country in which changes 
across the state, society and economy keep taking place without relevant 
constitutional changes in the background. Some transitional countries, and 
successful ones, have not completely revised their constitutions after the fall of 
the old regimes, but they rather changed some parts of their old constitutions 
– mainly those which were necessary to enable establishment of political 
pluralism and parliamentary systems. It was only later that those countries, 
their institutions strengthened, engaged in implementation of changes in 
other domains (Hungary and Poland are typical examples of such approach). 
However, a great majority of those countries did carry out complete revision 
of their respective constitutions immediately following the establishment of 
political pluralism, or immediately after their first free elections. 
It is a widely known fact that transition-wise, Serbia lags behind by at least 
ten years. The reasons for this delay are also well known. It is more difficult, 
however, to grasp the reasons why, five years after the political changes, Serbia 
has done nothing to change a single article of its constitution, the one designed 
by the former regime that had practically identified itself with it. 
The period immediately following the changes 
– absence of constitutional policy 
There were several underlying such constitutional situation in Serbia after 
the October 2000. All those reasons, as we shall explain in short, proved to be 
stronger than the explicitly stressed intentions of the opposition to put the 
412 Slobodan Samardžić
final touch to the overturning of the undemocratic regime by implementing 
a thorough constitutional change. When the political change had already 
been made, the constitutional enthusiasm of revolutionary kind dried up in 
the sand of everyday problems, and shortly after that, the political agreement 
among the winning parties disappeared. Still, the question is what the reasons 
for the delay were. 
Firstly, the existing constitution was, in some of its parts, applicable 
in the newly generated situation. The part concerning the organization of 
government that was based on the constitutional principle of power division 
guaranteed normatively some kind of rationalized parliamentary system 
which could, together with the provisions of constitutionality and legality 
also normatively stated in the constitution, offer an acceptable solution for 
the period of transition. Whereas in Poland and Hungary there was an urgent 
need to change their constitutions regarding those provisions in the name 
of constitutional democracy, there was no such need in Serbia. Under such 
constitutional provisions, Serbia went to parliamentary elections twice already 
(in December 2000 and three years after that) and to presidential elections 
three times. For the presidential elections, however, the legislator did intervene 
(in 2004), since there had been no constitutional provision in case of failure 
to elect president, which had happened two times before (in the autumn of 
2003). 
The second reason for this pragmatic forgetfulness about constitutional 
changes resided out- side of Serbia, in the unresolved issue of the two-member 
federation, with Montenegro’s unexpected disloyalty to the federation in the 
post-Milosevic period. The ruling political agents in Serbia were genuinely 
inclined to resolve the federation issue in a fair and constitutional way, only 
to constitutionally organize their republic as constitutional residue soon 
after. Owing to a serious constitutional crisis of the federation, the process 
lasted until February 2003, when the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and 
Montenegro was finally adopted. 
Alongside the federation crisis, another political crisis unfolded in 
Serbia itself. It first jeopardized and then entirely eliminated any possibility 
of strategic coordination and agreement among the new opponents that grew 
out the once united forces of change. That phenomenon can be taken as the 
third important reason behind the lack of any successful constitutional policy 
in Serbia. At that level (the level of constitutional policy), the divisions within 
the then ruling coalition could be observed when the first initiative to change 
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Serbian constitution was put forward. That initiative (in April 2003) suffered 
a massive contradiction. It concerned the actual procedure of passing a new 
constitution. On the one hand, a decision was made to instigate a constitutional 
break (discontinuity), i.e. to establish a new procedure by legislation (therefore, 
not constitutionally). The intention was to revive the already torn ties with the 
revolutionary situation, in which the legitimacy of such a maneuver would 
have been taken for granted. On the other hand, the whole new procedure only 
relied on a series of simple majorities guaranteed by the parliament structure, 
the parliament being the body that was to turn into the sole constitution 
maker. Thus: the Law on the Procedure to Change the Constitution (May 
2003) was passed by the majority of all MPs in the Serbian Parliament; the 
structure of the newly formed Constitution Committee mirrored the party 
structure of the Parliament; all decisions made by the Committee were passed 
by the majority of its members, even the unfulfilled decision on the proposed 
draft; finally, the parliament was also supposed to adopt the proposed draft 
by the majority of its members. The above mentioned paradox showed itself 
in the fact that the presupposed revolutionary will of the majority, that was 
the only means for justifying the constitutional break, got to be simulated in 
a series of illegitimate parliamentary majorities in order to achieve such a far-
fetched aim. The revolutionary constitution was supposed to be passed by the 
Parliament in a procedure normally used to pass systemic laws. The ruling 
parties lapsed into this paradox primarily owing to their divisions. The smaller 
fraction, that became the opposition, could not provide a comfortable majority 
in the Parliament any more in order to pass the decisions that would legitimize 
the constitutional break. The irresolvable issue of squaring the circle befell the 
remaining tight majority in the Parliament – they were to keep, even renew, 
the legitimacy of the constitutional break and do so by means of minimal 
majority. 
It is necessary, though, to mention yet another reason that caused the 
absence of an adequate and focused constitutional policy in Serbia during 
the rule of its first transition government. It is the phenomenon that could be 
called ‘reformist practicality’. In the daily array of huge reformist enterprises 
– macroeconomic policies, privatization, foreign aid, donations and loans, 
sector reforms and all, the institutional bearings was lost. What missed was 
simultaneous building (or rather, reform) of the systemic frame that would 
provide support and adequate control for the ever-growing weight of the 
reforms. Without any changes in the domains of public administration and 
the judiciary, numerous reform laws were but a torrent that flooded over 
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the river-bed. If we add to that the chaotic parliamentary situation and the 
absence of systemic decentralization, then it becomes clearer why rational 
administration of power was impossible. Whether the lack of constitutional 
changes was the cause or the consequence of such a state of affairs remains 
to be more deeply analyzed. However, hat is likely is that the spontaneous 
spirit of reformist practicality had neither ear for nor real interest in bringing 
forth a new constitution. On the contrary, from its standing-point of churning 
reforms, that spirit viewed it as unnecessary waste of energy and time. 
Renewing constitutional policy under changed conditions
After the first transitional government’s failure to bring forth a new 
constitution, the second government (that took over on 4th March 2004) made 
this issue its priority. By the end of March 2004, the Parliament passed the 
decision on starting the procedure to create and adopt a new constitution 
for Serbia. The Parliament also authorized its Committee for Constitutional 
Matters to prepare a draft. Several months later, the Government drafted its 
own proposal and directed it to the Committee as “a possible view of new 
constitutional solutions for Serbia, that could be used by the Committee…as 
basis for drafting a new constitution for the Republic of Serbia” (quoted from 
the accompanying comment). 
Several points can be observed here. Firstly, the constitutional procedure 
to change the constitution was re-established (Art.132 and 133 of the existing 
Constitution), which means that the matter was brought back into the domain 
of constitutional continuity. )In the meantime, the Law on the Procedure 
to Change the Constitution was put out of force as unconstitutional by the 
Serbian Constitutional Court). However, that, given the content of the above 
mentioned Articles of the Constitution, requires the policy of constitutional 
consensus and not the policy of constitutional differentiation, which is, as a 
rule, an act of political arbitration. The presently valid procedure to change the 
constitution assumes acceptance by a two-third majority in the Parliament (in 
two instances of voting) and the acceptance by a half of the total electoral body, 
as necessary requirements to adopt constitution. Such a procedure practically 
imposes the constitutional policy of consensus that, as a rule, begins among 
the parliamentary parties and then spreads into a broader social consensus. In 
other words, instead of the revolutionary constitutional policy, we now have, 
so to say, a regular constitutional policy. 
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The fact that the parliamentary decision on making a new constitution 
was passed by a qualified majority provided for the legality of the steps to be 
taken in this matter. The above mentioned Government’s Draft Proposal made 
an effort to meet the future consensus, as it subsumed parts of a number of 
proposals made in the period 2001 - 2003. At one moment, it seemed possible 
to fulfill two tasks in one go. First, to adopt the constitution as soon as possible, 
which was a general requirement of the second reforms wave; then to fulfill the 
requirements concerning the policy of stabilization and joining the EU stated in 
all the annual reports of the European Committee, as well as the strictly formal 
requirement on the necessity to harmonize the constitutions of the member-
states stated by the Law on Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro 
(Art.20.2). The second task was to make and pass the Constitution following 
an extraordinarily demanding procedure. 
The problem sprang up at the procedure level, not on the level of negotiating 
the text of the draft. At one point, the subcommittee of the Constitutional 
Committee was presented with a completed draft proposal (by the President of 
the Republic and the Democratic Party), which assumes a different procedure 
to pass a new constitution. The draft actually represents an initiative to summon 
a constitution assembly as new and authentic constitution-making body. The 
initial consensus was thus disturbed and the whole procedure entered a blind 
alley. 
At this moment, the main problem is the fact that the constitutional issue 
has become a political issue, just one of many current political disputes in the 
country. At the end of the day, it is an objective risk of the negotiation policy. Such 
a policy cannot step out of the daily political arguments, primarily between the 
political parties. The question remains whether the parties would find strength 
to rise above these daily political clashes to prevent this issue disappear in the 
melting pot of daily politics. It is quite certain that the importance and urgent 
need to create a new constitution demand that the political parties invest such 
an effort and show higher degree of political responsibility. 
Choice of constitutional solutions for Serbia 
When the two existing drafts presented to the parliamentary Subcommittee 
are compared, marked similarities and minor differences can be noted. (The case 
is not the same with many draft proposals coming from the non-governmental 
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sector or from individuals.) That fact clearly tells us, provided there was an 
elaborately coordinated constitutional procedure (which was believed to have 
been achieved until recently), that Serbia could have its constitution fairly 
soon. We shall not, however, discuss the contents of these two drafts at this 
point, but the deep dilemma of constitutional choices for Serbia. We shall also 
limit our discussion to the issues of material constitution, bearing in mind that 
the procedure of making and passing the constitution represents an authentic 
constitutional choice in itself. 
Choice of constitution in a country that has gone deep into the 
transformation processes is neither an act of will nor of chance. (Constitutional) 
choice is not actually a matter of choice. If anyone holding political authority 
and/or power tried to impose an example constitution, (i.e. a constitution 
that follows an existing pattern) – that would be an act of utmost political 
voluntarism. It should not be particularly stressed that a constitution is not 
(merely) a written document, but, above all, a legitimate (generally accepted) 
frame for overall management of a society and its state. In a situation when 
there is a politically articulated and accepted need to transform the society 
and the state, a new constitution, that should provide a legal frame and secure 
the direction of such transformation, should also fulfill two basic criteria: 
firstly, it should be rooted into the lasting structural features of that society, 
and secondly, it must direct that concrete society (not some abstract one) 
towards the desired changes and prescribe the best normative and institutional 
mechanisms to that purpose. 
Talking of Serbian constitution, it is clear that it has to undergo a thorough 
and complete reshaping. In principle, it is possible to achieve that in a few steps 
of constitutional revision, but if there is public agreement on the need for its 
total change (and such agreement exists in Serbia) then such a change should 
be implemented. 
Following the line of constitutional parts, we shall try to sketch the 
elements of constitutional choices for Serbia:
a) Constitutional principles (basic provisions). In this symbolic and declarative 
part of the constitution it is necessary to establish specific balance (that 
would be valid for Serbia itself) between the universal principles of 
modern constitutionalism (such as respect for fundamental rights, power 
of law, civil sovereignty, power division, secular character of state) on 
the one hand, and the specific principles of Serbian statehood tradition 
(preservation of state continuity, symbols of state, language and script in 
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public usage) on the other. It is indispensable that inner consensus be 
achieved on these matters not only between the political parties, but with 
the representatives of ethnic minorities, i.e. different ethnic communities 
in Serbia. 
b) Fundamental rights and freedoms. In this part it is necessary to apply the usual 
constitutional standard of modern and contemporary constitutionalism 
both in the area of rights and freedoms and in that of constitutional 
guarantees for their practicing. Special attention should be paid to the 
hierarchy of immediate constitutional protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms and additional legal regulations if needed. It is also necessary 
to accept the constitutional principle of immediate applicability of human 
and ethnic rights guaranteed by the international law. 
This specific feature of our constitutional system to guarantee and protect 
fundamental rights and freedoms is represented in the category of ethnic 
minority rights. They should be part of the whole system of rights, but 
in the constitution they should be defined in a specific way, alongside 
basic human rights. According to the draft proposal, those rights should 
be defined as rights of the members of specific ethnic communities living 
in Serbia, and not as rights of specific collective entities. Apart from 
that, their constitutional expression should be both positive - the right 
to preserve ethnic identity and to practice privileges of public life - and 
negative – any form of discrimination must be forbidden. 
c) Economic organization. This part of the constitution should define the 
foundations of the economic organization of Serbia. From the viewpoint 
of defining constitutional norms, it should be based on economic liberties 
(liberty to work and found companies, as well as the principle of market 
competition, free flow of goods, capital, workforce and services). Apart 
from that, it is also necessary to define basic economic institutes (property, 
market, competition) and institutions (national bank, financial court). 
The basics of public finances – budget, income, revenue and expenditure, 
public debt – should also be constitutional regulated in accord with the 
provided system of decentralized public administration (therefore, on the 
respective levels of republic, province, city and municipality). 
Having in mind the need for strategic reform of the economy on liberal 
principles, it is not advisable that the state take over large responsibilities 
in the area of specific social rights and policies. For this particular purpose, 
it would be enough to underline (among others) the principle of social 
justice. In the specific conditions of transition, the state will definitely 
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have to face and deal with numerous social issues, but this domain of its 
activities is not necessary to regulate by strict constitutional provisions; 
legal regulations based on the principle of social justice and some specific 
social rights are quite sufficient for that purpose.
It is quite obvious that here we are talking a normative and general, 
but still precise and concise constitutional definition of the economic 
organization of Serbia. It reflects a commitment that economic life should 
be run by those who participate in it, without being excessively normative, 
especially not on the constitution level.
d) Administration organization. Serbia must create for itself a system of 
administration that will be the function of democratic governance of the 
country throughout a long-term process of transformation. In this part 
of the constitution, the requirement that constitutional solutions must 
take care of lasting features of the present situation should probably be 
the most dominant. One of such features is the coalition structure of 
the government, which is a result of the still unstable party system in 
the country. Comparative practice shows that the most stable political 
systems are those in which governments are formed by a single party, 
and in case of coalitions, then two-party governments are sufficient for 
political stability. As a rule, governments formed by three or more parties 
are not stable. Serbia is facing exactly that kind of situation, and it will 
probably do so for a longer period of time. 
The most convenient administration system under such (lasting) 
circumstances is the presidential-parliamentary system. Serbia is under 
no condition in a position to introduce a presidential system that would be 
both democratic and operative at the same time. Even a semi-presidential 
system (like the one in France) would present Serbia with a challenge of 
prevalent amount of power in the hands of one party-leader who would 
be the president of state, which could easily turn into usurpation of power 
in likely crises. Due to its lasting political circumstances, Serbia must have 
a mechanism of balanced legislative and executive power built into its 
system. How is that to be constitutionally achieved?
The existing political pluralism in Serbia cannot provide for a clear relation 
between the government majority and oppositional minority on a long-
term basis. Being such a complex coalition structure, the government 
will incessantly strive to maintain its parliamentary majority, and will, 
therefore, have to make constant concessions to smaller parties within 
itself. Smaller parties will, consequently, get a greater specific weight then, 
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which is not favorable for regular political activity. In regard of that, the 
opposition will always have smaller government parties up their sleeve, 
and be in position to put all sorts of conditions to the government. That 
is, the government can easily fall on the basis of an ad hoc silent alliance 
between the opposition and one of the smaller parties. However, viewing 
it from the system’s angle, that does not solve the problem of weak 
government, as in such circumstances the parliament is not strong either. 
If the government did fall by some chance, the coalition structure in itself 
would not guarantee a different situation even after new (extraordinary) 
elections, as the situation would just repeat itself in the mandate of some 
other government. The point is that the issue of lasting balance cannot be 
resolved on the level of parliament-government relation. 
A systemic solution can only be the constitutional introduction of a 
stronger president of state. The constitution must, therefore, equip him/
her with the tools to use in mediating between the parliament and the 
government in cases of crises. First of all, the president of the state must 
have legitimacy and authority of the state organ elected in direct elections. 
That would enable the president to address the parliament (and therefore 
the nation) when he/she considers it necessary, as the nation’s (and the 
parliament’s) immediate representative organ. Then, he/she must have 
the right to veto the laws passed by the parliament; this right should be 
reinforced by a provision on a more qualified majority in the instance of 
repeated voting on such laws. Finally, the president of the state should 
have the right to directly influence appointment of one-third of the 
Constitutional Court judges. Such tools would give the president sufficient 
constitutional authority to influence the relation between the government 
and the parliament in critical situations. This kind of authority is smaller 
than that of the president in semi-presidential systems (in which the 
government acts quite independently of the president), but it is also large 
enough to make the president able mediator in the state. 
In Serbia, the above presented solution may function only if the president is 
sufficiently neutral political figure. If politically biased, that would be fatal 
for the constitutional purpose of his/her position, regardless of whether 
his/her bias would flick the tip of the scales towards the government or the 
opposition. At this point we face a grave problem, as such personalities 
are hard to find, in Serbia and in more mature European democracies 
alike. The only constitutional provision that could prevent that would be 
a clear clause stating that the president during his/her mandate must not 
perform any other political function. 
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In this part we dwelled mostly on the problem of organizing the 
administrative system in general, and that is the relation between legislative 
and executive power. As a rule, judiciary power has a smaller part at this 
point. However, the most important thing for democratic judiciary acting 
in accordance with law is its independence of the other two, which can be 
more easily achieved if the constitution and the system are in balance, as 
well as politics and political practice. 
e) Territorial organization of administration. Although uniform as a state (and 
that is a principle that should be particularly stressed in the constitution 
preambles), Serbia should strive towards functional decentralization 
of power administration. It is possible and even desirable to do so in 
a way which guarantees its sustainability and efficiency on the levels 
lower than the central one. The constitution should list possible levels of 
decentralization - such as province-region, city and municipality- but it 
should also establish clear requirements to be met in applying a general 
model of decentralization. Regarding the province – region issue, the 
constitution should guarantee Vojvodina its territorially autonomous 
status, as it should define the specific status of Kosovo and Metohija. The 
constitution can also allow for establishment of that kind of autonomy 
in other parts of Serbia, but under strictly democratic procedure and 
in conditions of economic sustainability. The same principle should be 
applied when city status is to be acquired. Finally, the municipal level of 
power administration should have features of modern local self-governed 
community that practically aids the citizens to fulfill their immediate 
interests. 
f) The principles of constitutionality and legality. This part of the constitution 
immediately and completely guarantees the constitutional principle of the 
rule of law. Serbia, like most contemporary constitutional democracies, 
should implement the principle of constitutional judiciary control of 
constitutionality and legality. For that matter, the role of Constitutional 
Court should be defined as clearly as possible, as it could be crucial for 
establishing the rule of law and democracy. 
g) Changing constitution. The experience of changing the existing constitution 
of Serbia points to the need that revision clauses of the future constitution 
be less restrictive than those of the present one. The new constitution 
should not be ideal and therefore inflexible, according to the intentions 
of its makers. It is quite realistic to expect that the process of general 
421Basic Issues of the State
transformation will require certain changes in some constitutional 
provisions. 
On the other hand, the procedure to change the constitution would 
necessarily have to be to a certain degree stricter than the procedure of 
changing important (systemic) laws. If we assume that changing such laws 
would require at least a simple parliamentary majority, then changing the 
constitution would require a qualified two-third majority and a facultative 
referendum. Apart from that, the referendum majority would require a 
half (plus one) of positive votes, provided that a half (plus one) of the 
electoral body of Serbia consumes the right to vote. 
Conclusion
Serbia should establish a new constitutional organization as soon as 
possible. It actually depends on the politicians and their decision to carry on 
with the already initiated changes; otherwise, the whole remains in a deadlock. 
The years that have passed since the very beginning of the changes cannot be 
considered dramatically lost for the constitutional issue, although they have 
not yielded results. Being that often topical in the public life of Serbia, this 
issue has spontaneously led to some mutual understanding regarding this 
delicate constitutional matter. Two authoritative draft proposals lying in front 
of the Constitutional Subcommittee are not in any way exclusive, as is the case 
with some proposals from the non-governmental sector. The many similarities 
in their contents, especially in some key parts, resulted from the fact that 
various constitutional ambitions calmed down and got to the point where they 
realistically reflect what is real and objectively possible. 
It is quite interesting that such understanding concerning the matters of 
constitutional contents does not have a matching counterpart in the matters 
of procedure. The two approaches are still very distinct. That is, however, 
more of a reflection of their positions in the political life of Serbia (those of 
the government and the opposition, i.e. the Government and the President of 
the Republic in cohabitation) than a matter of essential differences concerning 
the procedural issue. Still, if consensus figures as the way to settle this (or any 
other fundamental) dispute, then, the attitude that all parties are in the right 
should be accepted. The solution is hidden in a general agreement, and the 
road to success leads through negotiations. The goal is nothing less than a new 
constitution. Political loyalty to this goal is checked by the acceptance of the 
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procedure itself, i.e. the political methodology for achieving the set aim. This 
implies also a negative, but logical conclusion: if the goal is not reached, all 
participating parties will be responsible. 
RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 
AND THE FUTURE OF THE STATE UNION
Almost five years after the democratic changes, Serbia and Montenegro 
have not managed to get the common state to function. At first that may appear 
odd, as until October 2000 there had been a general opinion that Milosevic’s 
undemocratic regime was the only impediment to that. After the political change 
in Serbia, the Democratic Party of Socialists, the ruling party in Montenegro, 
switched over completely to the policy of acquiring state independence. For 
that purpose, it entered a coalition with the independence-oriented Social-
democratic Party after the extraordinary elections in April 2001, as it was left 
without its previous coalition partner, the federation-oriented People’s Party. 
As the majority of political parties in Serbia both politically and through 
their programs favor some kind of state connections between Serbia and 
Montenegro, the main reason that this issue still remains unresolved is in 
Montenegro itself. If the orientation toward independence were obvious and 
dominant in the smaller state, Serbia would not be in the way in any respect. 
However, the fact that Montenegro has been almost evenly split between 
the two options for the last five years prevents Serbia from taking a neutral 
attitude towards the issue. Not even the European Union, that had taken 
part in arranging the temporary union between Serbia and Montenegro, has 
remained neutral. At this point, we shall analyze the creation, functioning and 
future prospects of this provisional state. 
Transition shadowed by the state issue 
The present solution in the shape of state union is negatively functional in 
the actual conditions. It is there to prevent even worse solutions that might crop 
up owing to the lack of democratic, in this case consensual assumptions. This 
negative functionality is the result of mediation by the European Union to help 
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create the state union and it’s Constitutional Charter. Although this document 
contains a number of positive projections for development and functioning of 
the state union, with time they have gradually lost their practical significance, 
since one of the two partners – Montenegro, that is – has systematically worked 
against them. For that reason, what has become obvious is the European 
Union’s bare motif to maintain the safety status quo in Montenegro and in the 
region, the motif which had underlain the readiness to mediate in the making 
of the state union. A fragile peace is better than any overt conflict that appears 
inevitable should far-reaching decisions, such as proclaiming independence, 
be made without a basic political consensus. In short, the European Union can 
be much more efficient and successful in mediating and leading the region by 
means of its integration policy than by its policy of post festum intervention, 
for which it has no adequate institutions and strength. 
The Constitution Charter of Serbia and Montenegro came into power 
in February 2003. Before that, Serbia and Montenegro were formally federal 
members of the two-member federation established in 1992. Montenegro had 
not applied any decisions of the federation organs until the Constitution Charter 
(practically since 1999), except in special cases of defense policy and when 
accepting international help or various financial arrangements made through 
the federation. Therefore, the decisions passed by the federal government 
practically affected only Serbia. The absurdity of the situation was even 
enhanced by the fact that those decisions were made also by the Montenegrin 
representatives, who represented only the Montenegrin opposition in the 
federal administration. The Constitutional Charter at least helped overcome 
this rather unusual political and legal situation. 
The Constitutional Charter is, in any way, a transitional constitutional 
document. It defines the status, aims, jurisdiction and means of the state 
union as specific a construct as it is. 
1) As for the status, Serbia and Montenegro are defined in a usual 
constitutional way as “one entity by the international law” (Art.14.1), 
holding all the rights and obligations implied by such international status 
in today’s globalized world. 
All other constitutional features of the state union reflect its specific and 
transitional character. 
2) The aims of the union, beside general values of human rights, reflect 
particular functional reasons for establishing such a state union, and 
those are its faster and more efficient stepping into the space of European 
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integrations (Art.3, particularly lines 3, 4 and 6). The final aim is as follows: 
Serbia and Montenegro will maintain their mutual functional relations 
(common market, harmonizing regulations and practices with European 
standards, creating a real market economy) following the model of 
European integrations and will simultaneously work toward leading the 
state union into tangible integration relations with the European Union. 
The two features that follow, namely those related to the jurisdiction and 
finances of the state union, point to the narrow maneuvering space that 
the Constitutional Charter leaves to the state union itself, i.e. its organs.
3) Two things catch the eye when looking at the jurisdictions of the state 
union, and they are characteristic of confederate organizations: a) the 
state union has only the jurisdictions vested in it by the constitution, or 
the jurisdictions directly delegated by the member states (Art.17.1.2.); 
in other words, it does not posses the general jurisdiction to assign 
jurisdictions, as is the case in all federations); b) the inventory of the 
jurisdictions constitutionally assigned to the state is but very moderate 
(cf. Art.19). 
4) A typically confederate arrangement has been applied in the part 
concerning the means, i.e. the institutes of the state union and their 
authority. Such an arrangement is constitutionally provided for either 
by the parity structure of the institutes) The Council of Ministers and 
The Court of Serbia and Montenegro), or by the principle of delegate 
agreement, which is the case with the decision-making procedure in the 
Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro. In this way, the state union does 
not have its own authentic organs, but it rather has the organs which are 
actually those of the member states raised to the level of the state union. 
In short, the whole constitutional construct rests on a bona fide attitude 
that the ruling majorities of the member states have toward the aims and 
jurisdictions of the state union. If the constitutionally confirmed possibility of 
stepping out of the state union is added (by either one or both of the member 
states – Art.60) then the picture of its temporary character is complete. 
The two-and-a-half-year existence of the state union reveals two opposing 
strategies towards its constitutionally projected function. For the official 
Montenegro, it represents the last obstacle to be jumped over on the road to 
independence. For Serbia (and here we shall not use the word ‘official’, because 
the government and the opposition agree entirely over it, unlike Montenegro), 
the state union represents a form, which should fulfill its constitutional role in 
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order to become comprehensive and functional enough to enter the process 
of European integrations. Such confronting strategies have resulted, as a rule, 
in different attitudes towards the responsibilities implied in the Constitutional 
Charter. Here are two examples to illustrate it:
Example 1 – gradual harmonization of economic systems. Since the 
creation of common market is one of the projected aims of the state union, it 
has become necessary to devise mechanisms and instruments to harmonize 
the two systems. In order to achieve that, the Action Plan to harmonize the 
economic systems of Serbia and Montenegro was put together. The Plan 
assumed gradual balancing of the two foreign trade and customs policies. The 
very procedure to adopt the Action Plan was characteristic of the nature of the 
state union. It was adopted by all three parliaments (two republic parliaments 
and in the Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro) in exactly the same way in 
which the Constitutional Charter itself was adopted (in September 2003). The 
Action Plan was not complete, since an exception had been made for some 
56 so-called ‘delicate’ products, on whose exclusion Montenegro had insisted. 
Finally, when after a full year Montenegro did not apply the document, it was 
clear that it had no intention of meeting the stated obligations. 
Example 2 – direct elections for the Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro. 
According to the Constitutional Charter (Art.20.4), two years following the 
first (indirect) elections, the MPs for the Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro 
are to be elected in direct elections. The elections were supposed to have been 
organized in February 2005, but were not, as Montenegro refused to carry the 
elections out. 
It is quite clear from these two examples that the official Montenegro has 
adopted the tactics to obstruct the functioning of the state union, not hesitating 
even to violate the Constitutional Charter and other binding regulations. In 
both above mentioned cases, it was Serbia and European Union that acted in a 
synchronized way to save the state union arrangement. In the first case, it was 
done by introducing the ‘double tracks’ accession policy, which postpones the 
formation of the common market until the implementation of the Agreement 
on stabilization and accession (under the condition that the Agreement be ever 
made). In the second case, the problem was solved by the initiative to amend 
the Art.20.4 of the Constitutional Charter.
Still, in spite of such interventions, it clearly shows that the state union 
does not even function within its concrete constitutional jurisdictions, let 
alone at the level of aims that are set in its founding document. If one of the 
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two union members constantly keeps obstructing the union, and there are 
no neutral internal mechanisms that would force that member to stick to the 
rules, then such a union can hardly survive. 
However, the case of Serbia and Montenegro is even more complex than 
could be perceived in a superficial glance. The already used word ‘obstruction’ 
well describes the phenomenon we are talking about. There is an organized and 
well-planned political activity going on in Montenegro, which does not allow 
functioning of the state union at the level of its jurisdictions, an even less at the 
level of its aims. The calculation behind it is but simple: since independence is 
the main political project of the ruling parties, and since there is no comfortable 
majority of the electoral body to support it, it is necessary to engage all means 
to prevent the alternative project, i.e. the function9ing of the state union. The 
active political disturbance of its functioning is then presented as it structural 
problem, or, as it is readily called, the ‘the structural flaw’. 
Naturally, any political party or group is entitled to active struggling to 
promote its political program in the public eye, especially those parties in 
power, that have on their (legal) disposal various state means to achieve that 
aim. However, the Montenegrin case is different. Its government violates the 
very rules it has created in this political game. Such doing meets no sanctions 
that would protect the right of the state union and that would penalize 
its violation. (The Court of Serbia and Montenegro is both politically and 
procedurally unfit for such action). From such a situation, it may be implied 
that Montenegro is a sovereign state. However, even if it is, it has become so 
in a illegal, i.e. counter-legal way, by violating the right that had been backed 
up by the authority of the European Union. If the state union does not have 
proper judiciary protection, it could then have efficient political protection by 
the only real authority behind it, and that is the European Union. That brings 
us back to the fundamental question of why the EU had backed up the creation 
of the state union. 
The future of the state union 
Despite its modest jurisdictions and even more modest means to 
implement them, it is the state union that the European Union addresses, 
especially within the framework of its integration policy. As it is well known, 
agreements of this kind (the agreement on stabilization and accession) may be 
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made only by internationally recognized states. The State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro undoubtedly possesses this capability, viewed from the angle of 
international law. What actually is a problem of Serbia and Montenegro is the 
misbalance between its international legal ability and internal legal deprivation 
that is manifested in its inability to implement such a complex international 
agreement. If there is a ‘structural flaw’ in the Constitutional Charter, it is the 
above mentioned misbalance. In such a constitutional context, only political 
obstruction is needed to jeopardize the whole structure. 
With two concrete examples, we have shown how ‘the day was saved’. 
The European Union suggested an innovative solution – the ‘double tracks’ 
mechanism to be implemented in the agreement consisting of one common 
and two separate parts. The criterion for division follows the line of jurisdiction 
division between the state union and the member states, which practically 
means that the lion’s share of the agreement content will be regulated in the 
parallel agreement parts. What it would look like still remains to be seen and 
the chances for a positive outcome are realistic. How it will be implemented 
remains hidden in the uncertain political future of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro. In this respect, the agreement has to fulfill one more requirement 
– it has to subsequently stabilize the only internationally legal partner of 
the European Union in this matter, and that is the state union. Within the 
agreement, this is exclusively the domain of a specific agreement policy, 
and not the usual domain of its legal, economic and integrations-oriented 
senses. Since the European Union generally acts in favor of the state union, 
this agreement is the only means that it has on its disposal. The European 
reasoning is as follows: if the agreement is made not only with the real legal 
partner, but also the two quasi legal partners – the member states – then the 
agreement has to be implemented. In that phase, the two member states, the 
real masters of the agreement in the matter of partnership with the EU, will be 
forced not only to get closer to each other (which they failed to do by means of 
the above mentioned Action Plan), but they will also have to transfer some of 
their jurisdictions to the state union and consequently reinforce it. This process 
would have to be irreversible and it would last until the state union becomes a 
formal international subject capable of self-governing. 
It goes without saying that such an agreement policy leads to the 
fulfillment of both essential and by-product aim – and that is the adaptation 
of Montenegro. It is reckoned that any obstructive policy on the part of 
Montenegrin government would have to be abandoned, and even the right to 
referendum on independence would have to go out. Those two tactic means 
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are simply not in tune with the agreement, in fact they are quite contradictory 
to its main sense. Indeed, from the viewpoint of such EU policy, it remains 
unclear why anyone would be running away from the open doors to the EU, 
especially the one whose proclaimed aim is to join the EU. 
This issue is, however, loaded with excessive normative ambitions. Why 
would joining the EU integrations framework be the highest normative aim 
of one’s public policy? It is not important here what is said about this – what 
matters is the behavior of the participants. If Montenegro starts a campaign 
on the independence referendum, that is planned to take place at the time 
when the negotiations on stabilization and accession agreement should be 
in their final phase, then it means that independence is a higher priority for 
Montenegro than the European integrations. This priority may be endangered 
by the success of the agreement, so these two matters take entirely conflicting 
positions. If it were not the case, the referendum idea would be abandoned 
or at least postponed until the agreement is made and its implementation 
initialized. In this latter case, there would be room for to apply the so-called 
Czechoslovakian model of state separation. However, the political background 
of that ‘model’, that practically enabled the implementation of it, was entirely 
different from that in Serbia and Montenegro. In Czechoslovakia there was a 
political consensus not only between the member states but within each one of 
them, so the separation could not have any bad consequences, either internally 
or externally. Therefore, that could hardly represent a ‘model’, it was simply an 
individual case. 
It is absolutely clear that the case of Serbia and Montenegro is different. 
What is important at this moment is that the EU spotted the problem and 
decided to mediate.1∗ The EU did not do in order to facilitate Serbia and 
Montenegro’s joining the European integrations, as that was primarily a matter 
of their own commitment. The European Union did for safety reasons, in 
order to help preserve delicate peace in the region. Those reasons, at that time, 
appeared more important than others – economic, developmental, integrative 
- and justifiably so. There is neither economic development nor integrations 
where wars are waged. 
1  The story of how the EU entered the picture is interesting. It happened immediately after yet one 
more failure of the then governments of FRY and the two republics to reach agreement concerning 
the reform of the federation (in 2001). The Montenegrin negotiators insisted on independence and 
subsequent alliance between the two independent states. When the then President of the federative 
state announced that the negotiations failed and that Montenegro should resolve the problem by 
referendum (end of October 2001), the EU soon reacted by offering mediation . In practice, that 
initiative prevented the Montenegrin referendum from happening. 
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Still, the EU entered the whole process in a way that was available to it 
and accordingly equipped. It used the prospective of gradual integration as the 
means, which opened up new windows not only for Serbia and Montenegro, 
but for all states in the region. It is reckoned that the integration processes 
– both regional and European – are conversely proportionate to disintegration 
processes by secession. Not because the EU would consider newly formed 
states in the Balkans illegitimate, but because in the Balkans there has never 
been any agreement, only disputes, conflicts and ultimately wars. When wars 
do break out, the EU has no means on its disposal to mediate successfully, and, 
therefore, until elementary conditions for peace are created, the EU withdraws 
into the background. 
In short, the future of Serbia and Montenegro, not only as the existing 
state union but as a functional state, practically depends on two mutually 
related things: that the inner reforms be a priority and that the EU persist on 
its agreement policy. 
SOLVING THE KOSOVO AND METOHIJA ISSUE
The Kosovo and Metohija problem has been there for a long time and 
it is quite likely that Serbia, together with the international community and 
the political participants within the province, will have to deal with it for a 
considerable time in the future (and, in the international sense, Serbia and 
Montenegro as well). In a synchronic cut, the problem may be presented as a 
conflict of irreconcilable interests – the interests of Serbia to keep the province 
within some internal legal arrangement on the one hand, and the Albanian 
majority’s interests to tear off the Kosovo territory from Serbia and establish 
an independent state on the other. The Kosovo reality, since 1999, has been 
essentially marked by the international protectorate instigated by the United 
Nations. 
The above described state of affairs in Kosovo and Metohija were 
already there at the time of political change and the beginning of systemic 
transformations in Serbia (autumn 2000). The fact that the former regime did 
not solve the problem of Albanian secessionism, but had additionally radicalized 
it, as well as the presence of the international troops and civilian missions in the 
province gave the new government an opportunity to address the problem in 
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a way that comprised modern safety, diplomatic and democratic mechanisms. 
A major test of such an approach suddenly cropped up immediately following 
the establishment of the new government. The Albanian rebellion in three 
South-Serbian communities (not in Kosovo and Metohija) was supposed to 
repeat the mid-nineties scenario carried out by the so-called Kosovo Liberation 
Army. The Serbian and FRY governments managed to calm the problem and 
put it back into the context of peaceful negotiations and therefore evade a 
conflict of the nineties kind. The success, however, although recognized by 
the international community, did not persuade the international protector to 
allow the reformist government of Serbia to participate directly in the Kosovo 
and Metohija problem solving. 
Period 1999 – 2005
Although the political forces that came into power in Serbia after October 
2000 were democratic and pro-European, the international representatives’ 
(civilian - UNMIK and military - KFOR) attitude towards them changed slowly 
and peripherally. At that time, the temporary institutions of self-government 
were not yet established in Kosovo and Metohija, and international mediators 
evaded to use the democratic change in Belgrade in any way that could lead 
towards the establishment of institutions to boost mutual confidence building 
and towards their efficient functioning. From the time when the UN mission 
was established in Kosovo and Metohija in June 1999 to the autumn of 2000, 
there were events and changes that reached the scale of ethnic cleansing of the 
Serbian community. Out of 250000 exiled people, there were around 170000 
Serbs, or almost two thirds of the Serbian population that had lived in Kosovo 
until June 1999. Their property – houses, flats, land - was either usurped or 
devastated. Precise records kept by the Serbian Orthodox Church show that 
112 religious monuments, such as churches, monasteries, graveyards were 
either destroyed or considerably damaged. What was going on was only the 
Albanian revenge because of the former regime, but also a planned action to 
expel the population of other nations, religions and cultures (not only Serbs, 
but the Roma and Ashkali as well) to fulfill the idea of ethnically clean and 
independent Kosovo. 
The International mission’s mandate was defined by the UN Resolution 
No. 1244, but that mandate was heavily influenced by the Albanian majority 
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pressure to create legal prerequisites for independence. Just as a reminder, let 
us list the five key elements of the UN document:
1) international civil and military administration is introduced in Kosovo 
and Metohija;
2) sovereignty and territorial integrity of FRY (today’s Serbia and 
Montenegro) is guaranteed; 
3) the international administration’s task is to enable stabilization of general 
conditions in the province, especially to secure basic human and civil 
rights and preservation of the multiethnic character of the province; 
4) the international administration is to aid formation of temporary 
institutions of self-government;
5) after these basic tasks are fulfilled, the future status of Kosovo and Metohija 
will be defined.
The situation in the field, however, was not governed by the Resolution 
1244 provisions, but by the actions of Albanian leaders geared towards factual 
secession of the province from Serbia and by the opportunism of international 
mission, especially the UNMIK, which was very convenient for the Albanian 
side. As early as in the first year of the international mission’s mandate, 
a particular amalgam of the international and domestic administrations 
(exclusively Albanian) was formed, that led to the establishment of a fait-
accomplie state. Evading essential cooperation with the new government 
in Serbia was but an expected consequence of such a situation. The most 
persuasive example is offered by the way in which a general legal frame for 
the constitution of temporary institutions in Kosovo and Metohija was made, 
the so-called Constitutional Frame for Temporary Self-Government, which 
entirely lacked reliable institutional protection for the Serbian community, 
and instead established a mechanism of classical majority democracy. In the 
atmosphere of general political-ethnic polarization, this mechanism actually 
prevented the Serbs from efficient presentation and implementation of Serbian 
interests within the temporary institutions, above all in the parliament and 
government. The fact that not one amendment suggested by the Serbian 
representatives in the Kosmet parliament in the past two years was accepted, 
gives a true picture of the situation. 
To what extent, however, the cooperation between UNMIK and the new 
reformist government in Serbia could have resulted in gradual stabilization 
and confidence building among the participants in the Kosovo situation can be 
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illustrated by the only serious attempt at such cooperation. In November 2001, 
the first document on mutual implementation of the UN Resolution 1244 
was signed by the government in Belgrade, represented by the Coordination 
Centre for Kosovo and Metohija, and UNMIK. The domain of cooperation 
covered the practical issues important for the Serbian community living in 
Kosovo, such as education, health care, traffic and communications and safety. 
The mechanisms to resolve those issues were established, and they included the 
Albanian representatives, i.e. the representatives of the temporary institutions. 
Relying on that agreement, the Kosovo Serbs agreed to participate in the first 
parliamentary elections in Kosovo, to elect their MPs and enter the government. 
UNMIK’s abandoning of the agreement and the Serbian MPs’ failure to achieve 
any progress in improving the Serbian position in the province led the Serbian 
collation “Return” to leave the parliament and the government and adopt the 
policy of civilian disobedience. That happened by the end of December 2003. 
The Albanian violent attack on Serbs in March 2004 showed the Kosovo Serbs, 
Belgrade and the international community that the multiethnic Kosovo was an 
unsustainable concept in the existing international mission regime. It entered 
the crisis which lasts until this day. 
The existing efforts to solve the problem
The most serious problem in Kosovo and Metohija is the implementation 
of human rights. Bad public administration and inefficient judiciary are the 
problems that directly influence the poor state of human rights in ethnic 
communities in Kosovo, especially the Serbian one. They are generally unsafe, 
they suffer the lack of right to move freely (especially in small Serbian enclaves) 
and there has been no return of Serbian refugees. Regarding that, UNMIK 
estimates are that only 10000 refugees have returned, 50% of them Serbs. That 
means that the rate of return in the past six years has been 2.5% of all Kosovo 
refugees or around 2% of Serbian refugees only. 
Apart from this, Kosovo is facing a catastrophic economic situation, 
criminalized society and massive unemployment (UNMIK estimates are 
between 50% and 70%). Since the government of Serbia (as well as that of 
the state union) have no jurisdiction whatsoever over the province, such a 
situation is undoubtedly the result of UNMIK’s and local (Albanian) mixed 
administration. As the relative order in the province is owed to the presence 
of international troops, it would be very difficult to believe that possible 
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independence, which means total takeover of administration by local 
Albanians, would leave to an improvement. On the contrary, odds are that 
such a solution would irreparably take Kosovo and Metohija further down the 
road of economic, social and political chaos. 
In spite of the total failure on the part of international administration to 
implement the essential provisions of the Resolution 1244, the international 
participants in the affair still keep open the possibilities for solving the 
problem of the future status of Kosovo and Metohija. The end of 2003 saw 
the shaping of the so-called ‘standards before status’ policy. According to 
this policy, Kosovo and Metohija should manifest progress in eight domains, 
with political talks on the future status to follow. The eight domains are: 
1) democratic institutions functioning, 2) rule of law; 3) right to move freely; 
4) return and rights of ethnic communities; 5) economic recovery; 6) property 
rights; 7) renovation and repair of cultural heritage; 8) the Kosovo protective 
corps. To general detriment, the greatest massive violence in the province 
happened a few months after this strategy had been promoted and overtly put 
it under the question mark. Despite that, the international participants did not 
abandon the strategy, although the time that has passed speaks of its practical 
impossibility. 
If we were to describe the three main players on the Kosovo political 
scene, it would be as follows: 
-  the Albanians: for them, independence as soon as possible seems to be 
an only solution. The role of international community, according to their 
political representatives, is to finish the international mission mandate 
until mid 2006 at latest. Not only that any other political solution is 
openly threatened by violence, but several months back there have been 
announcements of unilateral moves by the temporary institutions and 
their expectations that unilaterally proclaimed independence would gain 
factual recognition by the international community. 
-  The international community: they are trying to lead their policy, which 
has not rendered results, to the next stage, and that is talks about the 
future status of Kosovo and Metohija. No one is making any statements 
concerning the solution content ; procedural side is still being given 
priority, and it counts on participation of the temporary institutions 
representatives, Belgrade and the international community representatives 
as mediators. General orientation reveals intentions to reduce the presence 
of international mission and strengthen the role of the EU. 
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- Serbia: insists on keeping and more energetic implementation of the 
Resolution 1244, particularly the fulfillment of obligations on the part 
of international community. The solution of the greatest problem in the 
province, namely survival, safety and return of the Serbian community, 
Serbia sees in providing higher standards of decentralization and 
achievement of self-government for the Kosovo Serbs. It sees the future 
status of Kosovo as atypically wide autonomy, following some European 
examples (South Tyrol, the Oland Islands, the Bask Country and 
Catalonia). 
The prospects of Kosovo and Metohija : (re)integrations and reforms 
In its instable region, Kosovo and Metohija is the greatest problem. What 
makes it even worse, it is not a problem that can be localized and solved 
in the given territory, but it is a problem that spills over into the region. 
In principle, that is the main reason that any kind of independence of this 
territory does not offer the key to a peaceful, lasting and irrevocable peace. In 
an economic sense, such a solution would not sustainable, since Kosovo does 
not have institutional, financial and human resources to back up its economic 
independence. Politically, today’s Kosovo is not capable of preserving its chief 
historic characteristic – multiethnic and multicultural structure – as the new 
reality of Kosovo is heavily marked by practices of both spontaneous and 
planned ethnic cleansing of the smallest ethnic community by the largest one. 
In a regional sense, the independent Kosovo and Metohija would set a seriously 
bad precedent of creating an ethically homogenous state in a historically 
multiethnic region, proving it is possible , internationally acceptable , even 
sanctioned by the normatively exemplary European and world milieus. Besides, 
it is hard to believe that the independence of Kosovo and Metohija would not 
lead towards the creation of Great Albania, in spite of all the international 
guarantees that it would not. 
In short, an independent Kosovo of any form at any foreseeable time, 
would inevitably result in lasting hampering of modernization, economic 
integration and general political liberalization not only of Kosovo and Metohija 
itself , but of the West Balkan countries as well (Croatia excluded, probably). If, 
in principle, the solution to this problem is seen in the European integrations, 
then independence does not offer a good model. Quite contrary, it would lead 
towards a new vicious circle of border disputes, mutual accusations, potential 
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and overt hostilities, new ethnic migrations and dormant revengefulness. If 
such tendencies are present in the region for a longer period of time, and that is 
quite likely if such unilateral model be applied, it would essentially jeopardize 
European integrations of the whole region. 
In such a present and likely future of the ‘Kosovo and Metohija’ problem, 
determined by the Albania constant of ‘independence’ , a decisive role to alter 
the situation could be played by the remaining two players : Serbia (Serbia and 
Montenegro in the international sense) and the international community. Their 
strategy to change the existing tendency must be comprehensive, synchronized 
and at lest minimally persuasive for all the local population of Kosovo and 
Metohija. The elements of the strategy are as follows: 
-  The international community should preserve but also structurally 
differentiate its preventive- security plan from the developmental - peace 
one of its presence in Kosovo and Metohija. The former plan should 
remain within the frame of UN, whereas the latter should be given over 
entirely to the EU. In that way, Kosovo and Metohija would remain under 
the protectorate of UN, but would be in economic and social custody of 
the EU. The status of the territory in terms of international law would 
not be changed against the fundamental provisions of the UN Resolution 
1244. 
-  The Serbian community position in Kosovo and Metohija would have to 
be changed in principle and for a lasting period of time. That could be 
done by institutional establishing of Serbian community self-government 
within Kosovo and Metohija, with guarantees that it retains some 
functional and financial ties with Serbia. In a certain legal and functional 
sense, the Serbian self-government would be linked, and to a certain 
degree even subordinated to the reformed legal and institutional system 
of Kosovo and Metohija. That system, on the other hand would not have 
any legally binding institutional ties with Serbia and the state union apart 
from the institutions of Serbian self-government. 
-  In time, functional integration between Serbia and Kosovo and Metohija 
(free flow of people, goods, capital, traffic, energy, telecommunications etc.) 
would be established, aided and controlled by the European Union. Such 
policy of functional integration could be incorporated into the Agreement 
on Stabilization and Accession in a later stage of implementation. 
-  A strategic arrangement of this kind would create realistic chances for the 
inner reforms and modernization of Kosovo and Metohija, and would 
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leave open the possibility to reassess that special status when Serbia and 
Montenegro enter negotiations to join the EU. That leaves about 5 to 7 
years that should be used fully for economic, legal and political reforms 
in Kosovo and Metohija and its reintegration into the wider space of free 
market. 
The essence and meaning of such proposed strategy to resolve the problem 
of Kosovo and Metohija are in creating basic prerogatives for the economic 
recovery and legal and institutional rebuilding of this area independently of 
difficult, belligerent, therefore politically unfit questions of ruling the territory. 
From a methodological angle, the issues over which the opposing sides cannot 
reach a compromise should be put aside for a while, until conditions are created 
for compromising. Instead of unilateral forcing of the so-called ultimate 
solution, where the international community conveniently intervenes in favor 
of one side only, it is necessary to follow the method of gradual minimalism. 
It means that the limited period of time should be used to achieve results that 
would undoubtedly be valuable for both sides. 
For the time being, Serbia seems the only player in this uncertain and 
ominous game that is ready to take this approach. A minimal condition to 
apply the approach would be the attitude of international community, the 
destined mediator in this deep and troublesome argument. After six years of 
rather unsuccessful mediation and participation, the international community 
should finally accept the approach that is rational in a general strategic and 
developmental sense and not only in its particular-political sense. In other 
words, not one of the local players in this game should feel privileged because 
of the international community mediation. 
Boris Begović
Four Years of Transition in Serbia: The Resume 
and a Look Ahead
THE CONTEXT OF THE TRANSITION IN SERBIA
In order to understand the process of transition in Serbia one must 
identify the initial advantages that the country had in that process as well as 
the most significant difficulties which place limits upon it.
The most important advantage Serbia has is probably the very fact that 
it embarked on transition late, due to political constellation and international 
situation in the 1990s. Transition in Serbia began in 2000 together with the 
political change that occurred in October that year. In other words, transition in 
Serbia was ten years late. During those ten years the transition states, excluding 
Serbia, had gained experience on various aspects of transition – for example, 
experience relating to macroeconomic policies, price liberalization policies 
and foreign trade, privatization and restructuring of the real sector, reform 
of social services etc. Thus a body of knowledge was generated concerning 
the outcomes of particular transitional policies and models. Much experience 
has been gained on the mechanisms leading to certain out-comes as well as 
those leading to the formulation and implementation of transitional policies 
– much has been learned about the conditions which have to be fulfilled in 
order for certain policies to be carried out successfully. In that respect the fact 
that Serbia was lagging behind presented an opportunity to learn lessons from 
other states’ mistakes and to avoid certain pitfalls. Among Central and East 
European states only Slovakia has also had such an advantage.
Then, some consider it an advantage for Serbia that, during those ten 
years without transition and due to factors that have nothing to do with it 
(wars, sanctions, loss of former markets) there had been a recession – a 
considerable reduction in the amount of production of the real sector. As 
opposed to other states which endured a transitional recession, producing 
a number of transitional losers for which voters held their governments 
accountable (leading to the fall of many a transitional government), Serbia 
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suffered a recession mostly caused by factors which were not directly under the 
control of the government of the time (leaving aside to what extent the then 
government indirectly brought this about) and thus there have not been the 
political consequences of such a recession. In Serbia transitional governments 
already inherited low levels of production which simplified their task in 
comparison with other countries enduring transitional recession regardless of 
whether such recession still lies ahead of them. However, this did not prove to 
be much of an advantage since considerable political pressure was generated 
aimed towards the “revival” of the production of the inherited real sector and 
the resurrection of the economic system which had existed before.
Some considered it an advantage that socialism in our country, after the 
conflict between domestic communists and the Soviet Union and the Soviet 
Communist Party, took the form of self-management, that is, of something 
that was mistakenly called market socialism. Naturally, market socialism is 
a contraditio in adjecto and in such a system the only form of market that 
operated was the product market, also controlled by the Party. However, on 
such a market there were certain institutions which did not exist in other East 
European states, that is, in the states of the so-called real socialism. In addition, 
the country was quite open in that period and the general public freely traveled 
(without visas) to almost all countries of the world; in that respect a market 
economy was not unfamiliar to them. Those who hold this view maintain that 
such experience should ease the acceptance of the institutions of a full market 
economy. However, this did not prove to be of much benefit, especially since 
the openness of the country and the freedom of travel has long been lost. The 
most important legacy of self management is the mind-set of workers who are 
also the owners of the means of production (as often as not financed through 
loans at negative real interest rates whose principal was never paid back) – self 
managers who had the authority to take decisions concerning pay increases 
while the losses suffered by their companies ate away the capital (“workers’ 
ownership – state’s responsibility”, Lajos Bokros). Such a mentality always 
focuses on real or alleged rights failing to link them with responsibilities, that 
is, without any wish to understand and accept causal relationship between 
certain actions and their results. Moreover, socialistic self management was not 
imposed on Serbia from the outside as in most other East European states – it 
was a warmly and widely accepted domestic product. Thus it is obvious that 
the self-managing tradition is far more to the disadvantage than to the benefit 
of Serbia in relation to transition.
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The self management mind set is still alive and well in Serbia. It is in part 
the result of the wide-spread and tenacious left-wing ideology which results 
in a tendency towards economics populism. Since most political parties in 
Serbia have not taken solid ideological form as yet, that is, they still have not 
developed a consistent ideology of their own, many of them have taken over 
leftist rhetoric and other elements of left-wing programs especially in respect 
to economic transition and institutional reform. Therefore it is not surprising 
that there is no consensus of relevant political actors on basic issues such as 
the desirability of the transition which should lead us to the market economy, 
economic freedoms, restrained or curbed state intervention and the rule of 
law. The lack of such a consensus is the main stumbling block to transition in 
Serbia.
Another major obstacle to transition in Serbia is the fact that basic matters 
of state remain unresolved (chapter fourteen). We do not know where our 
borders are (still less where they will be in 10 or 20 years), what the territory of 
the state is and what is its population. It is still not certain what the constitutional 
system of the country will be and what structure of the state administration, 
especially in respect to the relationship between central and the other authorities 
will take. All this has powerful negative effects on transition in several ways. 
Firstly, a tremendous amount of political energy is wasted on the debating of 
these issues – energy which could be put to better use in actually solving key 
problems of economic and social transition. Political energy, being a limited 
resource, incurs it own opportunity costs – the energy burned in one place 
cannot be used in another. Secondly, unsolved fundamental matters of state 
increase business risks, that is, investment risks, thereby increasing the price of 
capital and reducing its placement – as investment. Without new investments 
there cannot be economic growth and well-being – without success in this 
area there cannot be very many of those who will benefit from the transition. 
In this manner transition itself is compromised in terms of the expectations 
of the voters.
Another major impediment to transition in Serbia is the historical legacy 
of the wars waged in the 1990s and the pressure generated by the need to face 
up to the past. The pressure is exerted by certain political parties and NGOs. 
However, there has been no general agreement on what this would actually 
mean; however, it is usually taken to mean facing up to war crimes. Why is 
this impediment to transition in Serbia? First, because the mechanisms already 
discussed in connection with unresolved matters of state are at work here as 
well – the opportunity costs of political energy wasted. Second, in this case, 
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the political agenda is even more drastically altered – political debate veers far 
away from economic transition and institutional reform. Moreover, those who 
have much to say about the wars and the past gain political weight (they are 
usually divided into “patriots” and “mondialists”) – while they are usually very 
loud in such debates they seldom offer much in terms of transition to a market 
economy and the rule of law. In contrast, those who advocate facing the past 
often maintain that it is a necessary precondition for successful transition. 
However, the problem is that such a claim is usually not supported with an 
appropriate argument showing the causal relationship between facing the 
past (supposedly successfully completed) and the necessary conditions for 
successful transition. In addition, the critical point at which facing up to the 
past can be considered to have been successful and at which we are free to 
start dealing with the present has not been defined. Moreover, dealing with the 
past does not seem to include issues concerning the performance of domestic 
institutions at home, that is, issues such as the abuse of the justice system for 
political purposes – a legacy which truly holds relevance for the reform of the 
administration of justice in Serbia. 
Facing up to the past also has significant international relevance – far 
greater than that at home – the Hague Tribunal. Powerful pressures mounted 
by the international community (chapter 13) have had a considerable impact 
on domestic political life. These effects are, most obviously the destabilization of 
the political scene (such as the conflict between the DOS and DSS which broke 
out only six months after the crucial victory at the parliamentary elections in 
December 2000) and the strengthening of domestic “patriotic” forces, that is, 
they simply fostered xenophobia. Certainly, it should not be claimed that all 
this was done intentionally; however, the road to Hell is said to be paved with 
good intentions.
THE EFFECTS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES: THE POLITICAL 
FRAMEWORK OF TRANSITION IN SERBIA
The above advantages and especially the disadvantages led to several 
effects in terms of the political framework of transition in Serbia.
After more than four years of transition in Serbia there is still no strong 
political commitment to reform – a commitment which would persistently 
formulate and carry out economic transition and institutional reform in the 
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state. It is obvious that there is no political consensus of relevant stakeholders 
concerning a single key aspect of transition. There is no unambiguous political 
answer to the question of what our goal is, or what our goal should be, still less 
the answer to the question of how we are to get there – to the point that we are 
not even sure if we need to reach it at all. The inevitable consequence is that 
the mainspring of transition in Serbia is not within the country but outside 
it. There is no original, internal driving force for transition since there is no 
consensus among political forces on whether transition is necessary, that is a 
desirable outcome. Therefore transition in Serbia is mostly unfolding under 
the influence of international factors, that is, the international community. 
The main driving force of transition is the European Union followed by (and 
closing in lately) international financial institutions, especially the IMF.
It should be noted that for a moment, at the very beginning of the 
transition, it seemed that the consensus had been reached while the enthusiasm 
for reform was high. However, it turned out that “transition fatigue” appeared 
in Serbia far sooner than expected. The fatigue, together with other factors, led 
to the resurgence of those political parties, political orientations and forces 
which were thought to have been marginalized by the end of the year 2000.
The European Union, or rather desired membership of the European 
Union is the mainspring of transition in Serbia. This is due to the fact that a 
large majority of the electorate fully supports accession to the European Union, 
specifically, Serbia’s membership in this organization. The EU and especially its 
original member states (EU 15) still symbolize high living standards and wealth 
in Serbia. Opinion polls regularly show that the Serbian population is mostly 
preoccupied by their living standards. Most people seem to have found a direct 
link between EU membership and a dramatic increase in living standards.
Domestic politicians discovered this linkage quite early on and the 
accession process has regularly been used as a trump card in public broadcasts 
aimed at increasing popularity. There have been too many populist appearances 
and public bidding on which year we will “certainly join” the EU. Rarely is 
public mention made of the serious  and as often as not painful economic 
and institutional reforms necessary even to approach membership status, even 
to begin negotiations concerning accession, let alone membership itself. Still 
less mention is made of the extent to which we will have to change our lives 
if Serbia is actually to become a market economy under the rule of law. These 
truths are skillfully concealed since they are unpleasant; both to domestic 
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voters strongly influenced by self-management and leftist ideology, and to that 
part of the political elite which still holds similar views.
On the part of the EU, the accession process has been taken quite 
seriously and the demands concerning it have encouraged many economic 
and institutional reforms which have been successfully completed, in a large 
part as the result of the demands made by the consultative working group, 
as a part of the process for attaining a positive result for the feasibility study. 
Now we can expect negotiations on the stabilization and accession process, the 
implementation of which will generate new incentives for transition in Serbia.
Recently, in terms of economic policies and economic reforms, stronger 
incentives than those provided by the EU have been generated by international 
financial institutions, namely, by the IMF. It is obvious that the domestic 
authorities deem it necessary to maintain good relations with the IMF, that is, 
to honor arrangements with this institution since to break them would entail 
severe consequences for Serbia (a small state with a large deficit in the balance 
of payments, a low international credit rating, a considerable foreign debt and 
a substantial repayment due to foreign creditors in the years ahead).
However, this raises the question of what the essential difference is 
between the internal and the external motivation for transition. What is wrong 
with the mainspring of transition being outside the country?
Actually, there are several things. The main problem is whether such a 
driving mechanism is sustainable. Namely, Serbia is only one of the points of 
activity of the international community and international institutions. Their 
policies and priorities are subject to change in line with changes in the world 
which have no connection to Serbia. However, it is Serbia that will bear the 
consequences of such changes. Second, it is questionable whether such external 
mechanisms can be effective since their effectiveness is achieved through the 
laying down of conditions. Specifically, the Government implements certain 
policies, not due to a sincere belief in their value but through coercion. The 
whole thing becomes a cat and a mouse game. It is true that the Serbian mouse 
is at times quite creative, but in the end the cat always wins. However, the crux 
of the matter is that you will implement a policy much better if you believe in 
it, which holds true for transition as a whole.
Finally, such a situation eliminates or severely reduces the room for 
“influencing” foreign influence. If the government itself (consulting 
international institutions) does not formulate relevant reform policies, then 
international institutions will intervene by imposing the so called ‘universal 
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recipes’ which are not necessarily optimal. Moreover, since there is no clear 
commitment to reform, and we do not know what we want, less than optimal 
solutions can be imposed through the more or less erroneous judgment of 
those who cannot be held accountable by domestic voters. At the same time 
those who are held accountable view their relationship with the external driving 
mechanism as a part of their political struggle; a new division appears into 
“patriots and mondialists”, that is, into “tough guys and wimps” according to 
the manner in which pressure is handled – to what extent the side in question 
is willing to give in to the international community.
The additional consequence of this is the lack of a broad, serious and well 
balanced public debate on important issues of transition, that is, on key reform 
projects. Without doubt, when you do not know what you are striving for, there 
is not much point in discussing how to reach that goal. In many cases there has 
been no public debate, even on the adoption of new and essential reform laws 
– they were passed summarily and the debate in Parliament was reduced to 
party squabbles and taunts aimed at winning cheap popularity. Occasionally 
the adoption of core legislation was subject to political trading, leading to a 
compromise, not on the content of the law in question but rather about the 
trade off: I will vote for yours if you vote for mine.
Such is the political framework which has influenced the results of 
transition in Serbia.
THE RESULTS OF TRANSITION IN SERBIA
As has already been said (Chapter one) assessments of the results of 
transition range from, on the one hand those who believe it to be a complete 
failure, that it remains essentially at the very beginning and those, on the other, 
who claim that we are the champions of transition and leaders in the Balkans 
(and wider) although this standpoint has had to be abandoned under the 
pressure of reality.
However, the question remains how to assess the results of the transition 
in Serbia. Should we seek to reach an overall estimate or focus on particular 
sectors of the transition? It seems that focusing on separate sectors can yield 
better, more accurate results, especially since there are considerable differences 
in the outcomes across sectors.
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Still, as for the overall assessment, it is certain that transition in Serbia 
started off at a fast pace and that by the end of its first year considerable results 
had been achieved. However, it turned out that such a pace simply could not 
be maintained. Transitional fatigue overcame Serbia as soon as unpleasant and 
painful elements of the process were embarked upon. It became clear then that 
there was no consensus between the relevant political actors concerning basic 
issues of transition; political energy began to be diverted to other burning topics 
– at that time to the problem of relations between Serbia and Montenegro. In 
short, transition slowed down dramatically and occasionally even came to a 
complete standstill. This and the ten-year delay at the start pushed Serbia to the 
bottom of the list of European transitional states – still far away from a market 
economy, the rule of law and stable democracy.
In respect of macroeconomic policy (Chapter two) four cycles have 
been identified: 1) the reform cycle, at the very beginning of transition, 2) the 
abandonment of the reform macroeconomic policy around the middle of 2003, 
3) the arrival of the new government in power in early 2004 accompanied by 
strong economic populism and 5) the return to the reform macroeconomic 
policy in 2005 under pressure from international financial institutions as well 
as the announcement of the beginning of the negotiations concerning the 
stabilization and accession process. 
Thus, less than half the time in the first four years has been spent on serious 
transitional issues while the rest was characterized by typical macroeconomic 
populism accompanied by announcements of the revision of the liberalization 
already accomplished (the final part of prime minister Zivkovic’s time in 
government), of the change of privatization methods and the revision of all 
privatizations affected, the abandonment of  the steps towards liberalization 
already made, and similar (Kostunica’s government). Such “on-off ” policies 
are in stark contrast to the two key principles for successful management 
of an economy: a) that all change should be implemented gradually so as to 
reduce disruption to a minimum and b) that each subsequent measure must 
be recognizable as a logical sequel to the previous one.
The current policy mix with a restrictive monetary and the predominantly 
expansive fiscal policy has become untenable since the economic environment 
is permanently ‘overheated’ and the populist system of benefits and unearned 
pay-outs threaten to put at risk the only unquestionable achievement of the 
economic policy –price stability. This is why it is necessary to abandon the 
policy in which the rate of exchange of the dinar is used as a nominal anchor 
– which causes the most harm to exporters. Easing the restrictiveness will 
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cause interest rates to drop; it is necessary to cut fiscal expenditures sharply, 
primarily in the area of subventions and unearned pay – the remuneration 
policy should be in line with the ‘golden rule’ that the increase in productivity 
should at least be equal to the amount of real appreciation and real increase 
in earnings, while the foreign trade policy in the process of joining the WTO 
and the process, already underway, of the accession to the EU will have to be 
liberalized at least to the same extent as in other EU states. All these measures 
can yield results if strict budgetary limitation is imposed first and if the state 
gives up the management of the property of public companies and allows them 
to be brought under the rules of contemporary economics. Part of the credit 
for the obvious success of the macroeconomic policy (price stability) goes to 
the very active international financial institutions, especially the IMF and its 
insistence on the control, reduction and finally elimination of the deficit and 
the maintenance of monetary stability.
Occasionally strong attacks by both the professional and the general public 
have been launched against the macroeconomic policy implemented in the 
four years of transition. Such attacks were also in part based on the belief that 
all the economic problems of the state can be solved through macroeconomic 
policy and that Serbia can be transported painlessly and overnight from an 
undeveloped, poor and backward country an into an EU state – developed, 
rich and progressive. However, once again, it has been proved that the effects 
of macroeconomic policy in transition are relatively limited. Adequate and 
consistent macroeconomic policy is just one lever for transition. The other one 
is structural macroeconomic reform, that is, a comprehensive restructuring of 
the economy.
In terms of the dynamics of economic activity (Chapter two), the key 
fact is that the starting position of the state in the year 2000 was extremely 
low and that, after the beginning of transition, economic growth rates were 
not spectacularly high. Cold facts confuted the propaganda about a swift 
recovery. In addition, the economic structure remained largely unchanged. 
Finally demand rose sharply resulting in a negative balance of trade. This was 
accompanied by a swift rise in real income (over 20% a year) which has not 
been reported in any other transitional economy. Unemployment is widespread 
and unemployment rates are high, regardless of the method used to calculate 
them and the source of research. Some of the officially unemployed have been 
absorbed by the informal sector (the grey economy) which also provides jobs 
for those who still formally work for socially owned companies.
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As regards the reform of public finances (Chapter three) and the overall 
reform in this area, the results are unquestionable. However, the problem 
is that there has been much more activity and success in terms of public 
revenue policies than public expenditure. Especially successful was the initial 
simplification of the turnover tax, primarily the introduction of the unified 
rate, considerable increase in its collection (legalization of transactions) and 
later the introduction and fairly successful implementation of value added tax 
(VAT). New forms of consumption taxes resulted in a significant increase in 
public revenues and in the last year some budgetary surplus has even been 
reported. Besides the achievements, however, there have also been some ill-
advised moves such as the extra-profit tax, an unclear tax based on inconsistent 
political ideas and the philosophy of some sort of legal Robin Hood – we shall 
take from the rich (some of them) and give to the poor, that is, to the users of 
budgetary funds, who certainly are not one and the same. If we cannot or are 
not capable of taking revenge on those who supported the previous regime, let 
us at least punish them in this way, and this will enhance our popularity with 
the voters as well. Both the political and the economic damage caused by this 
tax far exceed the benefits, if any.
The greatest success relating to public expenditure reform is the adoption 
and implementation of new solutions regulating the budgetary system and the 
new transparency introduced into its operation, especially the introduction 
of the Treasury which phases in complete centralization of all payments from 
the Budgetary account rendering the transactions open to public scrutiny and 
ultimately contributing to effective control over budgetary spending. However, 
the real reform of public expenditure in Serbia still lies ahead. Such reform 
would mean the cessation of subventions to (unsuccessful) companies, the 
restructuring and privatization of state owned companies and the extensive 
reform of social services, that is, matters concerning the financing of healthcare, 
social protection and the pension system. Indeed, public spending is too high 
(in 2004 it amounted to 42.3% GNP) constituting the gravest problem in the 
public finances policy in Serbia and one of the main obstacles to transition 
in general. The problem amounts to the relationship which exists between 
excessive public spending and the restructuring of the real sector (Chapter 
six) and social services (Chapters eleven and twelve), that is with the non-
market, re-distributive character of the economy in which subventions and 
social benefits amount to as much as 49% of total public expenditure. It is 
obvious that state intervention is still strong - the state pays out too much of its 
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revenues. This fact is the best illustration of how far away from a real market 
economy Serbia actually is.
In addition, the budgetary balance cannot be maintained without cuts 
in public spending. Budgetary revenues cannot practically be increased any 
further – the introduction of VAT was about the last trump card to be played 
to that effect. In addition, the repayments of the principal of the state debts 
will soon be due, which will inevitably lead to an increase in overall public 
expenditure unless spending is drastically reduced, excluding additional dues 
to foreign creditors.
It is exactly such restructuring of public expenditure, that is, public 
spending reform, which has been persistently avoided over the last four years, 
since such measures are necessarily painful and cannot win political popularity 
in the short term. Most political actors in Serbia hold only short term views; 
the crux of the matter for them is to stay in power now, not to come into power 
again.
In addition to the extensive restructuring of public spending, Serbia must 
also launch a reform of local public finances; intervention in this area still lies 
ahead – the first steps have just been taken in this direction. Finally, further 
simplification of the tax system is required as is a reduction in the number of 
fiscal instruments.
Transition in the area of public finances can be deemed a partial success. 
Results have mostly been achieved in the area of public revenues while much 
remains to be done in respect of public expenditure. The reduction in public 
spending is of essential importance for the future success of transition, since it 
requires deep reforms in various domains (primarily the restructuring and the 
privatization of the real sector as well as the reform of social services and their 
system of finance).
The success of the public finances reform can in part be explained by 
strong incentives provided by the IMF. This institution seems to have been the 
main driving force of reform in this area, which is quite understandable since 
deficits here pose grave risks to macroeconomic stability. The results concerning 
public revenues testify to this; in the last year analyzed, the IMF requirements 
focus far more on the amount of public spending; as a condition for further 
support the IMF demands its further reduction and specifically, the structural 
and institutional reform which will lead to this, such as restructuring and 
privatization of public enterprises and the reform of pension funds. It remains 
to be seen whether the incentives, or rather demands, laid down by the IMF 
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will be effective, since considerable political risk is involved – such reforms can 
incur high political costs, primarily those relating to the loss of popularity. 
As for the privatization of the real sector (Chapter four) Serbia has gained 
from being late in the reform and from  the opportunity to learn by other 
states’ mistakes. Indeed, privatization in early transitional states was riddled 
with errors. The privatization model selected in 2001 is basically sound, which 
is not to say that all details of its implementation are faultless, for instance 
the one stipulating several criteria for awarding tenders which, among other 
things, inevitably results in a lack of transparency in decision-making.
The basic (inherent) problem of the model selected is slowness of 
implementation, especially in the first phase when capacities for its 
implementation need to be built. Just when the privatization began to gather 
pace, a political change occurred and the new Government led by the PM 
Kostunica sent a clear message through its initial nomination of personnel 
that it was not striving for faster privatization; it even raised the question of its 
possible revision. In a political environment used to political flak where each 
(real or constructed) spin story whets the appetite of the public for another, 
privatization could not be continued and all was back to the ‘old way’. Only 
precious time was lost – and we in Serbia are certainly skillful at that.
Many are disappointed with the results of the transition so far. However, 
facts (Chapter four) as such do not justify such disappointment; rather, it 
seems that grandiose, utterly unrealistic expectations led to the sense of 
disillusionment. Many in Serbia believe in magical medicines (especially in 
those which do not taste bitter) and privatization (in part deliberately and in 
part unintentionally) was portrayed as such a medicine often enough. However, 
this is far from true since it soon became obvious that in Serbia there were 
only a few solid enterprises which were capable of becoming a driving force of 
economic development through privatization. Those which have gone through 
privatization mostly stand well and become centers of productive employment. 
Experience has proved that it is new private companies, that is, new actors, that 
can tug the economic growth along – and this is exactly what Serbia lacks. 
Barriers of entry are still high and connected to numerous state policies (often 
at the local government level); sometimes the barriers are built up or at least 
supported in cooperation with the authorities by major actors who have already 
taken strategic positions and do not want effective competition.
In public debate the proceeds from privatization are often portrayed as 
the main criterion of the success of privatization – the allegedly low amount of 
the proceeds is then taken to stand for the ‘clearance sale’ of public wealth. Two 
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things should be noted here. First, the capital of a company is privatized which 
means that the new owner in addition to assets also ‘buys’ the liabilities of the 
company. Privatization does not follow the rule: ‘what you see is what you get’. 
Second, the overriding question to be posed is that concerning opportunity 
costs incurred through avoiding privatization, i.e. what is lost by not going 
through with the privatization of socially and state owned enterprises.
What lies ahead of Serbia is the continuation and the completion of the 
transition. This should be done according to the current model although there 
are still unsolved issues concerning the privatization of public (state owned) 
companies. Their privatization is somewhat more complex since they need 
to be restructured first and in some cases, because institutions of economic 
regulation need to be set up first. There is not a single economic reason why 
the existing public state companies or company parts which will stem from 
them through restructuring should not be privatized. State-owned railways are 
probably the exception primarily in terms of the possible demand for them, 
which does not mean that this should be a priori ruled out. In addition, it is 
necessary to begin the privatization of public utility companies and municipal 
land. While it is quite probable that some public utility companies, especially 
those in smaller communities, will remain public property, there is no reason 
for the delay of the privatization of municipal land which is not in public use 
(providing public good). The problem of restitution should also be resolved.
The restructuring of the real sector is one of the most painful questions 
in every transition. To face up to the legacies of socialism as an ineffective 
economic system actually means having to decide the destiny of the real sector 
and what further actions need to be taken in that area. Restructuring aims to 
improve the economic performance of such enterprises, that is, their economic 
effectiveness; from loss-making firms they become profitable businesses, from 
those with low margins of profit they become those with high profits. Politically 
the most painful question is the fate of the workforce which also needs to be 
restructured: some will have to work more and better, some will have to go 
through additional training, some will lose their jobs and yet others will be 
pensioned off. The working classes, especially those who still hold socialistic 
self-management views, do not like restructuring. Since it is painful it is only 
to be expected that those who carry out restructuring will not win much 
popularity.
At the very beginning of transition a principle was adopted in Serbia 
that all restructuring of all companies except public enterprises is to be left to 
the private owner. It is certainly a wise decision since the state is a very poor 
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manager and cannot achieve desirable results in this line of work. Initially, 
the problem arose from the fact that many enterprises which at least formally 
could have been privatized were not put out to tender since it was justifiably 
believed that no one would buy them at any price in the condition that they 
were in at the time – long-term loss makers with enormous liabilities, often with 
negative capital – conglomerates without specialization with huge numbers of 
surplus employees. Until transition these enterprises had mostly lived off ‘soft 
budgetary limitation’, that is, implicit and explicit subventions by the state in 
addition to the gradual loss of their own capital. Therefore it was decided that 
such companies needed to be restructured before privatization. This created 
problems.
The working class, that is, the voters will be aware who is responsible 
for restructuring regardless of whether it is affected directly by the state or 
by the new owners. The political costs of restructuring will be borne by the 
administration in power, the popularity enjoyed by the government will fall. At 
the same time the opposition will spin heavily demagogic stories about deliberate 
destruction of the Serbian economy and those who “padlock factories”. The 
Serbian economy in question was practically destroyed by the decisions by 
which it functioned. Investment decisions taken at Central Committee Party 
meetings by people who were not held accountable for them is not the best 
way to achieve economic effectiveness. Even before the onset of the 1990s with 
wars, bombardment, sanctions and the loss of markets, the Serbian real sector 
was not economically viable. It placed its products on the markets of the former 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union which were well protected from competition; 
even under such circumstances it could not cover its costs and suffered losses. 
It lingered on like a hangover after a drunken party called self management 
socialism and the still unnamed ten year period in the nineties.
Little has been done in respect of the restructuring of the real sector – 
almost nothing has been agreed on in the four years of transition. The political 
risks turned out to be to severe, although it must be said that the task itself was 
daunting in the technical sense.
The account of the following steps is of key importance. First success was 
recorded in 2005: several restructured enterprises were sold. However, the key 
element concerning the real sector is the establishment of strict budgetary 
limitation for all enterprises. This means the withdrawal of direct and indirect 
subventions as well as the consistent execution of the liquidation procedure 
to settle debts with the creditors of insolvent, bankrupt debtors as well as the 
procedures for settling accounts with solvent debtors.
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However, it is reasonable to ask whether there are political incentives 
for the implementation of the measures discussed; can the activities of the 
government in that direction be realistically expected? The answer lies in the 
following facts.
There is strong pressure from the IMF for the restructuring of the real 
sector to tackle the problems of excessive public spending and the balance of 
payment deficit. Excessive public spending is primarily connected with public 
enterprises while the trade balance deficit results from the fact that socially 
and state owned enterprises which have not undergone restructuring and 
privatization are not able to export. The pressure from the IMF cannot be 
expected to ease up, it can only increase. 
Changes in political circumstances can be expected (they may already 
have occurred) where most of those who work in companies which have not 
undergone restructuring see themselves as the losers of the transition. So,   in 
the large majority, they vote for the political parties which are against transition 
and against the establishment of a market economy. In other words under such 
political conditions, restructuring of the real sector will not create any more 
political opponents and so there is nothing to be lost in restructuring. This 
could also lead to stabilization of the government which begins the work on 
the restructuring of the real sector. Indeed, without restructuring there will be 
no progress in transition. 
All the failings of the real sector of the Serbian economy, its inefficiency 
and insolvency, spill over into the domestic banking system, multiplying in 
the process. In practice banking in Serbia before the beginning of transition 
was a mechanism of redistribution, since the deficits of the real and the public 
sector were ‘covered’ by so-called ‘soft’ loans, that is, non-returnable loans. 
In other words, the deficits of the real and the public sector spilled over into 
the banking sector multiplying along the way due to its own inefficiency. In 
addition, the low level of public trust in this sector led to the withdrawal of 
practically all personal deposits.
There are several key steps to banking reform. The first is the entry of 
the new banks whose capital is owned abroad, by reputable foreign banks 
(banking ‘brands’). In the first years this entry mostly involved the opening 
of new banks while somewhat later, partly owing to restrictive licensing, it 
included the take-over of existing domestic banks. The second step was the 
closure (liquidation) of the four major socially/state owned banks where most 
‘contaminated’ assets were deposited as the consequence of the spillover of the 
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deficit into the banking sector. Although this move was expected to result in 
extensive protest by former employees and subsequent political (mis)use of 
the situation, nothing much actually happened. The third step was the partial 
and temporary nationalization of the banking system carried out through the 
conversion of the debt of commercial banks to the Paris and the London Club 
(the debt with sovereign guarantees) into the state capital in banks with such 
liabilities.
These three steps were the basis of the radical reform of the domestic 
banking system that has been affected in the last four years. This led to the fast 
renewal of lending activity and high annual growth rates in the value of loans 
made have been recorded. The level of lending activity rose by so much that 
at one time it was regarded as a hazard in terms of macroeconomic stability, 
that is, of the excessive aggregate demand. The banking system also began to 
win back public trust which resulted in a considerable rise in deposits (both 
absolutely and relative to money supply). However, the banking system in 
Serbia is still quite shallow, measured by, for example, the proportion of loans 
approved to the economy as a share of gross domestic product – almost all our 
neighbors have overtaken us in this respect. Loans are still a minor source of 
finance for the economy.
Probably one of the reasons for this lies in interest rates – they are still 
rather high. On the one hand, this is the consequence of the still highly risky 
placement which, in turn, is the result of doubt concerning the collection of 
debt from the debtors which, in the final analysis is, among other things, caused 
by the ineffectiveness of the justice system and inadequate lien regulations. 
On the other hand, however, high active interest rates are also the result of 
high interest margins, produced by the high costs of financial brokerage i.e. 
high banking costs incurred by their ineffectiveness in the area of financial 
brokerage. 
In that respect two of the main strategic objectives for further transition 
in the banking sector are to build up the capacities of the banking sector and 
the improvement in its efficiency and the effectiveness of financial brokerage 
as a whole. Both objectives gain importance when we take into account the 
undeveloped capital market as an alternative source of supply for this resource. 
New entry into banking and the increased pressure from competition within 
the sector will promote the achievement of these goals.
As for economic legislation, much has been done, especially in the area 
of new regulation. Many laws have been adopted, regardless of the government 
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under which they were prepared and before which Parliament they were placed. 
However, legislative activities have rarely been accompanied by serious and 
comprehensive public debate. A large number of laws were often needlessly 
passed summarily, according to emergency procedure; their adoption was the 
object of political horse trading aimed at securing the majority in Parliament 
rather than the result of a serious political consensus. Furthermore, certain laws 
were delayed for political reasons. The gravest problem here lies in the relations 
between Serbia and Montenegro which have been problematic for some time. 
Under the legislation of the former Yugoslavia, part of economic legislation 
was dealt with at the federal level, and part at the level of the republic. Certain 
important laws (for example, the Law on Enterprises, the Law on Enforced 
Settlement, Bankruptcy and Liquidation) were passed at the federal level while 
the other federal unit, already on the path towards independence, had created 
its own economic legislation. It had long been thought that, for political 
reasons, Serbia should not take the same course. However, in waiting for a  final 
constitutional solution to the federal puzzle the change of course from federal 
to republic legislation began relatively late (in most cases after the adoption of 
the Constitutional Charter) which caused considerable delay.
As for the content of new legislation, problems of conception occasionally 
arose there as well. Since there was no clear and consistent idea for the direction 
transition should take, there was also no unified concept of legislative activity 
and often the laws were in essence mutually inconsistent (the inconsistency 
stemmed from variations in the pace of the changes), and certain laws called 
for inappropriate solutions. The lack of a clear vision and a plan for transition 
occasionally allowed foreign donors to practically impose solutions which, for 
one reason or another were familiar to them. In addition, the preparation for 
the beginning of the process of stabilization and accession to the EU led to 
the request for partial harmonization of domestic laws with those of the EU, 
regardless of whether they are optimal for this state.  
However, problems with the implementation of the new laws are far 
more serious. In part they result from the lack of specialized institutions (the 
Agency for the Registration of Economic Agents, the Telecommunications 
Council, and the Broadcasting Council) necessary for their implementation. 
Such completely new institutions in line with modern legislation require 
special resources, primarily human capital with specific knowledge who 
have largely proved impossible to find in Serbia so far. It takes time and hard 
work to establish such institutions and for them to become effective and 
they cannot be instantly produced even with strong political will. However, 
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along with this objective difficulty, in many cases (the Law on Broadcasting 
and the Law on Telecommunications for example) there was no political will 
to even embark on the establishment of these institutions. The task was (in 
part) the responsibility of the parliament which selected the members of the 
bodies; however, even though the law set a time frame for the establishment 
of the institutions the majority in parliament never even tried to meet it. This 
proved that the legislative body holds no respect for the laws it passed which 
is a poor message for all who are expected to abide by the law. Moreover, the 
administration of justice holds much responsibility for the implementation 
of these laws and the situation in this sector (Chapter eight) makes it too 
optimistic to expect that judges and public prosecutors will soon be ready for 
change and the implementation of new regulations, especially in terms of the 
new philosophy by which the state partly delegates both the regulatory and 
the supervisory function to independent bodies. Finally, certain legal solutions 
were inappropriate, over complex and even mutually contradictory, putting 
their unified implementation out of the question, notwithstanding the above 
problems.
The reform of the justice system has certainly been the greatest failure of 
transition in Serbia so far. Unquestionably, the legacy was extremely unfavorable: 
in the 1990s the system was constantly misused for political purposes while 
simultaneously pushed to the margins economically speaking. It is not strange 
that about one third of judges resigned their positions. Because there was no 
doubt concerning the gravity of the existing situation, it is odd how carelessly 
the authorities in Serbia have tackled the reform of the justice system in the last 
four years. This is especially true considering that the main principles of the 
reform (‘cleaning out’ the personnel, strengthening independence, changing 
the procedures for appointment and dismissal, more effective organization of 
courts) had been formulated before the political change in October 2000 as 
part of the preparation of the then opposition for coming into power.
The legislative reform of the administration of justice from 2001 shows 
the depth of the problem. The laws in this area were not proposed by the 
Government of the time nor by the relevant ministry but by a Parliamentary 
Group (DSS). The Ministry of Justice, which had itself set up the working group 
for the preparation of a set of laws concerning the administration of justice, 
opposed the proposals, but they were adopted nevertheless. It was claimed 
at the time (and has never been convincingly rebutted) that this manner of 
legislative operation was the result of a political trade: we will vote for your 
law on labor if you support our laws concerning the system of justice. So the 
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laws were passed without any properly thought out, even less publicly debated 
concept for the reform of the administration of justice. The two propositions 
discussed differed considerably in relation to the key aspect – continuity. The 
laws adopted, which aim to reform the justice system, retain full continuity 
of institutions and the inherited personnel. However, even laws adopted in 
this manner have brought about some improvement, at least formally (a cynic 
would say that it was not very difficult in the light of the inherited situation), 
especially in terms of the nomination and dismissal of judges and public 
prosecutors, the material status of the sector, reorganization of courts and 
institutional guarantees of objectivity and efficiency.
Unfortunately, however, even these regulations have not been enforced 
consistently. As for the nomination and dismissal of judges and prosecutors a 
conflict of interest was soon revealed, escalating into open conflict between 
the judicial authority on one side and executive and legislative authority on the 
other. There has certainly been some improvement concerning the material 
status of the judiciary, although many consider it to be far from ideal. As for 
the reorganization of courts, the stipulations of the new laws have still not 
been implemented and the legal deadlines for their execution have been 
exceeded (for example in the case of appellate and administrative courts). As 
for objectivity and the effectiveness of justice, it is obvious that the institutional 
guarantees provided by the current laws on the judiciary are ineffective. Both 
domestic and foreign empiric research has revealed the existence of wide-
spread corruption (direct as well as institutionalized through pressure exerted 
by executive powers) as well as poor effectiveness (on average the enforced 
execution of a contract takes 1, 030 days). The concept which has endured the 
most flexible interpretation in the last four years is the independence of the 
judiciary. On the one hand there are some in executive power who interpret 
independence to mean the full freedom of the justice system to carry out their 
directives, while in the judiciary there are those who read it to mean that they 
are not accountable to anyone regardless of how poorly, incompetently and 
ineffectively they work.
Things are somewhat better as regards the reform of procedural law 
including the new criminal and civil executive procedure. Although it is still 
too early to assess the effects of the reform of the law on procedure (which, in 
part, provides for improvement in the effectiveness of the administration of 
justice), in practice certain procedures stipulated by the new criminal law have 
proved questionable.
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After four years of transition the reform of justice is still at the very 
beginning – apparently these have been lost years. The main reason for this 
is the lack of any consistent and purposeful strategy for reform, comprising 
measures adopted and resources earmarked for their implementation. 
Moreover, if not all relevant actors, then at least the majority need to agree 
on this strategy. It was only in the fifth year of transition that work on it has 
begun. Indeed, without such a strategy, based on the will to face the past and 
the present reality of Serbian justice, with a consistent plan for overcoming 
such a present and by drawing together all relevant agents of the reform, there 
is little hope for sustainable improvement in this area.
For the assessment of the reform of the financial market in Serbia of the 
utmost importance is the fact that, practically until early 2002, there was no 
activity on the capital market – it only began to operate during 2002. The main 
instrument of such activity are shares issued in privatization according to the 
regulations in force before the new privatization model from 2001. However, in 
the next few years the amount of activity was drastically reduced – the market 
was depleted. To be precise, the capital market in Serbia served for purposes 
completely opposite to those in market economies. Instead of establishing 
companies on the stock market, that is, for their financing, it serves either to 
close them down or take them over. This phenomenon directly relates to the 
failure to protect small, or minority shareholders, those who do not have the 
ambition to run a company but only to receive dividends on the basis of the 
placement of their capital. Then, trading in the best quality securities was largely 
transferred into out of stock exchange methods of trading. The phenomenon 
of trading out of the stock exchange is connected with regulations which were 
effectively introduced in the autumn of 2003.
For the consideration of the linkage between the capital market and 
the corporate control market the main parameters are the poor protection 
of minority shareholders and regulations which are discriminatory to the 
advantage of the individual taking over the company. It has been noticed that 
a certain exchange of functions has occurred on the corporate control market 
as well. While in developed market economies such a market primarily leads 
to takeovers which eliminate ineffective companies and managers, in Serbia 
the function of rent formation predominates (due to the establishment of 
uncompetitive market structures), and therefore, also to high capital returns. 
Then, it turned out that when joint stock companies are taken over in Serbia there 
is a massive breach of the ownership rights of the current owners.  Immediately 
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after taking control, the new owner often executes the expropriation of the rest 
of shareholders through (abuse of) recapitalization.
In terms of the strategy for the development of the capital market the 
overriding question is its survival, taking into account the dramatic fall in 
market activity. The survival can only be secured through a change in its 
character. Instead of its current function as a mechanism for the re-allocation 
of ownership rights, the market should become a mechanism for financing the 
real sector, that is, the enterprise sector. This is why the existing regulations 
need to be radically changed, primarily the Law on Securities which is not 
in keeping with the basic standards regulating financial markets. It is also 
necessary to adopt new regulations concerning the take over process, although 
the new Law on Economic Associations offers some solutions to this problem. 
In addition to the introduction of new legislation it is also necessary to secure 
its implementation which can be achieved either through strengthening of the 
existing specialized institution (the Commission for Securities) or through 
the establishment of a new institution for monitoring all financial activities 
(banking, insurance, financial markets etc). Regardless of the solution selected 
– whether it is a specialized or an universal institution – it is of the utmost 
importance that its independence is protected both from the influence of the 
executive powers and from participants in the market.
The reform of labor relations and the labor market is one of the areas 
where the most important changes concerning the introduction of a market 
economy are expected. Change is of utmost importance for a state where a type 
of product market existed in the era of socialist self-management but where 
the labor market has never existed in recent history and where unemployment 
is rampant. The more flexible the labor market, the more freedom employers 
(entrepreneurs) have to dismiss employees and the more freely they will also 
employ them and in larger numbers. The improved flexibility of the labor 
market, primarily through the reduction of the protection of employees and the 
responsibilities of employers allows an increase in employment and therefore 
causes a fall in unemployment. At the present level of economic activity a 
high level of protection for employees and a high level of employment are 
mutually exclusive. In other words, a high level of protection for employees 
incurs opportunity costs – high unemployment. The self-management mind 
set refuses to accept this basic relation. Such disregard for reality gives rise to 
much misunderstanding as well as to demagogic spin by political parties and 
trade unions.
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From 2001 to 2003 some far reaching changes were effected in the labor 
relation and employment laws. New provisions of the Law on Labor provided 
a fairly strong basis for the transition of the Serbian economy and effective 
operation of private enterprises by introducing a considerable amount of 
flexibility into the labor market. The provisions of the labor laws from 2003 
provided for the modernization of the state employment policy. In 2005, after 
much dispute and strong pressures applied by trade unions and leftist circles, 
the Law on Labor was amended so that the flexibility of the labor market 
was reduced. The interventions and the demands of international financial 
institutions, especially by the World Bank seem to have prevented a higher 
level of workers’ protection being incorporated into that Law, which otherwise 
would have further reduced the flexibility of the labor market. Nevertheless, 
this modification of the law did, to a large extent, annul the progress made in 
relation to the deregulation of the labor market from 2001.
As for movement on the labor market, the level of employment is in 
mild decline while unemployment is on the rise. Such dynamics should be 
considered in the light of the fact that the restructuring of the real sector has, in 
fact, hardly begun and that this process, together with the coming into force of 
the bankruptcy regulations, will further increase unemployment. In addition, 
the investment climate in Serbia is such that no new large investment which 
would open up new productive jobs can be expected.
The main direction of further reform of labor relations should be the 
deregulation of the labor market and its improved flexibility which would 
provide help a relatively modest level of economic activity to generate higher 
employment and better use of human capital.
The reform of the pension-disability system began against a background 
in which the number of pensioners is disproportionately high in relation to the 
number of the employed. Difficulties relating to the system which is based on 
the current financing of pensions stemmed from the fall in the number of those 
in employment, the evasion of payment of contributions and the spread of the 
grey economy on the one hand and from the effects of an aging population 
and very liberal entitlement to pensions (pensioners as an electoral body 
gravitated towards the former regime) on the other. This is why the system was 
in considerable debt at the beginning of transition.
First steps in the reform, immediately after October 2000 were aimed 
at the stabilization of the system and the regular payment of pensions. The 
payment of pensions has remained one of the priorities of the Government 
in all four years of transition. As for the reform of the system itself, steps were 
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soon taken to establish short-term sustainability of financing. For long term 
reform, the idea of the so-called second pillar (obligatory additional insurance 
of the younger population) was discarded relatively early; instead the option 
was considered that a third pillar be introduced (voluntary additional pension-
disability security).
As for the existing system (the first pillar), by the end of 2001 the pension 
age limit was raised by three years, from 55 to 58 years for women and from 
60 to 63 years for men. Simultaneously the minimum age was raised from 
50 to 53 years of age. In this manner Serbia caught up with other transition 
states which had began the changes earlier, but decided to phase in the raising 
of the limits. The other significant change concerned transition from keeping 
pensions in line with pay to indexing based on the rise in salaries and the 
costs of living. In this way pensions were prevented from rising too fast, which 
would be untenable due to the deficits in the pension fund.
One of the most important changes introduced by the new Law on 
Pension-Disability Security from April 2003 concerns the introduction of a 
new formula for the calculation of pensions, based on the point system and 
extending the accounting period to the whole working life. The accounting 
system provides for closer connection between the amount of pension and 
the contributions paid in, since it takes into account all the years in which 
they were paid, doing away with the spill over to those who achieved a rapid 
rise in career or pay in only one part of their working history. The new law 
also extends the coverage of pension security – for example, it introduces 
obligatory payment of contributions for engagement through authorship fees 
and temporary service contracts.
From an optimistic perspective, in the short term, the problem of financing 
pensions will be alleviated through the rise in employment and the reduction 
of the grey economy. However, in the long term, problems stemming from the 
aging of the population will remain. This is why we can expect further increases 
in the pension eligibility age limit, especially for women, and changes in the 
indexation of pensions and further revision of entitlements. In the long term, 
the pressure can be alleviated through the introduction of additional insurance 
pillars, primarily of the third pillar. The reassessment of the possibility for the 
introduction of the second pillar should rest on careful consideration of the 
experiences of other transitional states, but only after Serbia becomes ready to 
bear the transitional costs of its introduction.
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Poverty in Serbia exhibited dramatic growth in the 1990s; the middle 
class disappeared and the number of the poor doubled while the number of 
those who are immediately above the poverty line is on the rise. According to 
national criteria, measured by income per consumer unit, in the year 2000 over 
a third of the population, that is, nearly 2.8 million, were below the poverty line. 
Before transition such a situation was dealt with through social policy which 
mainly consisted of extending direct subventions to loss-making companies on 
the one hand and through imposing low prices of staple products and services 
(bread, milk, oil, sugar, electric power, rents) on the other. Simultaneously, in 
the 1990s the minimal social security net was practically destroyed.
Immediately after the beginning of the transition of social security, 
the first activities were of an interventionist nature, in essence aimed at the 
stabilization of the system. Among other things the repayment of long accrued 
debt began, regularity of payment of benefits was established and the situation 
in hostels was improved. The other part of activities was to initiate reforms in 
the system. The guiding principle was the rationalization of resources and the 
sustainability of social protection, which means that entitlements need to be in 
line with the financial status of society and that assistance should be accessible 
to all, under equitable conditions, especially to vulnerable groups.
In accordance with these basic postulates changes in the benefits system 
took the direction of establishing the absolute line of poverty the same for 
the whole territory of Serbia, the real value of which will be retained through 
indexing to the cost of living, with stable access to entitlements and better 
targeting of users. The changes in the area of services in social protection were 
directed towards decentralization, deinstitutionalization and the development 
of alternative forms of social protection, the inclusion of the nongovernmental 
sector into service provision and gathering together all actors which can 
provide active and passive protective measures, both at the central and at the 
local level. In this way the foundations for social security and social protection 
were laid down.
In the 1990s in Serbia a policy was at work which aimed at retaining 
all capacities and all employees in the healthcare system, as well as all legal 
entitlements concerning healthcare in the hope that the economy would 
recover and that it would be possible to keep all resources and avoid any 
serious perturbation. Meanwhile the socio-economic situation in the country 
worsened dramatically and the healthcare system had to adapt haphazardly 
to the changes, with constant diminishing of basic capital (facilities and 
equipment), the lack of medical supplies, a drastic fall in the quality of medical 
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services and their reduced use, informal modes of payment and corruption, the 
transfer of patients and part of the equipment from the state into the private 
medical sector and the subsequent deterioration of the health status of the 
population.
The reform of the healthcare system came rather late only really getting 
under way in 2002. Since then some things have been accomplished: The 
healthcare system operates in decent surroundings with sufficient essential 
equipment and supplies. However, the medical staff themselves, their 
professional commitment and satisfaction at work have not changed much. 
Medical institutions have been furnished with modern equipment and 
the provision of medicines and other supplies is better. All this is accompanied 
with measures for rational consumption, especially that of medicines through 
the establishment of the “positive medicines list” and the introduction of an 
information system to monitor their consumption.
However, hardly anything has been done concerning the in-depth reform 
of the healthcare financing system, that is, the reform of the health protection 
system. This key task still lies ahead.
The status of the private medical care system has also not been adequately 
regulated; it has developed in a random manner lacking appropriate legislation 
and inspection; today it is a powerful interest group demanding equal status 
in the medical protection system which is at this moment impossible due to 
the limited financial resources of the Insurance Fund, surplus capacities and 
staff in the public sector, the unchanged form of financing and inadequate state 
inspection.
Important aspects of the medical care reform such as the reform of 
financing (insurance), continuous improvement of the quality of services 
provided, accreditation of medical institutions and programs, issuing of 
licenses for healthcare providers and the assessment of medical technologies 
depend on the adoption of new systemic laws on which consensus as yet had 
not been reached. The work on the solution of this problem still lies ahead.
The consideration given to international relations which Serbia 
(independently and as a part of the FRY and of the State Community of Serbia 
and Montenegro) has kept up and promoted in four years of transition should 
be seen in the light of the already discussed conclusion that the main driving 
force of transition in Serbia lies outside the state. Moreover, since there is no 
national consensus on the need to integrate into the world as there are political 
forces which are against it out of interest or because of ideology, it is of the 
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utmost importance that it be clearly demonstrated that Serbia should gain 
benefit from it. In this manner the strong driving mechanism of the transition 
through international relations could be preserved while the laborious process 
of the creation of a similar internal mechanism can be initiated.
In terms of the directions for the future of the integration of Serbia into the 
international community and its impact on the transition process underway, 
we should start with the fact that at the moment (and in the foreseeable future) 
the accession to the EU is the mainspring of our reform. The harmonization of 
legislation and the appropriate rearrangement of the institutional framework 
are the main elements of the reform. This concept leads to the solution to 
several problems since the reform can then be established both as a political 
necessity and as a value in itself if only in the instrumental sense for the 
achievement of the main objective called European integration. Certainly, it 
is not that the institutional framework of the EU is ideal and that the policies 
carried out are optimal. Unquestionably, in the EU there is too much state 
interventionism, too much regulation and discretionary decision-making by 
supranational authorities which are practically accountable to no one. The 
separation of power from accountability never bodes well. The room for a free 
market, unbound individuals and enterprising initiative shrinks. However, the 
approach to and the final integration with the EU provides for the establishment 
of a clear and consistent legislative framework on the basis of (in many cases) 
several decades of practical experience, eliminating the need to invent the 
wheel. Moreover, where there is still a powerful majority in favor of European 
integration, many changes can be smuggled in under the cover of the slogan: 
“This is something we must do if we want to get into Europe”. However, there 
is still room for domestic creativity, primarily in the execution of the reform, 
its dynamics and priorities.
On the home scene the priority is certainly the creation of a competent 
state administration - the core of which will be able to communicate on a more 
or less equal footing with the representatives of international political, financial 
and economic institutions and with the representatives of the leading partner 
states. Without such administration Serbia simply will not be able to impose its 
own interests in the area of international relations.
Three main state issues which in the last four years have used up 
considerable political energy, although their relative importance and the 
intensity of the energy expended vary all the time, are: the constitutional 
system of Serbia, relations between Serbia and Montenegro and the problem of 
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Kosovo. Almost five years after the political change which made the beginning 
of the transition possible, Serbia still does not have a new Constitution nor has 
it amended a single provision of the one passed by the former regime which 
was identified with this piece of legislation and which was voted out of office 
in October 2000. 
One of the central dilemmas confronted in relation to the constitutional 
change concerns the procedure. Namely, the current Constitution calls for 
a complex procedure for changes. According to it, the adoption of the new 
Constitution would practically demand the consensus of all parliamentary 
political actors in the state. The alternative lies in discontinuity in order to 
circumvent the current exacting procedure. After four years of transition two 
politically relevant drafts, that is, two constitutional projects have appeared: 
one offered by the Government, the other by the President of the Republic. The 
essential difference between them does not lie in the contents of the document 
in terms of basic constitutional solutions but actually in the procedure for 
their adoption. As in many other transitional issues Serbia is still far away 
from agreement in this respect. Meanwhile the existing Constitution is still in 
force providing opportunities for the creative misuse (more or less successful) 
of its provisions for the introduction of the market economy such as private 
ownership over city land.
Relations between Serbia and Montenegro have become a veritable soap 
opera after October 2000 (before they were at the risk of becoming a vaudeville 
with singing and shooting). Four years after the beginning of transition there is 
still no functional common state. The present solution was practically imposed 
through mediation by the EU representatives. It sought to prevent worse from 
happening, especially in terms of security. In other words, the incentive for 
mediation was the maintenance of at least the same security status in the 
Region. As for the future of the state community, it should be viewed through 
the disproportion between its international-legal capability (communication 
address for example for the process of association with the EU) and the 
internal-legal failings, for example the inability to implement the terms of the 
future contract on stabilization and accession which is to be signed with the EU. 
The announcements concerning a referendum in Montenegro and the manner 
of political communication in this republic about this and other issues reveal 
such a deep rift the basic question (independence or not) that, in comparison, 
conceptually divided Serbia begins to look like a state with an insane level of 
political consensus.
464 Boris Begović
Finally, solving the problem posed by Kosovo is a state predicament 
which is increasingly gaining in importance and more and more domestic and 
international activities are taken in that direction. Irreconcilable interests seem 
to be at the core of the problem. One side demands that Kosovo should remain 
in Serbia with some internal-legal arrangement which can be discussed. The 
other says that it should be granted independence, as soon as possible. The 
international community increasingly calls for the so-called final solution. 
International priorities have changed and it can be felt that resources are being 
withdrawn from the region to be applied where needed more, primarily in the 
‘war against terrorism’. It remains to be seen whether any final solution which 
is sustainable, that is, which is at least in part acceptable to both parties can be 
reached in the foreseeable future.
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION 
After a vigorous beginning transition in Serbia has slowed down and in 
places come to a halt. In some of its segments much has been accomplished 
while in others hardly anything has been done. Rather a dismal picture. The 
reasons for this were discussed above and can be found in the circumstances 
creating the political framework of the transition, the framework which gave 
rise to such results. The circumstances produced the framework and the 
framework produced lackluster results. These results have disappointed many 
supporters of transition.
Sadly, Serbia is still far away from a real market economy and the rule of 
law. Today only a small number of new companies enter Serbia; there is a modest 
rise in new, productive employment, large budgetary transfers, considerable 
subventions, all encompassing state intervention and high business risk. Serbia 
is still a society where seeking rent is a very profitable activity.
Accordingly, the overriding question concerns the continuation of 
transition: what are the conditions for its successful continuance, what will 
make it gather pace and in the end establish a market economy and the rule 
of law?
First of all, the driving mechanism of transition needs to be returned into 
the country itself. This can be achieved through the consensus of all relevant 
political agencies in the state. The consensus need not concern the details 
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of the process; rather there should be agreement on basic issues: where are 
we heading and when do we want to get there? This can also be defined in 
a negative manner: what is it that we want to avoid at any cost? Until such a 
consensus has been reached, Serbia will need an outside driving mechanism.
The obvious question is whether such consensus can be reached in Serbia 
at this moment, a little over four years after the beginning of transition. Many 
will say that, on the Serbian political stage, there are powerful political forces 
which are simply against transition, whose belief system does not value a free 
market economy, the rule of law and stable democracy. This is certainly true, 
but the question is how to break the vicious circle. The only tenable possibility 
for this is to weaken anti-transitional forces. This can occur either through their 
internal reform (which can be triggered by division inside their organizations) 
or through the weakening of their political influence as the result of insufficient 
political support.
For both success in transition is needed, the kind of success which creates 
transitional winners. In the short term, transitional measures do have their 
costs; they create losers, diminish political popularity and can lead to the loss 
of office. In the long term, if consistently carried out such measures create 
winners and considerable political support for transition within the electoral 
body. If the horizon of the people in power in Serbia, the horizon of those who 
firmly believe in reforms broadens, that is, if they begin to think how to get 
back into office before they are voted out of it, Serbia will have the chance to 
continue and in the foreseeable future to complete the transition to a market 
economy and the rule of law. Otherwise...
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